【08.12.2 英国卫报】新冷战计划
【08.12.2 英国卫报】【原文出处】http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2008/dec/01/us-china-nuclear-programme
【发表媒体】英国卫报 http://www.guardian.co.uk/
【翻译方式】紫霞 中文原创翻译
【原文标题】Project for a new cold war
【中文翻译】新冷战计划
Project for a new cold war
新冷战计划
A new report that overstates China's nuclear capabilities and intentions shows that US neocons haven't gone away
这是一个新冷战的计划，夸大中国的核能力和意图，表明美国新保守主义者并没有消失
作者：罗伯特法利（Robert Farley）
In early October, the International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) released a report touting the dangers of Chinese military expansion. Chaired by Paul Wolfowitz, the ISAB is part of the US state department, and reports directly to Condoleezza Rice. The report warned of the dangers of Chinese nuclear weapons, and called on the United States to revitalise its nuclear deterrent, continue construction of a missile defence shield, and pursue conventional military programmes designed to ensure dominance over China. In alarmist tones, the report describes a military effort dedicated to making the US vulnerable enough to Chinese nuclear attack to deter the US from intervention in a Taiwan-China war. To call this claim deceptive is an understatement – it depends on ignorance of 40 years of Chinese military history and of the basics of deterrence theory.
在10月初，国际安全顾问委员会（ ISAB ）发表的一份报告，宣称中国发展军事的危险性。ISAB（国际安全顾问委员会）是美国国会的一部分，这次报告有保罗沃尔福威茨主持，并直接向国务卿赖斯报告。这份报告警告中国核武器的危险，并呼吁美国重振其核威慑力量，继续建设导弹防御系统，并推行常规军事方案，确保能够威慑中国。在危言耸听的语句中，该报告描述了美国在中国的核打击面前足够脆弱，以便阻止美国干预台海战争。这样的说法，就是一种欺骗，这是对中国军事四十年的历史以及威慑理论基础的一无所知。
Since the 1950s, Chinese nuclear policy has consistently focused on the goal of developing a second strike capability. Initially, the Chinese feared war with the US, but they later included the Soviet Union as a potential foe. The Chinese have never made an effort to match the nuclear arsenals of the US or Russia. In short, Chinese nuclear policy hasn't changed, and the essentials of the deterrent relationship are the same whether China has 20 missiles capable of striking the west coast or 100 missiles capable of striking anywhere on the continental US. As no American president is likely to consider the destruction of major population centres on the west coast an acceptable cost for preventing a Chinese conquest of Taiwan, the deterrent relationship is no different today than it was 30 years ago.
从1950年以来，中国的核政策始终着眼于发展二次核打击能力。起初，中国担心与美国开战，但后来包括苏联也被视为一个潜在的敌人。中国从来没有希望自己的核武器像美国和俄罗斯一样强大。简而言之，中国的核政策没有改变，中国无论有威慑的本质还是相同的。由于没有一位总统可以为了阻止中国大陆占领台湾而付出西海岸主要人口中心被摧毁的代价，所以如今的威慑关系与30年前没有区别。
Indeed, the ISAB report overlooks the central purpose of the Chinese nuclear expansion, which is an effort to restore the nuclear balance that existed in the 70s and 80s. Advanced US military capabilities have, it is generally agreed, substantially eroded the deterrent relationship that existed between the US and its nuclear competitors during the cold war.
事实上， ISAB报告忽略了中国核扩军的一个主要目的，这就是，努力恢复类似于70,80年代的核平衡。人们普遍认为，美国先进的军事能力大大削弱了冷战期间美国和竞争对手之间存在的那种威慑关系。
Daryl Press and Keir Lieber argued in Foreign Affairs that the US holds first-strike dominance over both China and Russia, in large part because due to stealth and precision-guidance capabilities. The development of a credible missile defence system (one that could knock out a high percentage of incoming missiles) would further erode the deterrent relationship. The Chinese are hardly ignorant of these developments. They recognise that the drive for missile defence on the part of the US means that they need to expand their nuclear capabilities in order to stay in the same place. It ends up being a good trade for the Chinese, because additional ballistic missiles (and eventually MIRVs, or multiple independent re-entry vehicles) are considerably cheaper than the missile defence system. Nevertheless, the expansion of the Chinese nuclear programme is an effort to maintain the status quo, and not to shift the military balance in China's favour.
Daryl Press和Keir Lieber在外交上表示，美国对中国和俄罗斯的第一核打击优势，很大程度上是因为隐形和精确制导的能力。开发一个可靠的导弹防御系统（一个能够淘汰高比例的来袭导弹）将进一步削弱威慑关系。中国不会对这些一无所知。他们认识到，美国推动导弹防御系统，意味着他们必须扩大其核能力，以便能够在同一位置。发展弹道导弹的费用，与导弹防御系统相比，相对便宜。然而，中国扩张核计划主要是为了维持现状，而不是改变对中国的军事平衡。
We've been here before. Wolfowitz participated in the infamous Team B project, which was an effort to radically overstate Soviet capabilities and radically misstate Soviet intentions in the 1970s. Like the Team B project, the ISAB report relies on claims about Chinese capabilities that current intelligence cannot verify, such as the existence of tactical nuclear weapons and a vast espionage network inside the US. Also like the Team B project, the report characterises efforts to maintain the status quo as threatening. The alarmism is familiar. Once again, Wolfowitz is claiming that the strategic balance is beginning to tip against the US, and that therefore the US ought to engage in a major effort at revitalising its own capabilities.
我们一直在这里。沃尔福威茨参加了臭名昭著的Team B project（很汗，翻译不好），这是在20世纪70年代为了夸大苏联的能力以及从根本上谎报苏联的情报。如同Team B project。 ISAB报告声称中国在美国的战术核武器和广大间谍网络中拥有目前情报无法确认的能力。也希望Team B project的报告努力维持威胁的现状。。再次，沃尔福威茨称，美国战略平衡的冰山开始消融，因此美国应该进行重大的努力，振兴自己的战略平衡能力。
President Bush leaves office in two months, and Wolfowitz will be out of a job. In the neoconservative world, however, no one stays unemployed for long. This ISAB report will serve as a template for the neoconservative approach to China and provide the foundation for critiques of Barack Obama's China policy. It is highly unlikely that Obama will pursue the "revitalisation" of the US nuclear force, as he has already logged his opposition to the Reliable Replacement Warhead programme. The report should be understood less as an internal effort to drive policy, and more as the opening shot in an effort to criticise Obama as soft on China.
美国总统布什两个月以后就要卸任，沃尔福威茨将失去工作。然而，在新保守主义的世界，没有一个长期失业者。ISAB报告将作为新保守主义对中国的办法的范本，并为奥巴马批评中国政策提供基础。能奥巴马是不可能振兴美国的核力量，因为他已经表示，他反对可靠替代弹头方案。该报告应不可能作为一个内部政策，只是在批评奥巴马对中国姿态软弱。
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