【08.12.28印度斯坦时报】听中国说几句
本帖最后由 skywo1314 于 2009-1-4 16:51 编辑【原文标题】Let China have a word or two
【中文标题】让中国说几句
【登载媒体】HindustanTimes
【来源地址】http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/StoryPage.aspx?sectionName=RSSFeed-Views&id=a8258473-5314-4c4c-bd9c-edde8825ee02&MatchID1=4874&TeamID1=1&TeamID2=3&MatchType1=1&SeriesID1=1229&PrimaryID=4874&Headline=Let+China+have+a+word+or+two+
【译者】荡漾
【声明】本翻译供Anti-CNN使用，转载请注明译者及出处，谢谢！
【译文】
如果中国这个中间人诚恳地参与印巴之间的“近距离会谈”的话，巴基斯坦的行政领导人可能将得到所需的政治软支持而开始真诚地寻找11/26孟买恐怖袭击的主谋。只有为遭受冷落的南亚近邻在世界权力体间来回传递交流信息的中国拥有外交影响力和大众接受度而使巴基斯坦采取令印度满意的行动。
中国外交部长杨洁篪在与印巴外长Pranab Mukherjee及Shah Mahmood Qureshi电话会谈之后人们从巴基斯坦总理拉扎尼拉尼的言论中能听出依稀相同的味道，他说“我们共同的朋友致力于通过外交努力缓解彼此间的紧张局势”。
同样令人难以置信的一致性还体现在于一年前的今天在拉瓦尔品第遭刺杀而亡的贝布托身上，1994年她听从了中国的友好建议而在联合国人权委员会上决定放弃克什米尔问题决议。两年后的1996年12月中国主席江泽民成功地说服了巴基斯坦搁置克什米尔问题而与印度建立关系，在2004年穆沙拉夫－瓦杰帕伊会晤达成协定巴基斯坦承诺不允许反印恐怖组织使用其领土后印巴关系步入正轨。
2007年穆沙拉夫甚至以“他们劫持中国人作人质并折磨他们，我不得不告诉中国领导人我对此表示惭愧。中国人是我们伟大的朋友，但这样的事情却发生在他们身上”这样的话借此打出中国牌赢得批准出动突击队向躲藏于伊斯兰堡的Lal清真寺的伊斯兰狂热派教徒发动攻击。
印度的汉学家们指出尽管自从1988年历史性的访华人们记住了甘地与邓小平的“长时间握手”以来印度和中国之间的关系稳步发展，但由于中国支持巴基斯坦的核武器发展计划中印之间产生了信任危机。
印度尼赫鲁大学教授Alka Acharya认为“这不是理想的状态，我们需要努力，但前提是他们不再玩那些直至90年代早期还在玩的把戏”，她认为“安静外交”是前进的方向，而不是期待来自中国的指示性的支持。
中国的外交政策所起的作用是有限的，真正能推动中巴战略性关系的是两国军队之间的联系。
【原文】
(by Vinod Sharma)
If it plays the honest broker, Beijing’s involvement in ‘proximity talks’ between New Delhi and Islamabad could afford Pakistan’s civilian leaders the political cushion they need to honestly pursue the masterminds of 26/11. Among global powers carrying messages back and forth the estranged South Asian neighbours, China alone has the diplomatic clout and popular acceptance to make Islamabad act to New Delhi’s satisfaction.
One read with a sense of déjà vu Pakistani Premier Yusuf Raza Gilani’s comments after Chinese foreign minister Yang Jeichi’s telephonic talk with Indian and Pakistani counterparts Pranab Mukherjee and Shah Mahmood Qureshi. “Common friends are engaged in diplomatic efforts to defuse tensions,” he said.
In a strikingly similar vein, Benazir Bhutto — who fell to an assassin a year ago this day in Rawalpindi — had attributed to Beijing’s friendly advice her decision to abandon a resolution on Kashmir in the United Nations Human Rights Commission. That was in 1994. Two years later, in December 1996, President Jiang Zemin famously counseled Pakistan to set aside Kashmir to build ties with India; a road on which it embarked after the 2004 Musharraf-Vajpayee accord that also committed Pakistan against use of its territory by anti-India terrorist groups.
Even Musharraf used the China card to gain popular approval of the 2007 commando assault on Islamic zealots holed up in Islamabad’s Lal Masjid. “They took the Chinese hostage and tortured them. I had to tell the Chinese leaders that I am ashamed. That they are such great friends and this happened to them.”
Indian Sinologists point to the trust deficit — arising out of Beijing’s support of Pakistan’s nuclear and missile development programmes — despite steady improvement of ties since Rajiv Gandhi’s historic 1988 China visit, remembered for his ‘long handshake’ with Deng Xiaoping.
“It isn’t an ideal situation. We have to proceed on the assumption that they aren’t playing the games they did till the early 1990s,” said JNU Professor Alka Acharya. She felt “quiet diplomacy” was the way forward — not the expectation of Beijing’s demonstrative support.
The Chinese foreign policy establishment has limited leverage. What drives the strategic Beijing-Islamabad relationship is the linkage between their armies.
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