经济学人：西藏问题上的讨价还价
本帖最后由 kirui 于 2009-3-12 15:34 编辑【原文标题】Plateau bargaining
【中文标题】西藏问题上的讨价还价
【登载媒体】经济学人
【来源地址】http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13269905
【翻译方式】原创翻译
中国总理温家宝在3月5日的年度人大会议上说，2008年是“极不寻常的一年”，在他的两个小时的讲话中，提到了5月份“举世震惊”的大地震，8月份的奥运会以及全球经济危机带来的“前所未有的困难”，但对西藏50年来爆发的最大骚乱，他没有提到一个字。
温先生有理由保持谨慎，59年3月10日，为了阻止当局绑架的传言，成千上万的西藏人包围了达赖喇嘛在西藏首府拉萨的宫殿，一个星期后达赖喇嘛逃到印度。他的支持者随后被中国军队**镇压。3月10日起义的周年纪念引发了去年整个西藏高原的动乱（约占中国陆地面积的四分之一） 。当局担心今年50周年更大的抗议活动。
1990年3月， 在粉碎天安门广场的民主抗议活动的9个月后，当时的总理李鹏，召集全国人大年度会议，宣布共产党已经取得对“反革命暴乱” 的胜利。 继任者朱镕基10年后采用同样的方式，宣布党在打击法**方面的“重大胜利”，一个类似于佛教的团体在此前一年进行了广泛的抗议。然而谈到西藏的分裂主义，中国领导人不太自信。
即便如此，政府的预期镇压使发生重大的抗议变得不可能。西藏已与外部的世界封锁。外国记者被禁止采访，远离藏区。军队和武警已被部署在了高原。在一些地方，网络和手机通信据说被切断。这些技术在去年起到了很大的煽风点火作用。
温先生的沉默也表明，涉及到西藏，党已经想尽办法。在20世纪90年代它可以通过导致经济快速增长的市场改革，去边缘化天安门抗议者的请愿，这十年来它在一个非常有效的宣传运动的辅助下，边缘化了法**，说服许多人相信，曾经流行的精神运动更像是一个邪恶的宗教。在两种情况下，大规模逮捕和其他形式的官方恐吓一直在对持不同政见者审查。
在西藏，党一直试图以经济作为诱因，并且失败。自20世纪90年代初的每年，该地区都在以两位数的速度增长。党一直没有更好的运气，试图描绘达赖喇嘛作为操纵宗教来欺骗自己的人民（类似对法**创始人李**的指控） 。与西藏接壤的青海省同仁县，寺庙里的达赖喇嘛的画像无处不在（该地区的官员还没有设法消除他们对于西藏表现出的奉献精神） 。
防暴警察的逮捕和巡逻可能使高原保持迄今以来的安静（同时达赖在一周年纪念之际在印度发表讲话， “藏人生活在恐惧之下” ） ，但很少有官员认为，分裂主义的情绪已经减退。如果有的话，中央政府在过去一年里支持西藏自治的行为会得到加强，如果不是完全独立的话。经济增长可能没有使得一些藏人喜欢共产党，但全球经济危机以及所带来的不景气必将引发敌意。
在西藏地区另一次不满的爆发，只是时间问题。为什么去年会发生这样的暴乱，尽管在筹备奥运会前进行了大量的安全准备，仍然引人猜想。但有一个合理的解释是，一些官员的确需要拉萨的动乱，以使得他们能够在奥运会之前更加紧城市安全。由于8月份的奥运会，将会有成千上万的外国记者，官员担心在媒体的监督下，任何临近该日期的动乱爆发将难以控制。当局镇压将引得大批媒体关注以及抗议者上街游行。去年惊人的在拉萨的广泛地点，暴乱发生起初的一些时间，几乎完全没有任何安全力量部署，使得有一些人相信这个理论。
假如这是有关当局曾打算过的，他们不大可能尝试同样的策略了。即使是最马基雅维利的官员也不想回顾去年的结果：抗议迅速在一个广大的地区蔓延，而且引发国际社会的强烈抗议，威胁要抵制奥运会，一直到5月份四川大地震，严重破坏了中国与西方的关系。
但是，中国在背后处理西藏的政治手段难以推测。温先生和他的政治局同事们自2008年3月以来避免公开去西藏。人们普遍认为胡锦涛主席在西藏问题上是一个强硬派， 1989年在他担任西藏自治区党委书记时在拉萨实施了戒严，3月9日胡锦涛主席对人大代表们说，中国应加强“打击分裂主义的长城” 。毫无疑问，一些官员可能不会相信他的说法，但去年的动荡令很多人惊讶。这一年里，他们会变得更加谨慎。
Asia.view
Plateau bargainingMar 11th 2009
From Economist.com
Fifty years after the 1959 uprising, Tibet remains restive
THE year 2008 was “extremely unusual”, said Wen Jiabao, China’s prime minister, at the opening of parliament’s annual session on March 5th. For two hours, his speech surveyed the year’s peaks and valleys: the massive earthquake in May that “shocked the world”, the Olympic Games in August and the “unprecedented difficulties” presented by the global economic crisis. But of the biggest outbreak of unrest in Tibet in 50 years he mentioned not a word.
Mr Wen had reason to be cautious. On March 10th, 1959, thousands of Tibetans surrounded the Dalai Lama’s summer palace in the Tibetan capital, Lhasa, to forestall a rumoured plot by the Chinese authorities to kidnap him. A week later the Dalai Lama, disguised, escaped to India. A bloody crackdown on his supporters by Chinese troops ensued. It was the anniversary of the March 10th uprising that triggered last year’s unrest across the Tibetan plateau (which accounts for one-fourth of China’s landmass). Authorities feared larger protests for the 50th anniversary this year.
APhttp://media.economist.com/images/columns/2009w11/ChinaclampdownAP.jpgThe solid Great Wall on the march
In March 1990, nine months after the crushing of the pro-democracy protests in Tiananmen Square, Li Peng, who was then prime minister, opened the annual session of the National People’s Congress, as the parliament is known, with a declaration that the Communist Party had achieved “victory” over the “counter-revolutionary rebellion”. Ten years later his successor Zhu Rongji used the same opportunity to declare “major victory” for the party in its campaign against Falun Gong, a quasi-Buddhist sect that had staged widespread protests a year earlier. When it comes to Tibetan separatism, Chinese leaders are less confident.
Still, the government’s anticipatory crackdown made significant protests unlikely. Tibet has been all but sealed off from the outside world. Foreign journalists are normally barred and now are being kept away from Tibetan-inhabited areas far beyond the Tibet Autonomous Region itself. Army and paramilitary troops have been deployed across the plateau. In some places, internet and mobile-telephone services have reportedly been cut off. Such technology played a big role in fanning the flames last year.
Mr Wen’s reticence could also be a sign that when it comes to Tibet, the party has run out of ideas. In the 1990s it was able to marginalise the Tiananmen protestors’ demands by launching market-oriented reforms that resulted in rapid economic growth. This decade it has marginalised Falun Gong with the help of a remarkably effective propaganda campaign that has convinced many people that the once-popular spiritual movement is no more than a sinister cult. In both cases, widespread arrests and other forms of official intimidation kept dissenters in check.
In Tibet, the party has tried economic inducement and failed; the region’s economy has grown at a double-digit rate annually since the early 1990s. The party has had no better luck with trying to portray the Dalai Lama as a manipulative figure who uses religion to deceive his people (similar accusations were made against Li Hongzhi, the founder of Falun Gong). In Tongren county of Qinghai province, which borders on Tibet, portraits of the Dalai Lama are still ubiquitous in monasteries (officials in the area have not sought to eliminate them with quite the dedication shown by their counterparts in Tibet itself).
Arrests and patrols by riot police may have kept the plateau quiet so far (as the Dalai Lama put it in an anniversary speech delivered in India, “Tibetans in Tibet live in constant fear”), but few officials believe that separatist sentiment has ebbed. If anything, the central government’s behaviour over the last year will have strengthened support for greater Tibetan autonomy, if not outright independence. Economic growth may not have nurtured Tibetan fondness for the Communist party, but the slump brought on by the crackdown and the global economic crisis will certainly fuel hostility.
Another explosion of discontent in Tibet is therefore just a matter of time. Why such an outbreak occurred last year, despite extensive security preparations in preparation for the Olympics, remains a matter of conjecture. But one plausible explanation is that some officials actually wanted turbulence in Lhasa so that they could justify tighter security in the city well before the games. With thousands of foreign journalists due to cover the Olympics in August, officials would have feared that any outbreak of unrest close to that date would be difficult to control because of intense media scrutiny. The clampdown enabled the authorities to keep the media hordes at bay and protesters off the streets. The astonishing near-total absence of any security deployment across a wide area of Lhasa during the first few hours of the rioting on March 14th last year lends credence to this theory.
If this is what the authorities had intended, they are unlikely to try the same tactic again. Even the most Machiavellian of officials would not have wanted last year’s outcome: protests that spread rapidly across a huge area and an international outcry that—until the earthquake in Sichuan Province in May—threatened to overshadow the Olympics and seriously undermine relations between China and the West.
But the political machinations behind China’s handling of Tibet are difficult to divine. Mr Wen and his Politburo colleagues have avoided visiting Lhasa publicly since March 2008. It is widely supposed that President Hu Jintao is a hardliner on Tibetan issues, having presided over the imposition of martial law in Lhasa in 1989 when he was party chief in Tibet. On March 9th, Mr Hu told deputies to the legislature that China should reinforce its “solid Great Wall for combating separatism”. No doubt some officials may not be convinced by his approach, but the unrest last year caught many by surprise. This year they have become more wary. 其实这个世界上本没有所谓的“西藏问题”，都是西方人搞的鬼
在这个问题上，某些个人或集团根本没有与中国政府和人民讨价还价的权力 都是些吃饱了撑着的人 吃饱了没事干 西藏问题不过是由于达赖喇嘛在政治上与国家的一种矛盾，然而欧美国家在进行炒作．最终形成了现在的局势．
有权利说独立的不是政治领导某一个人，而是一个民族全部人民． 我在想一个问题，dl升天以后，zd势力将失去一直依赖的靠山，为了把反华工作坚持到底，西方会不会把李大师抬出来呢？
我想想李大师会有些什么头衔：民主运动领袖、宗教领袖、诺贝尔和平奖获得者...
还会有其他什么头衔，大家展开想象补充啊！！！！ 本帖最后由 Aircraft 于 2009-3-13 23:02 编辑
Buddism is NOT a popular religeon in Europe.If DL is a true religeous person, why has he been spending almost all his time travelling and lobbying in a few west nations?Dalai Lama has been talking in ENGLISH LANGUAGE to his West audience, including politicians, anti-China forces, racists and some ignorant people for only one reason: All his political and financial support is from the anti-China forces in those nations!Tibet is indeed a West issue; it will continue to be uses to serve the interests of those west nations by mainstream west madia, anti-China politicians and organizations as well as racists.All those beautiful words or phrases such as "human rights" and "freedom" are just hypocratic slogans.Everyonewith clear mind (outside a few west nations) can see this.
Separation of church and religeon supposes to be the principle in the West-style democray, then how can Dalai Lama who self-claimes a religeous person,and whom the West has made into some kind of spiritual God has a government?And a government-in-excile whose top officials are all his family members!Where does the West-style democratic principles go?I feel very very sorry for taxpayers in those west nations.
佛教在欧洲西方并不普遍，如果达赖真是一个宗教信徒的话，那么为什么他几乎花费所有的时间在几个西方国家游说？达赖一直在用英语对一个西方观众说话，这些人包括西方政客，反华势力,和西方为数众多的种族主义分子以及那些对中国十分无知的人。他在西方上空不停地飞的理由只有一个：他的分裂事业的所有政治财政资助均来源于几个西方国家。西方所用的那些美丽词汇如“人权”和“自由” 仅仅是虚伪的口号。西方以外的头脑清醒之人都对这一点看的很清。
政教分离据说是西式民主的原则，那么一个自封宗教人士，一个被西方抬上精神上帝宝座的宗教人士如何又能有一个自己的政府？而且还是一个重要官员都是达赖家族成员的流亡政府？西式政教分离的原则哪儿去了？ 我为那些国家的纳税人感到很难过。 在西藏地区另一次不满的爆发，只是时间问题。为什么去年会发生这样的暴乱，尽管在筹备奥运会前进行了大量的安全准备，仍然引人猜想。但有一个合理的解释是，一些官员的确需要拉萨的动乱，以使得他们能够在奥运会之前更加紧城市安全。由于8月份的奥运会，将会有成千上万的外国记者，官员担心在媒体的监督下，任何临近该日期的动乱爆发将难以控制。当局镇压将引得大批媒体关注以及抗议者上街游行。去年惊人的在拉萨的广泛地点，暴乱发生起初的一些时间，几乎完全没有任何安全力量部署，使得有一些人相信这个理论。 bbs.m4.cn( X+ ]+ L; U! [
kirui 发表于 2009-3-12 15:13 http://bbs.m4.cn/images/common/back.gif
《经济学家》已经不是第一次宣传这个阴谋论了。按这个逻辑，九一一事件很可能是美国自导自演的…… 本帖最后由 kirui 于 2009-3-14 21:29 编辑
——
页:
[1]