美国《外交政策》：中国将成为下一个美国？
本帖最后由 magicboy 于 2009-4-8 22:53 编辑【原文标题】 Is China the New America?
【中文标题】 中国将成为下一个美国？
【登载媒体】 Foreign Policy 外交政策
【来源地址】 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4778
【译者】 xiongshu
【翻译方式】 人工
【声明】 本翻译供Anti-CNN使用，未经AC或译者许可，不得转载。
【原文库链接】http://bbs.m4.cn/thread-152877-1-2.html
【译文】
: ~. [: Hr- J'
In the Great Depression, as in the current economic crisis, the downturn was particularly severe because of a lack of leadership in the international order. The dominant financial power of the 19th century, Britain, was financially exhausted by the First World War. The new major creditor, the United States, had emerged as a strong economic player, but did not yet have leadership committed to the maintenance of an open international economic order. The simple diagnosis was that Britain was unable to lead, and the United States unwilling.
由于在国际秩序当中缺少领袖,在上世纪的大萧条时期经济低迷十分严重，而如今的经济危机也是这样。19世纪英国被一战拖垮，国内财力消耗殆尽。那时的新兴债权大户美国在经济方面的表现极为抢眼，但还并没有在开放的国际经济秩序中充当领导者的角色。大家对于这样的情况最简单的解释就是，英国没力为之，而美国则不愿介入。
If the scenario sounds familiar, it should. The story from the Great Depression has an uncanny echo in current debates about international economic leadership, with the United States playing the role of Britain -- the exhausted debtor economy -- and China taking the place of the United States as the world's largest creditor. But if China is the America of this century, can it do a better job than the United States did in the 1930s? The way in which the emerging superpower takes to this role will determine in large part how the world will emerge from the downturn and the shape of the new global economic order that will follow.
如果对目前情况的预计会和上次大萧条时期的情况有相似之处，那这场戏就应该如此上演：在当前对于谁是世界经济的领导者的争论上，美国出演当年英国的角色，一个气喘吁吁精疲力竭的债务国，而中国则取代当年的美国，成为世界上最大的债权国---大萧条时期的一幕幕戏就这样以抓人眼球的方式在当前的经济低迷期再次上映。但如果本世纪中国真的扮演上世纪的美国一角，他能干的比上世纪30年代的美国还要出色吗？新兴的超级大国如何扮演这一角色将在很大程度上决定世界怎样从经济低迷中摆脱出来以及下一步的全球新经济秩序。
Charles Kindleberger, the late economist, argued that the United States should have acted as a lender of last resort in the early 1930s, continuing to keep its financial markets open to investment and its market open to foreign goods, rather than heading down the path of protectionism. It should also have stimulated the world economy through countercyclical fiscal policy.
已故经济学家查尔斯.金德尔伯格主张，美国应该发挥20世纪三十年代最后贷款人的作用，继续向投资者开放本国金融市场，同意进口国外商品，而不应实施贸易保护主义政策。他还认为美国应该通过实施反经济周期财政政策来刺激世界经济。
But at the time of the Great Depression, there were all kinds of convincing reasons why Americans did not want to take on the burden of a worldwide rescue. Sending more money to Europe was seen as pouring money down the drain, and after all, Europeans had fought the world war that had been the root cause of the financial mess. Economically, helping Europe would have made a great deal of sense from a long-term perspective, but politically it was a non-starter with no short-term payoff.
但在经济大萧条时期，美国总有各种各样听起来头头是道的理由不去担负拯救世界的责任。向欧洲方面输送资金在美国看来就如打水漂一般，毕竟那时欧洲诸国正身陷世界大战的深渊之中不能自拔，而这场战争也就是造成世界经济混乱的根源所在。从经济角度来说，援助欧洲从有着非常深远的长期意义。但从政治角度来说，由于没有短期回报，这仅仅是一个不切实际的空想罢了。
In the middle of the current financial crisis, a deep-pocketed China faces the same dilemma: swallow its pique and help save the same countries that got us into this situation, or look to its own short-term interests first. Today, there are increasing demands that China contribute more to internationally coordinated rescue packages through a reformed International Monetary Fund (IMF). China is also one of the few economies still growing in 2009, though most economists have reduced their estimates of growth rates. Finally, China and the United States are the only countries that are large enough, and have sufficiently well-ordered government finances, to launch major efforts at fiscal stimulation.
在当前这次经济危机中，城府极深的中国也面临和当年美国一样的难题：是强压自己对欧美诸国不满的怒气，伸手援助这些造成目前局面的国家，还是把本国的短期利益放在首位。目前，要求中国通过改革后的国际货币组织（IMF）增加救援国际救援资金的呼声越来越高。尽管几乎所有经济学家都预计经济增长将会放缓，中国还是位列少数几个在2009年依然保持经济增长的国家之中。于是，中美两国就是仅存的能实施大型经济刺激计划的国家，两国政府的经济也井井有条，还不算失控。
Beijing's leaders might feel like they have already taken their best shot. The initial stages of the credit crunch in 2007 were managed so apparently painlessly because sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) from the Middle East, but above all from China, were willing to step in and recapitalize the debt of U.S. and European institutions. Between November 2007 and March 2008, the SWFs provided $41 billion of the $105 billion injected into major financial institutions. Had this process continued, the events of 2008 would have included problems with U.S. real estate and a severe stock market decline, but no meltdown of financial institutions.
中国领导人觉得，自己已经做到仁至义尽了。早在2007年出现的初期信贷紧缩时，由于来自中东及（最重要的）来自中国的主权财富基金（SWFs）愿意提供协助，对欧美各国的债务进行资产重组，从而使问题得到了妥善解决。在2007年11月到2008年3月之间，主权财富基金总共从其1050亿美元总资金中向大型金融机构注资410亿美元。如果这一进程能够继续下去，那2008年的诸多金融事件仅仅只会造成美国房地产业的运营问题及严重的股市下跌，而不会击垮整个金融机构。
But after March 2008, the availability of funds to prop up the global financial system shriveled up. The pivotal moment in today's events came when the state-owned China Investment Corp. (CIC) was unwilling to go further in its exploration of buying Lehman Brothers. CIC's turning back will be held up in the future as a moment when history could have shifted in a different direction.
但在2008年3月后，主权财富基金支持全球经济体系的能力已经是日趋下降了。中国国有企业中投公司（CIC）宣布不再进一步收购莱曼兄弟企业。中投公司这一态度的转变在将来可能会被看做是历史朝不通过方向改变的时刻。
Today there may be plenty of reasons why the Chinese will be tempted to pull back from their engagement with the world economy, and the external political logic sounds very much like the U.S. case of 1931. Some of the economic arguments reverberating around Beijing are very reasonable: There is a great deal of uncertainty, and the SWFs have lost a lot of money already and might lose more. China's investments in U.S. securities in 2006 proved to be a huge costly mistake. Clearly the CIC would have initially lost further billions had it tried to rescue Lehman. Other lines of thought are more emotional and political: Might not 2008 be a righteous payback for the U.S. bungling of the 1997-1998 Asian crisis? Trying times tend to heighten paranoia.
如今对于为什么中国不再参与世界经济事务这一问题大家众说纷纭，中方对外的解释听上去也和美国在1931年时的做法颇为相似。中国政府针对经济方面所做的一些解释也是合情合理的：目前还存在诸多不确定因素，主权财富基金已经损耗了大笔资金，而如果这样继续下去，那可能会有更大的资金消耗。中国2006年对美国保险业的投资已经被证明是一个劳民伤财的错误。很显然，如果一开始中投公司打算要拯救雷曼集团，那可能损失的资金就不止这些。另一种观点就包含了更多的情感因素和政治因素：难道2008年不就是美国为自己的过失造成1997年到1998年那场席间亚洲的金融风暴做出补偿的最佳时刻嘛。困难当前，人们往往会加深自己的偏执情绪。
There are also many domestic reasons why China might be wary about opening up to the global economy. The Chinese banking system is still quite opaque and might still have to wrestle with the legacy of problems of the 1990s, in particular, bad loans to big state-owned corporations that were the consequence of a political logic of directed credit. China is investing large amounts in education, but it may be more difficult to build a creative and innovative society that replicates the dynamism of the United States in the second half of the 20th century (which was fed in large part by openness, above all openness to immigration). China also faces a problem of aging and even demographic decline after the 2040s as a legacy of its one-child policy, which has also created a potentially destabilizing surplus of young males. With all these threats to stability, an authoritarian though reformist regime may find it harder to respond flexibly to popular demands and may be prone to try to mobilize a reactive nationalism to fend off challenges to its authority.
还有许多国内因素使中国对向世界经济开放带来的后果感到担心。对民众来说，中国的银行业体系尚有许多不甚透明的方面。而上世纪90年代的诸多遗留问题，特别是大型国有企业获得带有政治因素的指导性信贷后产生的坏账仍困扰着中国银行业。中国在教育方面投资极大，但要想建设一个创新型社会，以期创造出美国在20世纪后半叶那样的在创新方面的勃勃生机（这样的创新活力是源自美国的开放政策，尤其是对移民的开放），是极为困难的。中国也面临老龄化带来的问题，以及21世纪40年代后因实行独生子女政策而造成的人口基数下降。这一政策也可能造成男性青年比例过剩这样的人口结构的破坏。在所有这些对国家稳定的威胁面前，中国这一主权集中而又敢于改革的国家会发觉，根据不同情况应对人民的需求变得越发困难。政府也可能会更倾向于在民众中唤起本民族的创造性本质以应对外界对其权威的挑战。
The pressure to engage in large-scale fiscal stimulation is also likely to alter the balance of China's economic development. The Chinese model of capitalism is very different than that of the United States, and even before the economic crisis, there were two alternative models. The first was the rural, family, and small-business-based boom of the 1980s. But by the 1990s, some of the private-sector growth was being choked off by a rival vision of economic growth built around prestige projects and the large, state-owned enterprise sector. Consider Shanghai, which impressed many commentators as the most modern city in the world: Analysts of the Chinese economy have suggested it is one of the least entrepreneurial cities in China. Yasheng Huang, in his book Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics, described it as "a classic industrial-policy state." The new stimulus package is likely to push the balance of Chinese development more decisively in this latter direction, toward state capitalism.
外界对中国政府施压，要求其做出承诺以实施大规模经济刺激计划也可能会改变中国的经济发展局面，中国化的资本主义和美国的资本主义存在很大差别，即使在经济危机爆发之前，中国化的资本主义也有两种变化模式。第一种就是发生在20世纪80年代农村、家庭及小型企业中的小型资本主义潮。但到了90年代，由于与建立知名项目及大型国有企业的观点相左，一些私有行业的经济增长因此受到了阻碍。来看看上海这座给评论者们留下了深刻影响的城市:对中国经济的分析中已经暗示，这是中国企业化程度最小的城市之一。黄亚生在其作品《中国特色的资本主义》一书中将中国描述为“典型的工业化政策导向国家”。最新实行的经济刺激计划很可能会将中国发展的平衡不可逆转的推向第二种变化方向，即国家资本主义。
China thus has plenty of reasons why it might want to close itself off to the forces of globalization, as the United States did in the interwar years. This thinking will be reinforced by the structure and character of the international order. Again, an interwar analogy is appropriate. The United States felt uncomfortable with the international institutions of the interwar period, in part because they were aligned with the interests of the old hegemonic power, Britain. The League of Nations looked as if it was an instrument of British power. Similarly, in the modern context China worries about whether it is adequately represented in U.S.-dominated international institutions. Its influence in the IMF and World Trade Organization clearly does not correspond to its real position in the world economy and to the role that China could play in economic stabilization. Reforming international institutions is thus a key issue in deciding whether the coming geopolitical alterations will be crisis-ridden, abrupt, and disruptive, or whether a more gradual and peaceful path of adjustment can be achieved.
因此中国就有诸多理由来解释，为什么要像美国在世界大战期间一样，要对全球化的趋势说不。这一想法在国际秩序的结构及特性面前可能会得以强化。那就是，对美国世界大战期间政策的分析的确合理。美国在世界大战期间与国际联盟组织相处的并不愉快，导致这一局面的部分原因是由于美国当时和老牌霸主英国是盟友。国际联盟（1919年巴黎和会后依据凡尔赛公约形成的包括58个国家在内的联盟）在当时看来不过就是英国操纵的工具罢了。与此类似，在当今国际背景下，中国担心自己是否也已经是美国操纵的国际组织中的一员。中国如今在国际货币组织及世贸组织中的影响力与其在世界经济中的实际地位毫不相称，也和其在维持经济稳定所发挥的作用不相吻合。因此，即将发生在地域层次上的政治格局变化究竟是要将世界鲁莽而唐突地推上这一条危机四伏通往失败的不归路，还是循序渐进的调整世界的格局，带领世界通往触手可及的和平，改革中的国际组织将是决定这一切的关键因素。
Just before the Asia-Europe meeting last October, President Hu Jintao stated that China would behave "with a sense of responsibility." It remains to be seen what stake China really has in the survival of the global economy. As in 1931, the political arguments are all against a rescue. Only the farsighted will see that the economic case for such an operation is compelling. Much depends on the extent of China's voice in an altered international institutional architecture.
就在去年十月的亚欧首脑会议之前，中国国家主席胡锦涛表示中国会“本着负责任的态度”办事。这使得我们再一次看到了中国在这次世界经济危机中得以保全而付出的代价。而在1931年，所有的政治观点都是对衰败的世界经济袖手旁观。只有高瞻远瞩的国家才知道，在如此情境下这样的做法（拯救世界经济）是毋庸置疑必须实施的。中国是否参与此次拯救世界经济，决定于在已经发生改变的国际组织中中国的话语权有多大。
But that voice will make demands that are increasingly difficult for the old world to accommodate, including demands for a guarantee of China's U.S. asset holdings and suggestions for an alteration of the world's reserve management. In proposing a global reserve currency to replace the dollar, the Chinese central bank president recently followed in the footsteps of Charles de Gaulle in the 1960s. But unlike France, China is in a much stronger position to assert its preferences for international monetary reordering.
但来自中国的意见会对世界秩序提出自己的要求，比如要求保障中国持有的美国资产的安全以及改变世界货币储值管理机制的要求。这些要求要适应原有的世界秩序就难上加难了。中国央行行长周小川沿用20世纪60年代法国总统戴高乐的货币政策，提议设国际贮备货币以替换现有的美元。但和当时的法国不同，中国现在实力更强，能够对国际货币秩序调整发表自己的看法。
In other words, the world may be asked to transition from an American to a Chinese model of capitalism, and as in the 1930s, that won't be an easy switch for any of us.
换句话说，全世界现在都像上世纪30年代希望美式资本主义代替英式资本主义一样，呼吁将美国式的资本主义转变成中国式的资本主义。但这样的转化对我们所有人而言都不容易。
If people had heard the details of U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner's plan to absorb toxic assets a year ago, they could have been excused for mistaking the message as coming from Beijing. The scheme "will use government resources in the form of capital from the Treasury, and financing from the FDIC and Federal Reserve, to mobilize capital from private investors," Geithner wrote in the Wall Street Journal. "e as a nation must work together to strike the right balance between our need to promote the public trust and using taxpayer money prudently to strengthen the financial system."
如果大家听说了美国财政部长盖特纳一年前关于政府吸纳不良资产这一计划的细节，那可能大家会误以为这是中国政府的计划。“这份计划‘将会以资产的形式动用财政部的政府资金，并通过联邦储备保险公司及联邦储备委员会试试财政计划，将个人投资者的资金调动起来，’”盖特纳在华尔街时报的报道中写到。“作为一个国家，我们应该并肩作战，在我们的需求中谋得合适的平衡点，以调高政府的公信力，并谨慎适度地使用纳税人的钱来巩固国家金融体系”
It is a dramatic shift for a country that, in recent years, has grown more accustomed to righteous deregulation. But for China, watching the United States has been a lesson in déjà vu. In pursuit of national economic stability, the Obama administration is clearly moving toward the kind of statist intervention that China has been promoting the past two decades. You might say Washington is adopting the Beijing Consensus.
对于这一个在近几年越来越习惯于“合理”放松监管的国家而言，这是一次重大的转变。但对于中国而言，看着美国的如此转变，有一种似曾相识的感觉，就如自己也曾经历过一般。在追寻国家经济稳定的道路上，奥巴马政府很显然正朝着一种中央集权干预的方向前行，这是中国在过去二十年内一直实施的政策。你大可认为，如今美国正在接受“北京共识”的观点。
While continuing to benefit from the international market, the U.S. government is instituting more control over its financial sector, restricting government procurement policies, guiding research and development in the energy sector, and selectively curbing imports of goods and services. Sounds familiar? As in Beijing, what matters is not the nature of the political system, but the extent to which it is successful in improving the well-being of its people.
就在美国仍从国际市场中获得利益的同时，政府也在为其财政部门设置更多监管机构，限制政府官方采购政策，引导能源部门的研究及发展，并有选择性的控制货物进口及劳务输入。这些听起来是不是很耳熟？
Obamanomics is not the only area looking markedly Eastern; foreign policy has followed suit. In the Beijing school of diplomacy, national interests, not universal norms, dominate foreign relations. And indeed, Washington is seeking more and more to build pragmatic alliances that serve the country's economic needs. Cozying up with China and the autocratic Gulf states looks less malevolent when those countries are the main lenders to the U.S. Treasury. Working with Iran and Russia, meanwhile, holds the promise of reducing the costs of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In times of crisis, it seems, there is no shame in a bit of realpolitik.
奥巴马的经济政策并不是唯一带有明显东方特色的政策，其外交政策也是如此。在中国的外交界中，是国家利益而非国际准则主导对外关系。而事实上，美国也越来越倾向于的寻求建立务实的联盟关系以满足国家经济需求。中国和海湾地区的主权国家现在是美国的主要债权人，拉拢这些国家对美国而言并不算太坏。与此同时，美国也在积极与伊朗和俄罗斯开展合作，并许诺削减对阿富汗及伊朗两国的战备经费。在如今的经济危机时刻，采取一些比较现实的政治手段（美国一向不愿意在对伊及对阿问题上作出让步）并不是什么羞耻之事。
Washington's new realism is more than a revision of the devastating neoconservative muscle-flexing of the Bush years. Faced with an internationally weakened position, a declining power is attempting to use its restrained capabilities in a more economical way. After two decades of U.S. and European principles dominating international policy through a web of multilateral organizations, the West no longer has the leverage to enforce its conditions.
如今美国面貌一新的现实主义政策较之布什政府以武力开路的新式保守主义政策，不仅仅只是一个政策上的修改而已。美国正面临自己的国际地位日趋下降。如今国力不比当年的美国正尝试用一种更为经济的方式发挥自己有限的能力。在过去二十年内欧美国家的行为准则通过多边国际组织主宰国际政策，而如今的西方诸国已无力要求其他国家遵照自己的意愿处理事务了。
The West's retreat will open up space for a new concert of powers -- Brazil, Russia, India, and China -- tied together by a fixation with national economic growth. Instead of entrusting the United States with the arduous task of safeguarding global stability, the so-called BRIC countries will assume a more prominent role in policing their own backyards. Russia can have its Caucasus, and if the generals in Burma should go mad, that will be China and India's problem.
西方各国渐渐淡出主宰世界的历史舞台，这给新的大国联盟留下了空间---巴西，俄罗斯，印度还有中国---这四国的国家经济增长彼此相互紧密联系。号称“金砖四国”（BRIC有砖的意思）的这四个国家不再将维护世界稳定这一艰巨的任务交给美国，而是在为自己的领域出谋划策这一方面发挥更为突出的作用。俄罗斯自己处理自己的高加索地区问题。如果缅甸的将军要有什么不良动机，那也是中国和印度自己的问题。
Meanwhile, the trans-Atlantic alliance will wane. The United States will be able to adapt to the new rules. But Europe, its chief ally, lacks the capacity and the leadership to do so. The continent's strategic relevance is only destined to weaken further.
与此同时，跨大西洋联盟的实力也将削弱。美国也能适应新的国际准则。但其最主要的盟友欧洲则没有能力去适应新的国际准则，在欧洲范围内也没有领袖去带领其他各国来适应新的国际准则。欧洲各国间的战略性联合也注定会进一步被削弱。
None of this is to say that the Beijing Consensus guarantees a more stable world order. Far from it. A concert of powers is only as strong as its weakest player. If economic turmoil worsens, nationalism in one country or another could reduce the scope for pragmatic bargaining. Overlapping spheres of influence and frozen conflicts could once again lead to major conflict. And if, as some observers expect, China emerges from the crisis as the big winner, it won't be long before zero-sum thinking again replaces win-win cooperation as the order of the day.
以上这些都不足以说明“北京共识”就能确保一个更稳定的全球秩序。实际情况可能还差的更远。如今的大国联盟也不过和其最差的对手旗鼓相当。如果经济危机进一步恶化，任何一个国家的民族主义都可能削弱与其他国家务实谈判的内容范围。联盟中各国互相交叉其影响覆盖面并强行压制冲突只会再一次造成更大的冲突。如果和一些观察员预计的那样，中国从这场经济危机中全身而退成为最大的赢家的话，那“零和”观点（即损人利己）将在不久以后再次取代双赢合作，而成为世界的新秩序。 中国只想走自己的路！ 中国不会成为下一个美国，中国只会而且永远是中国。 中国不是救世主,自己浑身是伤,怎么救摔跤的西方??? 不要老是說中國怎樣中國怎樣，說一下妳美國會怎樣吧!!
美國只不過是發跡了一段很短的時間而已，就那麼自以為是，以牠的邏輯，那誰又會是下一個中國哩? 谁要当那个美国啊。。。。。。真自恋 出来混的迟早是要还的. 金砖四国实在是最大的谎话。
中国和剩下那三个国家根本不是一个级别的，即使那三个国家Combined也不是中国的对手。
还是赶紧Drop这个提法吧，太可笑了。 但在经济大萧条时期，美国总有各种各样听起来头头是道的理由不去担负拯救世界的责任。
呵呵，以己之心，度人之腹 这篇文章有一定的道理但还是怂恿中国居多
要知道当时欧洲列强在两次世界大战中被榨干了最后一点血本
才只能拱手送出霸主宝座目送美国雄起
现在的美国虽然在严重的经济危机里伤筋动骨但还远没到动摇其根本的地步
中国的国力也与２战之后的美国不能相比
所以中国还是要务实的保存自己实力为主而不要被忽悠 中国永远不会成为美国。因为我们从未想要称霸，我们只想强大。我们不会用武力威胁弱小国家，我们只想拥有和平。我们要的只是一个我们能够接受的地位，一个真正属于这个文明古国的赢得的实力和尊重。 想给我们灌迷魂汤？？没门！！ 走好自己的路就行了。 我五千年大中华会成为一个半路出家的美国？
如果这个就是我们的目标，未免太小看我们中国了。 要成为美国，那还真不容易，起码美国做出的许许多多事情中国永远也学不会，比如把军队开进一个主权国家，再把这个国家的总统处以绞刑，这样的事情只有美国才做得出来。 为什么中国成为最大的赢家的话，那“零和”观点（即损人利己）将取代双赢合作？是不是因为他们说双赢合作的时候其实从来就不想让别人得利？ 中美有着根本的不同，损人利己是美国专利，中国追求的既不是霸权主义，也不是纯粹的利己主义，而是双赢、多赢、共赢，是彼此尊重、共同发展。中国既不是救世主，也不是袖手旁观者，中国先得救自己，才能创造共同发展的机会，而不是先把自己牺牲掉，那样也救不了世界。中国就是中国，不做美国。 好吧我沒看明白
在当前这次经济危机中，城府极深的中国也面临和当年美国一样的难题：是强压自己对欧美诸国不满的怒气，伸手援助这些造成目前局面的国家，还是把本国的短期利益放在首位。
美國當年是怎么做的？ 翻译牛人！强顶！！
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