【10.01.14 时代周刊】中国和越南：群岛上的纠结
【中文标题】中国和越南：群岛上的纠结【原文标题】China and Vietnam: Clashing Over an Island Archipelago
【登载媒体】时代周刊
【原文链接】http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1953039,00.html
Protesters shout slogans during a 2007 rally in Hanoi against Beijing's claims to two disputed South China Sea island chains, the Spratlys and the Paracels
In the realm of geopolitical disputes, the barren Paracel Islands are a far cry from the mountains of Kashmir or the alleys of Gaza. Claimed by both China and Vietnam, the archipelago comprises some 30 tiny spits of land in the middle of the South China Sea with innocuous names like Woody Island and Antelope Reef. No one lives there, nor has there been any evidence that lucrative natural resources lie beneath its lagoons and reefs. But, experts say, at a time when regional economies are booming — and nationalist sentiments swelling — the Paracels and the heavily contested Spratly islands further south remain a flashpoint in this part of the world, where the traditional balance of power is tilting further toward China.
Tensions flared most recently last week when the Chinese government announced it would begin developing high-end tourism on a few of the Paracels as part of an ambitious new plan to draw tourists from around the world to Hainan, a Chinese island province off the mainland's southern coast. But while planners dream of creating a Chinese Hawaii — with the Paracels' clear waters a potential luxury destination for divers — the leaked proposal made Hanoi bristle almost instantly. China has retained de facto control over the archipelago since seizing it in its entirety with gunboats in 1974, but Vietnam has stubbornly clung to its long-standing territorial claims over the archipelago. On Jan. 4, a Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesman said the possibility of Chinese tourists snorkeling around a Paracel cove "seriously violates Vietnam's sovereignty." Chinese officials dismissed the Vietnamese protests, saying the matter was purely one of China's own economic development.
The spat may be a minor compared to incidents in the past — the two countries fought a bloody border war in 1979, and in 1988 a naval battle near the Spratlys left 70 Vietnamese sailors dead. But it comes amid a steady buildup of Chinese might in the region. Ralf Emmers, an expert on the South China Sea and associate professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, says the Chinese tourism gambit is a move "to make its sovereignty claims over these islands a fait accompli." Vietnam watchers point to an escalation of tensions since the 2007 completion of a strategic Chinese submarine base on Hainan Island, just over 124 miles (200 km) from Vietnam's eastern shore. The base has enabled Beijing to project its power not only in its own backyard, but further into the Pacific and Indian oceans as well. Last year, China detained 25 Vietnamese fishermen found near the Paracels, who were released only after weeks of demonstrations in Vietnam. Chinese officials also allegedly pressured multinational oil companies to eschew tying up deals with Hanoi to explore for resources in the South China Sea, or, as Vietnam calls it, Bien Dong (East Sea).
Vietnamese prickliness at what many see as Chinese encroachment has led to Hanoi beefing up its own naval capabilities. Last month, it penned a landmark $2 billion deal with Moscow to acquire six Kilo-class Russian submarines. The government is also formulating plans to improve its coastal-defense operations and to better protect Vietnamese fishing fleets. Still, considering China's size and wealth, there's little talk of an arms race in the region. "Vietnam is subject to the tyranny of geography. It's like a mid-sized Chinese province," says Carl Thayer, an authority on the Vietnamese military at the Australian Defence Force Academy. "If the elephant really decides to move, the Vietnamese will be squashed."
Open conflict, of course, is unlikely given the scale of economic integration in Southeast Asia. Sino-Vietnamese relations in most arenas are as robust as they've ever been. But observers are concerned that governments have yet to come up with an effective way to arbitrate this maritime dispute. In 2002, China signed a code of conduct with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Vietnam is a member, pledging to refrain from activities that would destabilize the fragile status quo in the South China Sea. Few parties have kept to the spirit of the agreement. The Spratlys, an island chain far larger than the Paracels, are claimed by China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and nominally by Taiwan, and resemble a Risk game board with territories grabbed pell-mell over the years in a scramble for land and influence. Malaysia has set up a diving resort on one of its own reefs, while most other nations have military posts on their islands. "The ASEAN model has been more or less useless," says Simon Shen, a professor of international relations at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. "The official discourse is to co-develop , but this is almost impossible given the nationalism the dispute inspires."
In China and Vietnam, in particular, nationalist netizens have pressured their governments to remain firm on issues of sovereignty. Both sides have dredged up archival evidence supposedly linking these clusters of uninhabited rocks in the sea to the glories of ancient dynasties and Emperors. For Hanoi, the matter has become especially sensitive as an array of dissidents — from Buddhist monks to activists protesting bauxite-mining — have taken up the cause of the archipelagoes, accusing the ruling Communist Party of selling out to China with every act of acquiescence. "The Vietnamese leadership is burning a candle on both ends," says Thayer. "They have to balance the reality of the situation against rising national sentiment and hope they don't get burned."
Walking such a precarious tightrope means Hanoi — as well as other governments claiming the Spratlys and the Paracels — have to measure their actions carefully. "The real risk in the South China Sea," says Emmers, "is that of a miscalculation that could lead to skirmishes and a clash of arms." As signs of meaningful cooperation are few, most expect this tacit consolidation of interests — including China's economic expansion into the Paracels — to continue. How this chess game plays out may have broader ramifications as the Chinese military extends its clout and influence in the coming decades. "It's an interesting showcase for what the future of Chinese naval power may look like," says Emmers. "And not just in the South China Sea."
2007年抗议者在河内集结，高喊口号，抗议北京宣称对中国南海有争议的两个列岛拥有主权：南沙群岛和西沙群岛。
在国际上的地理政治争端中，贫瘠的西沙群岛相比于克什米尔山区和加沙地带来说，根比不值一提。中国和越南均声称对其拥有主权的这些群岛，不过是散落在中国南海中的30多个小片陆地。他们的名字毫无个性，比如“木头岛”、“羚羊礁”。那里没有人居住，礁石下也没有迹象蕴藏着有利可图的自然资源。但是专家说，当区域经济振兴的时候——这往往也是国家柔情主义抬头的时候——西沙群岛和南沙群岛就成了周边区域紧张局势的导火线。传统力量上的制约权当然更加倾向于中国。
近期发生的紧张状态缘起于中国政府宣布要在西沙群岛上开发高端的旅游项目。中国一项雄心勃勃的计划是把全世界的游客吸引到中国南部沿海的岛屿省份海南，开发西沙群岛仅仅是计划的一部分。尽管计划制订者们梦想建立一个中国的夏威夷（西沙群岛清澈的海水是潜水爱好者奢求的地点），但是这个有漏洞的提案几乎立刻激怒了河内。中国在1974年，用炮艇取得了这些岛屿的实际控制权，但是越南一直顽固地坚持声称对岛屿拥有主权。1月4日，越南外交部发言人说，中国游客可能在西沙群岛海域潜水，“严重破坏了越南的领土完整权”。中国官员对越南方面的抗议置之不理，说这仅仅是中国在发展自己的经济。
两个国家在1979年经历了一场血腥的战争，1988年，在西沙群岛附近的海战中，70名越南水兵丧生。相比历史上的事件，这个问题的争执显得无关紧要。但是这件事情是发生在中国逐渐积蓄本地区的力量的时候。新加坡Rajaratnam国际研究学院的副教授、中国南海问题专家Ralf Emmers说，中国的旅游业策略实际上是“让政治统治这些岛屿成为既成事实”。越南观察家指出，紧张的局势从2007年就开始了，中国在海南岛修建了战略性的潜艇基地，这里距越南的东海岸只有124英里。该基地让北京的力量不仅可以保护其自身后院，还可以深入到太平洋和印度洋。去年，中国扣留了在西沙群岛附近发现的25名越南渔民，在越南方面抗议了几个星期之后才将其释放。中国的官员还强迫跨国石油公司尽量回避与河内之间的交易，目的是进一步开发南中国海领域的资源。南中国海，越南人称其为“边东”。
很多人认为，中国的威胁为越南充实自身的海军力量提供了一个机会，而越南人被这种观点深深的刺痛了。上个月，越南与莫斯科达成了一项里程碑式的交易——花费20亿美元采购6艘基洛级俄罗斯潜艇。政府还计划改善其海岸防卫系统，来更好地保护越南的渔船。尽管如此，鉴于中国的地理和财富规模，双方之间还没有形成任何军备竞赛。越南军方代表Carl Thayer在澳大利亚军事防御研讨会中说：“在地理方面，越南必定会遭受中国的暴虐，它只相当于中国一个中等规模的省份大小。如果大象真的决定迈出一步，越南只可能被压扁。”
当然，由于东南亚经济一体化的存在，此事演变成公开的冲突的可能性并不大。中越之间的关系在大部分领域还和以前一样坚实。但是观察家担心，双方政府还没有找到解决海上纠纷的有效方法。2002年，中国签署了东盟的行动守则，越南也是成员之一。中国承诺，将会制止一切破坏脆弱的南中国海现状的行为，但是几乎没有一个缔约国遵守了协议的承诺。比西沙群岛面积大出很多的南沙群岛，被中国、越南、菲律宾、马来西亚、文莱宣称拥有主权，甚至也被台湾标入自己的版图。这就象一个冒险拼图游戏，土地在多年的时间里，为拼凑完整的领域和扩大自身的影响力而被匆忙地夺来夺去。马来西亚在自己的岛屿上修建了一个潜水娱乐中心，其它国家在各自宣称拥有主权的岛屿上都安置了军事设施。香港大学国际关系教授Simon Shen说“东盟模式越来越失去其应有的意义。官方说它（让结盟国家）共同开发（岛屿），但这几乎是不可能的，因为存在着民族主义和争执的天性。”
在中国和越南，带有民族主义情绪的网民们都在给政府施压，要求在主权完整问题上保持强硬态度。双方都想办法找出历史上的证据，试图把这些海中散落、荒凉的礁石与古代辉煌的朝代和帝王拉上关系。在河内，该问题因一批持不同政见者的行为而变得敏感起来。这些包括了佛教和尚和抗议开发铝土矿的积极人士在内的抗议者，借群岛问题责难掌权的共产党，说政府的每一个默许行为都是在向中国出卖自己。Thayer说：“越南领导人把蜡烛的两端都点燃了，他们必须在现实的局势和不断上升的民族柔情主义中寻得平衡，但愿他们不会引火烧身。”
在这条摇摇欲坠的钢索上行走，河内和其它对西沙群岛和南沙群岛宣称拥有主权的国家一样，必须极为小心自己的一举一动。Emmers说：“南中国海问题真正的风险在于，错误的举措有可能会引发小规模的战争和武装冲突。”由于真正有意义的合作基本是不存在的，因此大多数专家认为，对现在这种争夺利益的行为的默许将会继续，这包括了中国在西沙群岛开发经济项目的行动。这盘棋最终会下成什么样子，随着中国军事力量在未来十年的影响力扩充，会对本地区有着深远的意义。Emmers说：“这是一个有趣的机会，让我们可以看到中国海军力量未来的发展如何。当然不仅仅是在南中国海了。” {:12_567:} 我怎么觉得作者话反着说啊 【09.08.18 越南青年报】中国声称占有东海的80%是完全没有根据的 国家地位当然是以实力排序的 MD，唐朝前越南整个国家都是中国的，79年没把我们失去的国土夺回来是我们仁慈。 近段时间僧侣们很让人出乎意料，除了西藏外逃的那个老和尚带领一班子人蹦哒做秀外，先是泰国的大乱，这里又表明越南的佛教和尚在抗议。
中国的少林寺前段时间也在炒作要上市，真弄不明白佛教到底是怎么回事了。 政治胁迫，武力压迫，思想逼迫 越南是什么国家，狼子野心 不过我却得到一种消息，中国政府准备割让领土o3O101)o3O101) 看了半天原来是说越南 在地理方面，越南必定会遭受中国的暴虐，它只相当于中国一个中等规模的省份大小。如果大象真的决定迈出一步，越南只可能被压扁。
这句很形象，很煽情
会让世界不少相同国家同情 时代周刊片面之词，为什么不说中国从清朝时就帮助越南抗击外国侵略军，新中国成立后，中国又援越抗法、援越抗美？越南统一胡志明过世以后，居然吃着中国援助的粮食，拿着中国的武器，开着中国的坦克侵略中国。这种忘恩负义的国家，它欠中国太多了，应该向它讨还回来！:@ 挑拨吧，使劲儿挑拨 虽远必诛是句让人热血沸腾的话
不过说实在，现在国际局势没有那时候那么单纯了
虽然希望扬我国威，哎··· 没有猜错的话，藏南快摊牌了！！ [这是一个有趣的机会，让我们可以看到中国海军力量未来的发展如何。当然不仅仅是在南中国海了
这话真透着股幸灾乐祸啊。 自古以来土地都是用生命和鲜血换来的，可不是靠嘴巴说来的。 不过南沙被越南占得还真是太多了，好在台湾为中国占着一个最大的太平岛 努力发展，人不犯我，我不犯人。
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