【10.03.7 纽约时报】中国的受教育者担忧未来 之一 唯利主义与社会动荡
【中文标题】中国的受教育者担忧未来 之一 唯利主义与社会动荡【原文标题】Educated and Fearing The Future in China - Materialism and Social Unrest
【登载媒体】纽约时报
【原文作者】C. Cindy Fan
【原文链接】http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/07/educated-and-fearing-the-future-in-china/
2009年，大学毕业生们在湖北武汉的一个人才招聘市场。随着中国经济复苏，雇主们都在竞相聘用低技能的工人，但是中国大批的最优秀、最有希望的大学毕业生们，则面临就业的严冬。
2009年，来自广东省广州市暨南大学的毕业生。
1999年，政府开始推行曾经被认为是黄金门票的高校扩招计划，以期培养更多的专业人士来满足国际化的需求。今年，超过630万名大学毕业生将涌入就业市场，而在1999年，这个数字是100万。但是，高技能需求和高待遇的工作岗位数量却没有跟上这个步伐。
如何才能弥补期望与现实之间的差距？这个问题将如何影响中国人的进取态度？如果更多数量的大学毕业生没有带来更多的经济回报，下一代中国人将如何看待教育的价值？
译者注：分别有来自各行业的5位人士针对此问题撰文。
唯利主义与社会动荡
C. Cindy Fan是加利福尼亚大学洛杉矶分校的社会科学学院主任和地理系教授。她的著作有《中国在前进》一书，以及其它大量相关文章。
1949年后的三十年里，由于受益于集体所有制，中国人的生活中几乎没有卖淫、股票、私人汽车、盛装游行、麦当劳和“失业”等内容。
邓小平的经济改革让效率低下的国有企业走上破产的道路，打碎了数百万工人的“铁饭碗”，从而制造了后毛泽东时代的第一股失业浪潮。
高校毕业生失业是中国的一个热点问题。一大批年轻人除了唯利主义和崇尚消费之外没有其它的信仰，这是目前中国社会的真实写照，因为社会主义者的思想体系早已失去了吸引力。没有工作是造成社会动荡的绝佳因素。
中国官方目前公布的失业率是4.3%，但是这个数字明显低估了实际情况，因为中国人在农村和城市都存在“低端就业”的现象——这些人或许有工作，但是他们的技能没有得到充分应用，待遇也很低。
如何解释这种现象？毫无疑问，全球经济危机加重了就业压力，但是中国可是最先从经济危机中恢复过来的经济体之一啊。
另一个解释曾被媒体广泛引用，就是政府在90年代主导了高校扩招政策。但即使在扩招之后，也只有8％的中国人可以接受大学教育，而美国这个数字是四分之一以上。这表示中国的高等教育还有足够的上升空间，尤其是它如果想要践行人们对“中国世纪”的期望的话。
实际上，有三个原因可以解释大学毕业生们的高失业问题。首先，地域因素。来自小城市和农村地区的年轻人在大学毕业之后，都倾向于留在大城市里。结果就是北京和上海这类大型城市的就业市场拥挤不堪，而小城市的经济很受伤。
其次，国际化因素。据粗略统计，四分之一海外留学的中国人会回国就业。这些绰号“海龟”的人具有竞争优势，轻松地把国内大学毕业生挤到低端的就业市场。
第三，中国的经济依然被工业型产业所支配，它占据了GDP总量的49％，而最符合大学毕业生就业口味的服务型产业只占据了GDP总量的40％。因此，需要高技术、专业性人才的工作岗位相比于类似销售这种低端工作岗位的数量要少一些。
创造高技术含量的工作机会，以及激励年轻人到小城市居住，是解决失业问题显而易见的两条路。可是这说起来容易做起来难。中国的经济已经不再是中央计划的模式，就像我们在太平洋这一边所观察到的，仅仅依赖市场，即使有经济刺激方案也无法让足够的人群回到就业队伍中。
原文：
College graduates at a job fair in Wuhan, Hubei Province, in 2009. As China’s economy recovers, employers are competing to hire low-skilled workers, but many of China’s best and brightest, its college graduates, are facing a long stretch of unemployment.
Graduates from Jinan University at a job fair in Guangzhou, Guangdong Province, 2009.
In 1999, the government began a push to expand college education — once considered a golden ticket — to produce more professionals to meet the demands of globalization. This year, more than 6.3 million graduates will enter the job market, up from one million in 1999. But the number of high-skilled, high-paying jobs has not kept pace.
What might be done to correct the mismatch between expectations and reality? How is this problem altering Chinese attitudes about upward mobility? If college graduates are not reaping economic rewards, how will the next generation view the value of education?
Materialism and Social Unrest
C. Cindy Fan is associate dean of social sciences and professor of geography at the University of California, Los Angeles. She is the author of “China on the Move” and numerous articles.
Like prostitution, stocks, private cars, beauty pageants, and McDonald’s, “unemployment,” thanks to collectivization, was practically absent from Chinese life for the three decades after 1949.
Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms paved the way for the collapse of inefficient state-owned enterprises, shattering the “iron rice bowl” of millions of workers and creating the first wave of unemployment in post-Mao China.
Unemployment among college graduates is a hot-button issue in China. A large number of young people have little other than materialism and consumerism to believe in — a general description of Chinese society today since socialist ideology lost its grip. Not having a job is a perfect recipe for social unrest.
Today, China’s official unemployment rate is about 4.3 percent, but it is a gross underestimate because of underemployment among both rural and urban Chinese — they may have a job but their skills are underutilized and they are underpaid.
What explains this situation? No doubt, the global economic crisis has contributed to job loss, but China is considered one of the first economies to recover from the recession.
Another explanation widely cited in the media is the government-directed increase in university enrollment since the late 1990s. But even with that expansion, less than 8 percent of the Chinese population are college-educated compared with more than one in four in the U.S. That suggests there is much room for growth in higher education, especially if the country is to live up to the expectation of “China’s century.”
Instead, three explanations may account for the relatively high unemployment among college graduates. First, geography matters. Young people from smaller places and rural areas, upon obtaining a university degree, are likely eager to go to or stay in big cities. This effect is crowding the labor market in cities like Beijing and Shanghai and hurting the economy of small cities and towns.
Second, globalization matters. By rough estimates, one quarter of the Chinese who have studied overseas have returned. Nicknamed “sea turtles” (haigui), these returnees are highly competitive and can easily push the domestic college graduates down the job hierarchy.
Finally, China’s economy continues to be dominated by the industrial sector, which accounts for about 49 percent of the gross domestic product. While services — the most likely sector for college graduates — account for about 40 percent of the G.D.P., high-skilled, professional jobs are still relatively few compared with low-end service jobs like those in sales.
Creating high-end jobs and increasing the incentives for young people to live in smaller cities are obvious ways to reduce their unemployment. But this is easier said than done. The Chinese economy is no longer centrally planned, and as we have observed on this side of the Pacific, relying on the market alone — even with stimulus packages — has not yet put enough people back to work. 正解 希望所谓的大学生们出来能真的像个大学生····· 很庆幸当初没读研，直接奔社会了…… 刚毕业的大学生与刚毕业的技校生比较，技校生的工资要比大学生的工资高（以同样的工业企业来讲）；
但是大学生的上升潜力比较大，工作环境要比技校生好；
大学生就业的压力取决于社会的价值取向与自我实现的方向。 有所作为是真理。 没有了信念，没有了信仰，只剩下金钱了 希望所谓的大学生们出来能真的像个大学生·····
Moarx 发表于 2010-3-18 20:41 http://bbs.m4.cn/images/common/back.gif
太难了，现在关注学术的学府少了，关注学术的老师也少了，真正渴求知识的学生也少了。学知识不是为了学知识，而是为了找个工作赚钱。 武汉有个国企招聘会，主办方预计接待1000人，结果来了5000人，不得不中途取消，有女生被挤脱臼了。
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