【2010.01.08华盛顿邮报】台湾公司：伊朗获得了中国转让的核武设备
【中文标题】台湾公司：伊朗获得了中国转让的核武设备【原文标题】Taiwan firm: China got Iran part with nuke uses
【登载媒体】华盛顿邮报
【来源地址】http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/08/AR2010010800835.html
【译者】连长，遥远的冬天，联合翻译
【翻译方式】人工
【声明】本翻译供Anti-CNN使用，未经AC或译者许可，不得转载。
【原文库链接】http://bbs.m4.cn/thread-216261-1-3.html
【译文】
TAIPEI, Taiwan -- A Taiwanese company agreed to a request from a firm in China to procure sensitive components with nuclear uses, then shipped them to Iran, the firm's head said Friday. Such transactions violate U.N. sanctions imposed on the Middle Eastern nation. 台湾，台北讯—一个台湾公司的负责人在星期五说，他们同意了一家中国公司的请求，参半敏感的核用途组件，然后运往伊朗。这种交易违反了联合国施加给中东国家的制裁。遥远的冬天校对（设法获得具有核用途的敏感组件） The admission by Steven Lin of Hsinchu-based Heli-Ocean Technology Co. Ltd. comes amid an international effort led by the United States to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. While Lin said he didn't know whether the parts - a vital component in the production of weapons-grade uranium - were eventually used by Iran militarily, he did acknowledge that they have nuclear applications.
Steven Lin of Hsinchu-based Heli-Ocean科技有限公司的林•斯蒂芬先生承认了。当时以美国为首的国际社会正努力遏制伊朗发展核武器。林说，他不知道这是生产核武器的重要组件，甚至伊朗将其用于军事。他承认了他们的核请求。
遥远的冬天校对（新竹市汉疆科技股份有限公司的林•斯蒂芬先生做出供认的背景是以美国为首的国际社会正努力阻止伊朗发展核武器。尽管林说他不知道这些组件——武器生产的重要组成部分——最终被伊朗用于军事，但是他承认这些组件有核用途。）
U.N. sanctions to prevent Iran from expanding its uranium enrichment program have led it to the black market to obtain sophisticated nuclear-related equipment. Aided by these illegal purchases, the program has grown to the stage where thousands of centrifuges are churning out enriched material, which can be used both for fuel or as the fissile core of nuclear warheads.
联合国制裁伊朗遏制其扩大铀浓缩计划，导致伊朗只能在黑市上获取先进的核相关设备。该计划靠着这些非法采购的数千台离心机生产的大量材料足够用于核能，或者核弹头的裂变。
遥远的冬天校对（enriched material 浓缩材料）
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Iran insists that it wants to enrich uranium to generate nuclear power, but its attempts to evade probes by the International Atomic Energy Agency and its refusal to stop enrichment are increasing suspicions it actually seeks weapons capabilities.
伊朗坚称，他希望提炼浓缩铀来生产核能，但它企图逃避国际原子能机构的调查，并拒绝停止铀浓缩活动。日益质疑他实际上寻求核武力。
遥远的冬天校对（……但它企图逃避国际原子能机构的调查，并拒绝停止铀浓缩活动令人日益质疑……）
In a telephone interview with The Associated Press, Lin said he received an Internet order from a Chinese firm in January or February 2008 to obtain an unspecified number of pressure transducers, which convert pressure into analog electrical signals.
林先生在接收美联社的电话采访时说，他在2008年1月或者2月接到中国企业的国际订购，购买数目不详的可以将压力转化为模拟电信号的压力传感器。
遥远的冬天校对（……接到一家中国公司的网络订单，要求得到数目不定的……% ）））
While pressure transducers have many commercial uses, they furnish the precise measurements needed in the production of weapons-grade uranium. 1 b
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虽然压力传感器由许多商业上的用途，但他们能够精确测量生产武器所需的铀。
遥远的冬天校对（……有许多……，但是他们为生产武器级的铀提供所需的精确测量。* h8 L-
Nuclear proliferation expert David Albright of the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security told the AP that Iran tried hard to procure the transducers in Europe and Canada, but was thwarted by a concerted international effort. , S; Y; g$ |" u2 K
美国科学和国家安全机构的核扩散问题专家David Albright在华盛顿告诉美联社记者：欧洲和加拿大努力遏制伊朗获得传感器，但国际的努力协商受到阻挠。
遥远的冬天校对（位于华盛顿的科学和国际安全研究所的核扩散专家David Albright告诉美联社，伊朗致力于从欧洲和加拿大获取传感器，但是被国际联合力量所阻挠。
However, he said, the existence of the Taiwanese-Chinese connection shows that Iran still has the ability to get what it needs by tapping alternative sources. & `3 T b m1 b* L
不过，他说，就台湾与中国的实际关系看，伊朗仍然铀能力通过开发替代能源得到他需要的
遥远的冬天校对（不过，他说，台湾与中国关系的存在表明，伊朗仍然有能力通过不同渠道得到他需要的。#
"This equipment is likely for its gas centrifuge program," he said. $ S
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“该设备可能用于气体离心”他说。
Lin did not identify the Chinese company that placed the transducer order, except to say that it was involved in the manufacture of pipeline for the oil industry.
林先生没有透露发出的传感器订单的中国公司，只是说这些产品是复杂的石油工业管道。
遥远的冬天校对（Lin没有指出是哪家中国公司下的传感器订单，只是说这家公司与用于石油工业的管道制造相关。
He said that he obtained the transducers from a Swiss company, which he declined to name.
他说他获得了一家瑞士公司的传感器，但他没有说出公司名字。
遥远的冬天校对（他说他是从一家瑞士公司获得传感器，他不愿说是哪家公司。
PS以上均由连长翻译，感谢连长对外媒的支持，感谢遥远的冬天校对
"It was only at the last minute that the Chinese told me to send them to Iran," he said.
他说：“在最后一刻中国人才让我将传感器送到伊朗。”)
Lin arranged for their direct transportation from Taiwan to the Middle East, he said, rather than sending them to the Chinese company first. 2 v) b( t5 M/ {6 s
Lin安排将它们直接从台湾运输到中东，而不是先送到中国公司。
Lin said that he didn't know what happened to the transducers after they arrived in Iran, though he acknowledged that they have an important role in the nuclear industry. + k7 I; c1 m$ y& `7 U% y3 i
Lin说他不知道传感器到达伊朗后做什么用，尽管他承认传感器在核工业中有重要作用。
“I know that the (peaceful) nuclear research units in Taiwan use these things," he said. "The equipment has multiple uses from semiconductors to solar energy to nuclear work."
我知道台湾的（和平的）核研究单位使用这些东西，”他说，“这种设备有多种用途，从半导体到太阳能再到核工业。”
A Taiwanese government official told the AP on Friday that an official probe of the Taiwanese-Iranian transducer connection confirmed that 108 of the transducers had been sent from Taiwan to Iran at a Chinese request, but that the equipment was not precise enough to be placed on the island's export control list. "
一名台湾政府官员星期五告诉美联社，对于台湾-伊朗传感器关联的一项官方调查证实，在中国要求下，108个传感器已经被从台湾弄到了伊朗，但是这种设备并没有明确地列在台湾的出口控制名单上。3 l" ?2
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The official, who was in charge of the probe, spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the information.
因为此信息的敏感性，负责调查的官员是在匿名状态下发言的。
Lin apparently felt free to talk because the official investigation, launched last March, did not implicate him in any wrongdoing. " - e$ C$ A! C: |0 O
Lin显然觉得可以自由谈论，因为三月份开始的官方调查并没有显示他有做不合适的事情。
Beside being prohibited by the U.N. from pressure transducer purchases, Iran is also banned from buying them on the open market by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an international body established to limit nuclear proliferation by controlling the export of materials that can be used in building atomic weapons.*
除了被联合国禁止采购压力传感器，伊朗还被核供应国集团禁止在公开市场上购买它们，核供应国集团是一个国际机构，通过控制能被用于制造核武器的材料出口来限制核武器扩散。
Asked about the circuitous route of the transducer transaction - from China to Taiwan to Switzerland, then back to Taiwan and finally to Iran - the Taiwanese official said that such deals were common in international trade. 9 T- N. r; m+ T( r! B
打听传感器交易的迂回途径——从中国到台湾再到瑞士，然后回到台湾，最后到伊朗——台湾官员说这类交易在国际贸易中是普遍的。
"It is fairly common to do business through third parties," he said. He did not elaborate.
“通过第三方做生意是相当普遍的，”他说。他没有做出详细说明。;
The U.S. and its allies accuse Iran of trying to develop nuclear weapons secretly under the guise of a civilian atomic energy program, but Tehran insists its efforts are aimed only at generating electricity.
美国及其盟友指责伊朗试图以民用核计划为幌子秘密发展核武器，但是德黑兰坚持他们只是致力于发电。$ z
Washington has been pressing both China and Russia to agree to stepped up sanctions to pressure Iran into stopping its alleged nuclear program, but so far without result. $ o. M! z9 s( a$ P% ]* R( v* S
华盛顿一直要求中俄同意对伊朗逐步增加的制裁，以强迫伊朗停止他所声称的核计划，但是目前为止都没有结果。
Over the past several years China has been accused of directly aiding the alleged Iranian nuclear weapons development on a number of occasions. Washington has enacted sanctions against several Chinese companies
过去几年中国好几次被指责直接援助了所谓的伊朗核武器发展。华盛顿已经通过了对几家中国公司的制裁法案。
China has denied involvement in Iran's nuclear programs.# G- z" f- j6 H- z/ o6 L! ]
中国否认参与了伊朗核计划。
At the same time, Beijing has courted close relations with Iran, with Chinese state companies purchasing Iranian oil and investing in Iran's energy industry.
同时，北京和伊朗有很深厚的关系，中国国有公司在伊朗采购石油，在伊朗投资能源和工业。
PS以上由遥远的冬天翻译，感谢遥远的冬天对外媒的支持
AC四 嗯，中国要转让核武还要依靠台湾制造的零部件……
这究竟是谁在拿谁当傻子啊？ 在湾湾的军武论坛中有看到过湾湾有公司往伊朗卖核设备的事，现在湾湾想把这事赖给TG吗？{:12_544:} 一句话，就中国是坏蛋，其他都好的 压力传感器？白痴！核武器要用钢，谁把钢材卖给伊朗，也算支持核武器？ 造核武器要带口罩谁把口罩卖给伊朗就是支持核武器 层出不穷，见怪不怪。 ……看到上回雷人的蓝翔之后，美媒再出什么nc的报道我也不觉得吃惊了…… 看到上回雷人的蓝翔之后，美媒再出什么nc的报道我也不觉得吃惊了…… 这个报道是别有用心的，某些台湾人先赚钱，然后抹黑大陆。 霉国同意制裁伊朗，弯弯竟然背着干爸赚钱。谴责！好歹，弯弯也是仰人家鼻息过日子的呀。
中国就没同意制裁伊朗，支持伊朗和平利用核能权利，你管我跟伊朗做啥交易呢。
核武？伊朗有核武？拿出证据来！没证据那是造谣! 楼上，霉国向来是战后开始寻找证据的，莫急{:12_549:} ……看到上回雷人的蓝翔之后，美媒再出什么nc的报道我也不觉得吃惊了…… ...
忧心 发表于 2010-3-19 20:38 http://bbs.m4.cn/images/common/back.gif
同感！
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