【2010.9.10 ECFR专题文章】比自己所想的更强大：欧盟应如何应对中国
【中文标题】比自己所想的更强大：欧盟应如何应对中国【原文标题】Stronger than it thinks it is: how Europe should deal with China
【登载媒体】欧洲对外关系委员会网站（http://ecfr.eu/）
【来源地址】http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/com ... an_it_thinks_it_is/
【译者】rhapsody
【声明】本译文供Anti-CNN网站使用，未经AC或译者同意、谢绝转载
【作者简介】第一作者即为专门就欧中关系撰写政策报告（和简报）的政策研究员顾德明（François Godement），第二作者是现任欧洲对外关系委员会（ECFR）主任的马克·莱昂纳德（Mark Leonard）。
【文章简介】2010年9月16日（也就是今天），欧盟将召开会议讨论欧盟与其战略伙伴的关系，而对华关系无疑是其中的一个焦点议题。顾德明和主任马克·莱昂纳德就此议题向欧盟各成员国的国家与政府首脑发出了下述公开信。
【译文】
亲爱的成员国国家与政府首脑：
(回复：欧盟与其战略伙伴的关系)
再过几天，在诸国外长对新兴国家进行非正式辩论后，你们将讨论欧盟与其战略伙伴的关系。这次前所未有的议程反映了两项相互关联的关键事实：首先，我们新的《里斯本条约》制度现在使得欧盟可以朝着更紧密协作的方向迈进，但仍需要迈出决定性的一步；其次，是对国际体系向发展中经济体倾斜的历史性承认。以此看来，构建一致的外交政策和安全制度以应对中国等崛起的国家，不能说是为时太早。欧盟通常比自己所想的更强大，只要它能调动其资源并且精简其制度的话。
定义挑战
中国和印度等国的崛起——或复兴——应视为工业化国家推行的贸易自由化及开放投资政策的成就。
但这些新兴大国同样在几个层面上对欧盟构成了挑战。
• 其崛起带来了从联合国到国际货币基金组织，从八国集团到二十国集团等国际机构内重新平衡代表权的需要。然而，让出席位或投票权未必能使那些持有狭隘国家利益观点的国家接受我们的世界观——即超越民族国家的多边法律秩序。
• 这些国家的快速增长对于应对自然资源日益紧张的境况，以及环境污染和气候变化问题，同样带来了挑战。
• 这些崛起中的国家如何在伊朗和朝鲜等一系列安全问题上运用其力量，发出其声音是存在疑问的。
• 需要说服这些国家，民主治理仍是长远和平的最佳长期保证。
为应对这些这些挑战，需尽快实施《里斯本条约》所允许的新制度，同时在（欧盟）委员会的协助下，致力改善各成员国和理事会之间的协作以及责任分担。没有什么地方的挑战比中国更为现实。该国是一个几乎在规模上与美国等量齐观的工业制造国。该国现时正坚定地攀登科技的阶梯，有着世界第二大的军事预算，以及与其相匹配的领土要求——亚洲的许多人会加上这点。对欧盟来说中国问题是多方面的，从非洲问题到（核）扩散问题再到国际治理问题都与此相关。
中国想从欧盟得到什么？
欧盟应如何回应以保证同中国稳定而互利的关系？你们下周的讨论是理清双边关系目标以及途径和方法的绝佳机会，首先是审视北京当局想得到的东西名录：
1. 首先，保持欧盟市场开放，扩大吸收中国的出口。因此中国关心汇率波动、抑制通胀政策，并尽可能久地维持自己的发展中国家身份。
2. 其次，限制相互依存的贸易和货币对中国国内经济和社会的影响。对此，北京当局需要一个健康、深厚而开放的欧洲资本市场（例如，从2010年7月中国对西班牙公债的关键收购就可见一斑），使得中国可以对冲对其最大债务人——美国的过度依赖。不管双边贸易的短期走向如何，2008年全球经济危机已使中国的持续增长更多地依靠欧洲。我们已经获得了影响力，无论是正面的还是反面的。
3. 再者，欧盟趋向对外投资的政策对中国有重要意义——当然反过来，对欧盟而言有重要意义的是，其投资者在此受到中国怎样的对待，而这很大程度上是在世贸组织的工作范围之外。高科技及其衍生品——知识产权与专利保护——同样是我们未来关系的核心。除了双输的保护主义冲突以外，还有其他途径。但我们必须记住：单方面对中国商品开放迄今为止并未见得必然会有回报。而中国对市场经济地位的要求如今只是象征性的索要，因为不久的未来这自然会成为现实。
4. 中国的其他要求几乎都是负面的：不干涉国内问题——而这不幸地包括了人权、宗教权利，以及领土主权的要求。只有解除1989年的武器禁运能够符合中国的正面需求。一个强大而团结的欧盟可以将重新考虑禁运作为影响力的来源，放眼于军民两用（科技）、建立信心，以及中国在伊朗核公文包等议题上的合作。
欧盟需要什么？
由于欧盟对其利益的定义更为广泛，欧盟的需求比中国更为宽泛也更为多样化。你们应开始对这些目标划分等级，并启动复查议程，看这些目标如何能够得到切实实行，同时在这每一个目标上利用世界范围内观点相近的伙伴。欧盟的目标清单应包括：
1. 中国经济的“二次开放”。自从中国加入世贸组织以来，该国已经保留——有时甚至加强了——所有它从更早时期起被允许留存的保护措施。现时所需的开放，与中国更多依靠内需的目标不谋而合，也与减少经济不平衡的全球议程相吻合。公司所有权、知识产权、金融与服务行业，以及公共采购，都是欧盟在此背景下有着迫切利益的领域。而在环境保护和气候变化方面的有效合作比其他任何东西都依赖这些议题。
2. 欧盟的第二个要求是对其市场的资本投入。尽管欧盟的对外账户余额保持为正，中国企业及其他群体还能为欧盟的增长做出很多。这与中国分散其持有资产的迫切需要不谋而合——欧洲至今相对其他地方而言是更为安全的投资地点。
3. 欧盟对中国的第三个要求是自身的安全。尽管所有的核不扩散法案以破坏规则的形式树立了错误的榜样，但伊朗国内的（核工业）发展直接影响到欧洲的核心利益。应该向中国明确无疑地表明：中国在这个问题上模棱两可的态度是与建立真实战略伙伴关系的愿望完全相悖的。你们应对中国施加影响力，不管是正面的还是反面的。
4. 广义上的人权——包括良好的治理以及可问责的制度——仍是对华关系中的困难领域。你们应该确保所有欧洲国家政府都不会是只能跟中国自己选择的代表会面。在承认和鼓励中国社会多样性增长的同时，你们不应在发生弊端的时候避而不谈。放弃普世价值，欧盟就会失去世界人民的尊敬。
设计复查议程
9月16日的讨论启动分清重要性和影响力的政治程序是重要的。理事会会议可以尝试：（1）形成同中国打交道的总体理念；（2）在相互负责和相互团结的行为准则基础上，在政策立场公认为重要/可达成的领域里达成一致；（3）确定九月之后在一些核心政策领域里形成更具体意见的程序。这个程序可以包括以下的一些元素：
1. 成立一个由委员会重要成员以及成员国一些专门的参与人员所组成的专责小组。这个专责小组将描绘我们的目标与我们举行的对华对话之间的相互作用，并将此连结到我们对议题的管理上，比如在能源效率和知识产权方面的合作。会议可在欧洲各国首都举行，保证对每一个议题有重要作用的会员国都能参与进来。
2. 专责小组可以帮助欧盟设定一些集体性的重要事项，并以政府领导人和理事会成员的名义将这些事项提交给北京当局。这能够回应中国方面不尽合理的要求，明晰欧盟的政策。
3. 该小组可以对如何改进现存的为数众多的对华对话之间的一致性提出建议，并用会员国的名义剔除冗余的渠道，或是将其捆绑到欧盟的程序上。
4. 该小组可以探寻如何最大程度地调动各成员国的对华专家和联络员资源，以及如何建立一个更强力的行政核心机构。由于走马换将并非缩小与中国文化和政治差距的最佳方式，新成立的欧盟对外行动署应征集和保留该领域的专业人员。
5. 最后，你们还应决定：欧盟必须改进与其在全球的所有伙伴打交道的方式。实际上，复查战略伙伴关系应有助于改善我们与每一个伙伴的成功关系。接连不断的改变目标可能败坏欧盟在这些21世纪新兴的强势实用主义国家中的名声。但恰恰是因为这些国家通常不愿奉行一套共同的价值观，它们可能在利益问题上分裂，正如它们也可能在面临外部压力的时候团结。如果欧盟在每种利益和每种价值观的基础上建立起观点相近的联盟和伙伴关系，就能获得中国的敬重。
如果欧洲各国外交部门在这些方向上支持新成立的欧盟对外行动署，他们的技能就能很好地得到发挥。尽量减少各自为战的情况，他们会在世界上成为一个规模骤增的经济体。欧盟比自己所能想的更有力量——但那是在他们选择了有效运用力量的方法的前提下。
此致
顾德明，高级政策研究员
马克·莱昂纳德，主任
【相关阅读】
请参阅这个索引贴：http://bbs.m4.cn/thread-173587-1-1.html
【原文】
Stronger than it thinks it is: how Europe should deal with China
By François Godement & Mark Leonard - 10 Sep 10
Dear Heads of State and Government of the Member States,
Re: The EU’s relations with its strategic partners
In a few days, you will discuss Europe’s relations with our strategic partners, following your Foreign Ministers’ informal debate on emerging powers. This unprecedented event reflects two key interlinked facts: firstly, the step towards greater co-ordination that our new Lisbon Treaty institutions now allow, but have yet to take decisively; secondly, a historical acknowledgement of the international system’s shift towards emerging economies. In this light, crafting a coherent foreign policy and security institutions to deal with rising powers like China comes not a moment too soon. Europe is often stronger than it may think, provided it mobilises its resources and streamlines its institutions.
Defining the challenge
The rise – or renaissance – of powers such as China and India should be seen as a triumph of the trade liberalisation and open investment policies pursued by industrialised nations.
But these new major powers also pose challenges to Europe at several levels.
• Their rise brings a need to rebalance the representation of nations within international institutions, from the UN to the IMF, G8 and G20. However, surrendering seats or voting rights will not automatically make states with a narrow definition of their national interests accept our world view of a multilateral legal order above nation-states.
• The fast growth of these nations also brings the challenge of dealing with increased strain on natural resources, along with environmental pollution and climate change.
• Questions about how the rising nations will use their power and voice on a range of security challenges - from Iran to North Korea.
• They will have to be persuaded that democratic governance is still the best long-term guarantee of further peace.
These challenges make it imperative to put in place the new institutions allowed by the Lisbon Treaty while working on coordination and sharing of responsibility between member states and the Council, with the help of the Commission. Nowhere is the challenge more real than with China. It is an industrial producer almost equivalent in size to the United States. It is now climbing the technology ladder with determination, has the world’s second military budget, and - many in Asia would also add - with territorial claims to match. For Europe the Chinese question is a multifaceted one, ranging from Africa to proliferation to international governance.
What does China want from the EU?
How should Europe respond to ensure a stable and mutually beneficial relationship with China? Your discussion next week presents a golden opportunity to address the goals of the relationship as well as its ways and means, starting by examining Beijing’s shortlist of what it wants:
1. Above all, to keep Europe’s markets open and expanding to absorb Chinese exports. China is therefore concerned about currency fluctuations, deflationary policies, and holding on to its own status of a developing economy for as long as possible.
2. Secondly, limiting the impact of interdependent trade and exchanges on China’s domestic economy and society. Here, Beijing needs a healthy, deep and open European capital market (reflected for example by key purchases of Spanish public bonds in July 2010) to allow China to hedge against overdependence on its largest debtor, the US. The 2008 global crisis has made China’s continued growth more dependent on Europe regardless of the short-term trends of bilateral trade. We have gained leverage, both positive and negative.
3. Thirdly, Europe’s policy towards external investment matters in Beijing – and reciprocally of course, it matters to Europe how our investors are treated by China in this sector, which is largely outside the purview of WTO. High technology and its corollary – intellectual property rights and patent protection – are also the heart of our future relations. They are the alternative to lose-lose protectionist conflicts. But we must remember that unilateral openings to Chinese goods have not necessarily paid off so far. And China’s request for market economy status is by now a symbolic claim, since it will happen automatically in the near future.
4. Almost all of China’s other needs are negative: non-interference in domestic issues, which unfortunately encompass human and religious rights as well as claims of territorial sovereignty. Only the lifting of the 1989 arms embargo would fill positive Chinese needs. A strong and well-coordinated Europe might well use a review of the embargo as a source of leverage, looking at dual use, confidence-building and China’s cooperation on issues such as the Iran nuclear portfolio.
What does the EU need?
Because the EU defines its interests more widely, Europe’s needs are much more extensive and varied than China’s. You should begin to prioritise these, and initiate a review process which will show how they can realistically be implemented, while making use of like-minded global partners on each of these goals. Europe’s short-list should include:
1. A “second opening” of the Chinese economy. Since China’s entry into WTO, it has retained – and sometimes reinforced – all the protection it had been allowed to keep from an earlier era. The opening that’s now needed coincides with China’s own goal to rely more on its domestic purchasing power and growth, and on a global agenda to reduce economic imbalances. Company ownership and IPOs, IPR, the financial and service sectors, and public procurement are all areas of pressing interest for Europe in this context. Effective cooperation on the environment and climate change hinges on these issues more than on any other.
2. Europe’s second need lies with capital investment into our market. Although Europe’s external account balance remains positive, there is much that Chinese firms – and others – can contribute to our growth. This coincides with a more pressing need by China to diversify its present holdings – and Europe is by far a safer investment than many other destinations.
3. Europe’s third need towards China concerns our security. Although all acts of proliferation set the wrong example by undermining rules, the developments in Iran concern directly Europe’s core security interests. China should be left in no doubt that its equivocations on this issue contradict any hope for a true strategic partnership. You should bring leverage to bear on China, both positive and negative.
4. Human rights in their wider sense – including good governance and accountability – remain an area of difficult relations with China. You should ensure that no European government is taken to task for meeting with representatives of its own choosing. While acknowledging and encouraging the growing diversity of China’s society, you should not shy away from pointing at abuses when they occur. By abdicating universal values, Europe would lose the respect of the world’s citizenry.
Designing a review process
It is important that the discussion of 16 September launches a political process for identifying priorities and leverage. The Council meetings could try to (a) formulate an overall concept for dealing with China; (b) to agree on the premises of a code of conduct for mutual accountability and solidarity in areas where a common policy stance is agreed as important/attainable; (c) to decide on the process after September to develop more concrete ideas in a number of core policy areas. This could include some of the following elements :
1. A taskforce that brings together key Commissioners and a few targeted participants from member states. This taskforce would canvas the interactions between our goals and the dialogues we hold with China, linking up for example our management of issues such as cooperation in energy efficiency and intellectual property rights. Meetings could take place in various European capitals, securing the involvement of member states which are key to each issue. Once started this process would generate ideas and maintain the momentum for coordination.
2. The taskforce could help the EU set a few collective priorities, and take these priorities to Beijing as government leaders and members of the Commission. This will answer a Chinese call, not wholly unjustified, for clarity in European policies.
3. It could make suggestions about how to improve the coordination of the numerous dialogues which exist with China, and decide as member states to cut down on duplicate channels or tie them to the European process.
4. It could look at how to mobilise the best expertise and contacts of member states on China as well as building a stronger cadre of civil servants. As a revolving door is not the best way to bridge the cultural and political distance to China, the new EEAS should enlist and retain expertise in the field.
5. Finally, you should also conclude that Europe must improve its game in dealing with all of its global partners. Indeed, the review of our strategic partnerships should improve our success with each of them. An accumulation of ever-changing goals may discredit Europe with the strong realist powers emerging in the 21st century. But precisely because these powers are often shy in implementing a compact of common values, they are as likely to split on any issue of interest as to unite against external pressure. On each of its interests and values, Europe will gain respect from China if it has built like-minded clubs and partnerships.
The skills of Europe’s national diplomatic services would be well-employed if they seconded the new EEAS in these directions. By minimising their separate endeavours, they would achieve economies of scale in a world which has suddenly become much larger. Europe has more power than it allows itself to think, but only if it chooses to use it in an effective way.
Yours sincerely,
François Godement, Senior Policy Fellow
Mark Leonard, Director 老欧洲又开始意淫了，你们有这个实力吗？
要求中国这、要求中国那，你们也配！
人权？别忙着恬着脸跟我们说人权，先把你们自己脸上的屎擦干净再说吧！ rha辛苦了，欧盟与中国的关系不容小视，虽然他们总是病怏怏的感觉。{:13_618:} 马克·莱昂纳德不就是《中国怎样思考》一书的作者嘛。 欧盟需要的和中国需要的，可以看出，欧盟想得到所有的东西，而中国啥也得不到甚至是主权。
中国只不过是欧盟这样一个高贵骑士手下的一个卑微的仆人。 谢谢翻译，这个报告的内容很空泛
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