【11.02.21 纽约时报】世界需要一个更有主见的中国
【中文标题】世界需要一个更有主见的中国【原文标题】The World Needs an Assertive China
【登载媒体】纽约时报
【原文作者】THOMAS J. CHRISTENSEN
【原文链接】http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/21/opinion/21iht-edchristensen21.html?ref=china
90年代末期，中国在“和平发展”的口号下成功地制定了发展政策，而如今的中国已经背离了这些原则。在过去两年里，中国损害了它与美国和其它邻国之间的关系。
从亚洲到华盛顿，对北京的不信任情绪都是显而易见的。观察家们经常说中国变得更有主见了，它修正了自身的战略方向，以反映2008年经济危机之后其自身的成长和美国的衰退。对中国这种反其道而行之的政策最好的理解是被动的、保守的，而不是有主见的。美国和其盟友应当鼓励北京回到它在经济危机发生两年前所奉行的那种果敢而又有建设性的政策上来。
在那段时间里，中国其实要比今天更加富有创新意识、更加主动，也更有主见。北京通过弱化传统上不干涉别国内政的原则，能够在国际问题上扮演一个有建设性的领导角色，还可以以此改善美中关系。
在2006年末和2007年初，北京通过多方和单方的途径敦促北朝鲜同意放弃宁边的核反应堆，这是六方会谈的唯一实质性进展。北京调整了在达尔富尔的政策方向，从保护喀土穆免受国际压力的影响，到2006年支持联合国的和平计划，再到承诺在2007年派遣第一支非洲以外的维和部队。2008年，中国还同意派出一支海军舰队前往亚丁湾，协助国际反海盗行动。联合国在当时允许国际力量进入索马里海域追捕海盗。
可惜的是，从2009年开始，中国失去了原有的那种积极的劲头，对别人的事情总是不耐烦地拒绝，这根本不是一个有主见的、自信的新兴大国势力的所作所为。
今年年初，中国对美国长久以来关注的台湾、网络自由和西藏等问题，用外交措辞摆出了强硬的态度。2010年7月，中国外交部长杨洁篪在回应美国国务卿希拉里克林顿有关多方合作，重建解决南中国海争端问题的信心的建议时，用尖锐的语言警告东南亚邻国，并反对与外部势力合作解决中国的领土争端问题。
2010年晚些时候，中国一艘渔船与日本海岸巡逻舰相撞，渔船船长被日方扣押。在中国的施压下，日本释放了这名船长，即使在此之后，北京依然要求日本对此道歉并给予赔偿。北朝鲜发动了两次严重的军事挑衅行动，并且明显违反了平壤核协议，中国不但拒绝直接谴责平壤，而且还试图阻止联合国安理会发表谴责声明。中国官方连续两次警告美国和韩国不要在临近国际海域举办军事演习。中国领导人通过这些行为让自己疏远于国际社会，尤其是韩国、日本和美国。
北京这种对抗性的姿态来源于在国际舞台上的自信和自身内部不安全感这两种因素奇怪的组合。自从2008年经济危机爆发以来，中国的公民、低层政府官员、媒体和网络评论人士纷纷夸大中国的国际影响力和美国势力衰退的程度。他们认为中国应当从国际舞台上全身而退，减少与美国及其盟友的国际合作。
根据我所接触到的中国人，北京的高层官员对中国的全球位置和发展面临的挑战，还是有比较清醒的认识，而哪些带有民族主义情绪的声音在国内制造出一种过激的政治环境。党内精英极为关注国内环境的长期稳定问题，因此希望尽量避免批判民族主义路线，因为这有可能激化针对中国官方各方面的抗议行为，从而引发全国性的混乱。尤其是在领导层转换期间，共产党将在2012年选举出胡锦涛主席的继任者。每个官员都希望塑造出民族自豪感和内部稳定的保护者的形象。
幸运的是，我从这些中国人中还了解到，北京内部的确存在一些意见的分歧，尤其是针对朝鲜的政策。如果想要影响这些争论的结果，华盛顿及其同僚需要继续鼓励中国在朝鲜、伊朗等问题上的多方合作中扮演积极的角色。但他们同时需要强调，尽管我们非常欢迎中国的合作，但无论中国是否参与，我们都要对挑衅行为做出反击。如果中国试图阻碍我们的计划，甚至仅仅是袖手旁观，中国都要为此付出代价。
奥巴马政府在2010年对此做出了良好的反应。说美国在奥巴马的领导下“重回亚洲怀抱”似乎过于夸张，但是华盛顿的对亚洲事务的介入的确更加密集，包括越来越多的高层互访。具体的行为包括美韩黄海军事演习，在华盛顿举行的美国、日本和海国三方国防会议表明，即使没有中国的积极参与，美国及其盟友也会对朝鲜形成一致的外交和安全态度。
北京应该不会去考虑怎样帮助美国、日本和韩国间的军事安全合作，包括反扩散安全协议中的导弹防御、反潜艇战争、搜寻朝鲜舰队等问题，也不会赞成日本为对抗朝鲜导弹威胁而发展潜在的进攻性武器。如果想让中国回到主动、果断、安全的政策层面上，还需要更多的理由。
到目前为止，华盛顿的做法虽然效果有限，但还是取得了积极的进步。例如，在胡锦涛主席访问美国之后，北京通过恢复军事对话和邀请美国国防部长Robert Gates访华来试图改进双边关系。还有迹象表明中国开始与东盟成员国接触，关注因北京在7月东盟区域论坛中抛出的威胁论而恶化的关系。作为对韩国在2010年12月进行的炮击演习的回应，中国准备在阻止朝鲜继续进行针对韩国的军事威胁中扮演更加积极的角色。
然而，我们没有看到北京通过在2006年到2008年间采取积极、果断的态度而获利。对于美国、其盟友和安全合作伙伴们来说，如何确保中国在未来的继续合作是一大难题，但是这一点在防止核扩散、金融稳定和气候变化等问题方面是至关重要的。从这个意义上讲，美国需要一个更有主见的中国。
原文：
In a departure from the largely successful policy of reassurance it adopted in the late 1990s under the slogan “peaceful rise,” in the past two years China has damaged its relations with the United States and most of its neighbors.
Mistrust of Beijing throughout Asia and in Washington is palpable. Observers often claim that China has become more assertive, revising its grand strategy to reflect its own rise and the America’s decline since the financial crisis began in 2008. China’s counterproductive policies are better understood as reactive and conservative rather than assertive, and Beijing should be encouraged by the United States and its allies to return to the more assertive but more constructive policies Beijing adopted in the two years just before the financial crisis.
In that period China was actually more innovative, proactive and assertive than it is today. By softening its traditional prohibitions on interference in the internal affairs of other states, Beijing was able to play a constructive leadership role in addressing global problems and improve U.S.-China relations in the process.
In late 2006 and early 2007 Beijing pressured North Korea multilaterally and bilaterally into agreeing to disable the nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, the only concrete progress in the six-party talks. Beijing also changed course on Darfur, from simply shielding Khartoum from international pressure to backing the United Nations’ peace plan in late 2006 to committing in 2007 to send the first non-African peacekeepers to the region. In late 2008, China also agreed to send a naval contingent to the Gulf of Aden to assist in international antipiracy efforts under a U.N. resolution that permits hot pursuit of pirates into Somalia’s territorial waters.
Unfortunately, since 2009, China has lost this positive momentum by reacting abrasively to events driven by others, hardly the stuff of an assertive and confident new grand strategy.
Early last year China adopted a rhetorically strident posture in response to long-held policies of the United States relating to Taiwan, Internet freedom and Tibet. In July 2010, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi responded to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s innovative multilateral confidence-building initiative for the South China Sea by warning Southeast Asian neighbors in caustic terms against coordinating with outside powers in managing territorial disputes with Beijing.
Later that year, Beijing demanded an apology and compensation from Tokyo even after Japan, under Chinese pressure, had released a Chinese captain whose fishing boat had collided with a Japanese coast guard vessel. After two severe military provocations by North Korea and a clear violation of Pyongyang’s existing nuclear commitments, China not only refused to condemn Pyongyang directly, it prevented the U.N. Security Council from doing so. Instead, Chinese officials twice warned the United States and South Korea against conducting naval exercises in nearby international waters. Chinese leaders thereby alienated many in the international community, especially South Korea, Japan and the United States.
Beijing’s new more truculent posture is rooted in a strange mix of confidence on the international stage and insecurity at home. Since the onset of the financial crisis in 2008, Chinese citizens, lower-level government officials, and media and Internet commentators have often exaggerated China’s rise in influence and the declining power of the United States, insisting that China push back against perceived slights and reduce international cooperation with the United States and its allies.
According to my Chinese interlocutors, top officials in Beijing have a much more sober assessment of China’s global position and of the development challenges ahead. Yet those nationalist domestic voices have created a heated political environment. Party elites are acutely concerned about long-term domestic stability and hope to avoid criticism along nationalist lines, a theme that has the potential to galvanize the many otherwise disparate local protests against Chinese officials into a national movement. Particularly during the leadership transition that will culminate in the Communist Party’s selection of President Hu Jintao’s successor in 2012, individual officials need to foster their reputations as protectors of national pride and domestic stability.
Fortunately, those same interlocutors report that there are real policy debates in Beijing, particularly about North Korea. In order to influence these debates, Washington and its partners need to consistently offer China an active role in multilateral cooperative efforts on North Korea, Iran, etc. But they must also emphasize that, while Chinese cooperation is greatly preferred, they will react to provocations with or without Chinese cooperation and that China’s interests will suffer if it obstructs those efforts or even stands on the sidelines.
In 2010 the Obama administration responded well to this challenge. It is a gross exaggeration to say the United States has “returned to Asia” under Obama, but Washington’s engagement in the region has been intense, including many high-level visits. More concretely, the U.S.–South Korean military exercises in the Yellow Sea and the trilateral meeting of Japanese, Korean and U.S. security officials in Washington demonstrated that the United States and its partners have diplomatic and security options regarding North Korea even without China’s active cooperation.
Beijing is unlikely to look with favor on the prospect of greater U.S.-Japan-South Korea security coordination on issues such as missile defense, anti-submarine warfare, searching of North Korean ships as part of the Proliferation Security Initiative, or the potential development of Japanese offensive strike weapons to counter North Korean missile threats. All the more reason for China to return to a more creative, assertive and reassuring set of policies to address the problem.
To date, Washington’s approach has had a positive, albeit limited effect. Beijing sought to improve bilateral relations in the lead-up to President Hu Jintao’s visit to the United States in January, for example, by restoring military-to-military dialogue and hosting U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates in Beijing. There are also signs that China is beginning to reach out to ASEAN member states to address ongoing security concerns that were exacerbated by Beijing’s bullying at the July ASEAN Regional Forum. China may also have played a constructive role in preventing North Korea from carrying through on its military threats against South Korea in response to the latter’s artillery exercise in December 2010.
However, we have not seen a return in Beijing to the proactive and assertive mind-set exhibited in 2006-2008. For the United States and its allies and security partners, securing this kind of Chinese cooperation in the future may be the highest hurdle to clear but will be essential in addressing problems from proliferation to financial instability to climate change. In this one important sense, the United States needs a more assertive China. 感想楼主的翻译，很长时间没见了 90年代，中国走和平发展成功了，我依然相信今天中国走的这条曲折道路依然会成功，只是需要时间证明。
现在，越来越觉得“网路自由”其实不是为了政治安全上考虑，因为中国允许VPN和在线代理服务，信息是不能被阻断的，尤其是有4亿网民的中国。我更倾向于认为，这种对外国一些网站的封锁实际上是为了保证国内社交网络的发展壮大，事实证明，腾讯、新浪微博是这种网路封锁政策的受益者。瞧瞧中国的微博注册用户，超过了5亿（腾讯4亿，新浪1亿）。爾Twitter在全世界，总共才不到2亿！！如果开放Twitter，腾讯也不用做微博了，新浪也会倒闭。（这不是危言耸听）
我可以直接无视或者说，嘲笑这句话嚒？
媒体和网络评论人士纷纷夸大中国的国际影响力和美国势力衰退的程度 主见不就是自己的意见和看法么，什么时候变成别人的看法了？ 我觉得这个“主见”是“普世价值和普世情怀”羞答答的面纱~~
:lol: 看不懂这厮在说神马！ 这家伙的意思好像是说帮西方背书，不和西方对抗才叫有主见，可能脑子进水了吧。 看完了，不知道作者要说明什么，文言文阿 NYT就是意见多的很 我认为世界需要一个更加强硬的中国！ 朝鲜问题就算了，西藏、台湾、钓鱼岛这个可能不强硬么？ 不敢有主见，有主见你们又该说我们傲慢了。
这个论点本身就很有趣，他们要求中国有主见，可他们所说的这个“主见”到底是什么呢？依照美国制定的规则玩游戏叫“主见”吗？乖乖做顺民，不去挑战美国老大的权威，叫“主见”吗？一边“循循善诱”告诉中国该怎么做，一边又道貌岸然的说，要有“主见”！拿人当三岁孩子吗？！ 如果中国试图阻碍我们的计划，甚至仅仅是袖手旁观，中国都要为此付出代价。
满仓 发表于 2011-3-2 13:08 http://bbs.m4.cn/images/common/back.gif
不知道美国准备付出多少代价来交换？我怕你付不起！ 不知道美国准备付出多少代价来交换？我怕你付不起！
三季稻 发表于 2011-3-2 18:16 http://bbs.m4.cn/images/common/back.gif
顶! Q33)那好像是美国的主见，管我中国什么事，不是按照你说的来说就是没主见？看来这个所谓的“民主国家”就是个法西斯嘛！ 不按“救世主”制定的规则行事，就是威胁。不接受“救世主”的意见，就是没有主见。 这人到底知不知道自己在说什么啊？ 刚刚不是有个记者说中国傲慢，向世界输送价值观吗？怎么这回又说没主见了？伺候你们真不容易，算了，别理这些疯子，我们该干嘛干嘛，等足够强大了，丫的再胡说九道，找个大规模杀伤武器什么的借口，一巴掌干过去！ 西方记者的“主见”就是中国不要对抗西方的利益，要听西方国家的话做奴才。 中国得走自己的路！
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