【2011.06.30 金融时报】搞清中国想要什么Working out what China wants
英媒：中国到底想从崛起中得到什么2011-07-04 08:20 环球时报
摘要：我们知道西方想从复兴的中国得到什么，也清楚中国不想从西方得到什么。但在当前全球地缘政治巨变中，对中国希望从崛起为强国中得到什么，我们并无明确概念。
英国《金融时报》6月30日文章，原题：搞清中国想要什么 我们知道西方想从复兴的中国得到什么，也清楚中国不想从西方得到什么。但在当前全球地缘政治巨变中，对中国希望从崛起为强国中得到什么，我们并无明确概念。
同许多欧美评论家一样，我常倾听中国学者、官员和外交人员的谈话。几年前，在国际会议上还鲜见他们的身影，在到访过北京的人眼中，所有中方人员只抱有同一种世界观。但如今时过境迁。几个月前，我听一位中国高官不经意透露，中央党校内对中美关系存在分歧。某些仍抱有意识形态情结的人认为美国只笃信硬实力，其他人则认为中国的利益仍有赖于（与美国的）合作与竞争。
除了对新崛起大国缺乏连贯政策的欧洲，西方国家中的美日很清楚想从新中国那里得到什么。一个尽管过时但仍有用的短语很好表达了美日的愿望：利益攸关方。这要求中国捍卫发展以规则为基础的全球秩序。北京有理由抗议这是西方构建的体系，但美国能辩称它为中国崛起提供了必要架构。
在这场争论的另一面，中国决策者坦率地表明他们不想从西方得到什么。在中国“说不”的名单上，首位是任何可能挑战其领土完整的企图。其次是可能干扰中国日渐繁荣进程的对抗行为。更加自信的北京正竭力防止任何危及经济增长和社会秩序的国外破坏活动。第三个禁忌是西方对中国的政治说教。本周，英国首相受到中国总理的公开训斥，中国早就受够了英国在人权问题上的指手画脚。
现在该问问中国对这个充满不确定性的世界有何野心了。没错，中国希望获得与其伟大和古老文明相称的地位。经济崛起使其战略利益得到极大扩张。不过，中国是否有意打造一种不同的国际秩序？其军事触角能延伸多远？中国认为本国政治和经济模式比西方的更具竞争力吗？这都是些难以得出答案的问题。推理能提供某些答案。解放军在南海的活动和军费开支表明中国渴望令美军后撤，与巴基斯坦的同盟关系彰显保护中国石油供给线安全的战略分量，分而治之的策略暗示（中国）意在利用欧洲当前的虚弱来削弱大西洋两岸的盟友关系。
中国越是崛起，其利益就扩展得越广泛。有多广泛？中国并无意填补美国让出的全球霸主角色。其实力受到太多制约，想想它周边地理环境，印日还有美国，此外我们就不知道了。不过，我认为中国自己也不清楚。▲（作者菲利普•斯蒂芬斯，王会聪译）
June 30, 2011 11:04 pm
Working out what China wants
By Philip Stephens
We know what the west wants from a resurgent China. We have a pretty good sense of what China doesn’t want from the west. What’s missing from this story of global geopolitical upheaval is a clear idea of what China wants from its rise to great power status.
Like many European and American commentators I spend a fair amount of time listening to Chinese scholars, officials and diplomats. A few years ago such figures were a rare sighting on the international conference circuit. And visitors to Beijing were left feeling that their interlocutors had been carefully screened to admit only one view of the world.
Not any more. Some months ago I listened to a Chinese vice-minister casually acknowledge divisions at the illustrious Central Party School about relations with Washington. Some among the keepers of the ideological flame thought the US would only ever understand the currency of raw power; others that China’s self-interest still lay in co-operation as well as competition.
Chinese academics speak quite openly, albeit off-the-record, about the conflicting currents in Beijing – between nationalists and liberals, generals and party leaders. The implications of the coming generational change at the top of the party are keenly debated.
One leading scholar was heard to say recently that Hu Jintao, who steps down next year as China’s president, had been little more than a “petty bureaucrat”. The west was in for a surprise when the generation of president-in-waiting Xi Jinping took office. These young leaders had been shaped and hardened by Mao’s Cultural Revolution. They would not be shy of wielding power.
Others are not so sure. One prominent (and very rich) business leader argues that the grinding process of getting to the top in the Chinese system militates still against a radical break with the past. What’s clear from most such conversations, though, is that Deng Xaoping’s admonition that China should hide its strength is nowadays observed more in the breach than the observance. Talk that China wants to take back charge of its East Asian neighbourhood is no longer met with protestations about a misreading of more benign intentions.
The west, which, absent a coherent European policy towards the rising powers, mostly means the US and Japan, is pretty clear what it wants from the new China. It was summed up in the worn, but still useful, phrase coined by Robert Zoellick, World Bank president, when he called for Beijing to behave as a “responsible stakeholder”.
This sees China taking its place in defending and developing the rules-based global order. Beijing has a point when it protests this is a western construction. Yet the US can argue that it has provided the essential framework for China’s rise.
On the other side of the fence, Chinese policymakers make few bones about what they don’t want from the west. Top of the list is any hint of a challenge to China’s territorial integrity. Support for more autonomy in Tibet or Xinjiang or for Taiwanese independence is a hostile act – an effort to foment the break-up of the Chinese state.
Second on the don’t-want list is a confrontation that would disturb the course of China’s rising prosperity. As much as it is now more assertive than Mr Deng might have liked, Beijing is anxious to avoid any rupture abroad that might jeopardise growth and social order at home. China will retaliate against, say, US arms sales to Taiwan, but within carefully-calibrated bounds.
A third taboo is western lecturing about China’s political and social order. David Cameron was reminded of this this week when he received Wen Jiabao in 10 Downing Street. The British prime minister got a public dressing down from the Chinese premier. China had had enough of British “finger-pointing” about human rights.
The snub was calculated. Accompanying officials let it be known that Mr Wen’s subsequent stopover in Berlin was much the more important leg of his European trip. This was partly, of course, because of the much more valuable trade and investment relationship between Germany and China. But Angela Merkel, it seems, is also careful to make rather less of a public fuss about dissidents.
Beijing does not want to see any extension of intervention in the affairs of sovereign states. If China joins in telling others how to behave, others will claim legitimacy in telling it how to behave. Liberal internationalism also makes it harder for Beijing to strike dodgy deals with dubious regimes producing vital natural resources.
Chinese officials will agree there is sometimes a balance to be struck. Beijing has signed up to United Nations principles on the rights of citizens as well as states. But it will only go so far. Thus, while it allowed UN authorisation for intervention in Libya, Mr Wen insists the western military action was a mistake not to be repeated elsewhere.
So far, so clear. It is when you ask about China’s ambitions for its place in the world that inscrutability sets in. Yes, China wants a role commensurate with its history as a great and ancient civilisation. Yes, its economic rise has greatly expanded its strategic interests. But does it want to shape a different international order? How far will it extend its military reach? Does it see its own political and economic model competing more widely with western liberal capitalism? These are questions that rarely elicit illuminating responses.
Inference provides some of the answers. The activities of the People’s Liberation Army in the South China Sea and the present tilt of military spending point to the desire to push back US forces. A close alliance with Pakistan underlines the strategic weight given to safeguarding China’s supply lines to and from the oil-rich Gulf.
A strategy of divide and rule suggests a conscious desire to capitalise on Europe’s present weakness and undercut the Atlantic alliance. The more China rises, the wider will be the spread of its interests.
How wide? China is not bidding to fill the role of global hegemon recently vacated by the US. There are too many natural constraints on its power – think geography, India and Japan as well as the US. Beyond that, we do not really know. But then nor, I suspect, does China. 强硬才有力量
嗜杀 发表于 2011-7-5 20:11 http://bbs.m4.cn/images/common/back.gif
要有实力才可以强硬 中国当然清楚自己的利益扩展将会有多广泛——像历史上一样——中国人所能到达的地方都有中国的利益，都受中国的影响！
中国的发展规划是以百年计的，而西方的发展计划是以四年计的，哪里能够想像一个大国的胸怀和眼界！ 普天之下，莫非王土 《诗经·小雅·北山》，全诗共五章，前二章：
第一章：
陟彼北山，言采其杞。偕偕士子，朝夕从事。王事靡盬，忧我父母。
[译文：登上北山，采摘枸杞。健壮男子，日夜不息。王家差事，无尽无休；思我父母，令我忧愁。]
朱熹《诗集传》解释说：“大夫行役而作此诗，自言涉北山而采杞以食者，皆强壮之人而朝夕从事者也。盖以王事不可以不勤，是以贻我父母之忧耳。”
第二章：
溥天之下，莫非王土，率土之滨，莫非王臣。大夫不均，我从事独贤。
[译文：普天之下，皆是王土，四海之内，皆是王臣。大夫失职，行事不公；以我为贤，派遣不停。]
《诗集传》解释说：“言土之广，臣之众，而王不均平，使我从事独劳也。不斥王而曰大夫，不言独劳而曰独贤，诗人之忠厚如此。”
《毛诗序》说：“《北山》，大夫刺幽王也。役使不均，已劳于从事，而不得养其父母焉。” 注曰：“笺云：‘此言王之土地广矣，王之臣又众矣，何求而不得？何使而不行？……王不均，大夫之使而专以我有贤才之故，独使我从事于役，自苦之辞。”
由此来看，此诗是针砭周幽王政治弊端的，这就告诫执政者，要注意做事公正。治国不能没有差役，但是，国土广博，官员众多，不能偏劳几个人，鞭打快马，却使有些人只顾享受清闲。从诗中的主人公来说是幽怨之情，但对执政者来说则是借鉴。在此，“溥天之下，莫非王土，率土之滨，莫非王臣”不是重点，重点在于“大夫不均，我从事独贤”。 周边宵小该教训还是得教训！{:12_558:} 中国要称霸全球 我心仓单、厚积薄发，广积粮缓称王，这都是成功的经验~大家莫要着急.... 时间在我们这边
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