【外交政策110721】米国挑拨：巴基斯坦，中国不是你的奶爸
本帖最后由 corie_zhu 于 2011-8-2 15:59 编辑【原文标题】Sorry, Pakistan: China Is No Sugar Daddy
【中文标题】对不起，巴基斯坦：中国不是你的甜心爹地
【登载媒体】外交政策网
【来源地址】http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/07/21/sorry_pakistan_china_is_no_sugar_daddy
【原文作者】URMILA VENUGOPALAN
【译 者】薄凉（多谢杰西Jesse的大力帮助）
【翻译方式】人工
【声 明】本翻译供Anti-CNN使用，未经AC或译者许可，不得转载。
【译 文】Sorry, Pakistan: China Is No Sugar Daddy
对不起，巴基斯坦：中国不是给你糖吃的爸爸
When the chips are down, as the saying goes, you quickly learn who your friends are.
当筹码落地，正如俗语说，这个时候你就会得知你的朋友是谁。
With the Obama administration's recent decision to suspend some $800 million in U.S. aid to the Pakistani military, the generals in Rawalpindi are once again turning to their "all-weather" friends in Beijing. Although the White House's action is unlikely to lead to a total cutoff of military assistance, the figure is significant, representing more than one-third of the United States' annual commitment to Pakistan.
奥巴马政府最近决定推迟对巴基斯坦军方的8亿美元援助，拉瓦尔品第的将军们再次转向他们在北京的“全天候”朋友。虽然白宫的行为不可能导致巴基斯坦的军事援助总体受阻。但这个数字的意义重大，代表着美国每年向巴基斯坦承诺的三分之一。
Reflecting his government's displeasure at the move, Islamabad's ambassador to Beijing, Masood Khan, pointedly announced that "China will stand by us in difficult times as it has been doing for the past years." His statement was designed to show Washington that Pakistan has other powerful friends. Implicit in Khan's message was also an expectation that Beijing would indeed provide enhanced military, and perhaps other, assistance.
出于对美国这一举动的不满，巴基斯坦驻中国大使马苏德·汗针锋相对的说：“中国将在我们困难时期站在我们身边，因为它在过去数年都这么做的。”他声明的目的在于向华盛顿表明巴基斯坦有其他强大的朋友。马苏德·汗的潜台词就是，期望北京方面向他的国家提供军事或别的援助。
Are Pakistani leaders unduly optimistic about Chinese largesse? Or does Washington's loss of influence provide Beijing an opportunity to deepen its ties with Islamabad?
巴基斯坦领导人是不是过度乐观的认为中国会慷慨解囊？还是说美国对巴基斯坦影响力的丧失给北京与伊斯兰堡加深关系提供了契机？
On the face of it, there are ample historic and strategic reasons for China to increase military aid to Pakistan. After all, Islamabad is Beijing's closest ally in South Asia, and both are keen to limit Indian influence.
表面来看，中国有充足的历史和战略理由增加对巴基斯坦的军事援助。毕竟，伊斯兰堡是北京在南亚最亲密的盟友，两国都非常希望限制印度的影响力。
Pakistan has also benefited from substantial trade and economic ties with China, particularly in infrastructure and mining. Beijing is Pakistan's largest trading partner, a relationship that was worth almost $9 billion last year
巴基斯坦也得益于与中国的大量经济和贸易联系，特别是在基础设施和采矿业方面，北京是巴基斯坦最大的贸易伙伴，去年这种关系创造的价值几乎达9亿美元。
Military ties have been a key feature of Sino-Pakistani relations; Beijing is now Islamabad's largest defense supplier. China has helped build elements of Pakistan's conventional and nuclear forces. It has participated in joint aircraft manufacturing programs,as well as helped Islamabad acquire tactical ballistic missiles, according to Jane's, and sensitive nuclear technology
军事联系历来是中巴关系的主要特征；北京现在是伊斯兰堡最大的国防供应商。中国帮助巴基斯坦建设核力量中的常规元素。据简氏防务周刊的消息，中国还参与了联合飞机制造程序，以及帮助伊斯兰堡获得战术弹道导弹，和敏感的核技术。
China's worries over its internal security provide a further motivation to bolster Pakistan's stability. Concerns about Islamist militancy on its western border have grown since the 2009 Uighur riots in the Xinjiang autonomous region, which left nearly 200 people dead. Violence once again broke out in the restive region this week, though not on the same scale as two years ago. In the remote town of Hotan, state media claimed that police shot dead 14 rioters, heightening tensions between the central government and the Uighur community.
中国对自身内部安全的忧虑为巴基斯坦寻求稳定提供了进一步的动力。自2009年造成近200人死亡的新疆“七·五事件”发生以来，中国对其西部边境的伊斯兰武装势力的关注持续上升。本周该地区再次发生暴力事件，虽然不是两年前的规模。在和田一个偏僻的小镇，官方媒体宣称警方击毙了14名暴乱分子，这一事件加剧了中央政府与维吾尔族之间的紧张关系。
The Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), a Uighur separatist group that Beijing often blames for terrorist attacks China, appears to have a sanctuary in the borderlands of Afghanistan and Pakistan. TIP leaders were killed in South Waziristan and North Waziristan, in September 2003 and February 2010, respectively. Chinese leaders fear that the reduction in U.S. military aid to Pakistan -- coupled with the impending drawdown of American troops from Afghanistan -- could afford the Uighurs a safe haven outside Beijing's control.
东突伊斯兰党（TIP）是北京经常谴责的在中国境内制造恐怖袭击的维吾尔人的分裂主义集团。它似乎已经在阿富汗和巴基斯坦的交界处拥有了一个避难所。东突伊斯兰党领导人分别在2003年9月和2010年2月在南瓦济里斯坦和北瓦济里斯坦被打死。中国领导人担心美国减少对巴基斯坦的军事援助，加上即将从阿富汗撤军，可能将给维族武装分子在北京控制之外的地方提供一个避风港。
Indeed, Afghanistan looms large in China's strategic calculus. Media reports highlighting the discovery of nearly $1 trillion in untapped mineral deposits in Afghanistan surely have piqued Chinese interest in bolstering relations with Kabul. With its export-oriented economy heavily dependent on raw material imports, the prospect of cheap resources on China's periphery is understandably appealing. Acutely aware that Pakistan's generals will play an integral role in Afghanistan's future, Beijing will be keen to leverage its close ties with Rawalpindi.
事实上，阿富汗在中国的战略算盘中正变得越来越重要。媒体报道强调，阿富汗发现了近1万亿尚未开发的矿藏必将激起中国的兴趣并加强与喀布尔的关系。鉴于外向型经济在很大程度上依赖进口原料，中国周边廉价资源具有相当的吸引力。巴基斯坦的将军们敏锐地意识到，在阿富汗的未来将发挥不可或缺的作用，北京将热衷于利用与拉瓦尔品第的密切关系。
But only up to a point. The relationship is more asymmetric than Pakistan would like to admit. For this reason, it makes perfect sense for Islamabad to "foster the impression that new tensions with America might nudge it even closer towards China," as the Economistrecently observed.
但有一点，这对双边关系比巴基斯坦愿意承认的要不对称。出于这个原因，它使伊斯兰堡完美的感觉到“与美国的新的紧张局势可能稍有改变甚至促进与中国的关系，”《经济学家》杂志最近就指出了这一点。
Beijing does not necessarily feel the same way. While Islamabad may be an ally, its utility is confined to South Asia; Pakistan is not central to Beijing's wider ambitions. As a world power, Chinese interests are global in scope and require a more considered approach. Consequently, the Chinese are rightly wary of getting drawn into the acrimonious marriage between Islamabad and Washington. And acrimonious it is. The chief of Pakistan's top intelligence service is, for example, reported to have told lawmakers that "America is an unreliable ally," presumably in sharp contrast with China. But Beijing has benefited from U.S. involvement in Pakistan. As Daniel Markey of the Council on Foreign Relations told me, the Chinese have thus far been content to "free-ride on U.S. efforts to stabilize Pakistan." The mainland may well share Washington's concerns about Pakistan's future, but it has preferred to let Americans bear the costs of improving the country's security.
但北京不一定有同样的感觉。虽然巴基斯坦可能算是盟友，但其用途仅限于南亚，巴基斯坦不在北京的更广泛的野心中央。作为一个世界大国，中国的兴趣在全球范围内，因而需要一个更慎重考虑的行事方法。因此，中国是警觉的卷入伊斯兰堡和华盛顿之间的尖锐的“婚姻”。例如，有报道称，巴基斯坦情报部门负责人告诉国会议员说：“美国是一个不可靠的盟友”，大概是在与中国形成鲜明对比。但北京受益于美国在巴基斯坦的参与。正如美国外交关系委员会的丹尼尔·马基说的，中国迄今在稳定巴基斯坦问题上一直在搭美国的便车。中国可能分享华盛顿对巴基斯坦的未来的担忧，但它更愿意让美国人承担改善国家的安全费用.
From Beijing's perspective, being seen to take a provocative stand alongside Pakistan comes at a substantial cost but provides little strategic benefit. An escalation in Chinese aid to Pakistan would surely antagonize India, creating a new point of friction in the triangular relationship between Beijing, New Delhi, and Washington. While keen to maintain pressure on certain issues, such as Indian support for the Dalai Lama and its various territorial claims, leaders in Beijing have no desire to push New Delhi further into Washington's open arms.
从北京的观点来看,被外界视为采取一个和巴基斯坦一致的挑衅立场是有着巨大的成本，但提供很少的战略利益。在中国对巴基斯坦的援助的升级肯定会得罪印度，在北京，新德里和华盛顿之间的三角关系创造一个新的摩擦点。虽然中国热衷于保持在某些问题上的压力，如对印度支持达赖及其各领土要求，但中国领导人没有进一步推新德里进入华盛顿怀抱的愿望。
In any case, expanding its relationship with Pakistan out of short-term opportunism or a desire to one-up the United States is not in keeping with China's style. Beijing prefers to play the long game, and the open-ended nature of any prospective financial commitment to Islamabad is enough to sharpen the minds of Chinese leaders. The risk of instability within Pakistan is simply too high for Beijing to willingly step in and become the country's main patron. At the end of 2008, according to a 2010 Brookings Institution report, Pakistan-- on the verge of default -- sought China's support to avoid having to meet the restrictive terms of a $7.5 billion IMF loan. But Beijing offered only tough love, sending a token commitment of $500 million, which was read as "a clear message to Pakistan that it is no longer willing to be Islamabad's lender of last resort."
在任何情况下，出于短期机会主义或一下子超越美国的愿望扩大同巴基斯坦的关系并不适合中国的风格。中国更喜欢采取持久战略，未来对巴基斯坦任何潜在的金融承诺都足以加深其在中国领导人心目中的印象。巴基斯坦不稳定的风险极高，北京并不愿介入并成为这个国家的主要赞助者。在 2008年底,根据2010年布鲁金斯学会的报告,巴基斯坦——在违约的边缘，寻求中国的支持——为了避免需要符合国际货币基金组织75亿美元贷款的限制性条款。但是北京只愿提供5百万美元象征性的承诺，被解读为向巴基斯坦传递一个明确的信息，即中国不再愿意扮演巴基斯坦最后贷款人的角色。”
According to China expert June Teufel Dreyer of the University of Miami, despite Pakistan's desire to show Washington that it has other partners, "it is impossible for Islamabad to replace U.S. aid with Chinese aid dollar for dollar, renminbi for renminbi." One reason, according to unnamed U.S. officials cited in a recent Financial Times report, is that "Beijing does not 'do' assistance in the same way as Washington and that Pakistan is made to pay for the help that it receives from China." Generous credit terms from China have clearly helped Pakistan, the newspaper notes, as evidenced by the 8,000-odd Chinese citizens involved in various Beijing-backed infrastructure investments in the country. These range from rebuilding and expanding roads to constructing dams and ports.
据迈阿密大学的中国专家 June Teufel Dreyer，尽管巴基斯坦显示华盛顿的其他合作伙伴的愿望，它不可能用中国援助的美元和人民币取代美国对伊斯兰堡的援助。一个原因是，据引述一个没有透露姓名的美国官员最近在《金融时报》的报告：北京是以与华盛顿不同的方式来支助巴基斯坦的。中国宽松的信贷条件已经明确地帮助了巴基斯坦。该报指出，由8000多名中国公民参与了巴基斯坦各种支持基础设施投资。主要涉及重建和扩大道路，建造水坝和港口。
A financially constrained Pakistan has also approached China for soft loans to pay for orders of jointly developed JF-17 fighter aircraft, according to a recent Jane's Defence Weeklyarticle. Other major acquisitions that could be funded through Chinese loans are on the horizon: up to six Chinese submarines, two 500-ton missile boats, and two squadrons of Chengdu J-10 fighter aircraft, according to Jane's. Pakistan is also considering acquiring at least another four Chinese frigates, either larger and improved F-22P ships or another design, Jane'sreports. Such defense assistance might well be increased in direct response to the reduction in U.S. military, and other, aid to Pakistan. To this end, Beijing will continue to feature among Islamabad's strongest supporters
据近期简氏防务周刊的报道，受财政约束的巴基斯坦还希望得到中国的软贷款，以支付两国共同开发的JF -17战斗机的订单。巴基斯坦还希望通过中国贷款得到其他重要的收购：六艘中国潜艇，两个500吨级导弹快艇，和两个中队的成都J -10战斗机。巴基斯坦也正在考虑购买另外至少有四艘中国护卫舰，或者更大的改进的F - 22P型船舶和其他装备。在美国的军事及其他援助减少的情况下，这种防御援助可能增加。为此，北京决定做巴基斯坦最坚定的支持者。
But these steps hardly add up to a fundamental realignment of Chinese aid policy. For all its emotive rhetoric, As a result, China is unlikely to institutionalize the kind of financial commitment that the United States has made -- even as Washington's influence over Islamabad continues to wane.
但这些措施很难加起来构成中国援助政策的根本性调整。对于所有的情绪化的言辞，结果中国是不太可能将对巴基斯坦做出的承诺制度化，类似美国所做出的
，尽管华盛顿对伊斯兰堡的影响继续减弱。
本帖最后由 lyycc 于 2011-8-2 16:37 编辑
不要再为自己粉饰了，说白了，美国就是在卸磨杀驴~
现在拉登死了，美国也成功的令恐怖组织将袭击目标由美国转移到阿富汗临或巴基斯坦这类亲美政权身上~
现在在南亚印度才是美国手里的牌，巴基斯坦已经是美国打出去的牌了~
所以现在的巴基斯坦对于美国来说已经没有什么利用价值了，所以美国想要收回之前对巴基斯坦的种种许诺~ 我就说最近维族人闹事一定与美国有关糸吧！ 好酸、好酸 要不是被枪顶着反恐，巴基斯坦鬼才要老美的援助
现在被反过来倒打一耙，为了要钱，才反恐.....真狗屎 这个……可以算作吃醋吗 爱咋说都行啊，这就是话语权。。。 米国才援助了巴基斯坦几个钱？够巴基斯坦为米国当保镖的费用吗？
还有巴基斯坦为了米国死的那些大批的百姓又怎么算？ 就一个招呼都不打一下直接冲进别人首都圈开枪杀人的国家还有脸说这话啊……
忘了MD从来就没过脸…… 好酸 酸死了 中国对巴铁的援助，岂能是用金钱可以衡量的！巴基斯坦的人民最清楚谁才是真正的朋友 中国不是巴的“奶爸”，美国却连朋友都不算 怎一个酸字了得
如果巴基斯坦和华盛顿有婚约的话，已经扯碎多次了 sugar daddy 不是专门包养小女孩的怪叔叔吗？楼主的翻译没有把意思说到位啊。 :LPH值严重小于7
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