【外交政策110805】经济是否二次衰退？美学者更担心中国
本帖最后由 lilyma06 于 2011-8-12 14:51 编辑【中文标题】多糟才算糟？
【原文标题】Just How Bad Is Bad?
【登载媒体】外交政策
【来源地址】http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/05/just_how_bad_is_bad
【译 者】lilyma06
【翻译方式】人工
【声 明】本翻译供Anti-CNN使用，未经AC或译者许可，不得转载。
【译 文】
Nouriel Roubini and Ian Bremmer debate the double-dip recession and whether China could end up like Europe's PIIGS.
努里尔•鲁比尼和伊恩•布雷默讨论二次衰退以及中国是否会如欧洲债务危机一样结局。
With global markets in a tailspin and the Dow Jones industrial average down more than 9 percent in the past month, jittery investors are wondering whether this is a second coming of the Great Recession and whether an increasingly insolvent United States and Europe's weak periphery will be able to weather the storm. Are we seeing the first slide into a double-dip recession? Is the euro doomed? And can China stay above the fray? Foreign Policy asked two of the world's most prescient market watchers, Nouriel Roubini and Ian Bremmer, for their views about what they see in the months and years ahead.
随着全球市场呈现一片混乱，道琼斯指数上个月降低超过9%，紧张不安的投资者们思考这是否是第二次大萧条的到来，美国和欧洲越来越无力还债以及疲软的周边是否能渡过难关。这是否是二次衰退？欧元是否要终结？中国能否置身事外？《外交政策》访问了世界上有先见之明的市场观察者努里尔•鲁比尼和伊恩•布雷默，看看他们关于这几个月以及明年的一些看法。
Perhaps it's not surprising that Roubini, better known as Dr. Doom, sees the outlook as being "more scary" than it was two or three years ago -- but it's less systemic failures that concern him than the total inability of buffoonish politicians and weak governments to do anything about it. They're "out of policy bullets," says Roubini.
或许不奇怪“末日博士”鲁比尼认为当下要比两三年前的情况“更糟”。但相对于体系破产来说政客的丑态无能以及政府的懦弱更令他担心。鲁比尼说，他们“用完了政策子弹”。
Bremmer is a bit more sanguine. "I don't believe that we're heading for a second recession," he says. "But I think that it's going to feel like a recession for an awful lot of people." What really worries him is China: While Europe and the United States try to muddle through the mess, "the Chinese are kicking a bigger can farther down the road than anyone else." In short, the global economy might get a whole lot worse before it gets better.
布雷默则更乐观些。“我不认为我们会走向二次衰退，”他说,“但是对于相当多的人来说感觉却是马上要衰退了。”真正让他担忧的是中国：当欧洲和美国试图敷衍了事的时候，“中国却比其他人走的更远。”简而言之，全球经济在变好之前可能情况更糟。
Excerpts follow.
节选如下
Foreign Policy: It's obvious now, if it wasn't before, that the economic outlook is not good. But how bad are the systemic market factors and what's the near- to medium-term future of the strength of the global economy?
《外交政策》：很明显如果不是之前的话经济展望不会好的。但系统性市场因素和近中期的未来全球经济的实力究竟有多糟糕？
Nouriel Roubini: At this point there is serious risk of a double-dip recession in the U.S. and most other advanced economies. If you look at the latest numbers from the United States, from GDP growth in the first quarter, to consumption, to housing, to even the labor market figures today, they are very weak. were better than expected because expectations were low and the unemployment rate fell only because 200,000 people got so discouraged that they left the labor force. Otherwise it would have gone up.
努里尔•鲁比尼：在这点上美国和其他发达经济体有着很严重的二次衰退的危险。如果你仔细看美国最近的一些数字，从第一季度GDP增长，到消费，到住房，再到今天的劳动力市场数字，他们都是很脆弱的。（失业数字）要比预期好，因为之前预期很低，而失业率只是因为20万人感到气馁离开了劳动力市场才下降的。否则的话失业率会上升的。
So everything is suggesting that we are already at slow speed and now with a 10 percent market correction, the wealth effects, and the widening of credit spreads can make that worsening of business, consumer, and investor sentiment even worse. And that's in United States.
所以一切都表明我们正处于缓慢的速度以及现在10％的市场调整，财富效应，信用利差扩大，这些都可能使企业，消费者和投资者的情绪更加恶化。这是在美国的情形。
In the eurozone periphery, five countries are already in a recession: Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, and Spain. Three of them have lost market access, and at this point, the chances that Italy and Spain are going to lose market access are very high. And Italy and Spain are "too big to fail," or too big to be bailed out. The United Kingdom has had flat economic activity for three quarters. Japan had a double dip and is going to recover just because of the reconstruction for a few quarters.
在欧元区外围，五个国家：希腊，爱尔兰，葡萄牙，意大利和西班牙已经在衰退。其中三国已经失去了市场准入，在这一点上，意大利和西班牙将失去市场准入的机率是非常高的。 而意大利和西班牙要么是“太强大了不会失败”或者是太强大了不会被保释出来。英国三个季度以来经济活动很平稳。而日本几个季度以来由于福岛之后重建会进行二次恢复。
And now the kind of forward-looking indicators like global PMI suggest there is also a massive slowdown in the growth of the countries that were growing very fast: China, India, emerging markets, and those countries like Australia that were growing because of their resource orientation. The outlook to me looks very bleak.
如今全球PMI（私人抵押贷款保险）前瞻性指数表明，也有大量增长速度非常快的国家增速放缓：这些以其资源取向来增长的国家例如中国，印度，新兴市场以及和澳大利亚，他们的前景我看起来非常暗淡。
I think the most important difference compared to the past is that we are running out of policy bullets. The U.S., the U.K., and the eurozone are doing fiscal contraction. There's going to be a fiscal drag on the idea of backstopping the banks that are running out of those options -- because now governments are distressed.
我认为与过去相比最重要的区别，就是我们用完了政策子弹。美国、英国和欧元区正在财政紧缩。因为现在各国政府都很苦恼，这些选项用完之后支助银行会有财政拖累。
Another problem is governments cannot bail out their banks, but actually sovereign risk is becoming banking risk because of the exposure of the banks to government debt. We may see a little more quantitative easing, but the European Central Bank is not going to do it, the Bank of England is not going to do it because inflation is above targets, and the Fed is going to do a little -- but too little too late, and it's not going to make much of a difference at this point. Last year, $600 billion of QE2 and a trillion dollars of additional tax cuts and transfer payments give us a growth of 3 percent for one quarter. But growth was averaging below 1 percent.
另一个问题是，政府无法帮助银行摆脱困境，但实际上是主权风险正成为银行风险，因为银行揭露了政府债务。我们可能会看到更多些的量化宽松，但欧洲央行并不打算这样做，因为通货膨胀超过了目标，英格兰银行也不打算这样做，而美联储会做一点 - 但量太小也太晚了，在这一点上也不会有太大区别。去年，6000亿美元的（量化宽松2）和一万亿美元的额外减税和转移支付使一个季度增长了3％。但经济增长（在去年其他三个季度）平均低于1％。
So how are we going to get out? We are running out of policy bullets. The policymakers don't have monetary bullets; they don't have fiscal bullets; they cannot even backstop their own financial system. That's why it's more scary than a year ago, two years ago, or three years ago -- when we had all these policy bullets. Now we are running out of them.
那么我们如何走出去？我们已经用完了政策子弹。政策制定者不具备货币子弹，也没有财政子弹，他们甚至不能支持自己的财务系统。这就是为什么要比一年前，两年前，三年前更可怕，因为当时我们有这些政策子弹。现在我们用完了。
FP: Ian, is this then a political problem as well? Has this new "age of austerity" put enormous pressures on governments? Do you feel as bleakly about the future as Nouriel does?
《外》：伊恩，这在当时也是个政治问题吗？这个新的“紧缩时代”给各国政府施加巨大压力了吗？你对未来也像努里尔那样表示暗淡吗？
Ian Bremmer: The one place that I am probably less bleak is that I don't believe that we're heading for a second recession. Again if we're defining it as a couple quarters of negative growth, but I think that it's going to feel like a recession for an awful lot of people. But the level of both uncertainty and volatility in the markets is absolutely going to be sustained through this electoral cycle. Obviously that hurts President Obama, and it hurts Congress even more. The political figures right now for the general views on Congress are the worst they've been since the New York Times started taking records in 1977. That's extraordinary. And it's because there's a view among a solid majority of Americans that the United States' economy is actually entering into structural doldrums and no one is prepared to do anything about it.
伊恩•布雷默：只有一点我不觉得那么暗淡，我不认为我们正在走向第二次衰退。如果我们将其再一次定义为几个季度的负增长，但我相信对于很多人来说感觉就像衰退一样。但市场的不确定性和波动的水平绝对是要通过这种选举周期来维持。显然，这伤害了奥巴马总统，更伤害了美国国会。自从1997年《纽约时报》开始记录大众对于国会的意见以来，目前的政治领导人是记录最差的，这太不寻常了。这是因为在大多数美国人中间有一种坚定的看法认为，美国的经济实际上正进入结构性低迷，而且没有人打算做什么来改变。
Where I agree with Nouriel is that I think that the ability to engage in massive policy redress is not there. You'll see some version of a QE3 in the United States -- I think that's right, and no one expected we'd be talking about that six months ago. But you're still talking fundamentally about muddling through. That's true in the United States, it's true in Japan, and it's certainly true in Europe. And the big change that we've seen politically in the last few months is that there really was a belief in the markets that, yes, the debt limit deal was going to prove obstreperous, but ultimately the Democrats and Republicans knew that they had to work for something that would be the outlines of a deal -- and then, after the elections, the U.S. was going to start treating the deficit seriously.
我同意努里尔的是，我认为没有能力进行大规模政策矫正。你在美国会看到一些量化宽松3的版本 - 我认为这是正确的，谁也没有料到，我们半年前就提到这些了。但你还是说从根本上得过且过。这在美国、日本都是事实，在欧洲也肯定是事实。而在过去数月的政治方面的巨大变化是确实相信市场方面，是的，债务限额政策证明市场难驾驭性，但最终民主党人和共和党人知道，他们不得不做些决策概述 - （2012年总统）选举后，美国将开始严肃处理赤字问题。
Well, what we are seeing is two things. First of all, there's now a lack of belief that that's going to happen in the United States. So the willingness of people to believe that when pushed against a wall Congress will be able to act effectively, that confidence is gone. And whether or not there are coming downgrades from the ratings agencies, you're going to see downgrades in the way big money -- not just smart money -- thinks about America. That's clearly driving the direction we've seen over the last couple days.
那么，我们看到的是两件事情。首先，人们不相信这会在美国发生。因此，人们愿意相信，当推倒国会墙将能够采取有效行动，信心已经一去不复返了。是否有评级机构降级，你会以降级的方式去看待美国赚大钱 - 不只是聪明钱。这在过去的几天已经清楚地看到推动未来的方向。
This is not just a short-term covering of bets. This is more structural. And then there's the issue of a confluence of economic crises. If this were just about the United States right now I'd feel much more confident that the U.S. can handle a couple more quarters, even a year, of anemic growth. But heading into an election season when the major European economies are seeing their spreads widen and are seeing investor sentiment turn against them very quickly, the ability to create contagion into the U.S. markets is significant. That's where we need to worry. Structurally, I think the world is in a much more problematic place right now than in many ways it has been in the past couple years.
这不只是一个短期覆盖的投注。这涉及更多结构方面的问题。然后还有一个经济危机的合流问题。如果这只是对美国的现在，我对美国可以处理几个季度甚至一年的缓慢增长觉得更有信心。但是进入选举季，欧洲主要经济体都看到他们的差价扩大，投资者反对情绪越来越快，能够进入美国市场创造的不良影响意义重大。这都是我们需要担心的。从结构上来说，在很多方面我认为全球相比过去几年来说现在处于一个更成问题的地方。
FP: Where do we need to act first?
《外》：我们首先要在哪里采取行动呢？
NR: First of all, an anemic, subpar, below-trend growth -- a "U-shaped" recovery -- is the best we can hope for because this was a recession caused by financial crisis caused by too much debt and leverage, first in the private sector and now in the public sector. And my own work, on America and others, suggests that whenever you have a balance sheet recession, you're going to have anemic growth at best for many years as there is a painful process of deleveraging. You have to spend less in the private and public sectors to save more, or destabilize to reduce debt and leverage. And that takes many years. We have barely started the deleveraging of government and the debt levels of many financial institutions are very high.
鲁：首先，缓慢的欠佳低于趋势的增长“U形”恢复是我们可以希望的最好的，因为金融危机引起的经济衰退最开始在私营部门和现在在公共部门已引起太多的债务。而且我自己的工作，对美国和其他国家表明，只要你有一个衰退资产负债表，你就会至少会几年增长乏力，因为去杠杆化过程很痛苦。就必须减少在私营和公共部门的花费来节省更多，或减少债务和杠杆来打破平衡。这需要许多年时间。我们刚刚开始政府减债，许多金融机构的债务程度是非常高的。
The best we can do is to avoid a double-dip recession, but now we have had a whole bunch of additional tail risks: rising commodity prices, the Middle East petroleum pricing that led to more geostrategic risk and higher oil prices, the Japanese earthquake that slowed down growth globally, renewed worries about the periphery of the eurozone, and now worries about the unsustainability of the U.S. fiscal deficit and the ugly fight we had that led almost to government shutdown and then to almost a technical default on Treasuries.
我们能做的就是最好避免二次衰退，但现在我们有一大堆的额外尾部风险：商品价格的上涨，中东地区的石油定价导致更多的地缘政治风险和高油价，日本地震使全球增长放缓，欧元区外围的再度忧虑，现在担心美国财政赤字的不可持续性和丑陋的战斗，这些已经几乎导致政府关闭，以及国债的技术性违约。
So these are lingering additional shocks. One day the trouble comes from Greece or the next day it comes from worries about the United States, or the next day it comes from worries about Italy and Spain losing market access, or the next day it's Portugal and Ireland again, or it's the United Kingdom or Japan. Private and public debt problems -- whether it's the housing sector or the financial system or central and local governments -- are going to be repeated sources of systemic shock, of risk aversion, or market worries.
因此，这些都是挥之不去的额外冲击。今天麻烦来自希腊，明天又来源美国的担忧，又或哪一天担心意大利和西班牙失去市场准入，又或是葡萄牙和爱尔兰，英国或日本。私人和公共债务的问题 - 无论是住房或金融系统或中央和地方政府 - 是要重复全身休克来源，规避风险，或是市场忧虑。
But these are not problems that are going to resolve anytime soon because these debt and leverage issues have to be reduced gradually for many years. So every other month, or every other week, or every other quarter, we're going to have another sector or another country or another government being in trouble. And that's going to have a negative effect on markets -- and the last thing you need right now is a market correction that's going to potentially lead to a double-dip recession.
但这些问题都不会很快解决，因为这些债务和杠杆问题多年来已经逐渐减少。因此，每隔一个月，或每隔一周、一个季度，我们都将有另一个部门或其他国家或其他政府陷入困境。这就是对市场的负面影响。最后一件事情，市场修正可能导致二次衰退。
We could get back into a negative feedback loop between the real economy, asset prices on the downside, and sovereign and private debt -- all of which risk leading to more market corrections, more widening, more negative wealth effects feeding back to the real economy.
可能回到实体经济、衰减的资产价格，和主权债务和私人债务之间的负反馈循环 - 所有这些风险都会导致更多的市场调整，更多的扩大，更多的负财富效应回馈实体经济。
We may be back to that vicious circle of falling asset prices, widening credit spreads, and weakening economic activity that we had in 2007-2009.
可能会回到2007-2009年间的资产价格下跌，信用利差扩大，经济活动疲软的恶性循环中去。
FP: Ian, do you also see the economy slipping back into the bad old days?
《外》：伊恩，你也觉得经济倒退至以前糟糕的日子吗？
IB: Where I'm concerned is that the global political environment is much less conducive to resolving shocks as they were in 2008 when the United States and Lehman Brothers was in crisis. Well, the G-20 and everyone was suddenly panicked, but everyone was focused on one thing -- which was what can we do so that this doesn't lead to a meltdown in the global financial system. Gillian Tett in the Financial Times wrote a little bit breathlessly that today reminds her of 2008, that it's very similar. I think it's very different.
伊：我担心的是，全球的政治环境要比在2008年时解决美国和雷曼兄弟危机的冲击更不利。当时G20和每个人顿时惊慌失措，但每个人都集中在一件事情上 - 这是就是我们能做些什么来使全球金融体系不会崩溃，。吉莲•邰特在《金融时报》上写道，今天让她想起了2008年，这非常相似。我认为这是非常不同的。
I don't think the severity or the shock is anywhere near as great. We're not talking about the sudden implosion of the world's financial markets. But I think the financial ability to respond isn't there; we don't have the same commonality of purpose. All of this is occurring against the process of global rebalancing where the countries that are growing extremely strongly are also countries that are important creditors to the United States and Europe, most notably China. And I think that in 2008 these guys were suddenly faced with an "Oh my god, what happens if the U.S. suddenly goes under?" You know, "We need to do everything possible to shore up this system."
我不认为冲击的严重性会接近多大。我们不是在谈论世界金融市场的突然内爆。但我觉得金融的反应能力是不存在的，我们没有相同的目的共性。在增长很强劲的国家，当然也是美国和欧洲的重要债权国，尤其显著的是中国，所有这一切对全球再平衡过程产生攻击。我认为2008年，这些家伙突然面临着这样一个场景“噢，我的上帝，发生了什么，如果美国突然破产了怎么办？”你知道，“我们需要尽一切可能来支撑这个系统。”
But the Chinese are taking a much longer-term view right now -- which is, we need to hedge away from the U.S., we need to try to decouple ourselves. The long-term structural implications of the U.S. and the Europeans not getting their house in order quickly are much more dangerous this time around than they were in 2008, even if 2008 represents a much greater short-term shock and potential catastrophe than today presently does.
但目前中国采取了一种长期的观点 - 这就是我们要规避美国风险，我们需要努力去耦自己。美国和欧洲的长期结构性影响没使他们房屋更有序，比他们在2008年状况更加危险，尽管2008年表面比今天更大的短期冲击和潜在的灾难。
Keep in mind that in 2008 we had the worst recession that the country had experienced since the Great Depression and we could have had a depression. We're at least an order of magnitude away from that right now, maybe two orders. But structurally, we actually have much greater danger as a consequence of the relative autonomy, clear-sightedness, and the willingness of a lot of the players out there to act strategically.
请记住，我们在2008年已经历了大萧条以来最严重的经济衰退，我们可能变得很沮丧。至少一个数量级上，或者两个数量级上。但在结构上，由于相对自治、目光敏锐我们其实有更大的危险。
I agree with what Nouriel said so strongly -- that we don't have a lot of policy bullets right now. One or more of the players in the developed world that are facing real structural troubles need to come up with a credible solution to make the markets feel more confident that, over the long term, we are going to see some real sustainable growth. The United States government shows no ability to do that; none of the European peripherals show any ability to do that. Only the Germans do, but they're not what's causing the crisis right now. And the Japanese show no capacity of doing that, so it's a much broader and more systemic problem this time around, even if the level of shock doesn't rise to the same level.
我也十分同意努里尔说的“我们现在没有太多政策子弹了”。发达世界一个或多个玩家正面临着真正的结构性麻烦，这需要拿出一个可靠的解决方案来让市场更有信心，从长远来看，我们将看到真正的可持续增长。美国政府没有能力做到这一点;欧洲周边也没有能力做到这一点。只有德国人可以，但不是他们导致了现在的危机。日本也没有能力这样做，所以这一次即使休克程度没有上升到同一程度，这还是一个更广泛和更系统性的问题。
FP: So where are the economic wise men in all this? The last time we faced a crisis of this sort there were Larry Summers, Ben Bernanke, and Tim Geithner. We had at least a sense that there were some economic mandarins trying to guide the global response. But who's there now?
《外》：那所有这一切经济智者在哪里？上一次我们面临的这种危机时有拉里•萨默斯，本•伯南克和蒂姆•盖特纳。我们至少从某种意义上说也有一些试图引导全球响应的经济高官。但现在呢？
IB: From my perspective, I look at someone like Olli Rehn as incredibly impressive, even inspirational, in the sense that he is doing the best he can possibly do. And yet what he is saying is, "The best the Europeans can do is muddle through." I don't know what Nouriel thinks from the American perspective, but that strikes me as sort of an ominous leitmotif for where we are right now politically.
伊：从我的角度来看，我觉得像欧洲经济和货币事务委员专员奥利•雷恩就令人印象深刻，甚至是鼓舞人心，在这个意义上，他是做得最好的。他还说道，“欧洲人可以做的最好的就是蒙混过关。”我不知道努里尔从美国的角度怎么看，但从政治上我们目前的位置给我一个不祥的主调。
NR: Well you know, there may be individuals that might have leadership ... but I think the fundamental problem is not the individuals. It's that in most advanced economies; they have weak governments. In the U.S., we have divided government. Two parties: one doing taxing; the other doing spending cuts. In the peripheral eurozone, minority governments from Portugal to Spain lead to eventual loss of market access. In Italy, there's a buffoon like Berlusconi. In the U.K. we have fragile cohesion that might also fall apart. In Japan, we might have soon enough six prime ministers in the last five years -- it's worse in Italy in terms of political instability in the 1960s and '70s! Even in Germany, which is growing robustly, Angela Merkel is not particularly popular within her own party, let alone with the opposition.
鲁:你知道，个人有可能有领导权......但我认为最根本的问题不在个人，而是在其最发达的经济体中;他们的软弱的政府。在美国，我们有已经分裂的政府。两党派：一个征税;另一个削减开支。在欧元区周边从葡萄牙到西班牙的少数政府最终失去了市场准入。在意大利，有一个像贝卢斯科尼这样的丑角。在英国，我们的凝聚力很脆弱，也可能会散架。在日本，最近五年可能很快就有六个首相-这比20世纪60年代和70年代的意大利政治不稳定性更糟！即使在增长强劲德国，默克尔在其自己的政党内都不是特别受欢迎，更遑论与反对派。
I think the fundamental problem is that tough choices need to be made -- gradual fiscal austerity, structural reform -- imply governments that can look beyond electoral cycle. And we don't have a situation in which this is possible, when growth is anemic, unemployment is high, and deleveraging is painful. Governments don't have the leadership to do the right thing, not nationally, and not in terms of international cooperation. So, smart individuals might be here and there, but fundamentally, there is a political economy problem in most advanced economies that remains unresolved.
我认为最根本的问题是需要作出艰难的抉择 - 渐进的财政紧缩政策，结构改革 - 表明政府有必要可以超越选举周期。同时，当增长疲弱，失业率高，痛苦的减债下我们也没有一些可能的情形。政府不具备领导能力去做正确的事，而不是全国性地以国际合作形式。所以，聪明的人可能会在各处，但从根本上说，在最发达经济体中有一个政治经济问题仍然没有得到解决。
FP: To what extent is China an issue here? You said that growth will probably slow a little bit there, but is currency imbalance a fundamental cause of this?
《外》：中国在这里是怎么样一个程度的问题？您说了增长有可能会有一点点慢下来，货币失衡是根本原因吗？
IB: Look at what the Chinese have been doing with their currency over the last couple years: They have been addressing it, but addressing it at their own pace, with inflation in mind and with very different constituencies that have different interests in terms of growth and unemployment.
伊：这就要看什么中国在过去的几年怎样利用其货币了，他们已经解决这个问题，但是按自身速率解决的，还要考虑到通货膨胀和不同的利息增长和失业下不同的选民。
I think that China is an issue because it understands better than anyone else that the short-term electoral cycles in the West are going to create inability to make the kind of policy moves that are required to create long-term sustainable economic growth and trajectory. So as a consequence, if you're China right now, you don't believe long-term sustainability of the dollar as the world's reserve currency. Even if you were concerned in 2008-2009 about what Americans would be able to consume to continue to allow China to have a more managed transition to its own internal rebalancing, you don't believe that anymore. You believe that you're going to be forced to rebalance domestically much more quickly.
我认为中国比其他任何人都能更好地理解西方的短期选举周期无力使政策发展，需要建立长期的可持续经济增长的轨迹。因此，如果中国现在不相信美元作为世界储备货币的长期可持续性。即使是在2008-2009年关注美国能够继续允许中国有更多的管理过渡到其自身的内部重新平衡，你再也不相信了。你相信你将被迫更快地在国内重新平衡。
I think that China's economic decision-making is going to be forced into a faster pattern towards not only getting up the value chain, but towards building their own consumption. And that's going to put a lot of strain on the Chinese domestically, and it will create greater risks within the Chinese economy. I don't think that's something to fear, however, and I'm probably more bullish than Nouriel is as we look out over the next two years.
我认为中国的经济决策是被迫进入到一个更快的模式，不仅仅是获得价值链，而是努力形成自己的消费。在中国国内施加一个很大的压力，将在中国经济内部产生更大的风险。我不认为这有什么担心的，不过，对于未来两年我可能比努里尔更加乐观。
But I think that the point is that the decision-making going on in China, which previously had really basically embraced a win-win of interconnectedness and mutually assured economic structure between the U.S. and China, is rapidly getting eroded. One final point I'd like to make is that there's nobody out there that's more interested long term in a sustainable euro than the Chinese, as an effective hedge against the dollar. If you watch what the Swiss franc has been doing recently, you know that there aren't many places for these guys to move to if the euro isn't strong -- and if the euro does really fall apart, I think we should watch very carefully the relationship between China and Germany.
但我认为关键在于中国的决策，以前基本上包含美中之间一个双赢的相互联系和相互保证的经济结构，现在正在快速被侵蚀。最后一点我想说的是再没有人比中国更对作为对美元有效对冲的长期的可持续欧元更感兴趣。如果最近你观察瑞士法郎在做什么，你会就知道，如果欧元不够强的话，这些货币也没有空间发展 - 如果欧元真的瓦解了，我认为我们就要十分注意中国和德国之间的关系了。
FP: Nouriel, what do you think of the future of the eurozone? Is it doomed?
《外》：努里尔，你怎么看欧元区的未来？它要终结了吗？
NR: Well before I get to that, I think China is part of the problem: They're still allowing very slow appreciation of the RMB , aggressively intervening. And since the RMB is shadowing U.S. dollar, every other emerging market from Asia to Latin America is shadowing the RMB; and therefore the appreciation of undervalued currencies -- in countries that have large current account surpluses, countries that have commodity currencies -- is not occurring fast enough. The countries that have large deficits are going to have weak domestic demand because of the leveraging of the public sectors, so they need to grow to get net export growth, which implies a weakening of the dollar in other currencies of countries.
鲁：在我得出结论之前我认为中国是问题的一部分：他们还积极干预，人民币升值很慢。自从人民币影响美元以来，每一个从亚洲到拉丁美洲的新兴市场也都在人民币影响下;因此被低估的货币升值 – 在拥有庞大的国际收支经常项目顺差的国家以及商品货币的国家 –影响不够快。有巨额赤字的国家将不得不因为公共部门杠杆作用而国内需求疲弱，所以他们需要增长来达到净出口的增长，这意味着美元在其他国家货币中地位削弱。
So the surplus countries that were oversaving have to save less and consume more and let their currency appreciate. But, if anything, China has responded to its slowing net exports not by boosting consumption -- which is now up to 33 percent of GDP -- but rather by pushing fixed investments from 40 to 50 percent of GDP. By 2013, China is going to have a hard landing -- because no country is going to be so productive that you invest every year half of your GDP into new capital stock. You're not going to have at the end of the day a massive NPL problem, a massive public debt problem (the Chinese public debt is now 80 percent of GDP), and a massive amount of overcapacity that's going to lead this investment boom into investment bust.
因此，过分储蓄的盈余国家要减少储蓄和加强消费，让本国货币升值。但是，如果有的话，中国对其净出口放缓而不是刺激消费有所回应 - 这是目前国内生产总值的33％ - 但是推动固定资产投资占GDP的比重是40％到50%。到2013年，中国将不得不硬着陆 - 因为没有一个国家每年将国内生产总值的一半投资生产，投入新的资本存量。你不会在一天内结束大规模不良贷款问题，庞大的公共债务问题（现在中国的公共债务占国内生产总值的80％），大量的产能过剩会导致这种投资热潮转化为投资萧条。
As for the eurozone, I would say, for sure, that they'll be restructuring public debt and banking debt. In Greece first, in Portugal and Ireland next, and if Italy and Spain were to lose market access (something I think is likely), there is not going to be official money enough -- with the deficit then tripled -- to backstop both Italy and Spain. Secondly, even if you can deal with banking debt and public debt to orderly restricting of this debt, you're not going to have economic growth unless you restore competitiveness. And unless the euro goes back to parity to the dollar, something unlikely, or unless you go through a painful deflation, it is unlikely to occur and is going to create even more recession. Then, if you cannot grow yourself out of a competitiveness problem, if you cannot devalue yourself out of the problem, then the only option is to exit the monetary union. I think in the horizon of the next three to five years, the chances that the weaker members of the eurozone, starting with Greece and Portugal, are going to decide of the costs of staying in the union are greater than the benefits.
至于欧元区，我会说，可以肯定，他们将公共债务和银行债务重组。首先在希腊，其次是葡萄牙和爱尔兰，如果意大利和西班牙失去市场准入（我认为这是可能的），官方钱就会不够了 - 然后三倍赤字支持意大利和西班牙。其次，即使可以有序地处理银行债务和公共债务这笔债务的限制，除非恢复竞争力，否则不会有经济增长。除非欧元可跟美元平价，这也是不可能的，除非痛苦的通货紧缩之后，这不大可能发生，并可能造成更大的经济衰退。其次，如果不能壮大自己的竞争力问题，如果解决贬低自己的问题，那么唯一的选择就是退出货币联盟。我认为未来三到五年欧元区较弱的成员，从希腊和葡萄牙开始，要决定留在联盟的成本大于收益的代价。
The point is that the current approach to the eurozone problem is not a stable equilibrium; it is an unstable disequilibrium. Kicking the can down the road, going from private to public debt to supernational debt, throwing more good money after bad money, is not going to work. Either the EU is going to move in the direction of a greater political, economic, and fiscal union, toward integration; but I don't think this is likely because the German conditions for accepting a fiscal union is that the periphery gives up all fiscal autonomy. So if that's not going to happen, then the other outcome of this unstable disequilibrium is first, orderly and disorderly restructuring, and eventually, a breakup of the eurozone. I think it's a likely scenario.
重点是解决欧元区问题的目前的做法不是一种稳定的平衡法，是一种不稳定的不平衡。把罐子踢到路上，从私人到公共债务，再到多国债务，坏钱之后扔更多的好钱的办法是行不通的。欧盟是朝更大的政治，经济和财政的联盟的方向走向融合，但我不认为这有可能是因为周边放弃所有的财政自主权才使德国接受财政联盟的条件。因此，如果这不发生的，那么这种其他不稳定不平衡的结果是首先的，有序和无序的结构调整，并最终成为欧元区的解体。我认为这是一个可能的情节。
FP: Ian, do you see this devolution happening in Europe?
《外》：伊恩，你觉得这种权力下放会在欧洲发生吗？
IB: First of all, on Europe, I'm generally much more bullish, but I'm much more bullish because I come from a different perspective. Economically, everything that we're talking about here makes an awful lot of sense, but politically, there's strength among the actors across the eurozone -- both the European leaders themselves and corporate leaders, who have very strongly petitioned across the continent recently the importance of protecting a single currency, as well as the strength of European institutions.
伊：首先，对于欧洲我通常更乐观，但我更乐观的原因是因为我从不同的角度来看。经济上，我们这里所说的一切都很有意义，但在政治上，整个欧元区各成员的力量 - 无论是欧洲领导人还是企业领导人，最近都表达了他们保护单一货币，以及欧盟机构的实力的重要性的非常强烈的请愿。
Let's face it, the European institutions, and I'm talking about the ECB , the European Commission, the European Parliament, are much stronger than they were five years ago, 10 years ago, 20 years ago. They absolutely want a stronger Europe over time. It is true that it's going to be much more onerous on these peripheral states to accept the loss of sovereignty that's implied by coordinating fiscal policy, much more so than the loss of sovereignty implied by common currency policy, which was required when they first put the eurozone together.
让我们面对现实，欧洲机构，我谈论的是欧洲央行、欧洲委员会、欧洲议会要比五年前、10年前，20年前更强大。他们绝对希望随着时间的推移会有一个更强大的欧洲。当然让这些周边国接受根据整合的财政政策表明的失去主权政策更艰巨，要比最开始把在欧元区放在一起的公共货币政策所表明的失去主权更难。
But even if the present equilibrium is not sustainable, I do think that the muddling through will lead to increasing restrictions -- first soft restrictions, then hard restrictions -- that will indeed ultimately lead to a stronger fiscal union and will take away a significant amount of sovereignty for these countries. You're already seeing that with the existing Greek, Portuguese, Spanish austerity, some of which is very significant, absolutely reflecting a giving-away of fiscal sovereignty. It may not be legally required, but effectively required by the markets. It's certainly required for the Germans, the French, and the European institutions to buy into any bailout.
但是，即使目前的平衡是不可持续的，我认为，敷衍了事会导致越来越多的限制：首先是软限制，之后硬限制，这的确会最终导致一个更强有力的财政联盟，会带走大量国家的主权。你已经看到，现在的希腊，葡萄牙，西班牙财政紧缩，其中一些是非常重要的，完全反应财政主权的丧失。这可能不是法律要求的，但却是有效的市场要求。这当然需要德国，法国和欧洲的机构买进救助。
I think that process is already under way. It's very, very messy; it's very ugly. From a political perspective, I can see it continuing much more likely than a breakup. The real point is that this has been the year of kicking the can down the road. The Europeans are doing it; Japanese are doing it; the Americans are showing that they're doing it. And the biggest danger is (though, I personally don't think it's 2013-2014; it's later) is the Chinese are kicking a bigger can farther down the road than anyone else.
我认为该过程正在进行中。这是非常混乱，也非常难看。从政治的角度来看，这极有可能会是解体。真正的问题是，已经把罐子踢到路上一年了。欧洲人、日本人都这样做，美国人也表明这样做着。最大的危险（我个人不觉得是2013年至2014年，而是这之后）是中国一个更大的罐子比其他任何人都踢得远。
They have the greatest job to do. They have the economic structures required, the biggest changes in their governments, both economically and politically, much greater than the challenges presently faced in Greece or Spain, Portugal or Italy, and they are in some way, they are the least set up to accomplish it. And the steps that they're taking presently are pushing off the day of reckoning, while, at the same time, the global economy is requiring it of the Chinese even faster. And so, even though China looks like a great story right now for the next year, two years, long term, that's the one that's going to come back and bite us, the one that we're going to need to pay the most attention to.
还有工作要做。要求的经济结构，政府的最大变化，经济和政治上要比目前希腊或西班牙，葡萄牙和意大利所面临的挑战要大得多，它们在某种程度上要完成它。目前，他们正在采取的步骤是推迟结账的日子，同时全球经济甚至要比中国要求的更快偿还。所以，尽管中国在未来一年，两年，长期看起来就像一个伟大的传说，但是他也会反过来咬我们，我们需要最密切关注他。
本帖最后由 lyycc 于 2011-8-12 16:14 编辑
呵呵，这里面有人预言中国2013年境界可能硬着陆哦~
我不懂经济，也许有可能~
但是仔细看看他们对于美国、欧盟、中国等国家 的经济政策全都品评了一番，而且用的是春秋语法，含糊其辞~但给出的解释几乎全都是否定的~
其实他们就是一群悲观论者，他们只关注一切悲观的事物，所以他们能将这次经济危机的起因经过以及各国经济政策中的问题剖析的非常透彻，但就是无法给出解决之道~
为什么？因为在悲观者得眼中是永远也看不到希望的，所以他们只能指出问题所在却无力回天~
所以如果想要了解一下经济危机的经过及起因，可以仔细看看他们的文章，但是如果想要找到一个更好的可以应对这次危机的有效政策，他们的文章就如同垃圾一样，甚至还不如垃圾，因为垃圾只会让人恶心，而他们的文章却能制造恐慌~ 中国最大的问题是穷得要命还借给富人大笔钱，更要命的是富人压根就没想过要还钱！ 对我这个文盲来说，太深奥了
不过怎么觉得这访谈都是在说些没意义的场面话 末日博士说中国要硬着陆。问题是中国真的如他所说投资比例这么高吗？我怀疑 嗯，到2013年年底，我们重新来看这个帖子。 鬼雄 发表于 2011-8-13 11:05 static/image/common/back.gif
嗯，到2013年年底，我们重新来看这个帖子。
中国这架飞机人会硬着陆，欧美这几架飞机会软着陆。
或者说，
中国这架飞机会着陆在飞机场，硬着陆。
欧美这几架飞机会着陆在沼泽地，软着陆。{:soso_e120:} cofy 发表于 2011-8-14 03:53 static/image/common/back.gif
中国这架飞机人会硬着陆，欧美这几架飞机会软着陆。
或者说，
其实，他们的担心一直比较悲观罢了。 十多年前就有了中国崩溃论！
其实二十多年前也有！ :L怎么这些所谓的经济学家竟说这么些个屁话，还是沙发说的对啊，他们就是一队悲观论者而已！ 没有看出来他们针对中国的特别的看法。
中国是有着庞大的外汇储备，借出外债也过多。但美国倒了，还不上债了，中国也就跟着会倒么？
那些，只不过是中国的储蓄而已！有多少中国人会因为存的钱没有了，就活不下去了？
相反，美国赖掉中国的债之后，还会有他今日的国际地位吗？
页:
[1]