【纽约时报110904】威胁论升温 美担心中国海上争霸
本帖最后由 lilyma06 于 2011-9-6 13:25 编辑【中文标题】中国的海上挑战
【原文标题】China’s Challenge at Sea
【登载媒体】纽约时报
【来源地址】http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/05/opinion/chinas-challenge-at-sea.html?_r=1
【译 者】杨靖旼
【翻译方式】人工
【声 明】本翻译供Anti-CNN使用，未经AC或译者许可，不得转载。
【译 文】
AMERICA’S fiscal woes are placing the country on a path of growing strategic risk in Asia.
美国的财政困难将国家置于一个来自亚洲发展战略危机的困境中。
With Democrats eager to protect social spending and Republicans anxious to avoid tax hikes, and both saying the national debt must be brought under control, we can expect sustained efforts to slash the defense budget. Over the next 10 years, cuts in planned spending could total half a trillion dollars. Even as the Pentagon saves money by pulling back from Afghanistan and Iraq, there will be fewer dollars with which to buy weapons or develop new ones.
民主党热衷于保护社会消费，共和党紧张于努力避开增税，两党都认为国家债务应该得到控制，因此，我们可以期望看到持续削减国防开支的努力。去年，全部削减的开支可能有5,000亿美元。包括连五角大楼也通过从阿富汗和伊拉克撤军而节省开支，可以用于购买武器和研发新武器的钱越来越少了。
Unfortunately, those constraints are being imposed just as America faces a growing strategic challenge. Fueled by economic growth of nearly 10 percent a year, China has been engaged for nearly two decades in a rapid and wide-ranging military buildup. China is secretive about its intentions, and American strategists have had to focus on other concerns since 9/11. Still, the dimensions, direction and likely implications of China’s buildup have become increasingly clear.
不幸的是，这些财政上的自我约束恰恰是美国需要面对的、日益增长的战略挑战。在每年以10%的经济增长的中国，已经近二十年都在致力于各方面的快速军力建设。中国对其意图处于保密状态，而美国的战略家们在9/11之后，则将注意力放于其他方面。无论从维度，方向还是可能的暗示方面，中国的军力建设已经越来越清楚了。
When the cold war ended, the Pacific Ocean became, in effect, an American lake. With its air and naval forces operating through bases in friendly countries like Japan and South Korea, the United States could defend and reassure its allies, deter potential aggressors and insure safe passage for commercial shipping throughout the Western Pacific and into the Indian Ocean. Its forces could operate everywhere with impunity.
冷战结束后，太平洋在实际上已经成为美国的内湖。随着美国的空军和海军军力基地部署在一些想日本和韩国这些友好国家上，美国可以保护并给它的联盟再保险，遏制潜在的入侵者，并确保西太平和进入印度洋的通商海上航道的安全。美国的军事力量可以在任何地方获得豁免。
But that has begun to change. In the mid-1990s, China started to put into place the pieces of what Pentagon planners refer to as an “anti-access capability.” In other words, rather than trying to match American power plane for plane and ship for ship, Beijing has sought more cost-effective ways to neutralize it. It has been building large numbers of relatively inexpensive but highly accurate non-nuclear ballistic missiles, as well as sea- and air-launched cruise missiles. Those weapons could destroy or disable the handful of ports and airfields from which American air and naval forces operate in the Western Pacific and sink warships whose weapons could reach the area from hundreds of miles out to sea, including American aircraft carriers.
但这样的环境开始发生变化。在90年代中期，中国开始从一点点的进入了五角大楼所指的“反接入能力”。换句话说，与其试图在飞机或是舰艇的数量上与美国抗衡，北京已经找了个更有效的方式去中和美国的实力。中国建造了大量相对便宜但高度精确的非核弹弹道导弹和海、空发射的巡航导弹。这些武器可以摧毁，使美国屈指可数的港口和机场，而使美国在这些地方的空军和海军部署的在西太平洋海军力量以及潜艇失效。这些中国武器可以发射到百里之外的海洋，美国的航空母舰也在射程之内。
The Chinese military has also been testing techniques for disabling American satellites and cybernetworks, and it is adding to its small arsenal of long-range nuclear missiles that can reach the United States.
中国的军力同样已经测试过可以使美国卫星和网络瘫痪的技术，而且这些技术正在加入能发射到美国的远射程核导弹的小核武库之中。
Although a direct confrontation seems unlikely, China appears to seek the option of dealing a knockout blow to America’s forward forces, leaving Washington with difficult choices about how to respond.
虽然与中国的正面较量不太可能发生，但中国开始显示出想要寻求可以彻底摧毁美国的能力，让华盛顿面临如何回应它行为的困难选择。
Those preparations do not mean that China wants war with the United States. To the contrary, they seem intended mostly to overawe its neighbors while dissuading Washington from coming to their aid if there is ever a clash. Uncertain of whether they can rely on American support, and unable to match China’s power on their own, other countries may decide they must accommodate China’s wishes.
中国的这些准备并不意味着中国想与美国开战。相反，中国人至多就是想吓唬一下周边邻国，同时劝阻华盛顿一旦有冲突发生时对这些国家进行援助。因为不确定美国是否会提供援助，也无法与中国相匹敌这些国家可能会选择服从中国的医院。
In the words of the ancient military theorist Sun Tzu, China is acquiring the means to “win without fighting” — to establish itself as Asia’s dominant power by eroding the credibility of America’s security guarantees, hollowing out its alliances and eventually easing it out of the region.
孙子曾说过：“不战而屈人之兵”，中国就是通过这种思想破坏美国在安保问题上的公信力从而建立它在亚洲的统治权力，挖走美国的盟友并永久的将美国扫除这个地区。
If the United States and its Asian friends look to their own defenses and coordinate their efforts, there is no reason they cannot maintain a favorable balance of power, even as China’s strength grows. But if they fail to respond to China’s buildup, there is a danger that Beijing could miscalculate, throw its weight around and increase the risk of confrontation and even armed conflict. Indeed, China’s recent behavior in disputes over resources and maritime boundaries with Japan and the smaller states that ring the South China Sea suggest that this already may be starting to happen.
如果美国和它在亚洲的朋友寻求自身防御和协调大家的努力，没有理由它们不能维持一个对中国崛起的良好制衡。但是如果它们对中国军力建设做出的反应失败，那将是中国错误估计此中的危险，开始仗势欺人并增加对抗的风险，更严重的还有军事冲突。事实上，中国现在与日本和一些小国在南海上对资源和海洋划界争端处理的行为预示着上述的情况也许开始出现了。
This is a problem that cannot simply be smoothed away by dialogue. China’s military policies are not the product of a misunderstanding; they are part of a deliberate strategy that other nations must now find ways to meet. Strength deters aggression; weakness tempts it. Beijing will denounce such moves as provocative, but it is China’s actions that currently threaten to upset the stability of Asia.
争端的解决不是一个可以简单用对话方式来解决的问题。中国的军事政策不是误会的产物；它是可以制定出的战略的一部分，而这个战略是其它国家必须要努力识清的。实力遏制侵略；弱点引诱侵略。北京会将这些行为作为挑衅而谴责，但是中国自己的行为目前让亚洲的稳定受到严重威胁。
Many of China’s neighbors are more willing than they were in the past to ignore Beijing’s complaints, increase their own defense spending and work more closely with one another and the United States.
许多中国的邻国比以前更愿意忽视来自中国政府的抱怨，而是增加自身的国防开支，并努力向彼此之间还有美国靠拢。
They are unlikely, however, to do those things unless they are convinced that America remains committed. Washington does not have to shoulder the entire burden of preserving the Asian power balance, but it must lead.
然而，除非它们确定美国会继续努力，否则它们不会去努力制衡中国。华盛顿并没有义务去承担在亚洲制衡中国的重担，但美国必须去主导制衡。
The Pentagon needs to put a top priority on finding ways to counter China’s burgeoning anti-access capabilities, thereby reducing the likelihood that they will ever be used. This will cost money. To justify the necessary spending in an era of austerity, our leaders will have to be clearer in explaining the nation’s interests and commitments in Asia and blunter in describing the challenge posed by China’s relentless military buildup.
五角大楼需要将找到应对中国蓬勃发展的反介入能力，以此来降低中国运用这种能力的可能。这需要耗资巨大。在证明必须要缩减开支的时代，我们的领导人必须更加清晰的界定国家利益，并在亚洲承诺，挫钝中国狠命发展的军力所带来的挑战。
艾伦·L. 弗里德伯格是普林斯顿大学政治与国际问题的教授，著有《霸权之争——中国，美国的亚洲控制权之争》
直说了吧，如果亚洲诸国勾结起来向中国起事，是最符合美国乃至西方利益的 还是那句老话，除非哪天美国人停止自己吓唬自己，他们才会发现原来自己其实一直生活的异常空虚。 美国的国力已经无法支撑他的势力范围，要求他退出西太平洋的军事存在是非常正当的 需要关注的是美国威胁论。
中国威胁论不过是jy游说政府软弱的西方走狗心理战。 中国对美国同样，必须拿出决心。
页:
[1]