【11.09.01 纽约时报】美国如何抗拒中国对学术自由的压制？
【中文标题】美国学者如何才能抗拒中国对学术自由的压制？
【原文标题】How Can U.S. Scholars Resist China's Control?
【登载媒体】纽约时报
【原文作者】James Millward、Yan Sun、Mary Gallagher、Gordon G. Chang、Rigzel Losel、Jeffrey Herbst
【原文链接】http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/01/can-us-colleges-defend-academic-freedom
简介：
美国顶级大学竞相在中国建立教育机构，新校园和研究中心如雨后春笋般落地开花。目前有4万名来自中国的学生在美国高校学习，比其它任何一个国家的留学生都要多。
这对很多美国学者来说是件大好事，钱财源源不断，新的研究机会层出不穷。但是对一些教授来说，尤其是那些研究敏感课题的人——比如西藏或者新疆维吾尔穆斯林，学术自由仅仅是一种妄想。中国曾经故意扰乱无数学者的研究工作，还阻止他们进入中国进行实地调查。《商业周刊》最近一篇文章就报道了几例类似的事件，还说聘请这些教授的大学对此不予置评。
美国大学怎样才能平衡捍卫学术自由的责任与进入世界最具活力的经济体之间的关系？
根本不存在的困境
James Millward是乔治敦大学Edmund Walsh外国服务学院历史系的教授，著有《欧亚之转折：新疆的历史》。
美国大学平衡学术自由与进入中国之间的矛盾，是根本不存在的。
过去十年中，中国重金投资高等教育和专业学者的培养。投资范围包括中国留学生在海外深造、博士后教育、访问学者，以及扩大奖学金范围，以吸引更多海外留学生来中国学习。而且，中国的学术机构开始根据教授参与国际会议的频率、在外国期刊上发表文章的数量来对其评级。学术国际化是中国人的重中之重。
与此同时，中国在极偶然的情况下，拒绝对外国学者发放签证。例如，两位著名的学者，Andrew Nathan和Perry Link被中国列入黑名单，原因是一些1989×××事件的出版物。最近，中国拒绝了我和其它十几名学者的签证申请，我们研究的领域是新疆和西藏，曾经在2004年共同出版过一本有关新疆的书。
我们在思想上该如何协调其学术国际化的进程与罕见的“不要在我家捣乱”的行为？
我们需要搞清楚，阻止外国学者访问的中国人和跟美国大学签署交换协议的不是一群人。后者希望与美国学术界进行接触，程度甚至比我们更加迫切。
中国的学术伙伴不会反对美国大学对学术自由的呼吁，事实证明，那些因研究新疆问题而被列入黑名单的学者所在的高校，包括乔治敦、达特墨斯、麻省理工学院、耶鲁和约翰霍普金斯，似乎表现的太软弱、太拘束、太没有创意了。
在面对中国政治干涉我们的课程、研究、研讨会和讲座时，美国高等教育机构旗帜鲜明的不妥协态度将会把矛盾推回给中国。中国究竟是想让其高等教育尽快国际化，还是沉溺在一事无成的压制策略中呢？
美国高等教育是全球的金科玉律，捍卫学术自由这个核心理念是严守标准的重要举措，它要比几场篮球比赛更能让中国人兴奋。
警惕西方意图
Yan Sun是纽约城市大学的政治学教授，她正在编写一部有关中国民族政治的书。
维护学术自由和与中国合作并非两个不可调和的目标，关键是首先了解为什么中国阻止一些外国学者入境。
在2004年合著《新疆：中国的穆斯林边疆》一书的13个人中，有一些被禁止进入中国，后来被称作“新疆十三”。他们的不幸部分原因在于新疆社会科学院中亚研究所主任潘志平对此书的负面评价，他说部分章节缺少正面信息、歪曲事实，甚至试图煽动美国以保护人权的名义横加干涉。
我认识这13人中的几位，对他们正直的学术态度毫无疑问。我也尊敬潘先生的工作成果，他长期致力研究中亚历史和新疆的泛伊斯兰分裂注意和恐怖主义。那么到底是哪里出了问题？
今年夏天，我在新疆访问了几个星期，让我对中国的观点有了更好的了解。对于北京宣传的所谓“三股邪恶势力”——宗教极端主义、恐怖主义和分裂主义，我向来不屑一顾。但是，那些地下兵工厂、伊斯兰圣战训练营、对无辜民众的肆意杀戮和数百起恐怖袭击——我在新疆期间有6人被杀，离开后又发生了三起恐怖袭击——让我不得不改变了看法。
我知道，地方当局不愿意让西方学者在敏感地区，比如西藏和新疆，进行现场研究。设置这样的障碍显然无法让任何人探寻事情的真相，这样人们就愈加无法在这个高度政治敏感的问题上获得事实以平衡负面观点。
我在新疆的收获极为宝贵，但是只有通过中美双方相互合作、相互信任才能获得这些信息。合作可以让中国有机会更好的理解美国的学术观，把美国学者看作独立的研究人士，他们有自己多元化的兴趣和观点，而不是怀有意识形态和政治意图的政府喉舌。
我在新疆访问期间，被禁止参加一个学术会议，但是被邀请在另外一个会议中发言。这就是学术自由的进步。如果中国重新邀请新疆十三，并与他们举行一次学术会谈，这会大大提高中国的国际形象。
缺少清晰的策略
Mary Gallagher是密歇根大学中国问题研究中心的主任和政治学助教。
文化大革命期间，中国的大学被关闭，很多知识分子被送往农村接受体力劳动和与“群众”接触的“再教育”。教职员工和学生经常因为小小的言论和行为不当而遭受政治迫害，轻者职业前程被毁，重者丧命。
中国的大学也像社会的发展一样，经历了一条漫长的道路。今天，中国教授已经获得了更多的自由来教书、争论和讨论一些话题，而不用担心政治迫害。但是，一旦触及政府认为具有危险性的政治或社会危机问题，当局可以迅速压制住所有的声音。
近年来，中国大学狂热追求美国的高校，密切的接触和科研成果的交换让双方均受益匪浅。很多中国大学的管理者和教授都认识到，借鉴美国学术行为对改善中国的教育质量、创新能力和迎接新想法、新观点是极为重要的。一些人甚至认为假以时日，中国的领导人会开始关注学术自由的重要性。
美国大学渴望与中国合作，但总是与保护学术自由的需求产生冲突。时至今日，美国大学并没有想出处理这种矛盾的明确方法，而总是在回避，说学术自由的概念已经灌输给中国了。
为了让美国学者在海外可以不受无理限制地从事研究工作，与中国有合作项目的大学应当认识到，学术自由不是靠当地合作伙伴和合作机构口头保证的。捍卫它的价值需要围绕具体事件持续、长久地努力，就像被中国政府列入黑名单的“新疆十三”事件。这些人至今还被禁止进入中国。
一党执政的国家无可匹敌
Gordon G. Chang是《中国即将崩溃》一书的作者，福布斯网站的专栏作家。
在目前这个阶段，美国大学还不是中国共产党的对手。
只要他们在中国开办分校，或者继续与中国的研究机构保持联系，北京就会持续施加压力。中国不存在学术自由的概念，美国人将为此付出代价。
我们已经付出了代价，就像“新疆十三”的悲惨经历一样，这些美国学者只不过是在试图完成一本有关中国西北部麻烦不断的少数民族地区——新疆的一些研究。党对穆斯林维吾尔地区的统治极为不安，但新疆绝非唯一案例。中国对西藏和内蒙古等少数民族地区的问题也极为敏感，这种敏感性还延伸到其它方面，包括独生子女政策、政府的代表性和环境问题。
不幸的是，所有问题在中国都与政治有关，因为党一直在遵循毛泽东“政治挂帅”的著名论调。当然，中国已经放弃了毛的极权主义思想，但在其继任者邓和江开创了改革开放局面之后，它仍有漫长的一段路要群殴。胡的中国似乎以多年来的压制行动为人共知，这几乎影响到了社会生活的所有方面。
在胡之下，共产党下定决心控制中国的言论，无论是在国内还是国外。所以，拒绝给学者发放签证；限制他们获取相关资料；强求宣誓效忠也就不足为奇了。
加利福尼亚大学的Perry Link指出，大部分情况下，北京会使用比较微妙的方式对外国人施加压力。他把这比作缠在吊灯上的巨蟒，静静地制造威胁。Link曾被拒绝进入中国，目前还是黑名单上的人士。他写道：“通常情况下，巨蟒一动不动。人们在它的影子下活动，一切似乎都很‘正常’。”
在巨蟒的威胁下，再强大的政府也必须有所收敛。难怪几乎没有任何学术组织给予新疆十三真正的帮助，也难怪试图与中国合作的机构多少都有所妥协。很不幸，但这就是与一党执政国家打交道所必须付出的代价。
大惊小怪
Dru C. Gladney是波莫纳学院的人类学教授。
《中国可以说不》在90年代是中国最畅销的一本书。作为一个独立主权的国家，中国完全有权力允许或拒绝外国人进入其领土。对一群研究新疆问题的学者拒绝发放签证这件事，本不应在广大的学术界引发太多的反响，尽管媒体在近期对此相当关注。
无数的学者曾经被禁止进入很多国家，这种限制或者黑名单行为往往相当复杂，甚至有时无法解释。
中国政府做一个决定，或者推翻一个决定的原因或许永远无法得到解释。就像一个中国高层学术官员曾经对我说：“把一个人列入黑名单需要一定的权力，但是如果把这个人从黑名单中拿掉，需要更高的权力。”很明显，这不仅仅是学术自由的问题，而是美中关系动荡、变化的大问题。
据说，在《新疆：中国的穆斯林边疆》一书出版的几年之后，作者们才发现他们登上了黑名单。“新疆十三”的学者们从未了解到任何理由，以及为什么单单选择他们。市面上有很多对中国更具批判性的作品——话题从新疆、西藏、台湾，到人权、对艺术家和活动人士的压制，这些作家都可以毫发无伤地进入中国。这其中包含了深不可测的人际关系、政治关系和背景情况的变化，似乎永远无法得到解释。
西方大学和学术机构应当勇敢站出来支持他们的学者，促进交换观点的开放态度。这才是学术自由的核心价值所在。
只有当越来越多的中国人和中国机构开始意识到，通过与陌生人定期、开放对话的重要性，我们才能解决相互间的分歧，并促进更有意义的学术研究。中国人必须自己改变中国，这对他们有益无害。中国面对自己的朋友时，需要鼓起很大的勇气才能说“不”，但恐怕需要更大的勇气才能说出“是”。
带着开放的心态来西藏吧
Rigzel Losel是中国藏学研究中心，当代西藏研究所主任。
与任何一个学者一样，我推崇学术自由的价值。我认为美中学术机构之间的交流，对双方都大有好处。然而，我关心的是，一些研究西藏问题的西方学者并不是在从事真正的学术研究，而是带有先入为主的偏见。
我最近在西藏论坛上遇到一位美国学者，当我问他对中国未来5年在西藏投资3000亿元人民币的看法时，他立即否认这对中国人和西藏人的意义。一位严谨的学者在了解细节之前，在事情发生之前，怎么就能得出这样的结论呢？
如果这些人来中国的目的，就是为了印证他们先入为主的概念，那还有必要来吗？如果这些学者的确抱着学术自由的心态研究中国，那么他们需要敞开心态，接触这个国家中各种各样的观点，包括那些敏感和政治的民族话题。所有西藏人的观点也并非一致。如果我来研究美国的民族历史，仅仅关注负面问题，这完全不符合真正的学术自由理念。
施加外交影响
Jeffrey Herbst是科尔盖特大学董事会主席。
美国大学应当积极维护学术自由，同时主动与中国合作。
勇敢地追求是美国大学优秀学术环境的基础所在，也是其它国家最为敬重的品质。与此同时，中国的崛起是我们这个时代最显著的现象之一。
当我在俄亥俄州迈阿密大学担任教区长时，我到北京去出席一个创办孔子学院的会议，这个研究机构的目的是推广汉语和中国文化研究，由中国国家汉语办公室出资。就像德国的哥特学院、法国的法语联盟、英国文化协会和美国富布赖特项目一样，孔子学院既是一个文化交流机构，也是中国延伸软实力的工具。
当我在迈阿密大学时，我去过印度的达兰萨拉，我在那里邀请至尊达赖喇嘛参观我们的校园，并接受我们授予他的荣誉学位。达赖喇嘛的到访是整个校区的一件大事，我们了解到很多西藏的问题，包括它与中国之间纷繁复杂的历史。我认为以上两件事并没有矛盾。
中国有时会侵扰具有批判性，或者涉及敏感话题的学者。我们应当竭尽所能来帮助这些大学，比如动用外交手段抗议这种行为，或者对中国强调为学术研究设置障碍的负面效果。我们还应发扬自身的优势，切不可也建立黑名单阻止对方访问。
长远来看，跻身世界顶级名校的行列——中国有时对此极为关注——在很大程度上将取决于是否奉行学术自由。
原文：
Introduction
Top American universities are competing to establish themselves in China, with new campuses and research centers springing up quickly. Nearly 40,000 undergraduates from China study in the U.S., more than from any other foreign country.
For many American scholars, this is a boon. Money is flowing, and new research opportunities abound. But for some professors -- especially those who study sensitive topics like Tibet or Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang -- academic freedom cannot be taken for granted. China has stymied the work of numerous scholars or prevented them from entering the country altogether to conduct fieldwork. A recent Bloomberg News article detailed several such cases, and said that the colleges that employ the professors tended to keep quiet.
How do American universities balance their responsibility to defend academic freedom with their need to be engaged with the world's most dynamic economy?
A False Dilemma
James Millward is a professor of history at the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He is the author of "Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang."
That American universities must balance academic freedom against their desire to engage with China is a false dilemma.
Over the past decade, China has invested heavily in its institutions of higher learning and in its scholars. This investment has included funding for overseas study by Chinese graduate students, post-docs and visiting professors, as well as expanded scholarship programs to help foreign students study in China. Moreover, Chinese academic institutions have begun evaluating their professors based on their participation in international conferences and publication in foreign journals. Internationalization of academe is a high priority for the Chinese.
At the same time, China has, in a few and unusual cases, refused to grant visas to foreign scholars. For example, two prominent scholars, Andrew Nathan and Perry Link, were blacklisted for activities and publications related to the 1989 crackdown in Tiananmen Square. More recently, China denied visas to me and about a dozen other scholars who study Xinjiang and Tibet. We had contributed to a book about Xinjiang that was published in 2004.
How do we reconcile China's rush to internationalize its academe with these rare cases of "you can't play in my sandbox" mentality?
We need to recognize that the people in China responsible for banning foreign scholars are not the same as those signing exchange agreements with American universities. The latter group wants to engage with U.S. academe as much as or more than we want to engage with them.
Our Chinese academic partners will not retaliate if a U.S. university stands up for academic freedom. Not that his has been well tested: The home institutions of those of us blacklisted for work on Xinjiang, including Georgetown, Dartmouth, M.I.T., Yale and Johns Hopkins, have been far too timid, limited and uncreative in their response to our banning.
An uncompromising, collective stand by U.S. institutions of higher learning in the face of Chinese political interference in our curriculum, research, symposiums or guest lectures will push the contradiction back to China. Does China want to internationalize its higher education system, or indulge in counterproductive pressure tactics?
American higher education is the global gold standard. Maintaining that standard by defending its core principle of academic freedom will please the right people in China, more than any basketball game.
Wary of Western Intentions
Yan Sun is a professor of political science at the City University of New York. She is completing a book about ethnic politics in China.
Defending academic freedom and engaging with China need not be irreconcilable goals. The key is to understand why China bans some foreign scholars in the first place.
A number of people among the 13 co-authors of a 2004 book, “Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland," were denied permission to visit China -- and have come to be known as the Xinjiang 13. Their misfortune may be attributable in part to an unfavorable review by Pan Zhiping, director of the Central Asia Studies Institute at the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences, who said some chapters lacked balance, distorted truth and even attempted to incite U.S. intervention in the name of human rights protection.
I know several of the 13 co-authors and have no doubts about their academic integrity. I also respect the work of Mr. Pan, who has long studied Central Asian history and pan-Islamic separatism and terrorism in Xinjiang. So what happened?
This summer, I spent a few weeks in Xinjiang, allowing me to see the Chinese perspective better than before. I used to dismiss as propaganda Beijing’s targeting of the “three evil forces”: religious extremism, terrorism and separatism. Yet, evidence of underground weaponry sites, jihadist training camps, random killing of innocents and hundreds of terrorist attacks, including six killings during my trip and three attacks days after I left, convinced me otherwise.
I know firsthand local authorities’ reluctance to grant Western scholars requests for field research. Wary of Western intentions and past support for restive minorities, they prefer to limit foreign access to sensitive places like Tibet and Xinjiang. Such restrictions obviously do not help anyone in finding the truth, since it generally takes extensive on-the-ground work to uncover facts and reach a balanced view on highly politicized issues.
What I learned in Xinjiang was invaluable. But such access to information and context can be gained only if both sides -- the U.S. and China -- engage with each other and overcome mistrust. Engagement will allow China the opportunity to better understand American academic values and see American scholars as individual researchers with diverse research interests and viewpoints, rather than government mouthpieces with ideological or political agendas.
During my Xinjiang trip, I was barred from one academic conference, but was invited to give a talk at another. That is progress toward academic freedom. It would be a big boost to China’s international image if the nation welcomed back the Xinjiang 13 and held an academic conference with them.
Lacking Clear Strategies
Mary Gallagher is an associate professor of political science and the director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of Michigan.
During the Cultural Revolution, Chinese universities were closed and many intellectuals were sent to the countryside to be “reformed” through hard labor and interaction with “the masses.” Faculty members and students were regularly subjected to political campaigns that could end careers or destroy lives for minor critical statements and acts.
China's universities, like its society at large, have come a long way since then. Today, Chinese professors have much more freedom to teach, debate and discuss topics without fear of political retribution. However, in the event of a political or social crisis that the government deems dangerous, the authorities can immediately clamp down on everyone.
In recent years, Chinese universities have courted American universities to engage on an institutional basis. Overall, increased contacts and exchanges have benefited the academic communities of both countries. Many Chinese university administrators and professors see the importation of American academic practices as a key path to improving China’s ability to educate, innovate and open up to new thoughts and ideas. Some even hope that over time, China's leaders will begin to value the importance of academic freedom.
American universities' desire to cooperate with China invariably comes into conflict with the need to protect academic freedom. To date, most American universities have not developed clear strategies to deal with the conflict, but have evaded it by noting that academic freedom has been promised to them in principle.
In order to assure that American scholars can research abroad without unreasonable restrictions, universities with projects in China should recognize that academic freedom cannot be guaranteed by any local partner or institution. Protection of this value will require constant and tenacious defense around actual cases, like the “Xinjiang 13" scholars who were blacklisted by the Chinese government, some of whom are still not allowed to visit China.
No Match for a One-Party State
Gordon G. Chang is the author of "The Coming Collapse of China" and a columnist at Forbes.com.
At this moment, American universities are no match for China’s Communist Party.
If they operate campuses in China or even maintain exchanges with their counterpart Chinese institutions, Beijing will exert pressure on them. Academic freedom, which does not exist in China, will suffer in America.
It already has, as we learned from the sorry tale of the “Xinjiang 13,” American scholars who contributed to a book on Xinjiang, the troubled minority region in China’s northwest. The party is extraordinarily insecure about its rule over the Muslim Uighurs there, but Xinjiang is by no means a special case. China is also sensitive about Tibet and other “minority” areas, such as Inner Mongolia. China's insecurity extends to plenty of other issues, including the one-child policy, representative governance and the environment.
Unfortunately, everything is considered “political” in China because the party has followed Mao Zedong’s famous instruction to put politics “in command.” Of course, China has abandoned Mao’s totalitarianism, but it has also gone beyond the more open days sponsored by his successors, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. The China of Hu Jintao, the current leader, has been marked by a multiyear crackdown affecting virtually every aspect of society.
Under Hu, the Communist Party has shown greater determination to control discourse about China, both inside and outside the country. So it is no surprise it has denied visas to scholars, limited their access to materials, and exacted what are essentially loyalty pledges.
Perry Link of the University of California, Riverside points out that, most of the time, Beijing pressures foreigners through subtle means. His metaphor is the anaconda in the chandelier, which intimidates silently. “Normally the great snake doesn’t move,” writes Link, who has been denied entry to China and to this day remains on a blacklist. “More often than not, everyone in its shadow makes his or her large and small adjustments — all quite ‘naturally.’ ”
In the face of the large snake, even mighty governments have exercised restraint in what they say. It’s no wonder that few in the academic community really helped the Xinjiang 13 -- and why institutions wanting to engage with China must make their compromises as well. That, unfortunately, is the unavoidable price of relations with a one-party state.
An Unpredictable Process
Dru C. Gladney is a professor of anthropology at Pomona College.
"China can say no," as was once declared in the title of a popular Chinese book in the 1990s. A sovereign country, China has every right to admit or exclude those who seek permission to enter its territory. That it has chosen to exclude a group of scholars who contributed to a book about Xinjiang should not and will not elicit much concern in the wider academic world, despite a slew of recent articles in the media.
There have been numerous scholars who have been denied entry to many countries. The reasons for these restrictions or blacklists are often highly complex and sometimes impossible to explain.
The Chinese government's decision to impose and then sometimes reverse a decision will perhaps never be fully understood. As one high-ranking Chinese scholar-official said to me: “It takes a certain amount of power to put one on such a list, but much greater power to take one off it.” Clearly, this is not simply a matter of academic freedom. It speaks to much larger issues in the shifting, complex dynamic of U.S.-China relations.
It has been noted that it took quite a few years after the publication of "Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland" for the book's contributors to become aware that we were all on the same blacklist. None of the "Xinjiang 13" scholars have ever been given any explanation as to why our group was singled out. There are many authors of works much more critical of China -- on a range of topics such as Xinjiang, Tibet, Taiwan, human rights, the repression of artists and activists -- who have been able to travel to China with relative impunity. The unpredictable mixture of personal relationships, political connections and shifting context that led to our visa denials may perhaps never be fully accounted for.
Western universities and academic institutions can and should play a bigger role in supporting their scholars and promoting the open exchange of different points of view. That is what defines the essence of academic freedom.
Only when a large number of individuals and institutions in China begin to realize that it is through open and regular dialogue with a wide range of people that we can resolve our differences and foster meaningful academic research. The Chinese themselves must change China, and it's in their best interests to do so. To paraphrase a friend, it takes a certain level of strength for China to say “no,” but even more to say “yes.”
Come to Tibet With an Open Mind
Rigzel Losel is the director of the Research Institute for Contemporary Tibet at the China Tibetology Research Center in Beijing.
Like any scholar, I value academic freedom. I believe it serves the interest of both American and Chinese academic communities to engage more with each other. However, I am concerned that some Western scholars of Tibet do not practice genuine academic research. Instead, they come with preconceptions.
A case in point is an American scholar I recently encountered at a forum in Tibet. When asked about China’s plan to invest 300 billion yuan in Tibet for the next five years, he immediately dismissed it as beneficial to the local Chinese population and unhelpful to the Tibetans. How could a serious scholar make such a foregone conclusion before he understands the details of the investment, and before it even starts?
If some people come to China to seek the kind of information that confirms what they want to believe in, then why bother? If these scholars want academic freedom to study China, then they should open themselves to a wider range of views that exist in the country, even on sensitive political and ethnic issues. All Tibetans do not speak with one voice. If I were to study America’s ethnic problems and focus only on the negative aspects, it would not be an exercise of genuine academic interest and research.
Apply Diplomatic Pressure
Jeffrey Herbst is the president of Colgate University.
American universities should aggressively defend academic freedom while actively engaging with China.
The ability to inquire fearlessly is one of the pillar foundations of academic excellence in American universities -- a quality that many foreign countries respect highly. At the same time, the rise of China is one of the most important phenomena of our time.
While I was the provost at Miami University in Ohio, I traveled to Beijing to present a proposal to set up a Confucius Institute, a center that promotes Chinese language and cultural study that is funded by the Office of Chinese Language Council International. Just like Germany’s Goethe Institute, France’s Alliance Française, the British Council, and the American Fulbright Program, the Confucius Institute should be understood as both a cultural exchange and a Chinese attempt to project soft power.
While at Miami University, I also traveled to Dharmasala, India, where I gave His Holiness the Dalai Lama an invitation to visit our campus and receive an honorary degree. The visit by the Dalai Lama was an important moment for the entire campus community to learn more about Tibet, including the complex history of its relations with China. I saw no contradiction between those two efforts.
China has, on occasion, stymied scholars who have been critical or have worked on subjects considered sensitive. We should exert whatever pressure we can to help these colleagues by having diplomats and elected officials protest these restrictions and by highlighting the negative effects on China in setting up barriers for academic research and exchange. We should also seek to improve America’s own good but not perfect record in allowing critics to visit our country.
Over time, it will become apparent that reaching the top of the world's rankings of universities – something that the Chinese care very much about – is derived in large part from adherence to the principle of academic freedom.
故意歪曲中国政府在西藏的管理，总是把达赖当做“圣僧”。怎么能指望中国的配合？
。
本帖最后由 滔滔1949 于 2011-9-6 19:29 编辑“批判性”？
很好的借口。
只不过这个“批判”的前提还需建立在平等而非单方面的傲慢，公正与客观而非偏见与敌意的基础上才有意义。
我们可以接受批评，但如果这些批评仅仅不过是些自以为是的说教和居高临下的抨击与指点的话，那就只能敬谢不敏了。 去死吧
西方人向来是有以为自己占领了道德制高点的自以为是. 学术自由，倒不如说是“分裂自由”，“内乱自由”，美国没什么其他可以关注的吗？比如环境，卫生，教育？ 别打中国的注意了，，管好自己就行了， 总是拿新疆西藏做文章，缺乏新意而且愈发显得恶心。 谁知道这些人是不是CIA派去挑事的？也许不全是，但是只要有一个就足够了。中国没有兴趣去了解每一个所谓学者的背景，也没有能力去判断其中哪位已经被CIA聘用，所以一锅端的禁止入境是成本最低代价最小的做法。不要怪中国政府，谁教你的政府时时刻刻把中国当敌人，不惜采用一切手段颠覆和分裂中国呢？ 看来中国少了研究美国印地安人，美国工人历史 ，和美国黑人情况的专家学者啊 说的比唱的好听，哪个国家不是对自己的反对派或者分裂分子限制？美国不是吗？ 假如在米国学术真的是自由的！假如他们是没有偏见的！假如他们的结论是论证而不是设想出来的！假如他们的目的是为了减少社会冲突矛盾的！
假如是美好的、现实是残酷的。因为从来没有完全无私的人，无论他是不是学者！或者是不是米国的学者！
页:
[1]