【金融时报博客111007】中国不翼而飞的一万一千亿元存款
在说数字，却没有提供数字游戏的来源。China’s disappearing Rmb1,100bn bank deposits
October 7, 2011 5:35 am
By Victor Shih of Northwestern University
http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/files/2011/06/for-emailvictor49-167x250.jpg
http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2011/10/07/guest-post-chinas-disappearing-bank-deposits/
In July this year, households and companies withdrew a total of Rmb1,100bn ($172.5bn) from China’s banks, equivalent to 2.5 per cent of GDP. In August, household deposits barely clinged to positive territory at Rmb26bn, despite receiving over Rmb188bn in new loans that month.
Corporate deposits grew a bit more, but were still abnormally low. Although the September numbers are not out yet, Chinese press reports suggest that the deposits in the major state banks declined substantially in the first half of the month. Where did all the money go?
The emerging consensus is that household deposits went to wealth management products (WMPs) to finance corporations. This makes great sense because households currently face over negative 3 per cent in real interest rates on their deposits, so they have high motivation to reallocate funds to WMPs, which offer higher yields.
If that were the case, though, we would see spikes in firm deposits, but we do not. In August, for example, corporate deposits increased by Rmb371bn, but nearly all of that can be accounted for by the Rmb360bn in new corporate loans. Funds provided by WMPs did not seem to play a role in boosting corporate deposits.
At the very least, we need to account for the Rmb188bn in new loans received by households in August, which did not show up as household deposits. If they used that money to pay companies, then companies should have seen an even higher increase in new deposits. But we don’t see that.
To be sure, government deposits rose by Rmb101bn in August, but again, even if all or most of the Rmb188bn in new loans to households went to pay taxes directly or indirectly, we are still left with Rmb88bn unaccounted for.
In all likelihood, much of the taxes was paid by corporations, so the disappearing household deposits remain largely a mystery.
The disappearance of funds is especially puzzling when we consider that China yet again ran a trade surplus in August ($17bn), which should have pumped Rmb107bn into the system.
Moreover, the PBoC redeemed a total of Rmb163bn in notes to inject liquidity into the system in August. There has also been no further increase in reserve requirement because the new reserve requirement for margin deposits did not apply until September for some banks.
Of course, some people will say that the money is just off-balance sheets, but held in a dark pool of “other assets” in banks. Again, this doesn’t make much sense to me because the supposed goal of WMPs is to finance company spending. Thus, if the money ends up in a company’s account or if the recipient pays another company, we should see a spike in corporate deposits.
Finally, another possibility is that funds have left China altogether, causing an absolute decline in bank deposits. To be sure, this does not seem to be the case at the moment because official bank statistics still show an increase in position in foreign exchange purchase in both July and August, suggesting that banks in China changed more dollars into renminbi than the other way around.
One loophole that has opened recently is that Chinese importers now can pay offshore suppliers using onshore RMB. Where legitimate current account transactions can take place, investors can also use it to move money overseas. So far this year, RMB trade settlement through Hong Kong has exceeded Rmb1,000bn.
If import settlement through Hong Kong was taking place on a large enough scale, substantial amount of onshore deposits may leave China without showing up in the net foreign exchange purchase number, which only reflects onshore exchange of currencies. Of course, even this loophole does not explain the spectacular decline in deposits in recent months.
Although the mystery remains unsolved for the moment, solving the mystery is important for investors who want a sense of where the economy is heading.
If large sums are indeed disappearing into the shadow banking system, then a rapidly rising share of the financial system is beyond the direct control of the government.
If large sums are indeed flowing out of China, we may have the beginning of major, sustained outflows from China.
《金融时报》博客: 中国不翼而飞的一万一千亿元银行存款
核心提示：今年七月，从数字上来看，中国的存款金额减少了11000亿人民币。作者分析了造成这一数字变化的多种可能性。排除一些不能自圆其说的可能之后，作者问：中国是否存在一个规模巨大的“影子银行”或是拉开了存款外逃的序幕？
本文由“译者”志愿者翻译并校对http://yyyyiiii.blogspot.com/
今年七月，家庭以及企业客户总计从中国的银行提取了11, 000 亿人民币的存款（1725亿美元），相当于GDP的2.5%。到了八月，尽管获得了1880亿的新贷款，家庭客户的存款额却仅仅回升至260亿人民币。
企业客户的存款额增长的要明显一些，但仍然低得不正常。虽然九月的数据还未出炉，中国媒体报导已经预测主要国有银行的存款会在九月的上半月大幅减少。那些存款都去哪里了？
越来越多人认同的一个看法是，家庭存款转移到了财富管理项目上（WMPs），这些项目又向公司提供融资。这说法不无道理。毕竟，当家庭客户存款的实际利率比-3%还低的时候，他们有较强的动机把存款转移到有较高回报的财富管理项目上。
但假如真是这样，公司存款应该大幅增加才是。但种情况没有发生。举个例子，在八月的时候，企业的存款增加了3710亿人民币，但这几乎就是新增加的3600亿人民币的企业贷款的总数。财富管理项目提供的资金对增加企业存款的作用看来是零。
最低限度来说，我们还得把八月份贷给家庭客户的、没有化为存款的1880亿人民币新增贷款计算在内。假如这些钱是用来偿还给公司的话，企业的存款额理应大大增加。可是我们没有看到这一现象。
说得确切些，政府的存款在八月增加了1010亿人民币。但即使发给家庭的1880亿人民币新贷款被全数用来直接或间接的纳税，依然有880亿人民币不知去向。
毫无疑问，大多数的税款都是企业缴纳的。因而不翼而飞的家庭存款依然是个谜。
考虑到中国在八月份再次录得贸易盈余（170亿人民币），而银行体系的资金应该增加1070亿人民币的时候，这些款项的消失更令人摸不着头脑。
再者，中国人民银行在八月总共兑现了1630亿人民币，给银行体系注入资金。而银行存款的准备金额并没有上调，一些银行的保证金存款准备金额新规定要在九月才生效。
当然，有人会说那些钱不过是从账面消失，并被纳入到银行中其他资产的黑池而已。这也是说不通的，因为财富管理项目的目的就是支付企业的开支。所以，假如款项最终落入公司的帐户，又或者收款者把款项付给另一家公司，企业的存款额应该有所增加。
最后，另一个可能性就是这些款项完全离开了中国，因而引致银行存款绝对的减少。毋庸置疑的是目前的情况看来并不是如此。官方的银行数据在七月和八月的外汇购买依然录得增幅，显示中国把更多的美元转换成人民币，而不是相反。
一个最近出现的漏洞是，中国的进口商可以用境内的人民币缴付给境外的供应商。而只要是可以合法地进行经常账户交易的地方，投资者也可以把金钱转移到海外。今年到现在为止，通过香港进行的人民币进口结算交易金额已经超过10,000亿人民币。
假如通过香港进行的进口结算规模够大的话，大量的境内存款便有可能离开中国，而不会对只会反映境内货币兑换的净外汇购买数额构成变化。当然，即使是这个漏洞也不能说明在最近几个月的存款显著下降的原因。
谜团虽然仍未解开，但揭开这个谜对想要知道经济前景的投资者而言是重要的。
假如大额款项正在移到影子银行体系，那么一个不受政府控制的金融系统所占的市场份额便会急升。
假如大额的款项正在流出中国，这可能就是中国大规模而且持久的资金外移的序幕。 人民币持续的升值可以想休矣？ 钱进了股市，股市下降吞掉了钱。 我也一直好奇中国的地下金融的规模究竟有多大呢……
反正根据各种来源透露出来的讯息判断，挺惊人的…… 为什么啊 不懂金融不知道在说什么
寒铁 发表于 2011-10-10 17:04 static/image/common/back.gif
不懂金融不知道在说什么
金融简单地说：
养猪能赚钱，单靠自己那点本养不了几头猪，也就赚不了多少钱。
得向温州帮那样，借钱养猪，熏心的时候，借点高息的债，打个短平快，炒一下猪城的股市 和 房子，猪城饱和了，再去炒牛城的，管它天下大乱，猪自巍然稳赚。
但也不能学他们那么无厌，什么东西迟早都是要还的，第一桶黑心金后，第二，第三。。。第N桶就一定要忧着点了，适可而止，最好能学 盖茨，还在赚钱，但已经不是坏蛋了。
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真不知你懂了没有？o3O78) diver18 发表于 2011-10-10 17:25 static/image/common/back.gif
金融简单地说：
养猪能赚钱，单靠自己那点本养不了几头猪，也就赚不了多少钱。
得向温州帮那样，借钱养猪 ...
对钱买钱钱卖钱不感兴趣，我15岁的时候就觉得股票，基金会，期货的存在是在勒索穷人的钱
寒铁 发表于 2011-10-10 17:28 static/image/common/back.gif
对钱买钱钱卖钱不感兴趣，我15岁的时候就觉得股票，基金会，期货的存在是在勒索穷人的钱
...
俺只是解释你的问题，没打算左右你的取向。 金融时报操心好美国的事就好了。不要挑拨中国 原来如此！！！
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