【今日印度0112】不要夸大中国的敌意
本帖最后由 花落无声 于 2012-1-12 18:56 编辑【中文标题】不要夸大中国的敌意
【原文标题】Don't talk up Chinese enmity
【登载媒体】今日印度
【来源地址】http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/india-vs-china-dai-bingguo-shivshankar-menon-pla-indian-army/1/168402.html
【译者】花落无声
【翻译方式】人工
【声明】欢迎转载，请务必注明译者和出处 bbs.m4.cn。
【原文库链接】http://bbs.m4.cn/thread-3293016-1-1.html
【译文】
http://media2.intoday.in/indiatoday/images/stories/bingguo_menon-350_011212110958.jpg
Chinese State Councillor Dai Bingguo (left) with National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon
中国国务委员戴秉国（左）和国家安全顾问夫香卡尔·梅农
At first sight, we should not expect much on the Sino-Indian front in 2012. This is, after all, the year in which the Chinese leadership will have its decennial turnover. The highly successful team of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao will give way to the untested and relatively unknown Xi Jinping and Le Keqiang. In the Hu-Wen period we came tantalisingly close to a border settlement in the 2003-2005 period, only to suffer setbacks in 2008-2009. The future with Xi and Le is, therefore, an unknown quantity.
初看之下，我们不应该对2012年的中印战线期待太多。毕竟这一年中国领导人将开始十年一度的交接。高度成功的胡锦涛和温家宝组合将让位给未经检验的、相对来说未知的习近平和李克强。在胡温时期的2003年到2005年我们曾十分接近边境争端的和解，只是在2008年到2009年有了周折。因此习和李的未来还是个未知数。
But can some qualitative shift occur in the coming months, which can set a favourable course for the future? Early next week, Chinese Special Representative, Dai Bingguo, will arrive in Delhi to hold the 15th round of talks on the border issues with his Indian counterpart, Shivshankar Menon. Both the officials are, of course, senior officials of their respective governments. Dai has many titles, but he is effectively the National Security Adviser to the Chinese President, and, Menon, of course, is the Indian National Security Advisor.
但未来几个月里会发生一些能够给未来打好基础的质变吗？下周早期，中国特别代表戴秉国将会到达德里，和印度同级官员希夫香卡尔•梅农开始关于边境问题的第15轮对话。当然，这两位官员都是各自政府的高级官员。戴有很多头衔，但他实际上是中国主席的国家安全顾问，而梅农当然是印度的国家安全顾问。
Shift
转变
Following Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit in 2003, the two countries were able to fast track their border negotiations by appointing Special Representatives to take the process forward. The immediate gain was the 2005 agreement on the "Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the settlement of the India-China border question." The idea was that the two countries would next decide on a framework agreement that would incorporate their mutual concessions, and thereafter an agreement would be signed to delineate the border.
在阿塔尔•比哈里•瓦杰帕伊总理2003年的访问之后，两国能够通过指定特别代表来快速开展边境协商。最直接的收获是2005关于“中印边境问题解决的政治因素与指导原则”的一致意见。想法是两国下一步将会决定一个能够结合它们共同的让步的框架协议，那之后将会签署一个描画边境的协议。
That there would be give and take was clear. So was the idea that the agreement would require concessions on the part of both sides. However, the second phase has got stuck and the talks have been going round and round since 2009 when the two sides actually expanded the scope of the SR's talks, signaling that they had come to a roadblock on their primary mandate to resolve the border dispute. It appeared that not only did the Chinese want India to concede its demands in the West i. e. Aksai Chin, but also concede their claims in the East- if not all of Arunachal Pradesh, its key town Tawang with its important monastery. A negotiation where what's yours is negotiable, and what's mine is mine, is not acceptable to India.
很明显将会有相互让步。这个协议将需要双方的让步这个想法也很明显。然而，第二阶段遇到了困难，从2009年开始对话就进行了一轮又一轮，在那时双方实际上都扩展了特别代表的对话范围，表示他们在解决边境争端的主要任务方面已经遇到了障碍。看起来中国人不仅希望印度在西方地区——比如阿克赛钦——的方面让步，也希望他们在东边——即使不是整个阿鲁纳恰尔邦，也应该是它的关键小镇，有着主要寺院的达旺——让步。什么是你的可以商量，而什么是我的就是我的，印度无法接受这种协商。
At first, it appeared that the Chinese shift was occasioned by the Indo-US nuclear deal - with the Chinese recognising that this represented a major geopolitical gambit on the part of the United States whose aim was to contain China. But over the years it would appear that the situation is more complicated. It is linked to internal debates with the Chinese system where the PLA calls the shots when it comes to dealing with the border dispute with India.
最初，中国的转变看起来是由印美核交易造成的——中国人认为这代表着一个重要的地理政治学的开始，认为美国方面想牵制中国。但多年以来状况看起来可能更复杂。它是和中国体系的内部争论联系在一起的，在这个体系里如果要和印度处理边境争端的话，解放军说了算。
More important it is linked to China's Tibet policy. The demonstrations that hit Tibet in 2008 - not just the Tibet Autonomous Region, but parts of Tibet which have been incorporated into various Chinese provinces - clearly shook the Chinese. Despite a huge investment for the development of the region, the Tibetans seemed unreconciled to the Chinese domination. Since then, the situation has not changed and protests by Tibetans have become a regular feature. An outcome of Chinese defensiveness was that they began to describe Arunachal Pradesh as "southern Tibet."
更重要的是它和中国的西藏政策联系在一起。在2008年打击了西藏——不仅仅是西藏自治区，还有已经被合并入不同的中国省市的部分西藏——的行走抗议很明显地使中国人震惊了。尽管为了这个地区的发展有巨额投入，西藏人看起来还是不服从与中国的主导。从那时开始，局势就没变化过，而西藏人的抗议变成了常态。中国的防御的结果就是他们开始将阿鲁纳恰尔邦称为“西藏南部”。
Another element of the changed situation is the Chinese perception that the 2008 economic crisis has enhanced their standing on the world stage. The Chinese have continued to grow at a fast pace, even while the rest of the world, especially the US and Europe, have seen depressed growth, unemployment and economic turmoil.
改变了的局势的另一元素是中国人对2008经济危机的洞察加强了他们在世界舞台上的地位。即使是当世界其它部分——尤其美国和欧洲——有着极低的发展、事业以及经济骚乱的时候，中国仍然继续以很快速度发展。
There is a clearly growing asymmetry in Sino-Indian relations. This is a consequence of China's massive economic growth and its huge defence expenditures. While the latter do not specifically target India - they are aimed at Taiwan and the U S- they do constitute capabilities that the Indian military cannot ignore. With the systematic growth of the transportation infrastructure in Tibet, especially the railroads, India needs to keep up its guard in view of the fact that the entire Sino-Indian border remains disputed.
中印关系很明显有逐渐增加的不对称。这是中国大规模的经济增长和巨大的国防开支的结果。尽管后者并非特别针对印度——它针对着台湾和美国——他们的确有着印度军方无法忽视的能力。通过在西藏对运输基本设施——尤其是铁路——的系统发展，考虑到整个中印边境还在争执中这一事实，印度需要保持警惕。
False
虚假的
Unfortunately, some forces in India seem determined to push Sino- Indian relations over the brink. This comes from inspired reports of Chinese intrusions into Indian territory. Now there are parts of the Line of Actual Control that both sides claim.
不幸的是，看起来印度的一些势力决心要将中印关系逼进困境。这从那些被授意的、关于中国闯入印度边境的报告开始。现在实际控制线有双方都索要的部分。
They also patrol to the extent they consider their border. There is nothing unusual about this and there are protocols that have been established to deal with the situation though it is rare that the two sides actually meet up face to face at a place both sides claim.
他们甚至还巡逻到了他们觉得是自己边境的地方。这没有什么不寻常的，有已制定的处理这种状况的拟定草案，尽管很少有双方真的在双方都索要的地方面对面偶然遇到的情况。
On Christmas eve last year, for example, a few regional TV channels in Arunachal Pradesh started flashing "news" that the Chinese had intruded into the Tawang sector and damaged a wall made by the Indian army on its side of the border. The "news" gained such currency that the commander of the 190 Mountain Brigade formally clarified that no such thing had happened and that the news footage being aired with the news item was "false." A leading channel in New Delhi, too, had done a detailed story on the presence of Chinese troops in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and the news gained such currency that the number two man in the PLA, General Ma Xiaotian, personally told Prime Minister Singh, during a visit to New Delhi last month, that there was not a single Chinese soldier in Pakistan, leave alone POK. What has probably happened is that Chinese construction troops in POK, much like our Border Roads Organisation, are being conflated with the PLA.
比如说，去年的平安夜，阿鲁纳恰尔邦的一些地方电视台开始滚动“新闻”说中国人已经侵入了达旺地区并损坏了一面印度军队在边境自己那边砌起的墙。这条“新闻”流通得如此广泛，以至于山旅190的指挥官正式澄清并无此事，和新闻一起被播放的画面是“虚假的”。新德里的一家主流频道也报道了一个详细的故事，关于中国军队在巴基斯坦占领的克什米尔出现，这条新闻也流通得如此广泛，以至于解放军的第二把手马晓天将军于上个月造访新德里的时候个人告知总理辛格在巴基斯坦没有一个中国士兵，只有POK。可能发生了的是POK——就像我们的边境道路组织——的中国施工队被和解放军混淆了。
Indian officials say that the Chinese do not seem to take India too seriously. While India meticulously follows the dialogue schedules on bilateral and multilateral issues between the two countries, the Chinese are wont to skip meetings. They put greater store by leadership summits which, though, are going well.
印度官员说中国看起来并没严肃对待印度。印度一丝不苟地遵守两国之间双边和多边问题的谈话日程，中国却习惯于不参加会议。他们通过领导峰会——进行得很好——更加重视。
Indeed, one of the outcomes of Dai's visit next week could be the establishment of a mechanism for consultation and coordination as an additional measure to ensure what the two sides call "peace and tranquility" on the border. This had been proposed by Chinese premier Wen Jiabao in 2010 during his visit to Delhi and in the April meeting between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Hu Jintao, the two leaders reached an agreement in principle to implement it.
的确，戴下周访问的结果之一可能是作为附加措施来保障双方边境的“和平与宁静”的磋商与协调机制的建立。2010年中国总理温家宝访问德里的时候曾提出过，在总理曼莫汉•辛格和胡锦涛四月的会面中，两位领导人大体达成了落实它的协议。
This could well be Dai's last meeting with his Indian counterpart. He started with Brajesh Mishra, went through J. N. (Mani) Dixit, M. K. Narayanan and will conclude with Menon. The 70 year old Dai has publicly stated his intention of stepping down with Hu and Wen. While the Chinese do think in the long term, they are also human, and there are expectations that he would like to leave some legacy of the talks he has been holding since 2003.
这可能是戴和他的印度同级官员的最后一次会面了。他从布拉杰什•米什拉开始，经过J. N. (Mani) Dixit，M. K. Narayanan，现在要以梅农作结。70岁的戴已经公开声明了和胡与温一起下台的意愿。中国人的确觉得长期来说他们也是人，有人预计他想留下一些他从2003年就开始的会谈的遗产。
Ghosts
幽灵
In a recent speech at a Chinese Embassy function Menon noted that there was nothing predetermined about the Sino-Indian rivalry. He said the two countries had erected a fairly robust framework for managing differences and building on commonalities. The issue he said was whether the two could manage their competition "within an agreed strategic framework" that allowed them to pursue their core interests.
梅农最近在中国大使馆集会上的演讲中提到中印之间的竞争并非注定的。他说两国已经建立了一个相当强劲的框架来处理差异并建立共同点。他说的问题是两国是否应该把竞争控制“在一个（双方同意的）战略框架里”，这样他们可以追求自己的核心利益。
History can never be a true guide to future foreign policy. Were it so, Germany and France, or the US and Japan could never have had good relations. Enmities would be permanent and the world would be a rather bleak place to live in.
历史永远不能是未来外交政策的真正向导。如果它是的话，德国和法国，或者美国和日本都永远不可能有好的关系了，敌意会是永久的，而世界会是一个阴冷的地方。
Sino-Indian relations have undergone such dramatic change, especially in the last two and a half decades, that dwelling on the past is to invoke ghosts which should now be exorcised.
中印关系已经经历了如此戏剧化的变化——尤其是在最近两个半年代中——以至于沉思过去只能招来原本应该已经驱除的幽灵。 至少它承认了印度媒体歇斯底里的造假癖 怀疑这是不是阿三写的 POK?:o:o:o 没什么敌意不敌意，我们只知道历史和事实，是你们要上升到敌意的 远则近之，近则远之。只有脑残的领导才会恶化与印度的关系，只要在西藏地区保持对印度的军事压力则尽矣。 水平低，看不懂，不知这篇报道要说啥 pakistan occupied kashmir （pok） 如果中印边界问题早日解决，国际形势会好很多 印度人何时才能知道他们真正的危险在那些试图坐稳奴才总管位置到万代的买办们？
反观中国，其实也差不多。。。 还我藏南！ 中印关系已经经历了如此戏剧化的变化:好-差-打-差-好 勇敢之盾 发表于 2012-1-13 18:02 static/image/common/back.gif
还我藏南！
还我藏南！中国的每一寸领土都不会放弃，中国早晚会要回来，中国不可欺，华夏民族不可辱 中印有领土争议，但那两个相邻国家能没有领土争议？
中印历史上有许多的友好交流，中国建国后印度也是率先建交的，我们两个贫苦兄弟有着很多的共性，都人口众多，都受过西方的侵略，信仰类似，也比较爱好和平。我们理应是好朋友。
但印度媒体秉承西方媒体对中国抹黑的秉性，夸大中国的敌意，的确对中印关系发展很不好。 有没有都一样 不要夸大，实事求是最能赢得人心 看到这标题第一反应是“是我打开方式不对还是我膝盖中了一箭？！”
之前最喜欢夸大中国敌意的不就是印媒么OTZ|||这突然转性了是闹哪样？ 印度永远都在自说自话。
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