俄罗斯和中国准备好进入一场新的大博弈了吗？
本帖最后由 花落无声 于 2012-1-16 20:42 编辑【中文标题】俄罗斯和中国准备好进入一场新的大博弈了吗？
【原文标题】Are Russia and China ready to play a new Great Game?
【来源地址】http://hotair.com/greenroom/archives/2012/01/08/are-russia-and-china-ready-to-play-a-new-great-game/
【译者】花落无声
【翻译方式】人工
【声明】欢迎转载，请务必注明译者和出处 bbs.m4.cn。
【译文】
In all the discussion of the sanctions on Iran and what effect they’re having, analysts have forgotten a major factor.The US, Iran, and Europe aren’t the only geopolitical actors in the world.We don’t operate in a sealed vacuum in which the interests and intentions of others have no meaning.And from the perspective of these others – especially Russia, China, and India – what the US is doing with sanctions could well be the beginning of an attempt to destabilize Iran on their doorstep.
在关于对伊朗的制裁及其会带来的影响的所有讨论中，分析家们忘记了一个主要因素。美国、伊朗和欧洲不是世界上唯一的地缘政治参与者。我们不是在一个他人的利益和意图毫无意义的密封真空中运转。从他人——尤其是俄罗斯、中国和印度——的角度看来，美国正在用制裁做的事很可能是试图在他们家门口动摇伊朗的开始。
The strategic drivers
战略驱动者
Once Iran is destabilized, the picture gets murkier from the standpoint of a great Asian power.Either the US has a specific plan to re-stabilize Iran – which would probably reestablish a US presence there – or the Obama administration really doesn’t understand how alarming the prospect of a destabilized Iran is, and has no plan.In either case, the potential outcome is worrisome or undesirable.Asian leaders can’t just sit there and watch something develop without preparing for what might happen.
一旦伊朗被动摇了，从一个强大的亚洲势力的角度来看，局势会变得更加朦胧。不是美国对重新稳定伊朗有着具体的计划——可能是在那里重建美国存在，就是奥巴马政府真的不明白失去稳定后的伊朗的前景有多令人担忧并且毫无计划。
The question is not whether they will prepare, but what they will do.India is an important factor, because whoever she aligns more closely with – Russia, presumably – will derive advantage from that.But in terms of actively trying to shape the outcome in Iran, the actors with capability and history are Russia and China.Both of them want to wield the major Asian influence over Iranian policy, and – perhaps more importantly – neither is willing to see the other gain the upper hand.
问题不是他们是否会准备，而是他们会做什么。印度是一个重要因素，因为无论她和谁更紧密地结盟——很可能是俄罗斯——都会从中获得优势。但在积极试图塑造伊朗的结果的方面，有能力和历史的参与者则是俄罗斯和中国。两国都想对伊朗政策施加主要的亚洲影响，并且——可能更重要地——都不想看到对方占得上风。
The basic conditions, which always have to be explained to Westerners, are geographic.Iran naturally commands the Persian Gulf and anchors Southwest Asia.She is the major power across the Caspian Sea from Russia.Her population is vigorous and educated; she has a unifying national idea from out of the depths of history that no other nation in her immediate vicinity can claim.
总是需要向西方人解释的基本条件是地理上的。伊朗很自然地控制波斯湾并牢牢确立在亚洲西南部的地位。她是和俄罗斯隔里海相望的主要力量。她的人口充满活力并受过教育；她有着从没有任何其它紧邻国家能够断言的历史深渊里而来的统一的国家观念。
Iran is a tremendous prize; neither Russia nor China is so foolish as to imagine ruling her directly, but obtaining her as a client is viewed by both as a major power-and-security move.It would give them a foothold closer to the “Great Crossroads” of the Middle East-Africa-Europe juncture than either has yet obtained.
伊朗是一个巨大的奖品；无论俄罗斯还是中国都不会愚蠢到想要直接统治她，但两国都把获得她作为附属视为一个重大的“权力与安全”的举动。
What Russia and China will not tolerate, if they can help it, is an Iran that falls either to the other or to the influence of the United States.The Russians and Chinese have both made it clear, in numerous ways, that they are not willing participants in any global vision the US may choose to operate on.They are no more interested in waiting for Barack Obama to reorder the world for them, through his trademark passive-aggressive approach, than they were for Bush II, Clinton, or Bush I to do it by their methods.
俄罗斯与中国不会——如果它们能——容忍的便是伊朗落入对方或美国的影响中。俄罗斯人和中国人都以许多方式清楚表示他们不愿意参与美国选择的任何全球视野。他们对等待巴拉克•奥巴马——通过他消极攻击的方法——来为他们重组世界的兴趣不会比对小布什、克林顿或是老布什用自己的方法重组世界的兴趣更多。
Potential courses of action
可能的行动方针
What can Russia and China do to respond to the toughened sanctions being imposed on Iran?They can breach the sanctions; they can prepare for what they perceive to be US intentions; and they can seek to influence the political outcome in Iran, where the leadership is increasingly in disarray and may indeed lose its footing as the bite of sanctions intensifies.
俄罗斯和中国可以对加诸伊朗的更严厉的制裁做些什么来应对？他们可以破坏制裁；他们可以为自己感知到的美国意图做出准备；他们可以设法影响伊朗的政治结果，在伊朗领导层正越来越混乱，并且在制裁之痛加剧时有可能真的失去立足点。
It would not be difficult at all for Russia to continue to trade with Iran.Russia has what no other G-8 power has:an inland sea shared with Iran, where conventional US or NATO forces would find operations inconvenient in the extreme, both logistically, militarily, and politically.China does not enjoy that advantage, but there are other ways into Iran, such as through Afghanistan and Iraq.The US and NATO don’t control all the roads through Afghanistan, and the US no longer patrols the border between Iraq and Iran.
对俄罗斯来说，和伊朗继续贸易并不会困难。俄罗斯有着其他八国集团势力都没有的东西：和伊朗共用的内海，在那里常见的美国或北约势力都会发现执行任务极度艰难，无论是在运筹上，军事上，还是政治上。中国并没有这项优势，但还有其他途径进入伊朗，比如说通过阿富汗和伊拉克。美国和北约没有控制所有通过阿富汗的公路，而美国也不再于伊拉克和伊朗的边境上巡逻。
Certainly, the most convenient method of trading in oil and gas products with Iran is through the network of maritime terminals set up in the south.But with the help of an outside partner, Iran could adapt relatively quickly to a different logistic footprint.
非常确定的是，最方便的和伊朗买卖石油和天然气产品的方法是通过在南部建立的海上终端网络。但通过外部伙伴的帮助，伊朗可以相对来说很快适应不同的物流足迹。
Meanwhile, we should not discount the options Iran may have from her southern coast.The sanctions-evasion industry that grew up around Iraq between 1991 and 2003 involved actors in Iran, the UAE, and Oman (non-government actors in the latter two, to be sure, but the governments did little to interdict their activities.See here for an analysis from 2009 of Iran’s evasion options).Someone in the Persian Gulf is always up for profiting from sanctions evasion, and if the contraband network involved Russia, China, India, or other interested nations as clients, its appeal would only be increased.
同时，我们不应该不算伊朗可能会有的南部海滩的选择。在1991年和2003年间于伊拉克周边逐渐形成的制裁规避工业涉及到在伊朗、阿联酋和阿曼的参与者（当然，后两者是非政府参与者，但政府基本没有禁止他们的活动）。在波斯湾总有人打算从制裁规避中获利，如果走私网络涉及俄罗斯、中国、印度，或者其它作为客户的关系国家，它的吸引力只会增加。
The banking sanctions can certainly hurt Iran a great deal in the short term, but they also create conditions in which it would be an indispensable relief for a nation like Russia or China to come in with cash under the table.Neither Moscow nor Beijing would do that out of compassion; the purpose would be to influence the course of political events in Tehran.Against the assumption that the mullahs would have nothing to do with them must be set the reality that economic conditions are deteriorating rapidly.The regime has a survival problem.
银行业制裁在短期内肯定会极大地伤害伊朗，但它也创造了对于像俄罗斯和中国这样的国家来说是一种不可或缺的帮助的境况，使它们可以带着秘密资金进来。无论莫斯科还是北京都不会出于同情这样做；它们的目的将会是影响德黑兰的政治事件方针。毛拉和他们毫无关系的假设必须放到经济状况急速恶化的现实对面来看。这个政权遇到了生存问题。
Since the end of World War II, both Russia and China have sought repeatedly to secure influence abroad by bolstering miscreant regimes against the policies of the West. They have had varying degrees of success, but the point to be disproven today is not why they would attempt it with Iran, but why they wouldn’t.We can assume without demur that both Moscow and Beijing have an active interest in “picking” the leadership that will establish itself out of a destabilized Iran.
自从二战结束，俄罗斯和中国都通过支持异端政权反对西方政策来反复寻求对海外影响的维持。它们已经有了不同程度的成功，但今天要被反驳的一点不是他们为什么要在伊朗身上做这种尝试，而是他们为什么不要这样做。我们可以毫无异义地假定莫斯科和北京都对 “拣选”能在失去稳定的伊朗中建立自己的领导有着活跃兴趣。
My own view is that if the US took a more active interest in cultivating a new leadership from among the liberalizing elements in Iran, we would have a good opportunity to succeed.Iranians have no illusions about the intentions of Russia or China.The idea that those nations’ purposes would be more consonant with the sentiments of Iranians, whether the political leaders or the average people, is laughable.
我自己的看法是如果美国对从伊朗自由化元素中培养新的领导层有着更活跃的兴趣，我们会有很好的成功机会。伊朗人对俄罗斯或中国的意图没有幻想。“这些国家的目的会和伊朗人——无论政治领袖还是普通民众——的情绪更一致”这种想法是可笑的。
But successful support of this kind cannot be accomplished without an overtly articulated moral and political case for it.The best way Obama could help Iranian reformers is by stating that the US is behind them.Reagan’s success with this approach stands out against decades of failure with the more Obama-like ambivalent rhetoric from both Democrats and Republicans.You cannot induce at-risk nations into liberalizing by applying secret-squirrel methods inside a cone of political silence.This is a case in which the only effective approach is to state your intentions and lead from the front.
但如果没有公开表达的道德和政治事件，这种支持就不能成功完成。奥巴马帮助伊朗改革者最好的方法就是声明美国支持他们。里根通过这种方法取得的成功和更加奥巴马式的、同时被民主党和共和党采用的矛盾修辞持续几个年代的失败形成了鲜明对比。你不能在政治科学的松果里用秘密松鼠的方法诱导处于危险中的国家自由化。在这种事情里，唯一有效的方法是声明意图，从前方带领。
The military aspect
军事方面
Besides breaching the sanctions and seeking to foster a client regime in Iran, Russia, in particular, can be – and is – preparing to counter US/NATO military action.That doesn’t mean China has made no “military” noises; in fact, a Chinese general has been quoted as saying that a US attack on Iran would launch World War III.China has conducted major military exercises with Pakistan – Iran’s neighbor to the east – this past year; has a military build-up underway in Pakistan’s northern territories (namely, Gilgit-Baltistan); and has a growing and respectable capability to project power in the Indian Ocean.(At the end of December, the Russian navy also had talks with the Seychelles about using Port Victoria for Russian naval operations.)
除了破坏制裁、力图在伊朗培养附庸政权，俄罗斯可以——并且正在——准备反击美国/北约军事行动。这并不意味着中国未曾制造过“军事”噪音；事实上，一位中国将军说美国对伊朗的攻击将会发动第三次世界大战。上一年中国与巴基斯坦——伊朗东方的邻居——开展过大型军事演习，在巴基斯坦北部领土（也就是吉尔吉特-巴尔蒂斯坦）正在进行军事集结，对于在印度洋部署力量有正在增加的骄人能力。（十二月末，俄罗斯海军也与塞舌尔就使用维多利亚港进行俄罗斯军事行动进行会谈。）
But Russia’s territory abuts Iran’s to the north, and the Caucasus and Central Asian ‘Stans are the southern flank of Moscow’s “near abroad.”The Russians are worried – to the extent of moving troops to the south, near the border with Turkey, evacuating families from military posts in the Caucasus, and conducting a large military exercise in the Caspian Sea, simulating the defense of oil and gas interests against an attack by Western forces.The oil and gas infrastructure in the Caspian Sea belongs to multiple nations; one implication of the Russian exercise is that Russia wants to be able to pursue joint commercial interests with Iran in spite of sanctions, and that the Caspian Sea is the nexus of that intention.Supposing that Russia merely intends to “help Iran” by defending Iranian assets is too narrow an interpretation.
但俄罗斯的领土紧靠伊朗北方，而高加索地区和中亚‘Stans是莫斯科“近邻国家”的南部侧翼。俄罗斯人很担心——担心到了调动部队到接近土耳其边境的南方、将家属从高加索地区的军事营地疏散、在里海进行大型军事演习、模拟保卫石油和天然气利益不受西方势力攻击的程度。里海的石油和天然气基础设施属于很多国家，对俄罗斯行为的一个暗示是俄罗斯想和伊朗追求共同的经济利益而不管制裁，里海则是这一企图的连系。俄罗斯仅仅试图通过保卫伊朗资产来“帮助伊朗”这种猜想是一种过于狭隘的解释。
Russia is also building both a case and a capability to eliminate Georgia as a potential base for US operations – and to secure Georgian territory for logistic support to Russian forces in Armenia.Multiple sources quote Russian military leaders as complaining that their logistic freedom is constrained by Georgia’s denial of a key transport route.And in mid-December, the chairman of the Russian Security Council – not an anonymous functionary, but the chairman himself – announced that Moscow was worried about a force of terrorists supposedly being readied in Georgia for attacks on Russia, specifically attributing this to Georgian government policy.
俄罗斯正在建立档案与能力来排除格鲁尼亚作为美军行动的潜在基地——并且保卫格鲁尼亚的领土作为亚美尼亚的俄军的后勤支持。很多线索说俄罗斯军队领导抱怨他们的后勤自由被格鲁尼亚对作为关键运输路线的否认而约束了。十二月中旬，俄罗斯安理会主席——不是匿名官员，就是主席自己——宣布莫斯科担心一支恐怖分子可能在格鲁尼亚为袭击俄罗斯做准备，特别地把这归因于格鲁尼亚的政府政策。
While manufacturing a case against Georgia, Russia has also consolidated the command structure of her Black Sea naval forces and put them at the highest readiness level (see RT link above).These are the ships that will blockade Georgia in the case of a Russian takeover.
在制造格鲁尼亚的罪名的同时（这句不确定），俄罗斯还巩固了她黑海海军的指挥结构并将他们放在了最高级的准备状态。这些是在俄罗斯控制的情况下将会封锁格鲁尼亚的船只。
Many readers are also aware that Russia has dispatched a naval task force to the Mediterranean, built around the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov.The naval love-fest continues between Russia and Greece:Kuznetsov conducted flight operations in Greek waters on 5-6 January, and her escorts pulled into Tartus, Syria on the 7th.From the Kremlin, Kuznetsov’s presence looks as much like the spearhead of a potential deterrent against US action in the Black Sea as it does anything else.Of course, Russia intends to stake her claim on Syria and support the Assad regime, but since 2007, when Putin proclaimed a return of Russian force to the global stage, it has been wrong to interpret the strategic purposes of Russian deployments narrowly.
很多读者还知道俄罗斯派遣了一只海军特别小组去地中海，建立航母库兹涅佐夫上将。这一海军示爱行动在俄罗斯和希腊之间继续：库兹涅佐夫于一月5日和6日在希腊水域实施了飞行行动，她的护航舰于7日驶入了叙利亚塔尔图斯。从克里姆林宫来说，库兹涅佐夫的存在看起来很像反击美国黑海中行动的潜在威慑的先锋部队，就像其它任何事一样。当然，俄罗斯想要坚持在叙利亚的要求并支持阿萨德政权，但从2007年当——普京宣告了俄罗斯军队回归世界舞台时——开始，狭隘地解读俄罗斯的部署的战略宗旨是错误的。
It’s also worth noting that Russia’s core security alliance, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), conducted a major military exercise in September in which it simulated preventing the construction of a gas pipeline between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.Such a pipeline could only get going with outside support from a presumably Western (perhaps Chinese) partner.Russia is starting to put serious ideas of military force behind her strategic concern that her rivals are all up in her Kool-Aid, and the actions of the Obama administration are having the opposite of a reassuring effect.
另外很值得注意的是俄罗斯的核心安全同盟——集体安全条约组织（CSTO）——在九月实施了一项大型的军事演习，它模拟了如何阻止阿塞拜疆和土库曼斯坦之间天然气管线的建设。这样一条管道大概只能从西方（有可能是中国）伙伴那里得到外部支持。俄罗斯开始把军事力量的严肃想法放到战略上的担忧——她的竞争对手all up in her Kool-Aid，而奥巴马政府的行动正起到安心影响的反面。
Russia’s preparations for something that many Americans reflexively assume will not happen are both extensive and expensive.In the wake of his inconsistent responses to the Arab Spring revolts, it is logical for Russia and other nations to read Obama as unpredictable, and to see him as dismissive of the repercussions of his policies for the rest of the world.
俄罗斯对一些很多美国人条件反射地假定不会发生的事情的准备既广泛又昂贵。随着奥巴马对阿拉伯之春叛乱的前后矛盾的反应，俄罗斯和其他国家认为奥巴马是难以预测的、认为他十分轻视世界其他部分对于他政策的反响，这很符合逻辑。
Obama’s lack of strategic understanding will only carry US policy so far.Iran has more options than simply collapsing and hollering “Uncle!” under the Western sanctions.Any of those options entails a major shift of power liaisons in the Eastern hemisphere.Team Obama seems to be proceeding as if none of that matters.But it does.
因为奥巴马缺乏战略意识，美国政策只能走到这么远。伊朗有更多的选择，而不只是在西方制裁下崩溃并叫喊“大叔！”这些选择中的任何一个都需要在东半球的阴暗的权力转移。奥巴马团队仍然继续，仿佛这些毫不重要。但这些很重要。
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