【外交政策 20120103】美国十大情报失误
本帖最后由 woikuraki 于 2012-3-31 16:58 编辑【中文标题】美国十大情报失误
【原文标题】The Ten Biggest American Intelligence Failures
【登载媒体】外交政策
【原文作者】URI FRIEDMAN
【原文链接】http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/1/3/the_ten_biggest_american_intelligence_failures?page=0,0
在2011年1月版《外交政策》中，前CIA官员Paul Pillar讲述了政治情报——无论是好消息还是坏消息——在多大程度上会影响总统决策、美国的外交政策走向，以及避免意外的发生。不管美国情报部门所覆盖的范围多么广泛，它总是在遭到一些有关短视行为的批评，最近一次的责难是因为没有能预测到阿拉伯春天和朝鲜领导人金正日的去世。
实际上，尽管情报部门有过一些成功的经验（比如，Pillar指出CIA在1967年成功预见到六日战争（译者注：指第三次中东战争）），但也的确遭受过一些羞辱性的失败。就像下面的实例所展示的，这些情报失误让美国误入中东核心政治环境、改变了冷战的进程、把美国推入二战、对恐怖分子开站、启动伊拉克战争。
珍珠港
1941年12月7日，美国战舰亚利桑那号在珍珠港袭击中起火燃烧。
1941年12月7日破晓，日本人袭击了位于夏威夷珍珠港的美国太平洋舰队，把一度犹豫不决的美国迅速推入二战。海军基地对这次袭击毫无准备，事实是，美国曾经试图破译的日本军方电报，以及日本对爪哇岛的军事行动，都向华盛顿预示对夏威夷、菲律宾和泰国的袭击。Roberta Wholstetter在《珍珠港：警告与决策》一书中说：“我们从未对敌人的情报网络有如此完整的了解。”
然而，这种了解最终未能影响决策，原因是内部信息流通的不畅、美国对日本进行如此大胆攻击的错误假设，以及美国情报部门内部的矛盾。1947年经国家安全法案成立的中央情报局在后来解释，珍珠港意外受袭强调了把“信号”从“噪音”中分离出来的重要性，因此有必要建立集中性的情报机构。
猪湾入侵
1961年4月，守卫在猪湾看管被擒获的2506突击旅士兵。
1961年4月，在CIA的策划下，古巴流亡人士试图推翻菲德尔•卡斯特罗，并建立起一个非共产主义的亲美政府的企图彻底失败了。对古巴空军基地的空袭未能实施，1400人的“2506突击旅”在登陆南部海岸之后遭遇古巴军队的强大火力压制。这场一无所获的入侵让美古关系迅速恶化。
后来被解密的CIA档案显示，CIA以为约翰•肯尼迪总统在进攻失败的情况下会让美国军队介入，因此没有向这位新上任的总统出具一份报告，其中说明了对没有美军支持情况下，突击旅成功登陆的疑虑。（历史学家Piero Gleijeses曾经把CIA和肯尼迪比作在黑暗中航行的船只。）第二年，CIA在古巴导弹危机发生前一个月的报告中，更加错误地认为苏联不大可能在古巴建立威胁性的导弹基地。之后，他们用U-2侦察机拍摄到导弹基地的照片，总算挽回了一些颜面。
越南春节攻势
1968年的春节攻势中，越共士兵爬上一辆被丢弃在顺化市街道上的美国坦克。
1968年1月31日正值越南春节假期，北越共产主义武装力量对南越悍然发动大规模、全方位进攻。尽管共产主义军队的优势转瞬即逝，但春节攻势普遍被认为是越南战争中的决定性战役。美国人不再对战争抱有幻想，政策制定者开始考虑从越南撤军。
春节攻势之后，政府内部的回顾发现，美国、南越的军事长官和情报分析人士尽管得到多次警告，但仍未能清晰预测“敌人进攻的规模、协作程度和时机”。海军图书馆长Glenn E. Helm指出，对情报收集、语言障碍和错误理解敌人战略的忽视，在这次情报工作失败中扮演了重要的角色。James J. Wirtz在《春节攻势：战争中的情报失败》一书中说：“美国人几乎成功地及时预测到对手的行动，完全可以避免这次意外的军事结局。”
赎罪日战争
1973年10月17日的赎罪日战争中，年轻的阿里尔•沙龙（头扎绷带者）与同伴军事领导人哈依姆•巴尔•列夫和当时的以色列国防部长摩西•达扬（戴眼罩者）在西奈半岛商量军事策略。
尽管CIA在1967年准确地分析出以色列和临近阿拉伯国家之间的六日战争（译者注：指第三次中东战争），但6年后他们再一次遭遇到出其不意的事件。埃及和叙利亚军队在犹太人假期赎罪日，在西奈沙漠和戈兰高地对以色列军事力量发起进攻。这场战争在1973年10月结束，美苏关系遭到严峻的考验，并把阿拉伯－以色列冲突摆到华盛顿外交政策的首要位置。
乔治华盛顿大学国家安全档案中收集的文件表明，以色列情报部门认为本国的高级军事将领有机会阻止阿拉伯邻国发动一场战争，而美国情报部官员也接受了这个结论。国家安全委员会在战争开始当天的记录提到，苏联顾问已经从埃及撤离，以色列本来已经因埃及和叙利亚军队的动向而预见到一场战争，但美国情报部门“依然低估阿拉伯国家攻击以色列的可能性”，并且“认为这是阿拉伯与苏联之间关系恶化的表现”。
伊朗革命
1979年1月1日，伊朗抗议者在德黑兰反对伊朗王的行走中，高举鲁霍拉•穆萨维•霍梅尼的肖像。
1978年8月，就在美国支持的伊朗王穆罕默德•礼萨•巴列维逃离伊朗前的6个月，CIA宣布“伊朗没有革命，甚至没有革命的迹象”。就像我们现在都知道的，鲁霍拉•穆萨维•霍梅尼在1979年的伊斯兰革命中掌权，造成了一直持续到今天的美伊不和。
据吉米•卡特的一位国家安全顾问Gary Sick说，在反抗伊朗王的革命发生之前，美国缩减了伊朗国内情报组织的规模，这导致美国官员忽略了伊朗民众广泛厌恶伊朗王和美国人的情绪，也低估了宗教反对力量推翻伊朗王的能力。乔治敦大学在2004年的一份报告中指出，情报部门的确曾经发布过有关伊朗王权力式微和反对派宗教权力膨胀的警告，但是卡特政府的政治内讧和埃及与以色列的和平谈判让美国忽略了伊朗问题。
苏联入侵阿富汗
1988年5月5日，俄罗斯军队撤离阿富汗时，阿富汗儿童在喀布尔挥舞阿富汗和苏联国旗。
1979年12月，苏联军队入侵阿富汗，逐渐发展成一场充满血腥的9年占领过程。卡特政府对此大吃一惊。美国情报部门曾经假设这是一场昂贵的游戏，苏联必然对入侵阿富汗望而却步。前CIA官员Douglas MacEachin在回忆道，在入侵发生后的几天里，局里流行一个黑色幽默：“分析人士预测对了，苏联人做错了。”
然而，我们还不能断言美国未能预见入侵行动是情报部门的责任。John Diamond在《CIA与文化失败》一书中承认，CIA仅在入侵即将开始的时候才有所察觉。但是他又说，CIA曾经在1979年警告苏联军队的战备和转移活动，这让卡特政府“有足够的信息向莫斯科发出严厉的警告”，而政府却选择“低调处理”。乔治敦大学的一项研究提到，白宫的注意力被限制战略武器会谈和伊朗人质危机所牵扯。
苏联解体
1991年12月25日，戈尔巴乔夫在莫斯科宣读辞职声明。之后，他在全国电视转播中宣布把权力交给俄罗斯总统叶利钦，苏联从此解体。
传统观点认为，美国情报部门未能预见到苏联在1991年的解体，这件事情的预兆包括戈尔巴乔夫总统的改革、苏联经济状况的恶化、东欧共产主义政权的垮台，以及若干独联体国家的独立倾向。就像BBC在最近所指出的：“苏联的实例说明情报收集人员所遭遇的重大挑战，他们可以根据导弹判断出兵工厂的产出能力，但是社会中重大的政治动荡很难被解读。”
实际上，David Arbel和Ran Edelist在《1980-199西方情报与苏联解体》一书中认为，情报部门经常刻意迎合里根和布什政府对苏联先入为主的偏见，营造出“分析人士与决策者间刻板的一致性”。但是前CIA官员Douglas MacEachin说，尽管CIA未能预测苏联的解体，但它“预测到了衰退的经济和荒谬的社会状况，并在多份报告中说明，这必将引发苏联内部的某种政治冲突……具体会发生什么，要取决于决策人和决策过程。”
印度核试验
1998年5月20日，印度士兵在新德里附近的Shakti现场巡逻。9天前这里进行了一次核试验。
1998年5月，CIA没有听到印度试图进行若干次地下核试验的风声。当时的参议院情报委员会主席Richard Shelby说这是一次“我们国家情报收集工作的重大失败”。几个星期之后，情报部门挽回了一些脸面，他们预测巴基斯坦即将进行核试验。1998年5月28日，事情果然如期发生了。
据《华盛顿邮报》的报道，当时美国一个间谍卫星在爆炸发生前6个小时，拍摄到印度准备核试验的清晰照片。但是负责追踪印度核项目的美国情报分析人员不在办公室，他们第二天早上发现了这些照片，但是试验已经完成了。
9/11攻击
2001年9月11日，纽约双塔在被飞机撞击后起火燃烧。
9/11委员会在有关2001年9月11日的恐怖分子袭击报告中指出，被指责“太多重点、太少预算、架构过时、官僚气息浓厚”的情报部门未能从90年代到9月11日所酝酿的“跨国恐怖主义”背景中，锁定针对美国的威胁。鉴于9/11委员会的建议，国会设置了一个全国情报总监的职位，并成立国家反恐中心来提炼各类情报。
前CIA分析人员Paul Pillar在《外交政策》的文章中说，情报官员忽视了9/11攻击，但是并未忽视基地组织的威胁。CIA在90年代末成立了一个部门专门关注奥萨马•本•拉登，比尔•克林顿总统也曾发动针对基地组织的秘密行动。2001年2月，情报部门在一次汇报中说，本•拉登的恐怖网络对全世界范围的威胁是美国“最严重和迫在眉睫的威胁”，他有能力“不动声色地策划多起恐怖袭击”。
伊拉克战争
2003年2月5日，鲍威尔在联合国大会上发表讲话。国务卿宣称萨达姆•侯赛或许有足够的炭疽浓缩干粉“足以装满数以千万计的茶匙。而萨达姆•侯赛因甚至还没有对一茶匙这种致命物质的去向做出可以证实的说明。”
2003年2月，在联合国安理会讨论对抗伊拉克的问题之前，国务卿科林•鲍威尔宣称针对伊拉克大规模杀伤性武器（WMD）的指控，是建立在“确凿的情报”基础上。的确，情报部门在2002年10月的分析认为，伊拉克在持续发展其WMD项目，并且有可能在“几个月到一年的时间里”制造出核武器，如果能得到足够核燃料的话。但是，美国在入侵伊拉克之后始终未能找到WMD的证据——这次情报失败被乔治•W•布什称作“最大的遗憾”。
然而，这是否也应该怪罪于情报部门的失职，还是决策人物的问题呢？2004年，《华盛顿邮报》报道布什总统和高层顾问“忽视了2002年10月情报部分提交的很多警告和限定条件”，固执地要求在伊拉克开站。例如，分析人士预测萨达姆不会把WMD交给恐怖分子，除非伊拉克遭到入侵。《纽约时报》也曾报道，布什政府的高层官员挥舞着他们所认为的伊拉克核武器离心机软管，不例会核武器专家的怀疑态度。
原文：
In the Jan./Feb. 2011 issue of Foreign Policy, former CIA official Paul Pillar takes down the conventional wisdom about the degree to which intelligence -- both good and bad -- can influence presidential decision-making, alter U.S. foreign policy, and prevent surprises. Whatever the limits of the U.S. intelligence community, it continues to face criticism for its perceived shortcomings, most recently for not predicting the Arab Spring and totally missing North Korean leader Kim Jong Il's death.
Indeed, while the intelligence community can claim several successes (Pillar, for example, points to the CIA nailing the Six-Day War in 1967), it has also endured a number of humiliating failures. As the ten examples below demonstrate, these intelligence breakdowns have been at the heart of pivotal events that refashioned the Middle East, altered the course of the Cold War, and thrust the United States into World War II, the war on terror, and the war in Iraq.
Pearl Harbor Attack
Above, the USS Arizona burns during the bombing of Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941.
As dawn broke on Dec. 7, 1941, the Japanese struck the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, pushing a once-reluctant America headlong into World War II. The naval base was utterly unprepared for battle, even though the United States had managed to break Japanese diplomatic code in the lead-up to the assault and a military attaché in Java had warned Washington of a planned Japanese attack on Hawaii, the Philippines, and Thailand a week earlier. "Never before have we had so complete an intelligence picture of the enemy," Roberta Wholstetter wrote in Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision.
That picture, however, was not seen in full because of inadequate intelligence-sharing among government agencies, faulty U.S. assumptions about Japan's appetite for carrying out such a brazen attack, and rivalries within the U.S. intelligence community. The CIA -- established in 1947 as part of the National Security Act -- later noted that the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor highlighted the need to separate "signals" from "noise" and create a centralized intelligence organization.
The Bay of Pigs Invasion
Above, guards keep a watchful eye on members of Assault Brigade 2506 after their capture in the Bay of Pigs in April 1961.
In April 1961, a CIA-planned effort by Cuban exiles to overthrow Fidel Castro's regime and replace it with a non-communist, U.S.-friendly government went horribly awry when an aerial attack on Cuba's air force flopped and the 1,400-strong "Assault Brigade 2506" came under heavy fire from the Cuban military after landing off the country's southern coast. The botched invasion poisoned U.S.-Cuban relations.
CIA files later revealed that the agency, assuming President John F. Kennedy would commit American troops to the assault if all else failed, never showed the newly minted president an assessment expressing doubt about whether the brigade could succeed without open support from the U.S. military -- support Kennedy never intended to provide. (The historian Piero Gleijeses has compared the CIA and Kennedy to ships passing in the night.) The CIA didn't do itself any favors a year later by concluding that the Soviets were unlikely to establish offensive missiles in Cuba in a report issued a month before the Cuban Missile Crisis, though the agency redeemed itself a bit by later snapping U-2 photographs of the missile sites.
The Tet Offensive
Above, Vietcong soldiers climb onto a U.S. tank abandoned on a road in Hue during the Tet Offensive in 1968.
On Jan. 31, 1968, during the Tet holiday in Vietnam, North Vietnam's communist forces stunned the United States by launching a massive, coordinated assault against South Vietnam. While the communist military gains proved fleeting, the Tet Offensive was arguably the most decisive battle of Vietnam. Americans grew disillusioned with the war, prompting U.S. policymakers to shift gears and focus on reducing America's footprint in Vietnam.
A government inquiry shortly after the Tet Offensive concluded that U.S. and South Vietnamese military officers and intelligence analysts had failed to fully anticipate the "intensity, coordination, and timing of the enemy attack" -- despite multiple warnings. Navy librarian Glenn E. Helm notes that disregard for intelligence collection, language barriers, and a misunderstanding of enemy strategy played particularly prominent roles in the intelligence debacle. Still, James J. Wirtz points out in The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War that the "Americans almost succeeded in anticipating their opponents' moves in time to avoid the military consequences of surprise."
The Yom Kippur War
Above, a young Ariel Sharon (bandaged head) confers with fellow military leader Haim Bar Lev and then-Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan (eye patch) in the Sinai on Oct. 17, 1973 during the Yom Kippur War.
While the CIA accurately analyzed the Six-Day War between Israel and neighboring Arab states in 1967, it was caught flat-footed only six years later when Egyptian and Syrian forces launched coordinated attacks on Israeli forces in the Sinai Desert and the Golan Heights during the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur. The conflict, which ended with a ceasefire in October 1973, tested U.S.-Soviet relations and pushed the Arab-Israeli conflict to the top of Washington's foreign-policy agenda.
Documents collected by George Washington University's National Security Archive reveal that the Israeli intelligence community believed that the country's superior military power would deter its Arab neighbors from initiating a war, and U.S. intelligence officials bought into this line of reasoning. On the day the war began, a National Security Council memo noted that Soviet advisers had been evacuated from Egypt and that Israel was anticipating an attack because of Egyptian and Syrian military movements, but added that U.S. intelligence services "continue to downplay the likelihood of an Arab attack on Israel" and "favor the alternative explanation of a crisis in Arab-Soviet relations."
The Iranian Revolution
Above, Iranian protesters hold up a poster of Ayatollah Khomeini on Jan. 1, 1979, during a demonstration in Tehran against the Shah.
In August 1978, six months before the U.S-backed Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi fled Iran, the CIA infamously concluded that "Iran is not in a revolutionary or even a pre-revolutionary situation." As we all now know, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini rose to power in the Islamic Revolution of 1979, opening up a rift between Iran and the United States that persists to this day.
According to Gary Sick, a member of Jimmy Carter's National Security Council, the United Stated had scaled back its intelligence gathering inside Iran in the lead-up to the revolution in deference to the Shah, which helped contribute to U.S. officials overlooking widespread Iranian resentment against the Shah and the United States and underestimating the ability of the religious opposition to overthrow the Shah. Still, a 2004 Georgetown University report points out that the intelligence community did issue warnings about the Shah's eroding power and the religious opposition's growing clout, and that political infighting and the Carter administration's preoccupation with Egyptian-Israeli peace talks contributed to American myopia on Iran.
The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan
Above, Afghan children wave Afghan and Soviet flags near Kabul on May 15, 1988, as Russian troops begin their withdrawal from Afghanistan.
The Soviet Union's military incursion into Afghanistan, which began in December 1979 and devolved into a bloody, nine-year occupation, took the Carter administration by surprise. The U.S. intelligence community had assumed that the specter of a costly quagmire would deter the Soviets from invading Afghanistan. Former CIA official Douglas MacEachin recalls that in the days after the invasion, a dark joke began circulating around the agency that "the analysts got it right, and it was the Soviets who got it wrong."
It's not entirely clear, however, whether intelligence or policy is primarily to blame for America's lack of foresight about the invasion. In The CIA and the Culture of Failure, John Diamond concedes that the agency failed to predict the invasion until shortly before it happened. But he adds that the CIA's warnings about Soviet military preparations and movements throughout 1979 gave the Carter administration "all the information it needed to issue a stern warning to Moscow," and that the administration instead chose to "downplay its warnings." A Georgetown study adds that the White House was distracted by the SALT II treaty negotiations and the Iranian hostage crisis.
The Collapse of the Soviet Union
Above, Gorbachev reads his resignation statement in Moscow on Dec. 25, 1991, before appearing on television to cede power to Russian President Boris Yeltsin and effectively dissolve the Soviet Union.
Conventional wisdom holds that the U.S. intelligence community failed to predict the Soviet Union's demise in 1991, presaged as it was by President Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms, the deteriorating Soviet economy, the collapse of communism in east-central Europe, and the moves toward independence by several Soviet republics. As the BBC recently noted, "the Soviet example illustrates the problem that intelligence gatherers are great counters: they can look at missiles, estimate the output of weapons factories, and so on. But the underlying political and social dynamics in a society are much harder to read."
Indeed, in Western Intelligence and the Collapse of the Soviet Union, 1980-1990, David Arbel and Ran Edelist argue that the intelligence community often catered to the preconceived notions officials in the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush had of the Soviet threat, producing a "rigid conceptual conformity between the analysts and the decision-makers." But former CIA official Douglas MacEachin adds that while the CIA did not forecast the breakup of the Soviet Union, it did "predict that the failing economy and stultifying societal conditions it had described in so many of its studies would ultimately provoke some kind of political confrontation within the USSR ... What actually did happen depended on people and decisions that were not inevitable."
The Indian Nuclear Test
Above, Indian soldiers walk on shattered ground on May 20, 1998, as they patrol the Shakti-1 site near New Delhi, where the nuclear test had taken place nine days earlier.
In May 1998, the CIA didn't get wind of India's intention to set off several underground nuclear blasts, in what Richard Shelby, then chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, called a "colossal failure of our nation's intelligence gathering." The intelligence agency saved some face a couple weeks later when it warned that Pakistan was preparing to conduct its own nuclear tests, which it did on May 28, 1998.
At the time, the Washington Post reported that a U.S. spy satellite had picked up clear evidence of India's nuclear test preparations six hours before the blasts, but the U.S. intelligence analysts responsible for tracking India's nuclear program hadn't been on duty. Instead, they discovered the images when they arrived at work the next morning, after the tests had already taken place.
The 9/11 Attacks
Above, the Twin Towers burn after getting hit by planes on Sept. 11, 2001, in New York City.
In its report on the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the 9/11 Commission noted that the intelligence community, assailed by "an overwhelming number of priorities, flat budgets, an outmoded structure, and bureaucratic rivalries," had failed to pin down the big-picture threat posed by "transnational terrorism" throughout the 1990s and up to 9/11. In response to the 9/11 Commission's recommendations, Congress created a national intelligence director and the National Counterterrorism Center to pool intelligence.
As former CIA analyst Paul Pillar points out in his Foreign Policy piece, intelligence officials missed the 9/11 attacks but didn't miss the threat posed by al Qaeda. The CIA created a unit focusing solely on Osama bin Laden in the late 1990s and President Bill Clinton launched covert operations against al Qaeda. The intelligence community's February 2001 briefing on worldwide threats branded bin Laden's terrorist network as "the most immediate and serious threat" to the United States, capable of "planning multiple attacks with little or no warning."
The Iraq War
Above, Powell holds a vial representing a teaspoon of anthrax during his Feb. 5, 2003, U.N. address. The secretary of state declared that Saddam Hussein might have enough dry anthrax to "fill tens upon tens upon tens of thousands of teaspoons." And, he added, "Saddam Hussein has not verifiably accounted for even one teaspoon-full of this deadly material."
In a February 2003 appearance before the U.N. Security Council to make the case for confronting Iraq, Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that his accusations about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were based on "solid intelligence." Indeed, an October 2002 intelligence estimate had concluded that Iraq was continuing its WMD program and could make a nuclear weapon "within several months to a year" if it acquired sufficient fissile material. But the United States never found evidence for such programs after its invasion of Iraq -- an intelligence failure that President George W. Bush called his "biggest regret."
Here too, however, it's unclear how much of the failure should be blamed on intelligence as opposed to policymakers. In 2004, the Washington Post reported that President Bush and his top advisers "ignored many of the caveats and qualifiers" in the October 2002 intelligence report as they doggedly pressed ahead with the plans for war. Analysts, for example, estimated that Saddam wouldn't use his WMD or give the weapons to terrorists unless Iraq was invaded. The New York Times also reported that senior Bush administration officials brandished tubes that they said were destined for Iraqi nuclear centrifuges despite the skepticism of nuclear experts.
只字不提朝鲜战争啊 为嘛捏;P 南斯拉夫那个旧地图看来不是失误 一看标题就知道铁定有911 分析人士预测对了，苏联人做错了。 世界就是美国和待美国开发的地区。。。
这是一口让美国人和努力成为美国人的人陶醉的井。。。 这是真的吗？太好了，谢谢您啊
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北京创维电视维修中心blog.163.com/skyworth_diansh99/ l1jemand 发表于 2012-1-18 19:18 static/image/common/back.gif
只字不提朝鲜战争啊 为嘛捏
朝鲜战争在美国被称为“被遗忘的战争”，至于为嘛“被遗忘”捏，我只有小人之心以度之。呵呵
无论如何，这场战争现在看来已经彻底被遗忘了。伟大的美利坚，历史上没有一个“第一次没有取得胜利的战争”。 美国现在过分小心翼翼了不是好事啊 超想看美国人在战争上实实在在无可争议 不能回避的吃一次鳖
现在光会撺掇别人打 自己不敢动手 只怕以后再也见不到美国人打仗了
这样也真的成就了美国人不败的神话 ;P
珍珠港的教训确实太惨痛了 大多是老美的选择性（下意识的）失明 偶然必然，这个谁都猜不到。 badboy331082 发表于 2012-2-12 13:05 static/image/common/back.gif
大多是老美的选择性（下意识的）失明
选择性失明更多的利益问题。 看完贴让分飞一会 新人努力赚分~~~
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