【经济学家 12/01/14】柯达的最后一刻
【中文标题】柯达的最后一刻
【原文标题】The last Kodak moment?
【登载媒体】经济学家
【原文链接】http://www.economist.com/node/21542796
柯达一只脚已经踏进了地狱，而它的老对手富士却愈加发达，这是为什么？
据说，列宁曾经嘲弄资本主义，说资本家为了利润会卖给你吊死他们自己的绳子。这句话的真伪并不可考，但其中的确有那么一点道理，资本家经常会发明一些砸烂自己饭碗的技术。
伊斯曼柯达是一个完美的例子。它在1975年制造出世界上第一部数码相机，随着配备摄像镜头的智能手机的普及，这个技术已经几乎让柯达传统的胶卷和相机制造业处于濒死的边缘。
回想起来，柯达曾经是那个时代的谷歌。成立于1880年的这家公司以先驱性的技术和开创性的市场策略为人所熟知。“你只要按下按钮，其余都交给我们”这句口号自1888年就存在了。
1976年，柯达在美国胶卷市场的占有率达到90％，相机市场占有率为85％。直到90年代，它依然是世界五大最有价值品牌之一。
之后，出现了数码成像技术替代胶卷，智能手机替代了相机。柯达1996年的收入达到160亿美元，1999年的盈利为25亿美元，市场分析人士一致认为它在2011年的收入将是62亿美元。公司最近的报告显示第三季度亏损2.22亿美元，是三年来第9个季度亏损。1988年柯达全球员工数量为14.5万，而最近一次统计的结果是还剩下十分之一。去年，它的股价下跌了90％。
几个星期以来，谣言在柯达的大本营罗切斯特甚嚣尘上，说除非公司迅速卖掉其知识产权资产，否则将会破产。1月10日发表的两项声明——公司正在重组为两个业务实体；准备起诉苹果和HTC的专利侵权——给乐观者带来了一些希望。但是重组毕竟意味着公司在准备破产保护。
柯达生不如死的同时，它的老对手富士的业务却一路攀升。这两家公司有很多共同点，他们都在本土市场凭借近乎垄断的地位获取巨额利润：柯达在美国，富士在日本。90年代美日间很大一部分贸易摩擦都源于柯达试图铲除市场中廉价的日本胶卷。
两家公司都意识到传统业务已经过时，但是柯达到现在还无法完全适应新市场，而富士已经彻底转型为一架赚钱机器。尽管经过了困难的一年，它的市场资本总量依然达到126亿美元，而柯达只有2.2亿美元。为什么这两家公司的遭遇有如此大的差别？
两家公司都预见到变化的来临。前柯达高管Larry Matteson目前在罗彻斯特西蒙商业学校执教，他记得在1979年曾经写过一份报告，准确、详细地描述了各类市场如何从胶卷向数字化转变——首先是政府部门，然后是专业摄影领域，最后是整个市场，时间在2010年。他的预测误差只有几年。
富士也早在80年代预见到数字化时代的阴影。它采取了兵分三路的策略：尽量把资金从胶卷业务中转移；时刻准备向数字化转换；开发新产品线。
两家公司都意识到，数字摄影本身的利润并不丰厚。Matteson先生说：“精明的商人普遍认为，最好不要急着从1美元有70美分利润的胶卷，向1美元只有5美分利润的数字摄影转化。”两家公司都必须接收这个现实，而柯达的步伐太慢了。
自满的文化
柯达的企业文化算不上差强人意。它有自身的优势——高额的科研投资、对生产过程的严格管控、与地方政府的良好关系，但这些因素让他变成了一个得意洋洋的垄断者。富士在1984年洛杉矶奥运会上赢得了赞助权，同时也暴露了自身的弱点，柯达临阵退缩。公众帮助富士廉价的胶卷进入了柯达的本土市场。
哈佛商业学院的Rosabeth Moss Kanter曾经作为柯达公司的顾问。她说，柯达转变迟缓的另外一个原因是，公司管理层“执着于完美产品的概念，而不是考虑如何使用高科技手段来生产、推广、维修产品。”在一家公司独大的城市里工作也是一项缺陷，柯达的老板在罗切斯特很少听到批评的声音。即使当柯达已经决定要扩大产业线时，它花费了数年时间才完成第一笔并购。Kanter女士说，它给自己建立起受人尊敬的风险投资形象，但从不冒险寻求突破。
坏运气也是原因之一。柯达原本设想，它的研究人员发明的数千种制作胶卷的化学品或许可以转化成药物。但其医药项目失败了，被迫在90年代卖出。
富士的多样化产业模式相对更加成功。胶卷有点像人类的皮肤，都含有胶原蛋白。就像照片会因氧化而褪色一样，化妆品公司让你希望自己的皮肤也含有抗氧化物质。在富士实验室的20万种化学品中，有4000种具有抗氧化效果。于是公司启动了一条化妆品生产线，品牌是Astalift，主要在亚洲销售，今年进入了欧洲市场。
富士还为其专业的胶卷技术寻找其它的市场渠道，例如，为LCD平板显示器制作光学胶片。从2000年到现在，它在这项生意上共投资了40亿美元，现在看来，这些投资是值得的。在一种拓宽LCD视角的胶片行业中，富士的市场占有率是100％。
1993年到1999年任柯达老板的George Fisher认为，他们的强项不是化学品，而是成像技术。他制作出一些数码相机，并且让用户可以在网络上分享照片。
一个富有智慧的老板或许会把这个想法变成像Facebook一样的产品，但可惜Fisher先生不是这样的老板。他没有将大部分生产活动外包出去，这本来可以让柯达变得更加灵活、富有创意。他苦苦执着于柯达的“刀片”业务模式——出售廉价的相机，等待用户购买大量昂贵的胶卷（就像吉列的盈利不是靠刀架，而是靠刀片）。很明显，这种模式不适用于数码相机。虽然柯达也建立起一个庞大的数码相机业务，但只持续了几年就被带摄像头的智能手机吞没了。
柯达对新兴市场的解读也是错误的。它本来期望中国的新兴中产阶级会购买大量的胶卷，短期内他们的确是这么做的，但很快就发现数码相机更酷。很多没有相机的人直接购买了数码相机。
柯达的领导层意见缺乏持续性，每一个新上任的高管都有一套不同的战略。最新一位首席执行官Antonio Perez在2005年上任，立志把公司转化为数码打印行业的巨擎（这是他在自己的老东家惠普学到的东西，柯达现在还坚持认为这是正确的方向）。他还试图仰仗公司的巨额知识产权投资获利——因此才会起诉苹果。
技术变革在富士也引发了权力斗争。起初，那些拒绝直面危机的胶卷业务拥趸占据上风。但最后的赢家是古森重隆，他批评这些人“懒惰”、“不负责任”，未能在数码大潮袭来前做好准备。他在2000年到2003年担任全球总裁期间，迅速着手改组公司。
富士的征程
从2000年开始，他为40家公司投资了90亿美元，他削减的成本和就业岗位。在18个月的时间里，他通过资产折旧、缩减批发商、关闭实验室、裁减科研人员节省了2500亿日元（33亿美元）。古森先生说：“这是一个痛苦的过程，但是如果照这样下去，必然会全军覆没。所以我们不得不重建业务模式。”
日本管理顾问创始人大前研一说，即使有丰厚的补偿金，这种先发制人的大规模行动在日本也很少见。日本经理人很少会迅速行动、大幅削减成本、并购大公司。
对古森先生来说，采取这样的行动意味着否定那些一手把他提拔起来的前辈们的工作，这在日本是重大的禁忌。大前先生猜想，日本公司长久以来的文化不大理会股东们对短期效益的压力，也可以容忍大量库存现金的存在，这让富士有机会去追寻古森先生的理想。美国股东可没有这份耐心。令人惊讶的是，柯达就像一家陈腐的、拒绝变革的日本公司，而富士则像一家灵活善变的美国公司。
古森先生说，他为这个“值得尊敬的老对手”的境况感到“遗憾和伤感”。但他也暗示，柯达太过自满了，即使危机已经迫在眉睫。这家公司对于自身的市场策略和品牌太过自信，所以总是试图走捷径。
在过去十年里，它试图买下业务已经成熟的企业，而不是花时间去发展自己的技术能力。而且他的业务多样化程度还不够，大前先生说：“柯达的目标是一架数字公司，但这只是一项小业务，无法支撑这么庞大的公司。”
或许这项挑战的确太艰巨了。具有广泛影响力的商业书籍《创新者的困境》作者Clay Christensen说：“这是一个庞大的问题，我从未见过其它公司需要跨越如此巨大的鸿沟。这完全是一项不同的技术，所以无论如何不能使用以前的方法来应对挑战。”
柯达的错误与美国一架电脑制造商数字仪器公司所犯的错误还不尽相同，后者未能预见到个人电脑的重要性，因为管理者坐在办公室里打盹。Christensen先生说，而柯达更像是“面对汹涌而来的海啸无计可施”。
他指出，其它行业中的领头羊在不那么巨大的变化中也纷纷阵亡。几十年前存在的316个连锁百货商场中，只有Dayton Hudson适应了当代环境而生存下来，原因是它开启了一项崭新的业务“塔吉特”（译者注：美国著名的折扣连锁零售企业，通过对顾客购物篮商品的分析大获成功）。而那些应对缓慢的企业遭受了致命的打击。如果50年前的人来到当今世界，我们的百货商场表面不会让他们觉得陌生，但是后台供应链早已面目全非。
柯达有机会扭转这个悲惨的局面吗？有人说他可以设法成为智能手机摄像头那颗“奔腾的芯”——就像消费者所信赖的品牌。但是佳能和索尼更先进的知识产权让它们具有更大的优势，可是无一达到这种境界。
公司和人不一样，理论上它可以永久生存下去。但大部分公司都过早夭折了，因为商业世界和人类社会不同，是一个你死我活的生存环境。富士抓住了新技术，得以存活。它的胶卷业务从2000年占总盈利60％下降到今天的几乎为0，但它找到新的赢利点。柯达和之前许多伟大的公司一样，似乎一直对周围视而不见。在矗立了132年之后，它像一张老照片那样开始褪色了。
原文：
LENIN is said to have sneered that a capitalist will sell you the rope to hang him. The quote may be spurious, but it contains a grain of truth. Capitalists quite often invent the technology that destroys their own business.
Eastman Kodak is a picture-perfect example. It built one of the first digital cameras in 1975. That technology, followed by the development of smartphones that double as cameras, has battered Kodak’s old film- and camera-making business almost to death.
Strange to recall, Kodak was the Google of its day. Founded in 1880, it was known for its pioneering technology and innovative marketing. “You press the button, we do the rest,” was its slogan in 1888.
By 1976 Kodak accounted for 90% of film and 85% of camera sales in America. Until the 1990s it was regularly rated one of the world’s five most valuable brands.
Then came digital photography to replace film, and smartphones to replace cameras. Kodak’s revenues peaked at nearly $16 billion in 1996 and its profits at $2.5 billion in 1999. The consensus forecast by analysts is that its revenues in 2011 were $6.2 billion. It recently reported a third-quarter loss of $222m, the ninth quarterly loss in three years. In 1988, Kodak employed over 145,000 workers worldwide; at the last count, barely one-tenth as many. Its share price has fallen by nearly 90% in the past year (see chart).
For weeks, rumours have swirled around Rochester, the company town that Kodak still dominates, that unless the firm quickly sells its portfolio of intellectual property, it will go bust. Two announcements on January 10th—that it is restructuring into two business units and suing Apple and HTC over various alleged patent infringements—gave hope to optimists. But the restructuring could be in preparation for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
While Kodak suffers, its long-time rival Fujifilm is doing rather well. The two firms have much in common. Both enjoyed lucrative near-monopolies of their home markets: Kodak selling film in America, Fujifilm in Japan. A good deal of the trade friction during the 1990s between America and Japan sprang from Kodak’s desire to keep cheap Japanese film off its patch.
Both firms saw their traditional business rendered obsolete. But whereas Kodak has so far failed to adapt adequately, Fujifilm has transformed itself into a solidly profitable business, with a market capitalisation, even after a rough year, of some $12.6 billion to Kodak’s $220m. Why did these two firms fare so differently?
Both saw change coming. Larry Matteson, a former Kodak executive who now teaches at the University of Rochester’s Simon School of Business, recalls writing a report in 1979 detailing, fairly accurately, how different parts of the market would switch from film to digital, starting with government reconnaissance, then professional photography and finally the mass market, all by 2010. He was only a few years out.
Fujifilm, too, saw omens of digital doom as early as the 1980s. It developed a three-pronged strategy: to squeeze as much money out of the film business as possible, to prepare for the switch to digital and to develop new business lines.
Both firms realised that digital photography itself would not be very profitable. “Wise businesspeople concluded that it was best not to hurry to switch from making 70 cents on the dollar on film to maybe five cents at most in digital,” says Mr Matteson. But both firms had to adapt; Kodak was slower.
A culture of complacency
Its culture did not help. Despite its strengths—hefty investment in research, a rigorous approach to manufacturing and good relations with its local community—Kodak had become a complacent monopolist. Fujifilm exposed this weakness by bagging the sponsorship of the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles while Kodak dithered. The publicity helped Fujifilm’s far cheaper film invade Kodak’s home market.
Another reason why Kodak was slow to change was that its executives “suffered from a mentality of perfect products, rather than the high-tech mindset of make it, launch it, fix it,” says Rosabeth Moss Kanter of Harvard Business School, who has advised the firm. Working in a one-company town did not help, either. Kodak’s bosses in Rochester seldom heard much criticism of the firm, she says. Even when Kodak decided to diversify, it took years to make its first acquisition. It created a widely admired venture-capital arm, but never made big enough bets to create breakthroughs, says Ms Kanter.
Bad luck played a role, too. Kodak thought that the thousands of chemicals its researchers had created for use in film might instead be turned into drugs. But its pharmaceutical operations fizzled, and were sold in the 1990s.
Fujifilm diversified more successfully. Film is a bit like skin: both contain collagen. Just as photos fade because of oxidation, cosmetics firms would like you to think that skin is preserved with anti-oxidants. In Fujifilm’s library of 200,000 chemical compounds, some 4,000 are related to anti-oxidants. So the company launched a line of cosmetics, called Astalift, which is sold in Asia and is being launched in Europe this year.
Fujifilm also sought new outlets for its expertise in film: for example, making optical films for LCD flat-panel screens. It has invested $4 billion in the business since 2000. And this has paid off. In one sort of film, to expand the LCD viewing angle, Fujifilm enjoys a 100% market share.
George Fisher, who served as Kodak’s boss from 1993 until 1999, decided that its expertise lay not in chemicals but in imaging. He cranked out digital cameras and offered customers the ability to post and share pictures online.
A brilliant boss might have turned this idea into something like Facebook, but Mr Fisher was not that boss. He failed to outsource much production, which might have made Kodak more nimble and creative. He struggled, too, to adapt Kodak’s “razor blade” business model. Kodak sold cheap cameras and relied on customers buying lots of expensive film. (Just as Gillette makes money on the blades, not the razors.) That model obviously does not work with digital cameras. Still, Kodak did eventually build a hefty business out of digital cameras—but it lasted only a few years before camera phones scuppered it.
Kodak also failed to read emerging markets correctly. It hoped that the new Chinese middle class would buy lots of film. They did for a short while, but then decided that digital cameras were cooler. Many leap-frogged from no camera straight to a digital one.
Kodak’s leadership has been inconsistent. Its strategy changed with each of several new chief executives. The latest, Antonio Perez, who took charge in 2005, has focused on turning the firm into a powerhouse of digital printing (something he learnt about at his old firm, Hewlett-Packard, and which Kodak still insists will save it). He has also tried to make money from the firm’s huge portfolio of intellectual property—hence the lawsuit against Apple.
At Fujifilm, too, technological change sparked an internal power struggle. At first the men in the consumer-film business, who refused to see the looming crisis, prevailed. But the eventual winner was Shigetaka Komori, who chided them as “lazy” and “irresponsible” for not preparing better for the digital onslaught. Named boss incrementally between 2000 and 2003, he quickly set about overhauling the firm.
Mount Fujifilm
He has spent around $9 billion on 40 companies since 2000. He slashed costs and jobs. In one 18-month stretch, he booked more than ¥250 billion ($3.3 billion) in restructuring costs for depreciation and to shed superfluous distributors, development labs, managers and researchers. “It was a painful experience,” says Mr Komori. “But to see the situation as it was, nobody could survive. So we had to reconstruct the business model.”
This sort of pre-emptive action, even softened with generous payouts, is hardly typical of corporate Japan. Few Japanese managers are prepared to act fast, make big cuts and go on a big acquisition spree, observes Kenichi Ohmae, the father of Japanese management consulting.
For Mr Komori, it meant unwinding the work of his predecessor, who had handpicked him for the job—a big taboo in Japan. Still, Mr Ohmae reckons that Japan Inc’s long-term culture, which involves little shareholder pressure for short-term performance and tolerates huge cash holdings, made it easier for Fujifilm to pursue Mr Komori’s vision. American shareholders might not have been so patient. Surprisingly, Kodak acted like a stereotypical change-resistant Japanese firm, while Fujifilm acted like a flexible American one.
Mr Komori says he feels “regret and emotion” about the plight of his “respected competitor”. Yet he hints that Kodak was complacent, even when its troubles were obvious. The firm was so confident about its marketing and brand that it tried to take the easy way out, says Mr Komori.
In the 2000s it tried to buy ready-made businesses, instead of taking the time and expense to develop technologies in-house. And it failed to diversify enough, says Mr Komori: “Kodak aimed to be a digital company, but that is a small business and not enough to support a big company.”
Perhaps the challenge was simply too great. “It is a very hard problem. I’ve not seen any other firm that had such a massive gulf to get across,” says Clay Christensen, author of “The Innovator’s Dilemma”, an influential business book. “It was such a fundamentally different technology that came in, so there was no way to use the old technology to meet the challenge.”
Kodak’s blunder was not like the time when Digital Equipment Corporation, an American computer-maker, failed to spot the significance of personal computers because its managers were dozing in their comfy chairs. It was more like “seeing a tsunami coming and there’s nothing you can do about it,” says Mr Christensen.
Dominant firms in other industries have been killed by smaller shocks, he points out. Of the 316 department-store chains of a few decades ago, only Dayton Hudson has adapted well to the modern world, and only because it started an entirely new business, Target. And that is what creative destruction can do to a business that has changed only gradually—the shops of today would not look alien to time-travellers from 50 years ago, even if their supply chains have changed beyond recognition.
Could Kodak have avoided its current misfortunes? Some say it could have become the equivalent of “Intel Inside” for the smartphone camera—a brand that consumers trust. But Canon and Sony were better placed to achieve that, given their superior intellectual property, and neither has succeeded in doing so.
Unlike people, companies can in theory live for ever. But most die young, because the corporate world, unlike society at large, is a fight to the death. Fujifilm has mastered new tactics and survived. Film went from 60% of its profits in 2000 to basically nothing, yet it found new sources of revenue. Kodak, along with many a great company before it, appears simply to have run its course. After 132 years it is poised, like an old photo, to fade away.
没有为汹涌袭来的新技术大潮做好准备，结果被直接KO的还有摩托罗拉。。。。。 摩托罗拉可能还有机会
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