【沙龙1129】为何中国和墨西哥很很重要——美国未来依靠这两国关系
本帖最后由 花落无声 于 2012-2-7 18:10 编辑【中文标题】为何中国和墨西哥很很重要——美国未来依靠这两国关系
【原文标题】Why China and Mexico matter America's future depends on its relations with these two nations
【登载媒体】沙龙
【来源地址】http://www.salon.com/2011/11/29/why_china_and_mexico_matter/singleton/
【译者】花落无声
【翻译方式】人工
【声明】欢迎转载，请务必注明译者和出处 bbs.m4.cn。
【原文库链接】http://bbs.m4.cn/forum.php?mod=v ... 3&page=1#pid5562160
【译文】
http://media.salon.com/2011/11/border-fence-460x307.png
A toy doll hangs from the U.S. and Mexico border fence in Naco, Arizona September 7, 2011(Credit: Reuters/Joshua Lott)
（图片）2011年9月7日，一个玩具娃娃挂在位于亚利桑那州Naco的美国-墨西哥边境的栅栏上。
One of the most tiresome games in Washington, D.C., is the search for a new American grand strategy. According to the folklore of the foreign policy community, the American diplomat George Kennan came up with the grand strategy of containment of the Soviet Union that the U.S. followed through successfully until the end of the Cold War. While Kennan indeed contributed the name “containment,” by the mid-1950s he had repudiated the policy and became in effect a conservative isolationist.Nixonian realpolitik, Carter-style human rights diplomacy and Reagan’s renewed Cold War were quite different. But the myth persists that some Kennan-like genius devised a new grand strategy, be it the “concert of democracies” favored by neocons and neoliberal hawks or the “offshore balancing” preferred by realists.
华盛顿特区最无聊的游戏之一就是寻找新的美国大战略。根据外交政策共同体的传说，美国外交官乔治•凯南想出了遏制苏联的“大战略”， 美国成功地一直应用到了冷战结束。尽管凯南的确贡献了“遏制”这个词，但在上世纪50年代中期他批判了这一政策，并成为了一个实际上的保守派孤立主义者。尼克松的现实政治、卡特式的人权外交和里根的新冷战都是不同的。但仍然有这种神话挥之不去：一些凯南那样的天才设计出了一个新的大战略，也即“民主协约”，这被一些新保守主义势力和新自由主义者推崇，再不然就是现实主义者更喜欢的“离岸制衡”。
A much more useful approach was laid out by the journalist and political thinker Walter Lippmann in “U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic,” which he published in 1943 during World War II. Lippmann spoke of “the order of power,” that is, the relationships among the handful of great military and economic powers that matter the most. In his view of history, American foreign policy has always been defined by America’s relations with other great powers: first Britain and France, and later Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union.
记者、政治思想家Walter Lippmann在《美国外交政策：共和之盾》中展示了一个要有用多了的方法，他在1943年二战期间出版了这本书。Lippmann谈到了“权力秩序”，或者说，少数有着强大军事和经济力量的至关重要的国家间的关系。在他对历史的看法中，美国的外交政策一直被美国和其他大国的关系决定：一开始是英国与法国，后来是德国、日本和苏联。
To this might be added a corollary: America’s relationship with Mexico, the other populous nation in North America and one with which, along with Canada, the U.S. shares a 2,000-mile border. Quite apart from the importance of good bilateral relations, American friendship and partnership with a stable, prosperous Mexico is critical to U.S. foreign policy.
因此也许要在这上面加上一个推论：美国和墨西哥的关系，墨西哥是北美另一个人口众多的国家，和加拿大一起与美国共享2000英里边境。更何况还有良好双边关系的重要性，美国与一个稳定繁荣的墨西哥的友谊与伙伴关系对美国外交政策而言是至关重要的。
Since the 1840s, European great powers have hoped to tie down the U.S. on its southern border. Britain sought to keep the republic of Texas out of the United States, in order to pursue a divide-and-rule strategy in North America. During the American Civil War, France’s dictator Louis Napoleon imposed an Austrian prince, Maximilian, as puppet ruler in a short-lived attempt to turn Mexico into a French colony. In the years preceding World War I, Imperial Germany and the U.S. engaged in a kind of cold war in Mexico, the Caribbean and Central America. The Zimmerman Telegram, in which the German government promised to support Mexico’s attempt to recapture territories lost to the U.S., increased American public support for U.S. intervention against Germany. Franklin Roosevelt’s euphemistically named “Good Neighbor” policy of appeasing repressive dictatorships in Mexico and elsewhere in the hemisphere succeeded in dissuading any Latin American countries from becoming allies of the Axis powers. Later during the Cold War the Soviets found allies in Cuba, Nicaragua and elsewhere but Mexico remained neutral.
从19世纪40年代开始，欧洲列强就希望将美国束缚在它的南部边境上。英国试图将德克萨斯共和国保持在美国之外，以对北美使用分而治之的战术。美国内战期间，法国独裁者拿破仑在将墨西哥转变为法国殖民地的短暂企图中，强加了一位奥地利王子Maximilian作为傀儡统治者。一战前的几年，德意志帝国和美国在墨西哥、加勒比和中美洲开始了某种冷战。在“齐默尔曼电报”中，德国政府承诺支持墨西哥重新夺回丧失给美国的领土，这增加了美国民众对美国介入德国的支持。富兰克林•罗斯福委婉叫做“好邻居”的政策对墨西哥及半球其他地方的专制独裁让步，这一政策成功地阻止了拉丁美洲国家成为轴心国的盟友。冷战后期，苏联和古巴、尼加拉瓜及别的什么地方成为了盟友，但墨西哥保持了中立。
For American strategic thinkers, the ultimate nightmares have long been an alliance between a foreign great power rival and a hostile Mexico, or chaos in Mexico exploited by America’s enemies. For the foreseeable future, only China, which is still far from being a superpower, has the potential to become a serious military rival of the U.S., as Britain, France, Japan, Germany and the Soviet Union were in earlier generations. It follows that relationships among the U.S., China and Mexico are much more important to the future of American strategy than the outcome of the Arab Spring or the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict or the success or failure of Russia to regain influence in Central Asia or whether the United Kingdom splits up because of Scottish secession. And far more important than the fates of Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are problems more for their neighbors — China, India, Russia, Iran — than for us.
一个强国对手与一个带有敌意的墨西哥联手，或者墨西哥的混乱被美国的敌人利用，对于美国的政策思考者来说这两者一直是终极噩梦。对于可预知的未来而言，只有中国（当然它离成为超级大国还很远）有着成为美国真正的军事对手的可能，因为英国、法国、日本、德国和苏联都是早年间的事了。因此，对美国策略的未来而言，美国与中国及墨西哥之间的关系比阿拉伯之春的结果、阿拉伯与以色列冲突的解决、俄罗斯能否重新在中亚获得影响力、或者英国是否会因苏格兰独立而分裂都更重要。这比阿富汗与巴基斯坦的命运比起来就更是重要得太多了，它们应该更多是邻国——中国、印度、俄罗斯和伊朗——的问题，而非我们的问题。
What makes the China Question and the Mexican Question today particularly difficult is the existence of a high degree of economic and demographic integration among those countries and the U.S. Thanks to successful Chinese policies of pressuring multinationals to transfer production to its territory, much of the U.S. industrial base is integrated with China’s factory system. The American and Mexican labor markets are deeply integrated, thanks to legal and illegal immigration as well as trade.
现在，中国及墨西哥和美国高度的经济与人口融合让中国问题和墨西哥问题尤其困难。都是因为中国政策成功迫使跨国公司把生产转到中国领土里，很多美国工业基地都和中国的工厂系统联合在一起了。美国与墨西哥劳工市场紧密联系，而这都是因为合法与非法的移民，还有贸易。
This means that thinking about the U.S.-China relationship and the U.S.-Mexican relationship in simple-minded military terms cannot work.For example, while a hostile China might be militarily balanced in various ways, it makes no sense to talk about “containing” China geographically. The containment of the Soviet Union worked because the Soviet empire (as distinct from Russia itself) included the populations and economies of its East European colonies. The Cold War ended when the Red Army withdrew from the former empire in Eastern Europe.
这意味着不能用简单的军事术语来思考中美关系与美国-墨西哥关系。比如说，即使可以通过不同方法在军事上制衡一个有敌意的中国，想从地理上“遏制”中国是一派胡言。对苏联的遏制有用是因为苏联帝国（与俄罗斯本身不同）包含了它东欧殖民地的人口与经济。在红军从这个东欧的前帝国撤出的时候，冷战就结束了。
But China, like America, is a continental nation-state whose power resources are almost entirely internal. In deriving its military potential from its large internal population and domestic economy, China is like the United States, although less favored with resources. Encircling China with U.S. bases in Australia, Vietnam and northeast Asia will not cripple it but may provoke it.
然而中国像美国一样是一个大陆国家，所有动力资源基本上完全都是内在的。尽管中国资源较少，在军事潜力源于大量内部人口和国内经济的这一方面，中国和美国非常像。用在澳大利亚、越南和亚洲东北部的美军基地包围中国不会击垮它，反而可能激怒它。
The excessive militarization of the U.S.-Mexican border would also be a mistake. Ever since the U.S. annexed Texas, California and the Southwest in the Mexican-American War, the smuggling of contraband and human beings has been a profitable trade along la Frontera — so profitable that local officials, in return for payoffs, have turned a blind eye for generations. Today’s Mexican drug cartels are no different in kind from thetequileros who smuggled alcohol across the border during America’s misguided experiment with Prohibition in the 1920s. The repeal of Prohibition dried up much of that business. The legalization of less dangerous drugs like marijuana would reduce, though not eliminate, the border drug trade and the attendant violence.
美国-墨西哥边境的过度军事化也是一个错误。自从美国在墨西哥战争中得到了德克萨斯州、加州和西南部地区，la Frontera附近的违禁品与人口走私就成了有利可图的交易——如此有利可图以至于当地官员几个年代来都睁一只眼闭一只眼，来报答他们所得到的报酬。
While border fencing in some areas and beefed-up Border Patrol units make sense, illegal immigration can be checked much more easily on the demand side, by prosecuting American employers of illegal immigrants, than on the supply side, by turning the border into a fortified combat zone. Comparisons between national border fences and the Berlin Wall are nonsense; the former seek to keep unwanted foreign natioanls out, the latter was built to keep citizens from escaping. Even so, for diplomatic reasons it is probably not prudent to create an Iron Curtain between the U.S. and one of the two countries in the world that are most important to America.
尽管用栅栏围起来一些地区的边境并加强边境巡逻有一定道理，从需求方一边（通过起诉非法移民的美国雇主），而非供应方一边（通过把边境变成有防御工事的作战区），可以更容易地阻碍非法移民。将国家边境上的栅栏与柏林墙相比毫无意义，前者是为了不让不想要的外国国民进来，而后者是为了不让公民逃跑。即使这样，因为外交上的原因，在美国和世界上对美国最重要的两个国家之一的国家间建立一张铁幕可能并不谨慎。
America’s foreign policy planners need to think carefully as well about the bilateral relations between China and Mexico, whether collaborative or competitive. China and Mexico, as developing countries reliant on trade for growth, are also competitors.The relationship between China, which may surpass the U.S. as the world’s largest economy, and Mexico, which like the U.S. has one of the world’s largest populations as well as a large market and abundant resources, is significant in itself. In addition to the Chinese Question and the Mexican Question as viewed by America, then, there is the Sino-Mexican question.
美国的外交政策规划者也需要谨慎思考中国与墨西哥之间的关系，不管是合作关系还是竞争关系。中国和墨西哥作为依靠贸易来发展的发展中国家，也是彼此的竞争对手。中国（它可能超过美国成为世界第一经济体）和墨西哥（它和美国相似，有世界上最大的人口之一，也有着很大的市场和丰富的资源）间的关系本身就很有特殊意义。在美国眼中的中国问题和墨西哥问题之外，还有中国-墨西哥问题。
Many proponents of NAFTA back in the 1990s hoped that the treaty would encourage American-based multinationals to offshore production to Mexico, rather than to China or other remote countries, spurring Mexican growth and reducing poverty and illegal immigration. That didn’t happen. But in the event of a serious Sino-American trade war the U.S. might seek to bring back some of the manufacturing it has lost to Mexico and other North American countries as well as the U.S. itself, generating new industrial growth and its spillover effects on both sides of the border.
许多上世纪90年代的北美自由贸易协定的支持者希望这一协议会鼓励以美国为基础的跨国公司会将生产送往墨西哥，而非中国或其他遥远的国家，这可以刺激墨西哥的发展，减少贫穷与非法移民。这并未发生。但在一场严肃的中美贸易战中，美国也许试图拿回一些失去的制造业，除了留给美国自己，还可以交给墨西哥和其他北美国家，这可以引起新的工业发展和边境两端的溢出效应。
And then there is energy. To everyone’s surprise, fracking technology has greatly expanded recoverable reserves of oil and natural gas, in Mexico and Canada as well as the U.S. In light of the continued marginal role of renewable energy worldwide, North America has the potential to become even more important in global fossil fuel energy markets. Here there is potential for collaboration among the U.S. and Mexico, as well as Canada — but also competition, if Asian and European powers pit the energy-exporting nations of North America against one another.
然后是能源。令每个人大吃一惊的是，不管是在墨西哥、加拿大还是美国，水力压裂科技已经大大扩充了石油和天然气的可采储量。基于北美在世界可再生能源中仍在继续的边缘角色，它在全球化石燃料能源市场上可能会变得更加重要。这是美国和墨西哥及加拿大合作的潜在可能，但如果亚洲和欧洲国家使北美能源出口国家互相竞争，这也是竞争的潜在可能。
These are issues that have not received enough attention from the officials, academics and journalists who debate foreign policy, distracted as they have been, first by misguided American wars in the Middle East and South Asia and more recently by the global economic crisis. To make matters worse, in American public debate complex questions have to be reduced to shouting matches over illegal immigration or trade among demagogic nativists on one side and open-borders, one-world libertarian and leftist utopians on the other.
这些问题还没从官方、学者、或者辩论外交政策的记者那里得到足够的关注，他们开始时被美国在中东和南亚误入歧途的战争分散了注意力，近期则被全球经济危机分散了注意力。更糟糕的是，在美国的公开辩论里，关于非法移民或者蛊惑人心的本土主义者一方、主张开放边界一个世界的自由主义者和左派的乌托邦主义者一方间的贸易，这些复杂问题必须被简化为大声的嚷嚷。
The future of America will depend to a considerable degree on developments in China and Mexico. But we Americans cannot settle on the right answers until we start asking the right questions.
很大程度上，美国的未来将依靠中国与墨西哥的发展。但在我们美国人找对问题之前，我们没办法做出正确答案。
美国在中东和南亚误入歧途的战争。。。。;P 当把中国和墨西哥放到一块的时候，我就知道这篇文章又没法看了
页:
[1]