【外交政策20121202】美国身后的世界
本帖最后由 woikuraki 于 2012-3-31 15:12 编辑【中文标题】没有美国的世界
【原文标题】After America
【登载媒体】外交政策
【原文作者】ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
【原文链接】http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/after_america
美国败落后的世界将会怎样——既危险又混乱。
不久之前，一位中国高层官员明显认为美国的败落像中国的崛起一样不可避免，用异乎寻常的坦率对一名美国高层官员说：“但是，请想办法让美国不要衰退得太快。”尽管中国领导人所期望的还遥不可及，但他已经开始用警觉的态度审视美国的灭亡。他是对的。
如果美国退居二线，世界不大可能再由单一的继任者统治，更不可能是中国。国际局势的扑朔迷离、国际间竞争对手的紧张关系、甚至地区性混乱都是完全可能出现的结果。
目前美国体制正在面临一场突如其来、排山倒海的危机——其中包括第二次金融危机，这必将对全球政治和经济秩序造成快速的连锁反应。考虑到美国向衰败的缓慢转化，以及与伊斯兰国家间无尽的战事，即使到2025年似乎也不会出现一个恪尽职守的全球秩序继任者。没有任何一个单一政权有能力，承担起自苏联在1991年解体后世界期待美国所承担起的责任：一个全新的、全球合作的世界秩序领导者。更可能出现的结局是，在一段相当长的时间里，全球和地区性力量间无休止的谈判，没有赢家，大批的输家。毕竟我们是生活在一个国际秩序不稳定，甚至全球人类的福祉遭到潜在威胁的背景下。世界将不再充满对民主的梦想，融合了各类独裁主义、民族主义和宗教性质的霍布斯式（译者注：英国哲学家，宣称君主专制政体是最为理性因而最为可取的政府形式）国家安全理念将取而代之。
二级强国的领导人——其中包括印度、日本、俄罗斯和一些欧洲国家——已经在衡量美国的败落会给他们各自国家利益造成哪些影响。日本人出于对刚猛果敢的中国统治亚洲大陆的恐惧，或许会考虑和欧洲靠得更近，甚至还会与印度进行更深层级的政治和军事合作。俄罗斯或许一厢情愿（甚至幸灾乐祸地）观望着美国模糊不定的前景，它毫无疑问会对从原苏联独立出去的国家虎视眈眈。毫无凝聚力的欧洲或许会向不同的几个方向发展：德国和意大利出于经济利益向苏联靠拢；法国和动荡不安的中欧国家倾向于政治团结的欧盟；英国则会在欧盟内部谋求更大制衡权力的同时，依然与败落的美国保持特殊的关系。其它人会穷兵黩武地谋划自己的势力范围：土耳其的古老奥斯曼帝国、巴西的南半球霸主愿望等等。然而这些国家中没有任何一个具备足够的经济、金融、技术和军事综合力量来继承美国的领导角色。
中国，曾经不止一次被提到作为美国未来继承人的角色，它具备令人心悦诚服的帝王气质，同时传统上的战略倾向总是极为耐心。这两点是获取压倒性优势的关键性因素，数千年来便是如此。因此，中国会小心谨慎地接过领导当前国际秩序的权杖，即使它不认为自己会永远霸占这个位置。它清楚地认识到，自己荣登权力之巅的原因并非当前体制轰然而倒，而是其向权力重新分配方向自然演化的结果。而且，在现实中，中国并不打算全部承担起美国的全球职责。北京的领导人不厌其烦地强调，无论用财富、实力和其它哪一项发展指标来衡量，中国在未来几十年中还会是一个发展中国家，不但远远落后于美国，与欧洲和日本的现代化和国家实力人均指标相比，也难望其项背。因此，中国领导人会极为谨慎地公开其全球领导者的身份。
然而，在某种程度上，中国的民族主义情绪或许会损害它国际政策方面的利益。一个盛气凌人、怀有狭隘民族主义情绪的北京，或许在不经意间会促成反对它的区域性力量联合。中国的邻居们——印度、日本、俄罗斯——谁都不准备认可中国取代美国在神坛上的位置，他们甚至会向已经奄奄一息的美国寻求帮助，以削弱不可一世的中国。鉴于这些邻居也同样推崇自身的民族主义，激烈的地区性冲突在所难免，亚洲必然要经历一段国际关系极为紧张的时期。21世纪的亚洲将变得类似于20世纪的欧洲——暴力、血腥。
那么，一些临近强势大国的众多弱势群体呢？它们的国防安全主要依赖美国在全球范围内所维持出的现状，它们与美国之间的关系是一荣俱荣，一损俱损。那些暴露在全球聚光灯下的国家和地区——包括格鲁吉亚、台湾、韩国、白俄罗斯、乌克兰、阿富汗、巴基斯坦、以色列，以及整个中东地区——在政治意义上相当于自然界的濒临灭绝物种，它们的命运完全取决于美国败落后的国际政治环境。它们会变得更有秩序、更自律，还是会变得无所顾忌、强力扩张呢？
一个年老气衰的美国还会发现，它与墨西哥之间的战略伙伴关系面临危机。美国的经济弹性和政治稳定性到目前为止轻松应对了各类挑战，这些挑战大多来自一个经济严重依赖、移民和贩毒问题严重的邻居。然而一个风光不再的美国很可能会失去其经济和政治体制的良性判断力，它的民族主义情绪会高涨，对国民身份的归属感更加敏感，对国土安全问题斤斤计较，而且不愿意为其它国家的发展牺牲资源。一个败落的美国与一个内乱不断的墨西哥之间关系如果恶化，或许会导致一个不祥问题的浮现：历史问题和边境冲突引发的国土边境争端，就像民族主义倾向严重的墨西哥政坛中的重大问题一样。
美国衰退的另一个后果是，各国对全球共享资源——海岸线、太空、互联网空间、环境等等——相对合作的态度将受到侵蚀。共同保护这些资源对全球经济的长期发展和地缘政治的稳定性是至关重要的。不管怎么说，缺少了美国这个极富建设性和影响力的角色，各国对全球共享资源的认知度必将大幅下降。因为美国超级强大、无与伦比的国际实力，在本来纷争不断的世界上维持出一道秩序。
以上这些都不一定会发生，美国在全球至高无上的地位也并非国际安全、弱势国家的领土完整和北美局势的唯一保证。实际上，21世纪错综复杂的战略关系让这种至尊地位几乎是无法获取的。但是，那些亡美之心不死的人恐怕要失望了。既然没有美国的世界将变得更加复杂和混乱，那么美国必须要寻求一种新的、与时俱进的外交政策方向。要么在投身国际漩涡之前，做好万全的准备吧。
原文：
How does the world look in an age of U.S. decline? Dangerously unstable.
Not so long ago, a high-ranking Chinese official, who obviously had concluded that America's decline and China's rise were both inevitable, noted in a burst of candor to a senior U.S. official: "But, please, let America not decline too quickly." Although the inevitability of the Chinese leader's expectation is still far from certain, he was right to be cautious when looking forward to America's demise.
For if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor -- not even China. International uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and even outright chaos would be far more likely outcomes.
While a sudden, massive crisis of the American system -- for instance, another financial crisis -- would produce a fast-moving chain reaction leading to global political and economic disorder, a steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay or endlessly widening warfare with Islam would be unlikely to produce, even by 2025, an effective global successor. No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative world order. More probable would be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially fatal risks to global well-being. Rather than a world where dreams of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion could ensue.
The leaders of the world's second-rank powers, among them India, Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already assessing the potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America falters and China rises. Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America's uncertain prospects, will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States. Others may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth. None of these countries, however, will have the requisite combination of economic, financial, technological, and military power even to consider inheriting America's leading role.
China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China is not yet ready to assume in full America's role in the world. Beijing's leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership.
At some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China's international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China's key neighbors -- India, Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty.
At the same time, the security of a number of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international status quo reinforced by America's global preeminence -- and would be made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America's decline. The states in that exposed position -- including Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, and the greater Middle East -- are today's geopolitical equivalents of nature's most endangered species. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the international environment left behind by a waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist.
A faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America's economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems. A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security, and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others' development. The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents.
Another consequence of American decline could be a corrosion of the generally cooperative management of the global commons -- shared interests such as sea lanes, space, cyberspace, and the environment, whose protection is imperative to the long-term growth of the global economy and the continuation of basic geopolitical stability. In almost every case, the potential absence of a constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential communality of the global commons because the superiority and ubiquity of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict.
None of this will necessarily come to pass. Nor is the concern that America's decline would generate global insecurity, endanger some vulnerable states, and produce a more troubled North American neighborhood an argument for U.S. global supremacy. In fact, the strategic complexities of the world in the 21st century make such supremacy unattainable. But those dreaming today of America's collapse would probably come to regret it. And as the world after America would be increasingly complicated and chaotic, it is imperative that the United States pursue a new, timely strategic vision for its foreign policy -- or start bracing itself for a dangerous slide into global turmoil.
那是肯定的，现在保护地球，保护空间，发展科技，基本都是美国在推动的，其它的都是利益分享者 有些道理 虽然不喜欢现在霸主，但此文也并非虚言，试想当年曹操就是这样的境地，如果不是曹操独大，早已不知有几人称王称帝。 这个世界，没有美国的历史远比有美国的历史长多了。。。;P 但是不管是不是美国，这个世界有霸主的时候比没有霸主的时候多 tyk2012 发表于 2012-2-27 10:06 static/image/common/back.gif
那是肯定的，现在保护地球，保护空间，发展科技，基本都是美国在推动的，其它的都是利益分享者 ...
凡是留恋该扔进历史垃圾堆的东西之人都是要被淘汰之人。你是个以便秘为荣的人吗？ 尔曹身与名俱灭，不废江河万古流 说的好像没有美国天会塌下来似的更可笑的是要说世界没有美国不行就罢了干嘛还要数落中国一番 现在的中东乱局，叙利亚、伊朗宛如要发动第三次世界大战似的，中国还是别参与卖卖武器吧，国家不是没钱造高铁吗？ 凌波骋逸 发表于 2012-2-27 14:39 static/image/common/back.gif
凡是留恋该扔进历史垃圾堆的东西之人都是要被淘汰之人。你是个以便秘为荣的人吗？ ...
挑食、偏食的人才会便秘Q39)
只搞政治，不懂发展的人，便秘的几率比较大 tyk2012 发表于 2012-2-27 17:44 static/image/common/back.gif
挑食、偏食的人才会便秘
只搞政治，不懂发展的人，便秘的几率比较大 ...
是啊，你就会挑食美国人吃剩的那些肮脏的东西，还来给国人炫耀说这是“普世”，好像离了美国地球要倒转一样，美国的存在不过是历史的一瞬间而已，成为过去式是必然的，你炫耀的那些都是要些进历史垃圾堆的玩意。 流氓说它是保护者。 paoding 发表于 2012-2-27 12:05 static/image/common/back.gif
这个世界，没有美国的历史远比有美国的历史长多了。。。
完全正确。
没有一方独大，这个世界才会真正懂得什么叫多方均势下的有限和平。 文章的立意阐述这样一个概念——美国是上帝，是世界的守护神。也就是说，没有了美国，其它国家没有能力共同建立一个和平的世界秩序。
直白点延伸这种想象——美国应当拥有更广泛的支配世界的权力，世界任何国家的发展或变革都应当求得美国的首肯，否则就是违背了人权或是民煮，或是犯了其它什么错误。我们应该在联合国仅保留美国的否决权，继续让美国拖欠会费；大家为维护世界发展制定的计划，美国可以根据本国利益任意否决，比如京都议定书之类的。自然，让美国不愉快的国家，也应当随时被颠覆或肢解，比如朝鲜、越南、洪都拉斯、格林纳达、古巴、南斯拉夫、伊拉克、利比亚……
我们需要美国的统治，欢迎它焚烧古兰经，欢迎它用我们做梅毒试验，欢迎它满世界地建立像阿布格里卜或者关塔那摩那样的监狱……
伟大的美利坚女神 让美国早日的崩溃吧。 互殴不是好现象 乱世出英雄，人类的科技文明就是这么一路过来的，文艺复兴以来有的文明挨不住，被灭了（参考玛雅），有的由盛转衰（参考英国），有的穷兵黩武招致地区大难（参考军国日本），有的不可一世最后分裂颓败（参考苏联），有的苦难重重涅槃重生（参考中国），历史早就一个文明还没开始他的进城之前就已经写好了。
所以我们只需要静静的等待，围观，打酱油就行了。直到那个最终命运召唤我们的时刻来临，所以我觉得美国没必要为自己国家的前途担心，毕竟，有一个英国做参考了。风水轮流转，今年到我家，是时候退下舞台休息了。 支持一下吧！
世界上本来没有上帝，当一群傻子开始膜拜的时候，上帝出现了。
当一个维系均衡的系统打破的时候，混乱是必然的，但混乱终究会被另一个均衡系统终结。
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