【中文标题】印度为何惧怕中国
【原文标题】Why India Fears China
【登载媒体】新闻周刊
【原文链接】http://www.newsweek.com/id/217088
【译者】满仓
中印边界争端可能会升级成边境冲突。中国士兵在守卫西藏和印度锡金省的边防站。
6月21日，两架中国武装直升机在碟木卓克低空盘旋，这是印度西北部与中国交界处，喜马拉雅山脉上的一个小村庄。直升机空投了一些罐装食品后，返回中国基地。印度军方的几架直升机紧急起飞，到达现场，但是似乎并不十分戒备。这类冷战式的猫捉老鼠的游戏在中印4057公里的边界线上已经上演了几十年，但是这一事件引发了媒体们关于“中国龙”的狂乱。从8月份开始，中国入侵印度的报道占据了24小时新闻节目和报纸的头条。
中国声称印度境内9万平方公里的土地为中国领土，这其中大部分属于西藏的范畴。印度北部山区的一大片狭长地区曾经是西藏的领地，附近的区域归一些效忠于拉萨的半独立王国所有。由于北京现在宣称西藏是中国的一部分，因此顺理成章地认为对印度境内历史上属于西藏的地区拥有主权。中国的态度在最近几个月变得带有火药味了。
自从去年发生西藏反华暴乱以来，解决边界争端的事情被搁置了，局势实际上是向更危险的方向扭转了。那些藏民在拉萨殴打汉族店主的视频被公布之后，北京承受了要求给与镇压的巨大内部压力。共产党领导层担心藏民的煽动会引起其它少数民族的不安定情绪，比如新疆的维吾尔族和内蒙古的蒙古族，进而威胁到国家的完整性。一位前克林顿政府的官员、中国问题专家Susan Shirk说““以前，台湾是‘国家主权的核心问题’，他们是这样描述的。西藏问题并不突出。”现在，Shirk说，西藏与台湾不相上下，也成了“国家主权的核心问题”。
印度国家安全，以及世界安全并不是一个乐观的局面。问题的本质是针对1914年地图上的一条线以及一片贫瘠、遍布岩石的山地所产生的模糊的争论，在这件事情上摩擦所产生的火花几乎不可能引发两个持有核武器国家之间的战火。中印边界争端不会只对这两个国家造成麻烦，美国、欧洲和其它亚洲国家都应当注意——中国和印度之间的冲突可能会相互动用核武器。西方国家有可能会被卷入：要么像台湾问题一样，作为保护亚洲民主的盟友；要么以分开双方的调停人的身份出现。
印度为达赖喇嘛和数万名西藏流亡分子提供了一个避风港，其中还包括越来越多的支持西藏 独立的好战分子，北京对此事的关注程度与日俱增。达赖喇嘛主张承认中国的主权，以换取真正的独立，并承诺不使用暴力。他的“中庸路线”让这些或许是出生在西藏以外的年轻藏民越来越不耐烦。如果这些人使用印度作为武装对抗中国的基地，就像西藏流亡分子在60年代的所作所为，那么中国就有可能对印度实施报复行动。印度境内的西藏大佛寺靠近边境，无论从政治上还是文化上，都被视为是藏民抵抗中国政权的一个象征。而北京则会要求或者动用武力来获取对其的控制权。
北京已经采取了一些外交攻势，来削弱印度对中国所索取的区域的控制权，特别是东北部省份阿鲁纳恰尔邦，和其主要城市达旺。那里是17世纪的六世达赖喇嘛的出生地，也是几个重要的西藏寺庙的所在地。西藏在1914年把达旺和周围区域割让给英属印度。中国最近拒绝了该省居民的签证申请；对印度首相曼莫汉辛格在2008年对该省的访问提出正式抗议；还试图阻止亚洲发展银行给印度提供29亿美元的贷款，因为部分资金将会用于该省的灌溉项目。在中国面对西藏问题的背景下，所有这些举动都很容易理解。因为北京越来越担心，以任何方式接受1914年的边界协定，都会导致最终承认西藏曾经独立于中国。这对于中国对拥有该地区的合法性，以及潜在地对拥有其它少数民族地区的合法性都会产生严重的削弱效果。
中国人越境的报道可以被视为一个信号，即中国是极为严肃地对待领土问题的。双方从未就具体的边界问题达成过一致意见，一方犯境，另一方就必然会例行地巡逻，但是中国明显地加快了边境线上的行动步伐。Brahma Chellaney是新德里政策研究中心——一家独立的智囊团——的策略研究专家。他说，印度军方在去年报告了270起中国犯境事件，几乎是前年的两倍、2006年的三倍。鉴于整个夏天几乎每天都有犯境事件的报告，Chellaney说这表明了“中国人的好战性格”。《中国日报》在6月份的报道中批判印度在近期加强边境防卫的举动，宣称：“中国在与印度的边境争端问题上绝不妥协”。报道还询问印度是否认真考虑过“可能与中国发生冲突的后果”。
对很多印度人来说，中国是一个强大的扩张势力，并且决意压制印度的崛起，以避免形成对北京在亚洲影响力方面的威胁。他们对于1962年的中印战争心怀恐惧，中国在那次战争中沿边境线发起了大规模的入侵，直捣印度内地，直到其单方面在如今实际存在的边境线上停止前进，这条线现在被称为“LAC”。他们害怕看到中国在印度洋上的海军扩张行为，把中国不断扩大的海军基地网络视为即将扼杀印度的索套。他们猛烈抨击总理曼莫汉辛格在面对持续增长的威胁时的软弱态度。《印度防务评论》的编辑Bharat Verma今年夏天在一篇广泛发表的文章中预测，中国在2012年前将进攻印度。他说，在世界经济下滑的局面下，中国内部的不安定因素持续增加。北京的领导人需要“一个小小的军事胜利”来团结内部，而辛格的短视让印度成为了一个“软柿子”。几个星期以来，印度的国防部和军方首领感觉不得不设法让公众相信“1962年不会重现”。
印度在对话中的位置需要得到一些武力方面的支持。新德里已经开始重新部署边境的部队，并且实施了一个基础设施建设项目，以期回应中国境内修建的道路和机场。近期印度还进行了一场为期三天的陆空联合军事演习，似乎是在昭示已经处于防卫状态。但是印度需要小心的是不要反应过度：它带有警惕的目光注视到中国在2008年拉萨暴乱之后在边境地区集结了数万人的军队，但是该行动的主要目的是重新夺回对西藏的控制权。麻省理工学院中印问题专家M. Taylor Fravel说，在西藏部署的大部分军队都是确保中国内部安全的武装力量，他们没有重型武器和远程攻击武器，所以并不像印度鹰派们认为的那样具有威胁。
印度应当明智地致力于开发远程武器，比如导弹和先进的攻击机，并让其保持冷静的待命状态，这样就不需要与中国军队在边境线上短兵相接。印度已经开始在与中国的边界处部署精密的雷达系统——这是一种处理险恶地形、避免直接对抗的方法。印度还应当寻求与其它国家共同分享中国在西藏的行动和军队动向的情报，比如美国、日本和台湾，这不但可以预防被突袭，还可以避免遭遇战。
来自台湾的经验告诉新德里，应当开放边境，开展贸易和交流，让自己与中国建立更紧密的关系。Shirk说，中国现在向台湾充分开放，这是为了“赢得人心”的一种努力，这也让中国怀有越来越高的期望，可以最终对西藏和其它少数民族地区寻求一种可以接受的处理方式。印度和中国都在试图低调处理对犯境事件的报道。中国军队高官曾经邀请印度三大区指挥部的将军跨过LAC来中国访问，作为建立信心的举措，访问内容甚至还包括几乎从未有过的拉萨。印度官员曾经恳求新闻媒体低调报告犯境事件。印度国家安全顾问M. K. Narayanan警告说，敲响战鼓或许会成为一个自践性预言（译者注：意指人会不自觉的按已知的预言来行事，最终令预言发生。），从而引发与中国的“莫名冲突或敌对行动”。这个问题现在应当交给双方最高层人士来处理——不要让急性子莽撞行事。
这些警告完全误解了中国的本意。在印度为中国的军队规模和财富忧虑时，中国也对美国的军队规模和经济担忧。中国在亚洲公开的目标是遵循“和平发展”的原则，惠及包括印度在内的邻国们，我们没有理由去怀疑这个目标。北京是一个存在安全隐患的势力，但并不是一个有侵略性的势力，因为其内部存在着真实的社会和经济不安定因素。中国在印度洋区域不断扩大的海军规模是其保护航线合法利益的体现，北京要依赖这些航线来确保来自非洲和中东的石油和自然资源的供应。边境上的行动也应按此理解：本质上并不是在防范来自印度的外部威胁，而是印度与中国内部西藏问题之间的关系。
而且，如果西藏是一个新台湾，那么它需要极端微妙的外交手段。如果西方低估中国对台湾 独立行动的打击态度，那么中国在1996年发射警告性的导弹可以证明一切，西藏应该明白这个道理。台湾给自己武装到牙齿，造成了现在危险的局面，但它依然尽量避免任何超过北京警戒线的措辞和行动。
印度也在做类似的尝试。去年它拒绝批准达赖喇嘛访问达旺，表面上的原因是议会选举，而他正在筹划11月份的另一次行程。对新德里来说，或许对其它那些对达赖喇嘛有影响力的势力，比如美国来说也是一样，谨慎的做法是为达赖喇嘛找一个保全面子的借口，来无限期推迟行程。在西藏流亡分子领地的军事行动方面，印度要极为警惕，这是最可能引发中国进攻的导火索。而且，停止拒绝与中国讨论西藏问题的政策，对印度来说也是一个明智的举措。Chellaney说：“还是有一些方法可以让我们用不挑衅、不对抗的方式来强调西藏的核心地位。如果新德里公开表示，西藏不再是印度和中国的政治缓冲地带，而是新德里和北京的政治桥梁。仅此一步，整个故事就会发生根本性的变化。”
原文：
The India-China border dispute could escalate into a broader conflict. Here, Chinese soldiers guard the border between Tibet and India's Sikkim state.
On June 21, two Chinese military helicopters swooped low over Demchok, a tiny Indian hamlet high in the Hima-layas along the northwestern border with China. The helicopters dropped canned food over a barren expanse and then returned to bases in China. India's military scrambled helicopters to the scene but did not seem unduly alarmed. This sort of Cold War cat-and-mouse game has played out on the 4,057-kilometer India-China border for decades. But the incident fed a media frenzy about "the Chinese dragon." Beginning in August, stories about new Chinese incursions into India have dominated the 24-hour TV news networks and the newspaper headlines.
China claims some 90,000 square kilometers of Indian territory. And most of those claims are tangled up with Tibet. Large swaths of India's northern mountains were once part of Tibet. Other stretches belonged to semi-independent kingdoms that paid fealty to Lhasa. Because Beijing now claims Tibet as part of China, it has by extension sought to claim parts of India that it sees as historically Tibetan, a claim that has become increasingly flammable in recent months.
Ever since the anti-Chinese unrest in Tibet last year, progress toward settling the border dispute has stalled, and the situation has taken a dangerous turn. The emergence of videos showing Tibetans beating up Han Chinese shopkeepers in Lhasa and other Tibetan cities created immense domestic pressure on Beijing to crack down. The Communist Party leadership worries that agitation by Tibetans will only encourage unrest by the country's other ethnic minorities, such as Uighurs in Xinjiang or ethnic Mongolians in Inner Mongolia, threatening China's integrity as a nation. Susan Shirk, a former Clinton-administration official and expert on China, says that "in the past, Taiwan was the 'core issue of sovereignty,' as they call it, and Tibet was not very salient to the public." Now, says Shirk, Tibet is considered a "core issue of national sovereignty" on par with Taiwan.
The implications for India's security—and the world's—are ominous. It turns what was once an obscure argument over lines on a 1914 map and some barren, rocky peaks hardly worth fighting over into a flash point that could spark a war between two nuclear-armed neighbors. And that makes the India-China border dispute into an issue of concern to far more than just the two parties involved. The United States and Europe as well as the rest of Asia ought to take notice—a conflict involving India and China could result in a nuclear exchange. And it could suck the West in—either as an ally in the defense of Asian democracy, as in the case of Taiwan, or as a mediator trying to separate the two sides.
Beijing appears increasingly concerned about the safe haven India provides to the Dalai Lama and to tens of thousands of Tibetan exiles, including increasingly militant supporters of Tibetan independence. These younger Tibetans, many born outside Tibet, are growing impatient with the Dalai Lama's "middle way" approach—a willingness to accept Chinese sovereignty in return for true autonomy—and commitment to nonviolence. If these groups were to use India as a base for armed insurrection against China, as Tibetan exiles did throughout the 1960s, then China might retaliate against India. By force or demand, Beijing might also seek to gain possession of important Tibetan Buddhist monasteries that lie in Indian territory close to the border. Both politically and culturally, these monasteries are seen as key nodes in the Tibetan resistance to Chinese authority.
Already Beijing has launched a diplomatic offensive aimed at undercutting Indian sovereignty over the areas China claims, particularly the northeast state of Arunachal Pradesh and one of its key cities, Tawang, birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama in the 17th century and home to several important Tibetan monasteries. Tibet ceded Tawang and the area around it to British India in 1914. China has recently denied visas to the state's residents; lodged a formal complaint after Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited the state in 2008; and tried to block a $2.9 billion Asian Development Bank loan to India because some of the money was earmarked for an irrigation project in the state. All these moves are best understood in the context of China's recent troubles in Tibet, with Beijing increasingly concerned that any acceptance of the 1914 border will amount to an implicit acknowledgment that Tibet was once independent of China—a serious blow to the legitimacy of China's control over the region and potentially other minority areas as well.
The reports of Chinese incursions can be read as a signal that it is deadly serious about its territorial claims. The exact border has never been mutually agreed on—meaning one side's incursion is another side's routine patrol—but the Chinese have clearly stepped up their activity along the frontier. The Indian military reported a record 270 Chinese border violations last year—nearly double the figure from the year before and more than three times the number of incidents in 2006, says Brahma Chellaney, an expert in strategic studies at New Delhi's Centre for Policy Research, an independent think tank. Noting that there was a reported incursion nearly every day this summer, Chellaney says this amounts to "a pattern of Chinese belligerence." In June the People's Daily criticized recent moves by India to strengthen its border defenses and declared: "China will not make any compromises in its border disputes with India." It asked if India had properly weighed "the consequences of a potential confrontation with China."
To many Indians, China is an expansionist power bent on thwarting India's rise as a serious challenge to Beijing's influence in Asia. They are haunted by memories of India's 1962 war with China, in which China launched a massive invasion along the length of the frontier, routing the Indians before unilaterally halting at what today remains the de facto border, known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC). They are fearful of China's expanding naval presence in the Indian Ocean, seeing its widening network of naval bases as a noose that could be used to strangle India. They blast Prime Minister Manmohan Singh for alleged weakness in the face of this growing threat. Bharat Verma, editor of the Indian Defence Review, predicted in a widely publicized essay this summer that China would attack India sometime before 2012. With social unrest rising within China due to the worldwide economic slump, he says, the leadership in Beijing needs "a small military victory" to unify the nation, and India is "a soft target," due to Singh's fecklessness. In recent weeks India's defense minister and the heads of the Army and Air Force have felt compelled to reassure the public that "there will be no repeat of 1962."
India's position in talks needs to be backed by strength in arms. New Delhi has already started repositioning border forces, launched a road-building program to match the roads and airfields that China has built on its side, and recently conducted a three-day combined air-and-land war game, seemingly designed to show that it is on guard. But India needs to be careful not to overreact: it views with alarm the tens of thousands of troops China has deployed to the border region since the 2008 Lhasa riots, but most of these moves are designed to reassert control over Tibet. M. Taylor Fravel, an MIT expert on the India-China border dispute, says many of the troops deployed in Tibet are internal-security forces, lacking heavy armor or artillery, representing less of a threat to India than Indian hawks believe.
India would be wise to invest in -longer-range weapons—such as missiles and advanced-strike aircraft—that allow it to maintain a standoff deterrent, without the need to go toe-to-toe with Chinese troops on the border. India has also begun deploying sophisticated radar systems along its frontier with China—a way to police inhospitable terrain while avoiding direct confrontation. India might also seek to share intelligence with other nations—such as the United States, Japan, and Taiwan—about China's actions and troop movements in Tibet, both to prevent being taken by surprise and to avoid an accidental conflict.
A final lesson from Taiwan is that New Delhi should pursue ways to open the border to commerce and communication, binding itself closer to China. Shirk says China is now opening ties to Taiwan, as part of an effort to "win the hearts and minds of the people," raising hopes that China may eventually pursue a more tolerant approach toward Tibet and other minority regions. Amid all the reports of border incursions, both India and China have sought to lower the volume. Chinese military officials invited Indian generals from all three of the regional commands that face off against it across the LAC to visit China for confidence-building measures, including a rare visit to Lhasa. Indian officials have pleaded with news organizations to tone down reporting on border incursions. Indian national-security adviser M. K. Narayanan warned that the beating of war drums might become a self-fulfilling prophecy, leading to "an unwarranted incident or accident" with China. This is now an issue that should be handled at the highest levels—not left to hotheads—on all sides.
These warnings completely misread China's intent. While India worries about the larger army and wealth of China, China worries about the larger military and economy of the United States. In Asia, its stated aim is to follow a "peaceful rise" that benefits all its neighbors, India included, and there's little reason to doubt this goal. Beijing is an insecure power, not an aggressive one, because of the real threat of social and economic unrest at home. China's growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean reflects a legitimate interest in protecting the sea lanes upon which Beijing depends for its supply of oil and natural resources from Africa and the Middle East. The border movements should be seen in the same light: it's not about an external threat from India per se, but India's relationship to the internal threat from Tibet.
Still, if Tibet is the new Taiwan, it requires extremely delicate diplomacy. If anything, the West tends to under-estimate China's willingness to fight independence moves in Taiwan—it has fired missile warning shots as recently as 1996—and the same may now be said of Tibet. Taiwan, however, has maintained the parlous status quo by arming itself to the teeth, while avoiding any rhetoric or action that crosses Beijing's red lines.
India is trying a similar approach. Last year it denied the Dalai Lama permission to visit Tawang—ostensibly because of parliamentary elections—and now he has scheduled another trip in November. It would be prudent for New Delhi—and perhaps others with influence on the Dalai Lama, such as the United States—to find a face-saving reason for the Dalai Lama to indefinitely postpone the trip. India needs to be especially vigilant against militant activity within the Tibetan exile community, the single most likely trigger for a Chinese attack, and it might be wise to end the policy of simply avoiding any discussion of Tibet in its dealings with China. "There are ways to highlight the centrality of Tibet without being provocative or confrontational," says Chellaney. "If New Delhi were to say in public that Tibet has ceased to be the political buffer between India and China, and India would like Tibet to be the political bridge between New Delhi and Beijing, that, in one stroke, would change the narrative fundamentally." |
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发表于 2009-10-17 23:23
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发表于 2009-10-17 23:34
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