RealClearWorld: 上海合作组织——中亚“正在苏醒的巨人”

荡漾

【原文标题】SCO: Central Asia's Waking Giant
【登载媒体】RealClearWorld
【来源地址】http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2009/01/sco_central_asias_waking_giant.html
【译者】荡漾
【声明】本翻译供Anti-CNN使用，转载请注明译者及出处，谢谢！
【译文】
     上海合作组织（SCO）汇集了几乎世界一半的人口，一些成员国拥有核武器，许多成员国是能源供应大国，还包括一些世界上增长速度最快的经济体。然而在中亚之外很少有人了解这个组织。

     1996年上海合作组织在苏联的罹难中诞生，今天成员国包括俄罗斯、中国、哈萨克斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦、塔吉克斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦，观察国包括蒙古、伊朗、巴基斯坦和印度。俄罗斯和中国仍然是其中的主导力量。自建立之日起上海合作组织的军事演习从主要是双边演习发展到所有成员国参与，日益凸显其在该领域的野心勃勃。上海合作组织也开始共同打击贩毒和有组织犯罪。

     迄今能源问题是上海合作组织中唯一仅限于两国双边的事务。不过为了协调能源战略及加强能源安全上海合作组织于去年成立了一个俱乐部，将能源生产国和能源消费国以及输送过境国包括私人公司联合在一起。上海合作组织也鼓励促进自由贸易，着眼于修建公路、铁路等基础设施以联通并促进成员国之间的贸易发展并协调海关制度及关税问题。

     然而由于成员国利益差异巨大上海合作组织内部的合作更多聚焦于国家而非集体的利益。例如中国要寻找更大的商品市场和更多的能源资源而俄罗斯则想利用上海合作组织来达到其反西方的目的。组织内的其他成员国在中国和哈萨克斯坦的带领下则希望加强与西方之间业已稳定的经济合作关系。因此去年8月的合作组织峰会上俄罗斯在格鲁吉亚冲突问题上并未得到其他成员国的支持。

     这些分歧使得上海合作组织很难成为东方版的北约组织。的确其成员国举行了军事联合演习也表达了将合作组织打造成一个更加成熟的安全组织的意愿，但上海合作组织仍然缺乏许多成熟的北约式安全组织的基本要素。

     上海合作组织既没有统一的军事政治体系也没有常驻的业务总部；既没有快速反应军事力量也没有定期政治商讨的机制。北约关注的是外部安全风险而上海合作组织的成员国则视各自领土内部的安全事务为重。

     因此西方特别是欧盟想要与上海合作组织合作，这将有助于压制俄罗斯想利用合作组织作为其反西方政策工具的企图，也有助于防止上海合作组织发展成一个军事实体。

     这些听上去似乎像是负面理由，不过欧盟有积极理由加强同上海合作组织的关系，欧洲需要来自中亚国家的能源供应而中亚也需要来自欧洲的投资。

     阿富汗则是另一个关系到共同利益的问题。当前欧盟向阿富汗政府提供财政援助并帮助培训警察队伍和司法机构，而上海合作组织与阿富汗也成立了一个联络小组。二者都希望更进一步，彼此合作比起各自行动能发挥更大的影响力。欧盟有资金，而上海合作组织的大多数成员国都与阿富汗接壤，能为阿富汗地区提供训练有素经验丰富的人员。

     而与北约合作的战略则是明智的。考虑到中国在经济和军事事务上的重要性、中亚与西方之间日益增长的能源和贸易关系，加上中亚安全将继续对西方安全产生重要影响的合理假设，上海合作组织、欧盟及北约之间的合作是不可避免的；而考虑到北约及上海合作组织在中亚共同面对的安全威胁，如基地组织及塔利班扶持的恐怖主义和毒品贩卖，合作就显得更具现实意义。

     但北约至今仍犹豫于进一步加强与上海合作组织的联系。很难揣摩北约究竟对上海合作组织持何态度，最多只能表述为北约将上海合作组织既不看作是问题也不看作是机会。

     而上海合作组织显然愿意支持北约的既定目标。911后北约作出决定联盟需应对全球范围内的威胁，这解释了北约在阿富汗问题上的立场。作为全球战略的一部分北约加强了同其他地区的合作，包括上海合作组织主要责任区域所在的东南亚地区。

     也许以俄罗斯和中国为首的上海合作组织不可避免地会将北约在该地区加大力度视为某种不信任。只要北约仍然不愿开展与上海合作组织的对话，这种不信任的感觉将继续存在并可能得到强化。因此有必要考虑像北约－俄罗斯理事会一样成立北约－中国理事会，有利于将上海合作组织作为一个整体在更为广泛的领域内开展合作。

     这样的合作并不会在合作组织成员国和西方之间为民主、人权等事务架起一道桥梁。合作所需要的远非仅限于联合制定政策而应包括互惠互利小规模特定项目等实质性的追求。北约和上海合作组织可以合作消除阿富汗的反人员地雷，也可以采取其他可能形式的措施建立信任，例如开展联合警察培训和反毒行动等。

     安全合作若想成功，必须聚焦于有实质意义的举措而回避敏感的政治事务。欧盟、北约及上海合作组织都将从中受益，至少也能满足阿富汗的利益。(作者Marcel de Haas是荷兰Clingendael国际关系研究所的高级研究员)

【原文】

(By Marcel de Haas)
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) brings together almost half the world's population, several members own nuclear weapons, many are big energy suppliers, and it includes some of the world's fastest-growing economies. Yet few outside Central Asia have heard much about it.

The SCO emerged from the wreckage of the Soviet Union in 1996. Today, its members are Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, while Mongolia, Iran, Pakistan and India are observers. Russia and China remain the lead actors. Since its launch, the SCO's military exercises have become increasingly ambitious, growing from largely bilateral to inclusion of all members. The SCO is also beginning to work together in the fight against drug trafficking and organised crime.

Until recently, the SCO's members addressed energy issues only bilaterally. But, in order to coordinate energy strategies and strengthen energy security, last year the organisation launched a club that unites energy-producing and energy-consuming states, transit countries, and private companies. The SCO promotes free trade, too, and aims to build essential infrastructure such as roads and railways to link its members and boost commerce between them while also harmonising customs systems and tariffs.

Yet cooperation within the SCO remains focused on national rather than collective objectives, because its members' interests vary so much. China, for example, seeks markets for its products and further energy resources, while Russia aims to use the SCO to promote its anti-Western agenda. The group's other members – led by China and Kazakhstan – want to strengthen their already robust levels of economic cooperation with the west. Thus, for example, at the SCO summit in August, Russia did not get the support of other members regarding the Georgia conflict.

These diverging objectives make it hard to believe that the SCO will ever evolve into an eastern version of Nato. True, its members have held joint military exercises and have expressed a desire to build the SCO into a more mature security organization. But the SCO still lacks many essential elements of a full-grown Nato-style security organization.

The SCO has no integrated military-political structure, and no permanent operational headquarters. It has no rapid-reaction force and does not engage in regular political deliberations. Nato's focus is on external security risks, while the SCO's members target security issues within their own territories.

It makes sense for the west, particularly the European Union, to seek cooperation with the SCO, as this would also help counter Russia's attempts to use it as a tool for its anti-western policies. It would also prevent the SCO from turning into a militarised entity.

These may look like negative reasons for the EU to engage with the SCO, but there are also ample positive reasons for encouraging cooperation. Europe needs energy supplies from Central Asia, and Central Asia needs European investment.

Another sphere of mutual interest is Afghanistan. At present, the EU offers financial support to the Afghan government and helps to train its police and judiciary. The SCO has established a contact group with Afghanistan. Both sides want to do more, and they might be able to make a greater impact by working together rather than separately. The EU has money and the SCO organisation, most of whose members border Afghanistan, has trained personnel and direct experience in the region.

Cooperation with Nato also looks strategically wise. Given China's importance in both military and economic matters, growing energy and trade relations between Central Asia and the west, and the reasonable assumption that Central Asia's security will continue to have great significance for western security, cooperation between the SCO, the EU, and Nato looks inevitable. This is all the more true in view of the common security threats faced by Nato and the SCO in Central Asia, such as al-Qaida and Taliban-sponsored terrorism and drug trafficking.

But both Nato and the SCO have so far hesitated to engage in closer contact. It is hard to discern whether Nato has any opinion at all about the SCO. At best, Nato seems to regard it as being neither a problem nor an opportunity.

Reaching out to the SCO would certainly seem to support Nato's stated objectives. After 9/11, the alliance came to the conclusion that threats may need to be dealt with on a worldwide basis, which explains Nato's presence in Afghanistan. As a part of this global strategy, Nato strengthened its relations with partners elsewhere, including in Southeast Asia which is the SCO's chief area of responsibility.

Perhaps inevitably, the SCO – and Russia and China as its leading members – regards Nato's increased presence in the region with some distrust. As long as Nato remains reluctant to enter into a dialogue with the SCO, such a cautious attitude looks set to linger, and may even intensify. Consideration also needs to be given, therefore, to the establishment of a Nato-China Council, along the lines of the Nato-Russia Council, and to the creation of arrangements that would facilitate greater cooperation with the SCO as a whole.

Such cooperation would not bridge the main differences between SCO members and the west over issues like democratisation and human rights. Cooperation would also need to comprise much more than mere joint policy development, and should involve the practical pursuit of mutually beneficial, smaller-scale ad hoc projects. Nato and the SCO could work together on neutralising anti-personnel mines in Afghanistan, as well as other possible types of confidence-building measures, such as joint police training and counter-narcotics operations.

If security cooperation is to be a success, politically sensitive issues should be avoided, with the emphasis squarely on practical measures. This approach would serve the interests of the EU, Nato, the SCO's members, and, not least, Afghanistan.

Marcel de Haas is a senior researcher at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael.

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