中国GDP8%增长率的迷信说

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http://www.yeeyan.com/articles/view/67378/33169?orgin=index

翻译:译言 chjac1123 @ yeeyan.com

中国向来对8%这个数字情有独钟，不多也不少，没什么科学上的渊源，却正好是8%的经济增长率。

经济不稳定期间很少有常量数据。

但是那些想要在经济危机中寻求安慰的人们，看看正在北京举行的全国人大吧。上周，温家宝总理召开会议，发布了中国版本的《国情咨文》。虽然全球受到金融危机重创，现在的状况与一年前也相差甚远，犹如牧师虔诚地念“阿门”一般，总理毅然坚定地重复着说，在2009年，中国预设的GDP增长率仍为8%。

近几年，官方数据大大低估了中国真实的增长速度。这一次，很多人士认为数据有些高估了。不管怎样，人们心中还是存有疑虑：为什么8%这个数字被认为是神奇之数？（显然原因不仅仅在于汉语中，8的发音接近于“发财，昌盛”，被认为是个幸运数字这么简单。）

大部分研究中国问题的专家学者会告诉你，就好像这已经是个既成事实，即大约8%的增长率是保持就业稳定的必需水平，也是遏制潜在社会动乱的一个数据水平。人们会特别地认为，为了给国有企业的下岗工人以及即将进入劳动力市场的应届毕业生创造足够的就业机会，8%这个数字是个底线。中国的领导人们，上至主席下至县级官员，都对完成8%增长率的重要性毕恭毕敬。没人提出更高或者更低的增长率（然而，数据上的一点提高也无多大实质性的损害）。如果高出8%太多，就意味着要冒着发生无法控制的通货膨胀的风险；过低于8%，失业工人们会在大街上游行，社会动乱接连发生。但是8%这个数字究竟是什么时候又是怎样变得如此神圣不可侵犯呢？

解决对8%的信仰问题，让我们刨根究底来看看其创始人邓小平的说法吧。在1982年9月召开的12次党代会上，邓小平确定了全国的经济目标，即到本世纪末全国年均工业和农业产出翻四番。在大会之前，邓小平问当时的总书记胡耀邦，一个国家的经济怎么能从1980年的7100亿元到2000年提升至28000亿元，实现翻四番的目标呢？胡耀邦回答说8%的年增长率就能取得成功。就是这么简单了。没有任何复杂隐秘的公式，没有任何增长率和就业率之间关联的精密方程，与孔孟、老子的圣言也没有任何瓜葛。追溯到1982年，就是基于到2000年实现经济翻四番的目标而设定的8%的年增长率。

20世纪末已经过去了，但是这个目标却没有变。接下去的五年计划仍然把年增长率的目标设在了7.5%到8.5%之间。自此，这个全国性的目标在政府各个阶层的官员心中根深蒂固。

事实上，很难说出中国年增长的确切数字。由于官员的晋升与他们在经济方面取得的政绩挂钩，这就使得各个阶层的官员们有欲望编造自己上报给上一级的数据。每年，县级官员必须计算地方经济增长的数据，报告至上一级，然后上报到省级政府，再由省级政府上报到北京中央。始终不变的是，几乎每个省上报的经济增长率都要超过全国的平均数——这当然是不可能的。著名作家和前驻中国记者吉米·曼恩曾经说过：“这就像是沃伯根湖。所有的孩子都很漂亮，而且比平均水平都要美。”（解释：森·凯勒 (GarrisonKeillor)笔下的小说《沃伯根湖》的市民在寻找一个所有小孩都高于平均水平的幻想世界一样。）

这就给在北京的高层领导带来了困难，他们必须或多或少的对官僚主义造成的“通货膨胀”作出修正。至少到现在为止，他们都很清醒地意识到这个现象。50年代末，地方官员在上报粮食产量的时候都体现出了同样的政治敏锐性——虚报产量，由于当时中央政府没能意识到报告中的通货膨胀倾向，当时被称为“夸大之风”，结果暴发了一场大饥荒。中国不是联邦制体系的国家。虽然中央会时不时地下派秘密调查员，但中央政府仍然要依赖于省级报告的机制。撇开数据本身的模糊性不谈，有一样东西是始终不变的，那就是全国上下对增长率的固定要求。

虽然8%的目标没什么神奇的，经济增长一直都与就业以及社会稳定有着紧密的关系。1993年，前总理朱镕基从上海市市长晋升为主管国家经济的领导人。中央委员会在那年公布了一份经济方针文件——《关于建立社会主义市场经济体制若开问题的决议》，最终形成了人们所熟知的政策方针——“抓大放小”。几百万在小型低效的国企工作的工人下岗了——意味着他们获得了无薪永久假期，但是这或许是种一揽子福利的象征。大型的国企重组了，又导致了几百万员工的失业。让这些下岗工人重新就业是当务之急，以免他们在大街上闲荡，抱怨那些从未实现过的养老金问题。朱镕基临危受命，要打破“铁饭碗”的旧识，并且改革先前的计划经济，将其引入全球化的竞争体系当中。然而，为下岗工人创造就业需要对基础设施建设投入大量的资金和引入新的国外技术，这就导致了前五年经济快速发展的同时每年都伴有10%到15%的通货膨胀率。当朱镕基成功完成经济增长的目标，避免了社会动荡出现之时，快速的增长率及其波动性就体现出了其自身携带的一系列挑战。

虽然中央对就业问题的关注人尽皆知，但是对通货膨胀的恐慌也是一个同等重要的驱动力。中国的官员觉得他们必须在创造就业和控制物价上走出一条正确的道路。中国的历史学家指出1948年单凭红军的力量是不足以打败国民党的——极度通货膨胀导致了物价飞涨，也同样是削弱国民党正统地位的一个重要因素。之后，1988年当通货膨胀率高达20%的时候，共 产 党发现自己的政权不稳，当时人们因恐慌而疯狂扫货，人们的不满情绪在1989年的天 安 门事件中达到顶点。

今天当中国在与全球金融危机做斗争的时候，问题就归结到猪肉（代指食品价格）之上了——问题不在于政府开销的浪费，而在于另一块白肉。在中国，油价是牢牢受到控制的，同时政府还掌管着粮食的价钱。所以食品价格，尤其是猪肉，就在中国经济复苏中起到重要的作用。中国是世界上生产和消费猪肉最多的国家，猪肉消费占到全国肉类消费的80%，所以猪肉的价格影响到每个家庭的食品预算开支。

食品占到了中国物价指数通货篮1/3的比重。作为衡量通货膨胀的标准之一，物价指数被视为是潜在社会动荡的晴雨表。因为低收入家庭必须拿出总收入更高的比例花在食品身上，而他们恰恰不是中国经济发展的直接受益者，而是潜在的对政府不满者，所以政府尤其担心物价上涨对这些市民带来的影响。意识到这点之后，国家发改委（中国经济规划部门），在去年对很多食品原材料和建筑材料的价格进行控制，试图遏制物价上涨，其中包括去年价格上涨了60%的猪肉。

当我看到温家宝总理出现在电视上的时候，我真的很同情他。在全球金融危机的情况下面临着创造9百万就业机会的挑战，还有因出口下滑而带来的担忧，总理在全国人民代表大会上的年度工作报告仍然用他坚定的语气让人们对这个预设的目标恢复信心。众所周知，今年要完成GDP8%的增长率确实很困难。然而，总理想要稳住军心，传达出一个讯息，与他的人民产生共鸣，这同时默默地勾起了人们对邓小平的信任之情——中国的经济增长就是一种信仰。

原文:
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4747

Beijing's GDP Numerology
By Drew Thompson


AFP/Getty Images
Maintaining figurative orthodoxy: Premier Wen Jiabao keeps the faith on China’s economic targets.

There are few constants during a time of economic uncertainty. But for those seeking solace in the midst of economic torment, look to the ongoing meetings of the National People’s Congress in Beijing. Last week, Premier Wen Jiabao launched the sessions by delivering China’s version of the State of the Union address. Although the world, rattled by the global financial crisis today, looks vastly different than it did a year ago, he repeated with all the certainty of a pastor pronouncing “amen” that in 2009, yet again, Beijing would be setting a target of 8 percent annual GDP growth.

In recent years, this official target has drastically underestimated China’s actual growth. This time, many observers think it may be an overestimate. In both cases, the question remains: Why is 8 percent considered the magic number? (Surely it isn’t just because in Mandarin, eight is a near homonym for “prosperous” and considered a lucky number.)

Most China watchers will tell you, as though it were a certain fact, that approximately 8 percent growth is the level needed to keep employment up -- and the potential for “social unrest” down. It is typically assumed that 8 percent is what is required to create enough jobs to absorb laid-off workers from failing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and new graduates entering the labor pool. Senior leaders in China, from the president down to the lowliest county magistrate, pay homage to the importance of achieving 8 percent growth. No one claims to want much more (well, a little more can’t hurt much), or much less. Too much more than 8, and you risk runaway inflation; much less than 8, and unemployed workers will march in the streets and chaos will ensue. But when and how did 8 percent become sacrosanct?

In all questions of faith, look first to one’s creator. In this case, that means Deng Xiaoping. At the 12th Party Congress in September 1982, Deng determined that the national economic goal would be to quadruple the annual industrial and agricultural output of the entire country by the end of the century. Prior to the big meeting, Deng asked then General Secretary Hu Yaobang how the country could quadruple its economy from 710 billion yuan in 1980 to 2,800 billion yuan in 2000, and Hu responded that 8 percent annual growth would do the trick. That’s it. There’s no complicated secret formula, no hallowed equation precisely linking growth to employment, no connection to the revered words of Confucius, Mencius, or Lao-tzu. Back in 1982, it was determined that it would take 8 percent annual growth to quadruple the economy by 2000.
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The end of the century has come and gone, but the target has remained the same. Subsequent five-year plans have all set an annual growth target between 7.5 and 8.5 percent. This national objective has since become the obsession of officials at each level of the government’s vast bureaucracy.

The truth is, it’s hard to tell exactly what China’s annual growth rate actually is. Because officials receive promotions based on how well they tend their economic gardens, there’s a strong incentive for mandarins at all levels to fudge the numbers they report up the bureaucratic food chain. Each year, county officials are instructed to tally their economic growth figures and report them to the next level, which then reports to the provincial government, which reports to Beijing. Invariably, almost every province reports economic growth exceeding the national average -- which, of course, is impossible. As Jim Mann, the noted author and former China correspondent, once pointed out: “It is like Lake Wobegon. All the children are beautiful and above average.”

This presents difficulties for senior leaders in Beijing, who have to somehow adjust for such bureaucratic “inflation.” At least by now they are well aware of the phenomena. In the late 1950s, local officials showed similar zeal (and political acumen) when they inflated grain outputs in their reports to higher authorities, resulting in mass starvation when the central government failed to recognize the trend of inflationary reporting, known as “the winds of exaggeration.” China is not a federal system. Although Beijing does occasionally dispatch secret investigators, the central government remains almost entirely dependent on provincial reporting chains. Regardless of this statistical ambiguity, one thing remains certain: the national fixation on growth.

Although there’s nothing magic about the 8 percent target, economic growth has long been linked to employment and social stability. In 1993, former Premier Zhu Rongji was promoted from his job as head of the Shanghai political machine to manage the country’s economy. The Central Committee that year promulgated an economic guidance document, the “Decision on Issues Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic Structure,” ultimately resulting in a policy that became known as, “grasping the large, letting go of the small.” Millions of workers in small, inefficient SOEs were let go or xia gang -- meaning they were on permanent furlough without pay, but perhaps a token benefit package. Larger SOEs were reorganized, laying off millions more. Getting those workers back into the workforce was a top priority, lest they take to the streets with their idle time to complain about pensions that never materialized. Zhu was tasked with breaking the “iron rice bowl” and reforming the previously planned economy into a globally competitive one. However, finding jobs for the laid-off workers required massive capital investments in infrastructure and new, often foreign technology, resulting in rapid economic growth along with inflation rates of 10 to 15 percent per year in the first half of the decade. While Zhu accomplished his goal of growing the economy and averting social unrest, the rapid growth and volatility presented its own set of challenges.

Although Beijing’s obsession with employment is well known, its fear of inflation is an equally important motivator. Officials in China feel they must walk a fine line between creating jobs and keeping a lid on prices. Chinese historians point out that the Red Army alone did not defeat the Nationalists (KMT) in 1948 -- hyperinflation, which resulted in skyrocketing food prices, was an equally essential factor in undermining the KMT’s legitimacy. Later, the Communist Party saw its own authority tremble in 1988, when inflation reached 20 percent, resulting in panic-buying and contributing to discontent that culminated in the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989.

Today as Beijing grapples with a global financial crisis, it might all come down to pork -- not wasteful government spending, but the other white meat. In China, gas prices are tightly controlled, and the government still manages grain prices. So food prices, and pork in particular, will play a significant role in China’s economic recovery. China is the world’s largest producer and consumer of pork, which makes up 80 percent of meat consumed in the country, affecting almost every family’s grocery budget.

Food contributes to at least a third of China’s consumer price index (CPI) basket. As a measure of inflation, the CPI is closely watched as a barometer for potential unrest. Because lower income families have to devote a larger portion of their income to food, the government is particularly concerned about the impact of rising food prices on citizens that have not benefited from China’s economic development -- and who are potentially dissatisfied with the government. Recognizing this, the National Development and Reform Commission, China’s economic planning ministry, placed price controls on a number of food staples and building materials last year, trying to rein in rising prices, including a pork price increase of almost 60 percent over the previous year.

When I see Premier Wen Jiabao on Chinese TV, I am often filled with sympathy for him. Taking on the massive challenge of creating up to 9 million jobs a year in the midst of global financial turmoil and the anxiety caused by falling exports, the premier’s annual work report at the National People’s Congress is reassuring in its predictability and sense of certainty. It’s no secret that 8 percent GDP growth will be a difficult target to reach this year. However, the premier is seeking to reassure his troops, preaching a message that resonates with his flock and silently invoking the convictions of Deng Xiaoping that China’s economic growth is an article of faith.
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Drew Thompson is director of China studies and Starr senior fellow at the Nixon Center in Washington.