[08.04.11 英国 the economist] 两种修复中国形象的妙方

yakunta

【原文連接】http://www.audiovideo.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11016420
【中文翻译連接】http://wwwl.Anti-CNN.com/forum/cn/thread-12867-1-4.html
【翻譯】 yakunta
【聲明】本文翻譯僅限Anti-CNN使用，謝絕轉載。

【原文】
Keeping the flame alight---Two ways to repair China's image: end the torch relay and take a lead over Myanmar


WERE shooting oneself in the foot an Olympic event, China would surely be well placed for a gold. The Beijing 2008 Olympic Torch Relay, taking the flame around the world before the games begin in August, was always a risk. Of course the flame would draw protesters like moths. But the suppression of riots and protests in Tibet has ensured the torch's progress has graduated from minor diplomatic embarrassment to full-scale public-relations disaster.
  
An exercise intended to flaunt the new, outward-looking and confident China has displayed its dark side: nervous, repressive, prickly and stubborn. That stubbornness may rule out the obvious remedy: calling the whole farce off before someone is badly hurt. At least the International Olympic Committee should have nothing more to do with it. Protests this week in London, Paris and San Francisco were ill-tempered enough. The passage through Delhi on April 17th could be uglier. India is home to some 100,000 Tibetans. The only stop on the torch's world tour sure to be trouble-free is Pyongyang. As for its proposed procession through Tibet in June, it is hard to imagine a more provocative or insensitive gesture.

To accuse China's critics of “politicising” a sporting event is nonsense. What has the relay to do with sport? It is not some timeworn practice integral to the games. Rather, the idea of a relay from Greece to the Olympic venue was revived by the Nazis for the 1936 Berlin Olympics, which is hardly a precedent China wants to advertise. The first “global” relay only took place for the most recent Olympics, in Athens in 2004. But that was not such a circus. China's pride may preclude any concession, however face-saving, on Tibet, or on human-rights abuses in general. But it is also facing criticism for its foreign policy—its links with the governments of Sudan and Myanmar in particular. Here, in theory, it can do something to show that it is indeed a responsible international “stakeholder”, with diplomatic maturity as well as economic clout.
  
Take Myanmar. After the bloody quelling of the “saffron revolution” last September, the ruling junta threw a few sops to international opinion. It accepted visits from a United Nations envoy, opened talks with the detained opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, and gave a timetable for a political transition. China deserves some credit for forcing the junta's hand. Myanmar's generals are nobody's puppets. But China, with its big commercial interests in the country, and its support in the UN Security Council, is now the junta's best friend.

It is time to use that position again. Confident that the outside world's focus on their misdeeds has shifted elsewhere, the generals have stalled on dialogue both with their opponents at home and the UN's envoy. The plight of their country remains desperate (see article). The political “process” has degenerated into a drive to impose a constitution entrenching military rule. A referendum on this solution will be held on May 10th in a climate of vicious intimidation.
     
Members of the Security Council are mulling a new statement, calling for some of the minimum reforms needed for a credible vote—such as the release of opposition leaders, including Miss Suu Kyi. The first thing China can do is to allow the statement to be issued in the name of a united outside world. More than that, China could help resolve the sterile debate that has raged for two decades over “engagement” or “isolation”. Isolation has never worked, because China, India and South-East Asian countries see too much commercial and strategic benefit in links with the junta. But nor has “engagement”, since Western countries have imposed sanctions of varying severity, and the junta has little interest in engaging anyway.

Nobody wins gold for sitting on a fence

Despite this, there is a broad consensus about the need for reform in Myanmar. With anti-Chinese feeling mounting in Myanmar, it is not in China's interests to be perceived as the prop that always holds up a loathed regime. It could take the initiative in forming a contact group to engage the junta in talks on economic co-operation and political reform. Even if it excluded Europe and America, such a group, of China,India, some South-East Asian countries and Japan, could help show the generals that they cannot forever survive in the cracks of other countries' disagreements. And it could help show that China is not always, unequivocally, on the side of the thugs

[ 本帖最后由 ltbriar 于 2008-6-27 10:31 编辑 ]

yakunta

編註: 圖文合併至開欄貼內


[ 本帖最后由 ltbriar 于 2008-6-27 10:32 编辑 ]

yakunta

【中文翻譯】
【聲明】本文翻譯僅限Anti-CNN使用，謝絕轉載。

让圣火永燃----两种修复中国形象的妙方：停止火炬传递和向缅甸施压

如果砸的脚自己也是一项奥运会项目，中国无疑是冠军得主。北京2008的全球奥运火炬传递，在8月前将一直进行，但却危机重重。火炬传递将引来无数的抗议。中国镇压西藏的骚乱和抗议让火炬传递从一简单外交问题变成中国的全球性公关灾难。

一次意在炫耀自己崭新、外向、自信的活动却彰显出其黑暗的一面：不安、压制、易怒和顽固。中国的冥顽不灵将使其看不清显而易见的改善方法：在未给人们造成更大伤害时停止火炬传递这样的闹剧。至少国际奥委会不必继续忍受。本周在伦敦、巴黎、旧金山的抗议者们已显示人们无法忍受的愤怒。而4月17日，在印度新德里的火炬传递将会更加难堪。在印度云集着10万逃难至此的西藏人。平壤是中国全球火炬传递中唯一一个全无麻烦的途径之地。至于中国的火炬在6月途径西藏，只能得到愤怒或是毫无知觉的迎接。

谴责中国的将奥运会政治化的评论毫无意义。火炬传递与体育运动有关吗？它并非奥运会的最初组成。事实上，从希腊到奥运举办国的火炬传递的做法始于1936年纳粹德国举办的奥运会-----这可不是中国所想要的先例。而第一个全球的火炬传递才始于2004年的希腊奥运会，不过当时并没有如此混乱。中国的傲慢将使其拒绝任何的让步，即使在西藏问题上，在人权问题上，他们总会掩饰。不过它的外交政策也一样面临抨击-----它与苏丹和缅甸的特殊关系。事实上，中国可以通过做一些事来表明他是负责任的国际大国，拥有与其经济影响力一样的外交。

以缅甸为例，自去年九月对“藏红色革命”的血腥镇压后，缅甸仅略释善意。面见联合国特使，与被软禁的反对党领导人----昂山素季重开对话，给出政治改革时间表。中国在对缅甸施加压力后挽回一些声誉。尽管缅甸军政府不是傀儡政府，但中国可以利用他在缅甸的巨大商业影响，他在联合国安理会的影响，以及是缅甸最好朋友的关系来向缅甸施加压力。

对中国而言，是时候再次利用他的优势向缅甸施加影响。让缅甸知道外部世界对其错误行径的关注已经转移，缅甸的军政们已经停止了与国内反对者以及联合国特使的对话。缅甸国内的状况仍然没有好转，政治的进程却是强化军政统治。而将于5月10举行的新宪法公投目前陷于恐怖之中。

联合国安理会正在讨论一项新的声明，拟设定缅甸举行公正公投的底线，如释放反对党领导人，包括昂山素季。中国首先要做的是让该项声明获得通过。此外，中国应当解决20年来关于干预和孤立的争论。孤立从来都没有效果，因为中国，印度和南亚诸国明白与缅甸维系关系所带来到的巨大商业和战略利益。干预也同样没有效果，虽然西方国家施加了不同程度的制裁，但缅甸统治集团却无意改变。

尽管这样，广泛的舆论认为缅甸需要进行改革。随着缅甸反华情绪的增加，被当作是缅甸军政府的支持者不符合中国的利益。中国可以率先组织谈判小组与缅甸军政府商讨经济合作和政治改革。即使军政府不愿同欧洲和美国商讨，中国，印度，一些东南亚国家以及小日本，却可以向军政府表明他们不可能永远在其他国家的反对中生存。毫无疑问，这将使中国向世界表明他并非一直和暴徒站在一边。

[ 本帖最后由 ltbriar 于 2008-6-27 10:35 编辑 ]

yakunta

編註:  本帖內容已編輯修改至譯文主體內.


[ 本帖最后由 ltbriar 于 2008-6-27 10:37 编辑 ]