【09.09.23 JSF】Changes in Beijing’s Approach to Overseas Basing?

渔音谦谦

Changes in Beijing’s Approach to Overseas Basing?                                                               
Publication: China Brief Volume: 9 Issue: 19
September 24, 2009 04:36 PM Age: 5 days
Category: China Brief, Military/Security, Home Page, Featured  
By: Michael S. Chase, Andrew S. Erickson
                                                               
          AlthoughChina has traditionally avoided basing its troops abroad, the People'sRepublic of China's (PRC) growing global interests and its military'sevolving missions are leading some Chinese analysts to suggest thatBeijing may need to reconsider its traditional aversion to establishingoverseas military facilities. In particular, the People's LiberationArmy Navy's (PLAN) experience with anti-piracy operations in the Gulfof Aden that began in December 2008 appears to have sparked a debateover the efficacy of continuing to adhere to China’s oft-stated andlongstanding policy of refraining from establishing any overseasmilitary bases or other dedicated facilities capable of supportingmilitary operations in distant regions. As the PRC’s global interestsrapidly expand, Chinese security analysts are debating the potentialvalue of such new steps as "establishing land-based supply and supportfacilities" with increased frequency and intensity [1]. This suggestsChina may be on the verge of moving beyond its traditional approach.Indeed, some Chinese scholars and military officers are now calling forthe establishment of such overseas support facilities to handle thelogistics required by a more active role abroad for the Chinesemilitary.

A radical departure from previous Chinese policyseems premature. Instead, statements by some Chinese scholars suggestthat China may adopt a relatively cautious approach, which allows thePLA to more effectively carry out its new missions without requiringthe formal alteration of Beijing’s longstanding approach to foreignbasing. The most likely outcome is one in which China would follow anapproach analogous to the “places not bases” strategy put forward bythe U.S. Pacific Command in the 1990s: establish facilities capable ofsupporting expanded PLA participation in non-traditional securitymissions such as anti-piracy and humanitarian assistance and disasterrelief operations, rather than developing a network of traditionalmilitary bases, which would be extremely expensive, politically anddiplomatically controversial and highly vulnerable in the event of acrisis or conflict.

China’s Traditional Approach to Overseas Bases

Chinahas refrained from setting up overseas military bases as part ofBeijing’s foreign policy emphasizing non-alignment and non-interferencein the internal affairs of other countries. Chinese security analystsfrequently stated that forgoing overseas military bases was consistentwith a defense policy that emphasized caution about entering intomilitary alliances and deploying troops abroad. Several officialdocuments published from the mid-1990s to 2000 highlighted thislongstanding approach. For example, China’s 1995 White Paper on ArmsControl and Disarmament states, “China does not station any troops orset up any military bases in any foreign country” [2]. Similarly,China’s 1998 National Defense White Paper repeats this statement aboutrefraining from establishing overseas bases [3]. China’s 2000 NationalDefense White Paper also indicates that “China does not seek militaryexpansion, nor does it station troops or set up military bases in anyforeign country” [4].

Numerous statements by Chinese diplomats,scholars and military officers have echoed the positions expressed inthese official documents. In particular, Chinese strategists havehighlighted the PLA’s lack of overseas bases as a reflection of China’sbroader approach to national security and defense policy, which theytypically portray as inherently defensive. For example, in a 1997address at the U.S. Army War College, Lieutenant General Li Jijun, thenvice president of the PLA’s Academy of Military Science (AMS), citedChina’s minimal overseas military presence and its lack of foreignmilitary bases as evidence of China’s purely defensive militarystrategy. “China has not occupied a single square inch of foreignsoil,” Li said, “nor has it possessed any overseas military bases” [5].Such statements have become less strident in recent years, however, andthe PLA has begun to take incremental steps toward a more active globalrole, especially through China’s participation in U.N. peacekeepingoperations. Nonetheless, China has continued to maintain a self-imposedprohibition on foreign basing.

Chinese Scholars Debate a New Approach to Overseas Basing

NotwithstandingChina’s historical aversion to the establishment of permanent overseasbases, there are a number of indications that this longstanding policymay be the subject of vigorous debate among Chinese scholars andsecurity specialists in the coming years. For example, in an articlethat appeared in Global Times—the offshoot of People's Daily—PLA AirForce (PLAAF) Colonel Dai Xu openly advocated the development ofoverseas bases to “safeguard commercial interests and world peace” [6].Specifically, Dai argues that 'support facilities' are required notonly to protect China’s growing global economic interests, but also toenable PLA participation in peacekeeping activities, ship escortdeployments, and humanitarian assistance and disaster reliefoperations.

Colonel Dai warns that “If we make thingsdifficult for ourselves in this matter by maintaining a rigidunderstanding of the doctrines of nonalignment and the non-stationingof troops abroad, then it will place a lot of constraints on us acrossthe board” [7]. Moreover, Dai argues that overseas bases or supportfacilities are required if China is to “effectively shoulder itsinternational responsibilities and develop a good image.” Perhapsanticipating the possibility that overseas bases would heighteninternational concerns about China’s growing power, however, Dai statesthat Chinese bases would not be part of a global military competitionand “would not require long-term stationing of large military equipmentor large-scale military units.”

As a first step, Dai advocatesthe establishment of a “test” base in the South China Sea. This followsGen. Zhang Li's recommendation at the 11th CPPCC that China shouldconstruct military support facilities on Mischief Reef [8]. Dai statesthat the base should be “suitable for comprehensive replenishment” andsuggests that it could be used to promote common development withneighboring countries. Future bases should then be established in otherareas where China has important strategic interests; when possible,bases should be located in countries with which China already has“friendly, solid relationships” (e.g. Burma, Bangladesh, and Pakistan).Looking beyond China’s immediate neighborhood, Chinese analysts havealso suggested establishing overseas bases or support facilities inAfrica and the Indian Ocean.

The anti-piracy operations that thePLAN has been conducting since late last year off of Somalia aretypically cited in discussions about the potential value ofestablishing logistical support facilities in Africa. On December 26,2008, China dispatched destroyers Wuhan and Haikou as well as supplyship Weishanhu to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden. After about threemonths, the destroyer Shenzhen and frigate Huangshan were deployed toreplace Wuhan and Haikou, while the supply ship Weishanhu remained onstation. The second escort fleet conducted operations for about 112days before being relieved by a third escort fleet composed of thefrigates Zhoushan and Xuzhou and another supply ship, Qiandaohu. ThePLAN handled the logistics and supply requirements associated withthese deployments through a combination of underway replenishment andport visits.

Although this mission was a major breakthrough forthe PLAN, some Chinese strategists argue that it proves that the PLANrequires overseas support facilities to more effectively safeguardChina’s growing maritime interests. According to Dai Xu, the deploymentis burnishing China’s image, but logistics and supply constraints limitthe amount of time each of the escort fleets can spend in the area [9].As such missions for the Chinese military become more common, however,China will need to carry them out in wider areas, at lower costs, andover longer periods of time. According to Dai, “moves towardestablishing an overseas base are a logical extension of this line ofthinking.” Similarly, Senior Captain Li Jie, a strategist at the PLAN’sNaval Research Institute, has recommended establishing a supply andsupport center in East Africa to facilitate PLAN operations in theregion. Li argues that setting up a support center in the area isfeasible since the PLAN has already conducted resupply and maintenanceactivities in African ports and China has friendly relationships withkey countries in the region [10].

The other part of the worldmost often mentioned in discussions of future requirements for overseassupport facilities is the Indian Ocean (i.e. Gwadar and Hambantota).Indeed, it is the Indian Ocean with its rich resources and busy energysea lines of communications (SLOCs) that seems the most likely futurearea of Chinese naval power projection. Chinese analyses note that fromancient times through the Cold War, the Indian Ocean has been acritical theater for great power influence and rivalry [11]. Some PLAanalysts argue that China will need to advance to the Indian Ocean toprotect its national interests [12]. Another assessment in China’sofficial media suggests that China should develop several overseasbases and build three or four aircraft carriers [13]. China’s growingmaritime interests and energy dependency may gradually drive morelong-ranging naval development; indeed, reports of imminent aircraftcarrier development seem to represent an initial step in thisdirection. The PLAN’s capabilities in key areas are currentlyinsufficient to support long-range SLOC defense missions, but it maygradually acquire the necessary assets, trained personnel andexperience.

To sustain a serious naval presence in the IndianOcean, the PLAN would need to expand its at-sea replenishment capacityand secure access privileges in locations such as Pakistan, Burma andperhaps Sri Lanka or Bangladesh. Yet China remains far from having anaval base beyond Chinese waters. According to Indian Naval analystGurpreet Khurana, “China and the [Indian Ocean region] countriesinvolved maintain that the transport infrastructure being built ispurely for commercial use. There is no decisive evidence at this pointto assert otherwise because these facilities are in nascent stages ofdevelopment” [14].

Instead, in an effort to secure its interestsin the Indian Ocean littoral, China has established a complex “softpower” web of diplomacy, trade, humanitarian assistance, arms sales,and strategic partnerships with countries in the region—includingPakistan and Bangladesh. One goal of this strategy is to maximizeaccess to resource inputs and trade in peacetime, while making itpolitically difficult for hostile naval powers to sever seaborne energysupplies in times of crisis. Greater access to regional port facilitiesmay be one outcome of China’s soft power initiatives. Indeed, forseveral years, China has been developing a number of what Kamphausenand Liang refer to as “access points,” or “friendly locations” that areintended to enhance the PLA’s ability to project power in Asia [15].Locations such as the ports at Gwadar (Pakistan) and Hambantota (SriLanka) as well as various other facilities in Burma and the South ChinaSea do not appear to amount to the supposed “string of pearls”envisioned by some analysts, but these facilities may offer somecapability to support transiting PLA forces, and could be rapidlyimproved in the future.

Conclusion     

There isvirtually no reason to suspect that China intends to establish aworldwide network of military bases that would give the PLA a globalpresence even approaching that of the United States, but some Chineseanalysts clearly support establishing at least a limited number offacilities capable of supporting Chinese forces in areas deemed vitalto China’s expanding political and economic interests. It is unclear asyet whether their writings reflect the emergence of a school of thoughtthat favors a change in policy or simply embody their personal views,but it appears that the anti-piracy deployment to the Gulf of Aden issparking serious consideration of the support requirements associatedwith PLA missions outside of China’s immediate neighborhood. Onealternative that may prove attractive to Chinese strategists could bean approach similar to the “places not bases” strategy put forward bythe U.S. Pacific Command in the 1990s, in which China would havearrangements in place for access to key facilities in strategiclocations while still refraining from establishing permanent militarybases abroad.

The development of “places” would enable the PLANto project power in key regions without necessitating a potentiallycontroversial change in longstanding Chinese policy. Chinese analystsmay also calculate that an approach centered on “places” would be lessalarming to the United States, India, Japan, and other concernedregional powers. This is in part because support centers couldpresumably handle the requirements of non-war military operations—suchas food, fuel, and maintenance and repair facilities—without thepropositioned munitions and large-scale military presence typicallyassociated with full-fledged overseas bases. For the same reasons,“places” would presumably be easier for host countries to accept, thusallowing China to more readily leverage its relationships with keycountries in regions of strategic interest.

The extent to whichChina’s approach to overseas basing may be revised remains unclear, butone thing that seems certain is that a debate has begun. As recently asa few years ago, Chinese analysts were adamant that Beijing desired “nobases and no places.” Today that approach appears to be changing as aconsequence of Beijing’s growing global interests and the expansion ofthe PLA’s roles to include missions well beyond China’s immediateneighborhood. Although “places” would not mark as dramatic a departurefrom the past as overseas military bases capable of supporting a fullrange of potential conflict scenarios, support facilities designed toenable non-war military operations in regions far from China wouldstill represent an important step forward for the PLA as it begins toshoulder new missions in support of China’s growing global interests.

AndrewErickson, Ph.D., is an associate professor at the China MaritimeStudies Institute, Naval War College (NWC). He is coeditor of the NavalInstitute Press books China Goes to Sea (July 2009), China’s EnergyStrategy (2008), and China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force (2007).Michael Chase, Ph.D., is an assistant professor in NWC’s Strategy andPolicy Department. He is the author of Taiwan’s Security Policy:External Threats and Domestic Politics (Lynne Rienner, 2008).

Notes

1.Li Jie, as quoted in “Military Expert: China Should ConsiderEstablishing a Land-based Support Center in East Africa,” ZhongpingNews Agency,May 21, 2009, gb.chinareviewnews.com/doc/4_16_100975224_1.html.
2. “China’s National Defense in 1998,” www.china.org.cn/e-white/5/5.2.htm.
3. “China: Arms Control and Disarmament” (Beijing: State Council Information Office, 1995), www.china.org.cn/e-white/army/index.htm.
4.  “China’s National Defense in 2000,” www.china-un.ch/eng/bjzl/t176952.htm.
5.Lieutenant General Li Jijun, “Traditional Military Thinking and theDefensive Strategy of China: Address at the United States Army WarCollege,” August 1, 1997, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm.
6. “Colonel: China Must Establish Overseas Bases, Assume the Responsibility of a Great Power,” Global Times, February 5, 2009,
www.chinareviewnews.com/doc/7_0_100877861_1.html.
7. Ibid.
8. Russell Hsiao, “PLA General Advises Building Bases in the South China Sea,” China Brief, vol. 9, issue 13, June 24, 2009,
www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/.
9.In Dai’s words, “The Chinese expeditionary force in Somalia has beenattracting a lot of attention from around the world, but with only asingle replenishment ship, how much escort time can two warshipsprovide for commercial vessels from various countries?”
10. Li Jieis cited in “Military Expert: China Should Consider Establishing aLand-based Support Center in East Africa,” Zhongping News Agency, May21, 2009, gb.chinareviewnews.com/doc/4_16_100975224_1.html.
11.Senior Captain Xu Qi, “Maritime Geostrategy and the Development of theChinese Navy in the Early 21st Century,” China Military Science, (Vol.17, No. 4) 2004, pp. 75-81.
12. Wang Nannan, ed., “Expert SaysChina’s Advancement toward the Indian Ocean Concerns National Interestsand Gives No Cause for Criticism,” Xinhua, June 10, 2008,  news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2008-06/10/content_8338128.htm.
13.  Sun Ruibo, ed., “The U.S. Military Strengthens Forces on Guam—For What Purpose?, Xinhua, July 4, 2008, news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2008-07/04/content_8489422.htm.
14.G.S. Khurana, “China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and itsSecurity Implications,” Strategic Analysis, Vol. 32, No. 1, January2008, p. 3.
15. Roy D. Kamphausen and Justin Liang, “PLA PowerProjection,” in Michael D. Swaine, Andrew N.D. Yang, and Evan S.Medeiros, with Oriana Skylar Mastro, ed., Assessing the Threat(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007), pp.111-50.



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