【2010.3.18 英国Progress杂志】Yanukovych/Nixon（谈乌克兰）

rhapsody

http://www.progressives.org.uk/articles/article.asp?a=5617

Like generals fighting the last war, much of the western press reported the recent Ukrainian election as a battle between the ‘pro-western' Yuliya Tymoshenko and the ‘pro-Russian' Viktor Yanukovych. But this election was not the great existential drama produced by the last vote in 2004

Then everything - foreign policy direction, internal regional tensions, even the very existence of Ukrainian democracy - seemed at stake, and the fixing of the vote by Yanukovych's supporters provoked the ‘Orange Revolution' that swept Viktor Yushchenko to power.

Events have moved on. All revolutions disappoint, and the Orange Revolution disappointed more than most. Its leaders have preferred fighting each other to getting things done. Tymoshenko served twice as prime minister in 2005 and 2007-10, but by the time of the great gas crisis in January 2009 had clearly made her peace with Russia. She and Putin got along just fine, making jokes in public at Yushchenko's expense. To use Mrs Thatcher's famous phrase about Gorbachev, Putin clearly thought Tymoshenko was someone he could ‘do business with'; and the Ukrainian media constantly speculated about what exactly that business might be. A deal on gas? This or that privatisation deal? Meanwhile, the Kremlin and Gazprom had a very public falling out with several of the business ‘oligarchs' who backed Yanukovych. Having got their fingers so badly burned in 2004, Putin's people still thought of the charisma-free Yanukovych as a serial loser, until very late in the election campaign.

But the other lesson that Russia drew from 2004, when its attempt to back Yanukovych with overwhelming force had back-fired, was not to put all its eggs in one basket. Medvedev's notorious open letter to Yushchenko in the summer of 2009 was designed to isolate his type of ‘anti-Russian' politics and define the rules of the game for a ‘primary' for Russian favour amongst the other candidates in the race. Tymoshenko and Yanukovych were not the only ones to play along: several of the minor candidates went further and took Russian money and airtime.

Both Tymoshenko and Yanukovych talked of ‘resetting' a more pragmatic relationship between Ukraine and Russia. But both had also learnt the key Ukrainian lesson from 2004, that there is little electoral mileage in being seen to be a Russian puppet - Ukrainian national interests should come first. They were further apart on some specific issues: Tymoshenko talked of resurrecting the EU gas deal signed in 2009, Yanukovych favoured solving the problem at the Russian end by asking for a lower supply price; Yanukovych was more willing to renew the lease on Russia's Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol after its expiry in 2017. But both played the game of balance between Russia and the West - albeit with Tymoshenko a little closer to the West and Yanukovych a little closer to Russia.

So what does this mean now that Yanukovych has won? During the election he played identity politics, seeking votes in east Ukraine by attacking NATO and promoting the Russian language. But his first foreign trips were first to Brussels and then to Moscow in the same week. In fact, in Moscow he got a version of Marlon Brando's wedding day speech from The Godfather - ‘why did you not come to us first?' - while Putin tried to bounce him into rash commitments on joining the customs union between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Yanukovych played a straight bat, though he surprised many on his return to Kiev by proposing a law preventing Ukraine from joining ‘military alliances' - though, depending how it was drafted, that could exclude the Russia-dominated CSTO as well as NATO.

Ukraine is more likely to balance between east and west than rush back to Moscow. There are even some in Ukraine who think that Yanukovych could be a ‘Ukrainian Nixon'. Like Nixon in China, because he is more reassuring to Russia and to Ukraine's Russian-speaking population, he could actually take Ukraine further towards Europe in the long run than Yushchenko ever managed.

A different east European analogy could be Aleksander Kwasniewski, who was similarly distrusted by the Solidarity right when he became President of Poland in 1995, but who took Poland into NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004 (though none would suggest things might happen in Ukraine that fast). Yanukovych's supporters also claim that he has a good record of no-nonsense delivery on bread and butter issues.

Unfortunately, Yanukovych, like Kwasniewski, is surrounded by too many representatives of the old guard, men who held power under president Leonid Kuchma (1994-2004) or were prominent during Yanukovych's brief return as prime minister in 2006-07. New prime minister Mykola Azarov was then notorious for abusing the VAT system to reward friends and punish enemies: there was even a word coined in Ukrainian to describe the process - Azarovshchina . The same people are back in charge of the energy sector, which has been Ukraine's main source of corruption in recent years. Yanukovych has also trampled on the constitution to fast-forward the creation of his new government.

So maybe the analogy with Nixon is too close for comfort. But if the right incentives are in place, the West may have someone it can also do business with.

Photo: Antonis Shen 2007

Andrew Wilson is senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, and the author of The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation (Yale, expanded third edition, 2009)

18 Mar 2010 14:59

tancong

认领

tancong

Like generals fighting the last war, much of the western press reported the recent Ukrainian election as a battle between the ‘pro-western' Yuliya Tymoshenko and the ‘pro-Russian' Viktor Yanukovych. But this election was not the great existential drama produced by the last vote in 2004.
    就像是为最后战争而战斗的将军们，西方媒体纷纷这样形容“亲西方的”季莫申科和“亲俄罗斯的”维克托亚努科维奇为当选乌克兰总理在最近发生的战斗。但是，这次选举将不会发生像2004年大选那样搞笑的戏剧性场面。

Then everything - foreign policy direction, internal regional tensions, even the very existence of Ukrainian democracy - seemed at stake, and the fixing of the vote by Yanukovych's supporters provoked the ‘Orange Revolution' that swept Viktor Yushchenko to power.
    然而一切——包括外交政策方向，内部区域的紧张局势，甚至是乌克兰民主的存在——似乎遭受到了威胁，而且亚努科维奇的支持者的固定得票数横扫“橙色革命”领袖尤先科的支持者。

Events have moved on. All revolutions disappoint, and the Orange Revolution disappointed more than most. Its leaders have preferred fighting each other to getting things done. Tymoshenko served twice as prime minister in 2005 and 2007-10, but by the time of the great gas crisis in January 2009 had clearly made her peace with Russia. She and Putin got along just fine, making jokes in public at Yushchenko's expense. To use Mrs Thatcher's famous phrase about Gorbachev, Putin clearly thought Tymoshenko was someone he could ‘do business with'; and the Ukrainian media constantly speculated about what exactly that business might be. A deal on gas? This or that privatisation deal? Meanwhile, the Kremlin and Gazprom had a very public falling out with several of the business ‘oligarchs' who backed Yanukovych. Having got their fingers so badly burned in 2004, Putin's people still thought of the charisma-free Yanukovych as a serial loser, until very late in the election campaign.
    事情在不断发生变化。人们对于所有革命的失望，尤其是对橙色革命失望极其突出。而乌克兰的领导人更愿意在对抗中达到目的。季莫申科，于2005年和2007-10两度担任乌克兰总理，但是在2009年1月发生的严重天然气危机清晰的显示了她希望和俄罗斯保持和平。而她和普京关系也相处得不错，甚至在公众场合开起了尤先科的玩笑。套用撒切尔夫人的一句名言，相比戈尔巴乔夫，普京清楚的认识到季莫申科是一个适合和他“做些生意”的人;而乌克兰媒体不断对到底会做什么生意产生猜测。天然气交易？这样或那样的私有化交易？与此同时，克里姆林宫和俄罗斯天然气公司甚至为几个“寡头”谁来支持亚努科维奇而在公共场合闹翻。在2004年有过糟糕表现的亚努科维奇，普金的人仍然认为有着自由魅力的他会是一系列的失败者，直到这场角逐的后期。

But the other lesson that Russia drew from 2004, when its attempt to back Yanukovych with overwhelming force had back-fired, was not to put all its eggs in one basket. Medvedev's notorious open letter to Yushchenko in the summer of 2009 was designed to isolate his type of ‘anti-Russian' politics and define the rules of the game for a ‘primary' for Russian favour amongst the other candidates in the race. Tymoshenko and Yanukovych were not the only ones to play along: several of the minor candidates went further and took Russian money and airtime.
    但是，对于俄罗斯来说还有个教训。在2004年，试图让当时具有压倒性优势的亚努科维奇回来参选，以避免把所有鸡蛋放到一个篮子里面，但是事与愿违。梅德韦杰夫在2009年夏天给尤先科写了一封臭名昭著的公开信，抨击他设想从“反俄”政治类型中分离出来，并且在竞选中为喜欢俄罗斯的“底层人民”所推选出来的其他竞选者定义了一套游戏规则。季莫申科和亚努科维奇并不是唯一的游戏者：几个年轻候选人因为拥有俄罗斯的资金和联系将会赢得未来。

Both Tymoshenko and Yanukovych talked of ‘resetting' a more pragmatic relationship between Ukraine and Russia. But both had also learnt the key Ukrainian lesson from 2004, that there is little electoral mileage in being seen to be a Russian puppet - Ukrainian national interests should come first. They were further apart on some specific issues: Tymoshenko talked of resurrecting the EU gas deal signed in 2009, Yanukovych favoured solving the problem at the Russian end by asking for a lower supply price; Yanukovych was more willing to renew the lease on Russia's Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol after its expiry in 2017. But both played the game of balance between Russia and the West - albeit with Tymoshenko a little closer to the West and Yanukovych a little closer to Russia.
    季莫申科和亚努科维奇都谈到了“重建”乌克兰与俄罗斯的关系，显得更加务实。但是，双方还从2004年乌克兰大选中懂得了，选举的关键在于不应该有什么选举利益被人民视为俄罗斯的傀儡政府的表现——应该以乌克兰国家利益为先。他们未来将关注一些具体问题：季莫申科将在2009年与欧盟重启天然气协议谈判，亚努科维奇主张通过要求更低的供应价格来解决在俄罗斯之间的问题;亚努科维奇更愿意在2017年租赁期满后，延长俄黑海舰队在塞瓦斯托波尔驻扎。但这都是在玩一种平衡俄罗斯与西方的游戏——虽然季莫申科更加接近西方而亚努科维奇更加亲近俄罗斯。

So what does this mean now that Yanukovych has won? During the election he played identity politics, seeking votes in east Ukraine by attacking NATO and promoting the Russian language. But his first foreign trips were first to Brussels and then to Moscow in the same week. In fact, in Moscow he got a version of Marlon Brando's wedding day speech from The Godfather - ‘why did you not come to us first?' - while Putin tried to bounce him into rash commitments on joining the customs union between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Yanukovych played a straight bat, though he surprised many on his return to Kiev by proposing a law preventing Ukraine from joining ‘military alliances' - though, depending how it was drafted, that could exclude the Russia-dominated CSTO as well as NATO.
    那么，这是否意味着亚努科维奇这次将会赢呢？在选举期间，他将会扮演的政治身份是寻求得到乌克兰东部遭到北约袭击的地区的支持和增加俄语地区的选票。但是，在同一周内，他的第一次外国访问先去布鲁赛尔然后再去莫斯科。事实上，在莫斯科他在参加白兰度 马龙的婚礼时被神父批评了——“为什么不先来我们这里？”——而且，普金还在试探他是否愿意加入俄罗斯，哈萨克斯坦和白俄罗斯的关税同盟方面的态度。虽然他感到很吃惊，但是直到他回到基辅才进行了直接的回击，提议立法防止乌克兰加入“军事同盟”——尽管，这取决于到底法律如何起草，但是这可以排除加入俄罗斯主导的集体安全条约组织和北约的可能。

Ukraine is more likely to balance between east and west than rush back to Moscow. There are even some in Ukraine who think that Yanukovych could be a ‘Ukrainian Nixon'. Like Nixon in China, because he is more reassuring to Russia and to Ukraine's Russian-speaking population, he could actually take Ukraine further towards Europe in the long run than Yushchenko ever managed.
    乌克兰更可能是通过平衡东西方来避免倒向莫斯科。甚至有一些在乌克兰人认为，亚努科维奇是“乌克兰的尼克松”。就像尼克松在中国那样，因为他对于俄罗斯和在乌克兰讲俄语的居民更可靠，他可能在未来将乌克兰实质性的带向欧洲，在这方面他将会走的比曾经的尤先科走得更远。

A different east European analogy could be Aleksander Kwasniewski, who was similarly distrusted by the Solidarity right when he became President of Poland in 1995, but who took Poland into NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004 (though none would suggest things might happen in Ukraine that fast). Yanukovych's supporters also claim that he has a good record of no-nonsense delivery on bread and butter issues.
    另一种不同的东欧方面的类比可能是波兰领袖克瓦希涅夫斯基，1995年在他成为波兰总统因为团结右派遭到了类似的不信任，但，是谁推动波兰在1999年加入北约并在2004年加入欧盟（尽管没有人会建议在乌克兰事情可能发生如此快）。亚努科维奇的支持者也宣称他在关注民生方面有着良好的记录。

Unfortunately, Yanukovych, like Kwasniewski, is surrounded by too many representatives of the old guard, men who held power under president Leonid Kuchma (1994-2004) or were prominent during Yanukovych's brief return as prime minister in 2006-07. New prime minister Mykola Azarov was then notorious for abusing the VAT system to reward friends and punish enemies: there was even a word coined in Ukrainian to describe the process - Azarovshchina . The same people are back in charge of the energy sector, which has been Ukraine's main source of corruption in recent years. Yanukovych has also trampled on the constitution to fast-forward the creation of his new government.
    不幸的是，亚努科维奇，克瓦希涅夫斯基都一样，被太多有着仅次于总统库奇马（1994-2004年）权力的下议院议员包围着，而亚努科维奇作为在2006-07年总理的简讯特别突出。新总理马埋斯库 阿扎罗夫当时因为滥用增值税制度而臭名昭著，奖励自己的朋友而惩罚敌人：甚至乌克兰人发明了一个新词来形容这个过程——Azarovshchina。还是那些人回到了能源部门，这是近年来乌克兰的腐败主要源头。亚努科维奇还践踏宪法，以求快速推进建立他的新政府。

So maybe the analogy with Nixon is too close for comfort. But if the right incentives are in place, the West may have someone it can also do business with.
    因此，关于安慰也许与尼克松的类比倒是非常接近。但是，如果正确的激励到位，也许有些西方人也可能和他做生意。

Photo: Antonis Shen 2007
照片：安东尼 申 2007

Andrew Wilson is senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, and the author of The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation (Yale, expanded third edition, 2009)
安德鲁威尔逊是在欧洲外交关系理事会的高级政策研究员，乌克兰作者：意外的国家（耶鲁大学，扩展版第三版，2009）

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