本帖最后由 黑霸王 于 2010-12-8 14:57 编辑
【原文标题】It isn’t only about North Korea
【中文标题】朝鲜不是一个人在战斗
【登载媒体】欧洲外事委员会
【来源地址】http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_it_isnt_only_about_north_korea/
【译者】黑霸王
【翻译方式】人工
【声明】本文供Anti-CNN/ACCN使用，未经译者或AC同意，谢绝转载；谢谢合作。
【译文】
Following North Korea’s deadly attack on Yeonpyong Island last week, South Korea considers itself a frontline state yet again. The reaction in Seoul makes that clear; the South Korean defence minister, who only a day before the shelling had burnished his hawkish credentials by raising the prospect of re-introducing U.S. nuclear weapons to the country, got the sack for not having initiated a prompt enough response to the North’s artillery barrage. And while diplomats have begun their ballet - China has, unusually, sent foreign policy tsar Dai Bingguo to soothe the South Korean president’s feelings - for the first time since six-party talks were started in 2003 it is South Korea which has open and public reservations about their usefulness. In this sense, the incident on Yeonpyeong Island breaks with a long-term trend. In reversing a decline in actual acts of the violence between the two Koreas that has lasted a quarter of a century, it further represents a shift in the situation on the peninsula. Perhaps most importantly, however, the shelling of Yeonpyong highlights a power-shift in Asia, and makes it clear that Pyongyang’s actions cannot be seen outside of a regional power balance context.
继上周朝鲜对延坪岛的致命袭击之后，韩国再一次做好了守在战争前线的准备。首尔方面的回应很明确：就在炮轰延坪岛事件发生的前一天，韩国国防部长已经准备好要与美国协商重新引入美国的核武器，但马上他又因为没有对朝鲜的炮袭做出及时有力的回应而被撤职了。外交家们已经开始了斡旋-中国出人意料的把国务委员戴秉国派往韩国平抚韩国总统的情绪，这是继2003始的六方会谈后中国首次做出类似举动，而韩国却公开地对此持保留态度。这么看来，延坪岛事件打破了传统的处理模式。该事件重新触发了持续了四分之一个世纪以来朝韩的武力对峙，而且更进一步地反映了朝鲜半岛上的情况变化。然而，最重要的一点可能在于，延坪岛事件突出显示了亚洲的权力转移，并且明确了一点-要想维持区域的权力均衡状态，必须把朝鲜考虑在内。
The DPRK’s usual behaviour has been to bluster and threaten, and it has repeatedly crossed all red lines set by the United States and international resolutions. But real violence has been declining for decades. The civilians killed on Yeonpyeong are not the first to die in South Korea since 1953. However, on South Korean territory, one must go back to 1968 to find such a high level of violence – a raid on the seat of the presidency in Seoul, massive commando landings and skirmishes, as well as the capture of a U.S. spy ship for good measure.
朝鲜的行为总是充满恐吓和威胁，并且总在不断跨过美国和国际决议给它设的底线。但近几个世纪以来，真正的暴力冲突已经减少了。从1953年朝鲜战争结束以后，朝韩之间仍有摩擦，死于延坪岛事件的平民并不是第一个牺牲品。然而，这也是自1968年以来最高级别的一次暴力冲突。当时，一批朝鲜突击队员突袭韩国总统官邸青瓦台，爆发了几场小规模战斗。朝鲜还扣押了一艘美国的侦察船。
This year has seen a defiant reversal of the long-term decline of actual violence. First came the sinking of the Cheonan corvette in March, killing 46 sailors. The DPRK has never admitted to this action – but it has now launched a massive and open artillery attack on civilian targets in South Korea, and threatens much more in more usual language. Can we treat all this as just another cycle in the long history of on-off talks about proliferation in the Korean peninsula? Even slow learners have become realists about Pyongyang’s crafty approach to negotiations, and its stage-managed use of irrational and unpredictable behaviour to remain on the radar screen and force its interlocutors to pay attention. “Buying the same horse twice” (or actually, for the umpteenth time), is probably the number one lesson from those experiences.
很长一段时间以来，实际暴力冲突已经减少了，但今年迎来了充满挑衅意味的大逆转。首先是三月的“天安”号护卫舰沉没事件，造成46名海军死亡。朝鲜一直没有承认这次事件，但现在却开始对韩国平民进行大量的公开的炮击，并在对话中进行大量威胁。我们能否把这看为是长期以来朝鲜半岛上的新一轮关于核扩散的对话呢？朝鲜的行为已经失去了理性而且难以预料，它想以此来引起谈判者的关注，即使是迟钝的人也能清醒地意识到朝鲜在谈判中耍出的这种狡猾招数。“不要两次陷入同样的陷阱”(或者更确切地说，是无数次)，这可能是我们从中学到的第一课吧。
Pyongyang’s resort to provocation is perhaps a familiar chapter of its repertory. Cynics turn everything around. North Korea revealed, only a week ago, a large nuclear enrichment plant built where you’d least expect it – a stone throw away from the Yongbyon nuclear plant: this is probably one of the places on earth most closely watched from the skies, and the disclosure adds insult to injury. Their artillery barrage would be their own peculiar way to call for quick talks – in sum, a calling card, Kim family style.
平壤的挑衅行为已经算是老把戏了。愤世嫉俗的人总是跟一切都对着干。朝鲜透露，就在一周以前，大型铀浓缩厂建在了宁边核电站旁边。这可能成为了地球上离天堂最近的地方吧。而朝鲜此举也使自己更加雪上加霜。朝鲜的炮击是是其特有的寻求尽早进行谈判的方法——总而言之，就向是在递名片一样。完全就是金氏家族的特色。
Others profess “last gasp” theories. Kim Jong-il’s succession is a disaster. The country is crumbling. In some ways, the Obama administration’s new doctrine of “strategic patience” has been a watered down version of the “last gasp” school. It also fits in well with China’s regular advice of “restraint” to all parties.
有人说这是“垂死挣扎”。金正日的继位就是一场灾难，朝鲜现在几近崩溃。在某种程度上，奥巴马新的政策主张-“战略性等待”是“垂死挣扎”的淡化版本。这很符合中国“限制”每一方的一贯建议。
These theories are wishful thinking, and China knows it well, while America condones them for lack of a better idea. In reality, the situation has shifted considerably in and around North Korea – so much that Pyongyang’s actions cannot be seen outside of a regional balance context. Let’s start from the core to the periphery:
中国很明白，这些想法都是痴心妄想，而美国却因为没有更好的办法而不得不采用。实际上，在朝鲜的内部和周围，所有情况都有所改变了。因此，平壤才更不能被排除在区域权力平衡的格局中。让我们从核心开始说起：
What Western observers wanted to see as another bizarre succession, this time in favour of a 27-year-old Kimster partly raised in a Swiss boarding school is in fact a turn to a more collective leadership. Kim Jong-il is still around. Several promotions have occurred, within and outside the royal family. Most of all, China has given its stamp of approval. Kim making two China trips in 2010 is a previously unheard of occurrence, and he took with him many of the top leaders, not just his son. Hu Jintao going out of his way to meet him in Changchun is also an exceptional show of support.
西方观察员们想看到的是朝鲜的新一轮继任，在瑞士寄宿学校长大的现年27岁的金正恩很可能就是下一任继任者。这场继任实际上是朝鲜在转向共同领导。也就是说，金正日依然游走在权力中心。在金正日家族内外已经有几位官员都被提升。大部分情况下，中国都保持赞成的态度。在2010年，金正日携高级官员及其子两次来访中国，这在以前是闻所未闻的。而胡锦涛特地到长春会见他，这也是前所未有的支援。
Both the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyong make aggressive use of simmering maritime disputes between the two Koreas. Pyongyang indeed overreaches in its actions, but keeps a reference to the issue – for example, by alleging intrusive Southern Korean military exercises. This is clever use of the regional context – China has launched its own series of regional claims and incidents. North Korea moves in the slipstream of China, but fires across its bow. This is vintage Kim Il-sung strategy – making opportunistic use of another conflict, therefore counting on a weak response by the targeted party.
不管是天安舰事件还是延坪岛事件，都是长期以来韩朝海事争端的产物。平壤的行为确实是不自量力的，但把关注又拉到了争端之上，比如宣称韩国的军演具有侵入性。中国有一系列区域的权利要求和敌对行动，这是对区域背景的巧妙利用。朝鲜紧随中国其后，但剑拔弩张。这是对金日成的策略的巧妙运用-不放过每一次冲突的契机，以此获得目标国的微弱回应。
In fact China is also trapped – if it has second thoughts about all this, it’s hard to reverse course now. Cooperating with the US and Japan would be weakening its own case in the East China Sea and in pushing back the U.S. Navy deployments. This is China’s strategic priority, in a year when it has activated a record number of maritime issues. Just as it couldn’t possibly approve checking out ships on the high seas under the Proliferation Security Initiative, it has already committed to oppose military exercises in the Yellow Sea. For all practical purposes, China and North Korea are closer allies than at any time since Mao’s death. China’s mounting economic influence on North Korea – and South Korea’s official admission and acceptance of this influence – make this a valid proposition. For all practical purposes, there would be a greater chance today of a federation between China and North Korea than of a Korean reunification. Only a patriotic façade prevents this.
事实上中国也陷入了困局-如果它对一切再三考虑，现在就不会这么难以扭转乾坤了。如果中国与美日合作的话必将减弱其自身在东海问题上的立场，也将使其在逼退美国海军部署的问题上显得无力，而这是中国的战略重点，尤其是今年经过了这么多海事问题之后。就像中国基于防扩散安全倡议因此拒绝公海船只检查一样，中国已经明确表态反对黄海军演。出于对所有现实目的的思考，中朝同盟关系自毛泽东去世后第一次这么紧密，中国对朝鲜不断加深的经济影响力使这成为了有效命题，而韩国也承认和接受了中国对朝鲜的这种影响力。这么看来，中朝结成联邦国家的可能性比韩国统一朝鲜半岛的可能性更大。只有爱国阵线会反对这种结果。
North Korea has moved in another slipstream: Iran, and China’s defence of Iran. To those who wanted to believe that Pyongyang’s accession to nuclear weapons was more about status than reality, it is proving that North Korea remains dynamic. Since centrifugal uranium enrichment is dual purpose, and since America is giving signs of a compromise with Iran, North Korea claims the status of most favoured nation: whatever Iran gets, it must get. Pyongyang has just put up another horse for sale, and it’s a big one.
朝鲜已经开始关注伊朗以及中国对伊朗的保护。对那些认为朝鲜新增核武器是为了地位的提高而非其他现实意义的人来说，这是朝鲜具有威慑力的明证。因为离心铀浓缩有双重目的，又因为美国有与伊朗妥协的倾向，朝鲜因此宣称：不管伊朗能得到什么，它也要得到相同多的。 朝鲜这是在得寸进尺。
It’s impossible to separate the above from the overall test of the American alliance occurring in the Asia-Pacific. China has raised its profile, America has countered with closer ties to worried allies and partners. North east Asian countries – Japan, Korea, Taiwan – want the best of both worlds: China’s business, and a US security blanket. North Korea counts on conflict avoidance by these countries to move ahead. It already has China’s business. Now it wants a US security guarantee.
以上这些是无法与美国在亚太地区寻找同盟的整体测试所分离的。中国已经提高了自身形象，美国也与其同盟形成了更紧密的联系。而东北亚的国家和地区，比如日本，朝鲜，台湾既希望得中国的业务订单，也希望得到美国的安全保护。朝鲜指望着这些国家前行一步来阻止冲突的发生。朝鲜已经拥有了中国的经济支持，现在还想获得美国的安全保证。
This would take the form of acceptance of its nuclear status, and regime recognition. No less.
朝鲜不仅希望得到核问题上对其地位的承认，还希望得到对其政权的承认。这两样都不可少。
If we think this is science fiction, we need only to look back at the last two decades and ask ourselves: was the regime’s survival predicted? Could we imagine it would acquire nuclear weapons from its weak position? Could we imagine China would lean so much to one side?
如果我们把这当做科幻小说来看，我们只需回头想一想过去的二十年里然后扪心自问：我们预想过这个政权会存活下来吗？我们会想到处于弱势的朝鲜能获得核武器吗？我们能想到中国会如此偏袒朝鲜吗？
Were we to look for the first case of a powershift in Asia, this would be it. It will be interesting, to say the least, how South Korea, America and Japan buck this trend.
如果我们要寻找亚洲的第一例权力转移，那么就可以省省力气了，因为就是这个。最起码，看着韩国，美国，日本如何反对这股趋势将会是有趣的。
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发表于 2010-12-8 15:57
