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【中文标题】欧盟外交政策记分卡（中国篇）
【原文标题】European Foreign Policy Scorecard : China
【登载媒体】欧洲对外关系委员会（ECFR）
【来源地址】http://ecfr.eu/scorecard/2010/china/chinareport
【译者】rhapsody
【声明】本译文供Anti-CNN网站使用，未经AC或译者同意，谢绝转载；谢谢合作
【译文】
总评： C+
分项
| 评分
| 贸易自由化及总体关系
| B-
| 1. 欧中对话形式
| C+
| 2. 欧洲知识产权的在华保护
| B-
| 3. 欧中相互开放公共采购
| C+
| 4. 在华贸易与投资争端
| B-
| 5. 同中国在规范标准以及消费者保障上的协议
| A-
| 人权及管治
| C-
| | 6.中国的法治与人权 | D+
| 7. 达赖喇嘛和西藏问题
| D+ | 8. 中国在民间社团交流方面总的开放程度
| C-
| 全球与地区议题的合作
| C+
| 9. 伊朗及核扩散问题上的对华关系
| B+
| 10. 非洲问题上的对华关系
| C+
| 11. 全球治理改革问题上的对华关系
| C-
| 12. 货币汇率问题上的对华关系
| C-
| 13. 气候变化问题上的对华关系
| B
|
由于欧盟与中国之间的势力平衡发生了变化，欧中关系也在发生变化。中国在很短的时间内已经从一个遥远的发展中国家变成一个具有全球影响的大国，它在所有欧洲政策制定领域都扮演着重要角色。特别是自2008年爆发经济危机以来，对于中国在一系列外交事务上日趋强硬的作风，欧盟一直难以调整过来。欧盟想要使中国对其经济实行自由化，改善其公民的人权状况，在全球治理中担当更大的责任。但中国在涉及其经济和政治利益进行谈判时要团结得多，而欧盟成员国和机构在应对中国方式如何协调一致方面却面临着制度性的难题——美国等其他大国都不会有这种问题。某种程度上说，里斯本条约使得这种制度性的不对称更为严重——中国现在可以利用两名主席和一名高级代表他们之间的分歧，更别提同样在外交政策中发挥作用的欧洲议会。
2010年对欧盟来说是发人深省的一年：一个新的、更强硬的中国，以及欧盟对其影响力有限的现实就摆在眼前。2009年底哥本哈根气候大会敲响警钟后，欧盟在这一年开始尝试用新方法应对中国。欧盟采取了一些方向正确的举措：重新评估了与中国的“战略伙伴关系”，各国外长自2005年以来第一次就中国问题展开辩论，期间他们讨论到了武器禁运。高级代表阿什顿也首次同中国国务委员戴秉国举行了战略对话。十二月的理事会会议通过了基于互惠、制约和权衡的新路线。目的在于确定欧盟的首要利益并就此与中国协商——新路线遵照了欧洲对外关系委员会于2009年4月发表的《欧中关系实力审核》之中的建议。
这种新路线在贸易政策上体现得最为明显。欧盟贸易专员德古赫特和工业专员塔亚尼要求在投资、知识产权以及公共采购方面都要有公平的环境，对（中国的）本土科技计划和经济民族主义提出了疑问，并呼吁欧盟方面配备更多的政策工具。要求中国对等开放公共采购的议案便是这方面的成果。欧盟也回绝了中国意图使未来创新纯国产化的政策，在十二月份的高级别经济对话中，中国的态度出现了软化。然而，这种积极的路线有时被成员国间的分歧所耽误，具体的说是在应该用市场经济地位从中国换取什么的问题上。欧盟内部不团结的结果在十月份的欧中峰会上显现出来。中国在此次峰会上要求得到市场经济地位的承认，愤怒的温家宝总理过后就（人民币）汇率升值问题炮轰欧盟，尽管欧盟在此议题上已采取了放低姿态的做法。
欧盟新策略实施的难处从以下事实就可见一斑：即使是形容武器禁运为“障碍”这样平和的言语都会在一些成员国内激起媒体的反弹，这迫使阿什顿取消了进一步的讨论。她对于中国侵犯人权的事件也公开作出了回应，而之前在此类问题上更高调表达意见的成员国不说是沉默也至少是失声了。尽管奥巴马总统最终会见了达赖喇嘛，中国在这项议题上相对欧盟还是占据了上风：欧盟在人权和管治议题上一直几乎是默不作声的状态，直到年底中国对诺贝尔和平奖的过激反应突然激起了欧盟内部的团结应对。
欧盟新策略同样受阻于一些成员国对于债务融资的迫切需求。自爆发欧元危机之始，中国承诺会通过购买国债的方式来救助西班牙、希腊和葡萄牙等几个负债累累的国家。考虑到欧洲经济危机的程度以及中国创纪录的贸易顺差，这种购买是无可避免的。但对中国而言，这种狡诈的“债券外交”的成效由于双方（交易）的不透明被放大了，这使中国购买债券的真实幅度变得难以确定，因而让中国占得了有利地位。从这方面来看，中国相比美国对欧盟拥有更强的手腕，因为其购买债券的行为强化了双边（外交）的弱点和分化，而这又会转化为欧盟集体影响力的缺失。
欧盟在对华关系中确实拥有一些资本。比如，中国想要继续进入欧洲市场——世界最大的市场，以及可能将其投资分散到地缘政治上稳定的地区。欧盟在中国寻求获取的关键科技上也是具有吸引力的伙伴。不过，将这些资本转化为影响力需要欧盟协调一致，就像推行贸易政策那样，而不是像直接投资、金融市场、公共采购和技术转移那样。尤其是当中国在全世界公开的外交场合中变得愈加熟练的时候，欧盟需要向发展中国家和新兴经济体伸出橄榄枝。
除了更好地协调对华路线，欧盟还必须在国际组织发挥更大作用，中国现时在组织里拥有可观的否决权，尽管它还不具备设定议事日程的能力。2010年欧盟获得的结果好坏参半。欧盟和中国都带着比前一年在哥本哈根时更低的期望和更好的公关前往坎昆，虽然欧盟使得中国忙于应对——在哥本哈根的“灾难”后这本身就是一项成果——但距离形成有法律约束力的全球协议这一终极目标，与2009年底时相比没有丝毫进步。欧盟还在没有确保更广泛改革的情况下就交出了国际货币基金组织的席位。另一方面，欧盟三驾马车与阿什顿同美国一道，6月份在对伊朗实施制裁的问题上取得了中国的同意——在这个对欧洲有着很大重要性的议题上取得了一大成就。
【原文】
The relationship between the EU and China is in flux as the balance of power between them shifts. Within a remarkably short space of time, China has gone from being a distant, developing country to a global power that plays an important role in all aspects of European policymaking. In particular, the EU has struggled to adjust to China’s greater assertiveness across a range of foreign-policy issues since the economic crisis began in 2008. The EU wants China to liberalise its economy, improve the human rights of its citizens and take a greater stake in global governance. But while China is much more capable of negotiating its economic and political interests cohesively, EU member states and institutions face a structural difficulty in coordinating their approach to China that other powers such as the United States do not. In some ways, the Lisbon Treaty has made this structural asymmetry worse: China can now exploit differences between two presidents and one high representative, not to mention the European Parliament, which now also plays a role in foreign policy.
2010 was a sobering year for the EU as the reality of a new, more assertive China – and the EU’s limited leverage over it – set in. After a wake-up call at the Copenhagen climate change summit at the end of 2009, Europeans this year began to try to find new ways to deal with the Chinese. The EU took some important steps in the right direction. It reassessed its “strategic partnership” with China and foreign ministers even had a debate on China for the first time since 2005, when they discussed the arms embargo. High Representative Catherine Ashton also had her first strategic dialogue with Dai Bingguo, the Chinese state councillor for foreign policy. The December Council meeting adopted a new approach based on reciprocity, leverage and trade-offs. The aim was to define Europe’s principal interests and negotiate these with China – an approach that followed the recommendations that ECFR made in its Power Audit of EU-China Relations, which was published in April 2009.
This new approach was most evident in trade policy. EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht and Industry Commissioner Antonio Tajani demanded a level playing field on investment, intellectual property rights (IPR) and public procurement, and argued against indigenous technology schemes and economic nationalism, and for more policy instruments on the European side. The proposal for a reciprocal instrument to give access to public procurement in China is the fruit of this. The EU also pushed back on China’s desire to make its coming innovation policy purely homegrown and China softened its stance on this at the high-level economic dialogue in December. However, this positive approach was sometimes undermined by differences among member states on what exactly the EU should trade with China for market economy status (MES) (see component 4). The results of this disunity on the European side became apparent at the EUChina summit in October. At the summit, China demanded MES – and an irate Premier Wen Jiabao lashed out at Europe afterwards about currency revaluation, even though Europe had soft-pedalled on the issue.
The difficulty of making the EU’s new strategy work was demonstrated by the fact that even the anodyne language on the arms embargo as an “impediment” to relations sparked media reaction in member states that forced Ashton to foreclose any further discussion. She also reacted publicly to human rights abuses in China, while member states were quiet, if not silent, on issues on which they had previously spoken out more loudly. While President Barack Obama finally met with the Dalai Lama, China confirmed its upper hand with Europe on this issue: the EU maintained a near-complete silence on human rights and governance issues until China’s heavy-handed approach towards the award of the Nobel Peace Prize prompted a sudden show of European unity at the end of the year.
The EU’s new strategy was also undermined by some member states’ urgent need for debt refinancing. With the onset of the euro crisis, China pledged to come to the rescue of several debt-ridden countries such as Spain, Greece and Portugal by purchasing government bonds. Given the extent of the European economic crisis and China’s record current-account surplus, such purchases were inevitable. But the effectiveness, from China’s point of view, of this astute “bond diplomacy” was enhanced by opacity on both sides, which made it difficult to ascertain the real extent of Chinese bond purchases and thus gave China an advantage. In this respect, China has a stronger hand with the EU than with the US, since its debt purchases reinforce bilateral weakness and division, which translates into a lack of collective European leverage.
The EU does have some assets in its relationship with China. For example, China wants continued access to the European market – the world’s largest – and, increasingly, the possibility of diversifying its investments in a geopolitically stable area. Europe is also attractive as a partner for crucial technologies that China seeks to acquire. However, turning these assets into leverage requires the sort of European coordination that has existed in trade policies but not for direct investment, financial markets, public procurement or technology transfer. In particular, as China gets more proficient in a worldwide game of public diplomacy, Europe needs to reach out to developing and emerging economies.
As well as better coordinating its approach to China, Europe must be more effective in global institutions, in which China now has considerable veto power even if it is not yet able to set the agenda. In 2010 the EU had mixed results. Both the EU and China came to Cancún with lower expectations and better PR techniques than in Copenhagen the year before, and although the EU kept China engaged – an achievement in itself after the “disaster” of Copenhagen – it is no closer to realising its ultimate objective of a legally-binding global deal on climate change than it was at the end of 2009. Europe also gave away seats at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) without securing a broader reform. On the other hand, together with the US, the EU3 and Ashton were able to obtain China’s approval for sanctions against Iran in June – a major achievement on an issue of great importance to Europe. |
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狗仔卡
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