【2011.05.12外交政策】处理美巴关系要淡定，要援助

corie_zhu

【原文标题】Who will lose Pakistan?
【中文标题】谁会失去巴基斯坦？
【登载媒体】外交政策
【来源地址】http://rothkopf.foreignpolicy.co ... _will_lose_pakistan
【译  者】朱朱 （特别感谢秋秋滴帮助~）
【翻译方式】人工
【声  明】 本翻译供Anti-CNN使用，未经AC或译者许可，不得转载。
【译  文】
政府现在面临的最棘手的挑战之一就是想出办法保证流向巴基斯坦的援助。主要的障碍是说服让国会批准向巴基斯坦增加援助。因为这个国家似乎多年来一直支持美国头号公众敌人，直接支持许多重要的恐怖组织，并拥有一个核项目，该项目由曾隶属于这些恐怖组织的阿卜杜勒•卡迪尔•汗设计。毫无疑问，这个国家会吸走我们的援助资金用于发展核项目或用于其他不良目的，因此巴基斯坦不像是一个可接受来自一个缺钱国家更多慷慨资助的首选目标，何况我们已经在这个国家投入了200亿美元的援助。

但是以前我们曾试图跨越这个障碍。政府内部曾讨论我们应该实行什么项目以继续支援巴基斯坦。政府官员担心在国会被置于尴尬境地。有些人，主要是情报机构的人，担心巴基斯坦会在反恐方面不再好好合作，尽管美国的发言人满嘴都是与这个看法完全相反的花言巧语。还有一些人，包括美军高级将领，认为我们在巴基斯坦既有可以依赖的朋友也有这些朋友面对的反对派，现在抛弃这些朋友绝对是错误的时机。

甚至有人担心，我们一些完全出于人道主义和无疑是基于需要而进行援助的项目，以及去年巴基斯坦洪灾造成巨大伤亡后我们直到现在还在进行着的援助都会成为批评者的眼中钉。这些援助应该被区别管理以保证援助基金能直接到达需要的地方而不是通过不可靠的巴基斯坦政府加以分配。

随着美国高级官员包括国务卿希拉里和参议员克里对巴基斯坦高级别访问的即将到来，这些问题在计划环节就开始被热议。本周我与内阁的一位官员谈话，他说，在美巴关系问题上的意见与如何能低调处决本拉登问题上的意见相比只多不少。

因此，奥巴马总统、希拉里国务卿和国会负责任的领导人现在应该鼓起政治勇气，公开并明确地宣布现在不能抛弃巴基斯坦同情及支持我国利益的人，这点非常重要。巴基斯坦也许遍布着与美国积极作对的危险人物及宗派。但是如若我们与这个国家切断联系，收回对朋友的支持，彻底拆了他们的台，我们将会处于何种境地？

我们现在应该竭尽所能保证我们对巴的援助既不会被浪费也不会被用于加剧我国与我们盟友的危险的用途。我们还应该通过同时与印度、中国、阿富汗、俄罗斯、沙特阿拉伯等波斯湾国家积极合作以遏制巴基斯坦的威胁。但是，我们也应该清楚，即使一些援助去向不明，我们与巴基斯坦一些深度关注的问题没能解决，与巴基斯坦能帮助我们的人积极合作并支持他们是非常关键的，而且支持与合作程度要比以前更大。

失去巴基斯坦的支持，或使巴基斯坦的温和政府下台符合更加极端的反美力量的利益，这两者都会使这个国家或至少这个国家的一部分沿着失败国家的道路越走越远。这种代价比我们现在所计划的任何一项援助项目都高昂。事实上，这种代价甚至高于我们迄今为止对这个国家的所有援助的总和。失去巴基斯坦会置它的核武器于险地，这将间接促进极端主义者的事业，使世界面临的恐怖主义威胁更加旷日持久，并将进一步增加地区不稳定和动乱的可能性。

援助项目要认真管理。对援助资金要进行更直接的分配。还要仔细审核援助项目。要一丝不苟地选择我们要帮助的对象。但是，在这块当今世界上最险恶又最重要的地方，我们决不能在一些关键时刻意气用事并采取意图惩罚敌人实则伤害朋友的做法。因为，这个赌注实在让我们承受不起。“谁失去了巴基斯坦？”如果我们轻率的背弃了这个国家，当这个问题不可回避的时候，没有人愿意自己被问到。
【原  文】
One of the toughest challenges facing the administration right now is figuring out how to maintain aid flows to Pakistan. The big hurdle is getting the Congress to approve more dollars for a country that seems to have abetted America's public enemy number one for years, is directly supporting a variety of major terrorist organizations, has a nuclear program that was conceived by a man, A.Q. Khan, who once affiliated with those organizations, undoubtedly is siphoning off our aid dollars to support those nuclear programs or for other unwholesome ends, and as a consequence doesn't seem very much like a top candidate to receive ever more largesse from a cash-strapped country that has already pumped $20 billion into the place.

But before we even get to that hurdle, there is a debate going on within the administration about what programs we should continue to try to fund. Administration officials are wary of being put in the position of defending the indefensible up on the Hill. Some -- notably from the intelligence community -- feel that Pakistan has become less cooperative on counter-terror efforts (despite all public rhetoric to the contrary by U.S. spokespeople.) Some -- including members of the top military brass -- feel that we have both some dependable friends in Pakistan and that given the opposition those friends face, this is precisely the wrong time to turn our back on them.

There is even concern that some of the aid programs we have that are purely humanitarian and undeniably need-based, like those still responding to the horrific toll caused by last year's flooding, will both become lightning rods for critics and that perhaps they ought to be administered differently to ensure that funds get directly to those in needs and that they are not channeled through unreliable Pakistani government channels.

With high profile visits to that country from top U.S. officials including Secretary Clinton and Senator Kerry looming, these issues are heating up in planning sessions. To say that there are as many or more points of view on the subject as there were on how to dispatch bin Laden would be an understatement according to one individual in a cabinet agency I spoke to this week.

It is thus very important for President Obama, Secretary Clinton and responsible leaders in the Congress to summon the political courage to publicly state in no uncertain terms that this is no time to cut off those in Pakistan who are sympathetic to and supportive of our interests. The country may be full of dangerous characters and factions that are actively enemies of the U.S. But consider where we would be if we simply cut ties with the country, withdrew support from our friends, and thus undercut them dramatically.

We should do everything we can to ensure our aid dollars are not squandered or directed to programs that exACerbated the risks to the U.S. and our allies. We should simultaneously work to contain the threats from Pakistan through active work with India, China, Afghanistan, Russia, the Saudis and the other Gulf countries. But we should also accept that even if some of the funds go missing and some of our deep and worrisome problems with Pakistan remain unresolved, active engagement and supporting of those within the country who can help us is absolutely critical - more now than ever before.

The costs of losing all support in Pakistan and possibly of undercutting moderate government there to the benefit of more extremist, anti-American forces or, alternatively in ways that send the country or parts of the country further down the road to failed-state status, are vastly higher than any aid programs currently contemplated. They are in fact, probably higher than all the aid pumped into the country to date. Losing Pakistan, putting its nuclear arsenal at risk, indirectly advancing the cause of extremists, invites a protracted terror risk to the world and raises the likelihood of further regional destabilization and conflict.

Manage programs more carefully. Demand more direct distribution of funds. Audit programs more carefully. Choose who we help and how fastidiously. But by no means should we succumb to the temptation to act on the emotions of the moment and undertake steps that while intended to punish our enemies would only have the effect of undercutting those friends we do have in one of the most treacherous and important places in the world today. The stakes are too high. And no one should want their name to be the one invoked when it is asked as it inevitably would be were we simply to turn our back on the country, "Who lost Pakistan?"

Mc大梨

朱朱辛苦了~~

lyycc

现在的问题不是美国如何决定援助巴基斯坦的问题，现在的问题是美国要卸磨杀驴的举动让巴基斯坦很忐忑
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2oo8e

美国从来就是卸磨杀驴，
现实主义决定的。

mki002mki

巴基斯坦就是一个失败的国家，骑墙有什么好？真以为自己可以左右通吃。

pipixiyi

巴基斯坦总统今日抵达北京进行友好访问！

林香

呵呵
既然是人道主义援助，还得去考虑这么多？
虚伪啊。

lyycc

回复 5# mki002mki


    不是巴基斯坦想骑墙，而是他所处的地缘关系逼着他必须去骑墙，他位于南亚次大陆西北部，南濒阿拉伯海，西部与美国的死敌伊朗接壤，北部与西亚的火药桶阿富汗接壤，东南是与他敌对的印度，和他相邻的几个国家都不是善茬。巴基斯坦选择骑墙就是因为他有印度这么一个实力远大于己的死敌，如果他不骑墙获得大国支持的话可能早就让印度给秒掉鸟。
    其实骑墙是实力弱小国家挑战大国的惯用伎俩，当然有些大国也骑墙，比如印度，他骑的还很好，很风光，东南西北左右逢源。但骑墙的风险代价也很大，选择骑墙也就等同于选择将自己变成大国之间博弈的棋子，比如二战前的波兰就成为欧洲列强试探希特勒野心的一颗弃子。比如格鲁吉亚就成为西方试探俄罗斯底线的马前卒。
   所以中国那套“保持国家独立自主与领土完整”的官方语言虽然呆板老套，但却还是有它的现实意义的。

滔滔1949

这个作者费尽心思说了一大气，拐弯抹角的言下之意其实就一句话——美国不能中断对巴的援助，否则巴基斯坦就会从此不但变成美国的敌人，而且还会成为中国的盟友。

野蔷薇

巴基斯坦就是一个失败的国家，骑墙有什么好？真以为自己可以左右通吃。
mki002mki 发表于 2011-5-18 19:11

   一个有核国家尚且如此，可见此处地缘关系之复杂。
   结义大哥早年尚且鸵鸟，更别说小弟了。非不欲也，实不能也。