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【原文标题】China's Port in Pakistan?
【中文标题】中国在巴基斯坦建港口还是海军基地?
【登载媒体】外交政策
【来源地址】http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/05/27/chinas_port_in_pakistan
【译 者】大梨
【翻译方式】 人工
【声 明】 本翻译供Anti-CNN使用,未经AC或译者许可,不得转载。
【译 文】
巴基斯坦官员宣布,中国已经同意巴基斯坦关于让它接管经营瓜达尔港口(在霍尔木兹海峡的附近)的请求,同时还请求北京帮它在瓜达尔修建一个海军基地。中国显然对这些声明持否定态度,这表明了中国在这件事上还尚未做出决定。
巴基斯坦想让中国更广泛地参与运营这个战略性的港口,没人会觉得奇怪。尽管中国在这件事上还未做决定,也没有人会觉得奇怪。 瓜达尔就是“梦想照进现实的”的残酷版本。
中国为了在瓜达尔建设了一个现代化港口已经投资了2亿美元。然而,对中国政府来说,这种投资的理论意义比实际效果更大。中国面临着的难题被称为“马六甲困境”。因为石油和天然气从中东发货到到中国港口,中国太依赖于印尼和马来西亚之间狭窄拥挤的马六甲海峡了。
因此,中国一直从事于巴基斯坦和缅甸的港口项目建设,或许有那么一天可能会由公路串联起来,然后能源将直接通向中国。除了提供另一种能源供应途径, 这21世纪的新港口,就像十九世纪英国的装煤港口一样,将会使中国成为崭露头角横跨印度洋的海上帝国。一旦中国发展了他们的远洋海军来保护其海上联络,中 国将需要港口来获得全球能源的使用权。一个稳健强壮的中国能在瓜达尔为巴基斯坦建设一个海军基地,将有助于防范印度的战略野心,正如巴基斯坦可以利用中国 的影响来抗衡新德里。
问题是这些都是长远的计划,是梦想。它们与纷繁复杂的基层现实相互冲突。2008年我在瓜达尔访问了一个星期,我很震惊这个地方位于波涛汹涌的海洋和荒凉炙热的沙漠中间,非常孤立,也没想到俾路支省是如此的不稳定,而港口在陆地各个方向与俾路支省毗邻。少数民族俾路支人的叛军领导告诉我说,他们决不允许公路和管道建立在那里,除非他们与巴基斯坦政府在伊斯兰堡的不满得到解决。
【原 文】
Pakistani officials have announced that the Chinese look favorably on taking over the operation of the Arabian Sea port of Gwadar close to the entrance of the Strait of Hormuz, and perhaps building a naval base for the Pakistanis there as well. The Chinese have apparently contradicted these claims, indicating that they have made no such decisions on these matters.
The fact that Pakistan should want deeper Chinese involvement with this strategically located port, even as the Chinese are hesitant to do just that, should surprise no one. Gwadar is where dreams clash with reality.
The Chinese have already invested $200 million in building a modern port in Gwadar. Furthermore, a presence of some sort at Gwadar makes estimable sense for Beijing in the abstract. China faces what has been called a "Malacca dilemma." It is too dependent on the narrow and congested Strait of Malacca between Indonesia and Malaysia for its oil and natural gas shipments from the Middle East to Chinese ports.
Thus, China has been engaged in port-building projects in Pakistan and Burma, which, someday, may be linked by roads and energy pipelines directly to China. Besides offering an alternative route for energy supplies, such new ports will be the 21st-century equivalent of 19th-century British coaling stations for China's budding maritime empire spanning the Indian Ocean. Once China has developed a blue-water navy to protect its sea lines of communications, it will require port access along the global energy interstate that is the Indian Ocean. For Pakistan's part, a robust Chinese presence at Gwadar would serve to check India's own strategic ambitions, as Islamabad leverages Beijing against New Delhi.
The problem is that these are all long-range plans -- and dreams. They conflict with messy ground-level realities. Visiting Gwadar for a week in 2008, I was struck not only by how isolated it was, between pounding sea and bleak desert, but how unstable was the region of Baluchistan, which lies immediately beyond the port in all landward directions. Ethnic Baluchi rebel leaders told me that they would never permit roads and pipelines to be built there, until their grievances with the Pakistani government in faraway Islamabad were settled. |
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