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本帖最后由 lilyma06 于 2011-9-8 21:10 编辑
【中文标题】即将来临的
【原文标题】Over the Horizon
【登载媒体】外交政策
【来源地址】http://www.foreignpolicy.com/art ... _the_horizon?page=0,0
【译 者】lilyma06
【翻译方式】人工
【声 明】本翻译供Anti-CNN使用，未经AC或译者许可，不得转载。
【译 文】
Is worrying about war with China a self-fulfilling prophecy?
担心与中国会发生战争是自我应验的预言吗？
Is it possible that, a decade after 9/11, America has become too preoccupied with the threat from "nonstate actors" and too complacent about the more classic dangers posed by powerful and self-aggrandizing states? Or, put more succinctly, how afraid of China should the United States be?
9·11事件十周年之后，美国是否完全沉浸于“非国家行为者”的威胁，并对强大的和自我扩张的国家所带来的典型威胁过于自满？或者更简洁地说，美国该怎么害怕中国？
We know, of course, that China owns $1.5 trillion worth of U.S. Treasury bills and thus has the U.S. economy by the short hairs; that China refuses to significantly revalue the renminbi and thus retains its colossal imbalance in trade with the United States; and that China has begun to buy American real estate and other assets (including, perhaps, the Los Angeles Dodgers). But should Americans regard China as a national security threat and not merely an economic one?
当然，我们知道中国有着1.5万亿美元的美国国债券，因此可以任意摆布美国经济。中国拒绝大幅度人民币升值，因此在与美国贸易中保持着巨大不平衡;中国已经开始购买美国的房地产和其他资产（可能也包括洛杉矶道奇队）。但是美国应该不仅仅把中国当成经济威胁，更是国家安全威胁吗？
The authors of "Asian Alliances in the 21st Century," a report published by the Project 2049 Institute, a conservative think tank that focuses on East Asia, insist that we must. (The lead author is American Enterprise Institute scholar Dan Blumenthal of Foreign Policy's Shadow Government blog.) The report concludes that "China's military ambitions threaten America's Asian allies, raise questions about the credibility of U.S. alliance pledges, and imperil the U.S. military strategy that underpins its global primacy."
2049项目研究所出版的《21世纪的亚洲联盟》的作者是一些专注于东亚的保守派智囊团，他们强调我们必须应把中国当成国家安全威胁。（主要作者是美国企业研究所学者丹布卢门撒尔外交政策的影子政府博客）。报告指出：“中国的军事野心威胁到美国的亚洲盟友，对美国联盟的承诺可信性提出质询，并危及到美国巩固其独霸全球的军事战略。“
This is startling news to those of us who think of China as a "status quo" power, a view that until recently was widely shared in the academic and policy community. In Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics, published in 2006, David Shambaugh, a leading China scholar, concludes that "China is increasingly seen as a good neighbor, constructive partner, and careful listener." Shambaugh and others wrote then that China had emerged from a long era of suspicion and insularity and had begun to join regional organizations, send peacekeepers to U.N. missions, and improve bilateral relations in the neighborhood. Yes, China's military was rapidly modernizing in ways that gave the Taiwanese a fright, but such signs of belligerence had been offset, Shambaugh concluded, by "bilateral and multilateral confidence-building measures."
这对于我们那些认为中国“现状”力量的人来说是个令人吃惊的消息，这种观点直到最近才在学术界和政界广泛认可。在2006年出版的《权力的转移：中国和亚洲的新动力》中，中国学者David Shambaugh得出结论，“中国是个越来越好的邻国，建设性的合作伙伴和仔细的倾听者。”Shambaugh与另些人写道，中国从一个长期的怀疑和偏狭时代出现，并已开始加入一些区域组织，并向联合国特派团派遣维和部队，在邻国之间改善双边关系。是的，中国的军事正迅速现代化，给台湾吓了一跳，但这种好战的迹象已经抵消，Shambaugh总结说，中国已“建立双边和多边的信任安全措施。”
But five years is a long time for a country growing, and changing, as rapidly as China. "Asian Alliances" argues, in effect, that China has now fully emerged from its defensive crouch. In recent years, China has developed a new generation of ballistic and cruise missiles, attack submarines, tactical and stealth aircraft, radar, and space-based intelligence, as well as an anti-satellite missile, which together give it the capacity to establish "contested zones" in air, sea, and space, and thus push the United States further and further out from regions of the Pacific that it has long patrolled and protected. And China's behavior in the neighborhood has turned markedly bellicose, aggressively pursuing its claim to islands in the South China Sea and sending its blue-water navy on long-range exercises off the Japanese coast. It's for this reason that Robert D. Kaplan wrote in the current issue of FP that the future of conflict lies not in the sands of the Middle East but the open water of the South China Sea.
但对于一个像中国这样快速发展变化的国家来说，五年是一个很长的时间。“亚洲联盟”认为，实际上，中国现在已经完全从防守显露出来。近年来，中国已开发出新一代弹道导弹和巡航导弹、攻击型潜水艇、战术和隐形飞机、雷达、空间基地情报，以及反卫星导弹，这使其有能力在空中、海上和空间建立“竞赛区“，从而使美国越来越远离其长期巡逻和保护的太平洋地区。而中国在周边的行为已明显转向好战，积极推行其在中国南海诸岛的主张，并往日本海岸线派遣蓝海海军进行远程演习。它是这个原因，罗伯特·D·卡普兰在本期的FP写道，未来的冲突不在于在中东，而在于开放的中国南海。
It seems odd that a country so famously patient and slow-gestating would have so radically, and so quickly, changed its posture to the world. Maybe that careful listening was an elaborate show, or a transitional phase. Elizabeth Economy, a China scholar at the Council on Foreign Relations, argues that China's peaceful rise was never more than a "rhetorical formulation"; only now, however, has China's military capacity and its rhetoric caught up with its long-held aspirations to expand its sphere of dominance in East Asia. U.S. President Barack Obama's administration has not accepted that view, but has nevertheless warned China to play by the rules of the international system. In the 2009 speech in which he coined the phrase "strategic reassurance," then-Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg noted that China's "enhanced capabilities" and "overbroad assertion of its rights" in the South China Sea had caused Washington and its allies to "question China's intentions."
似乎很奇怪这个国家出了名的耐心、缓慢孕育着，并从根本上如此激烈，如此之快改变其对世界的姿态。或许认真倾听是一个精心制作的节目，或一个过渡阶段。一个在外交关系委员会的中国学者伊丽莎白认为，中国的和平崛起不只是“修辞手法”;中国军事能力及其华丽言辞只有现在才能维护其长久以来其在东亚领域扩张霸权的一贯野心。美国总统奥巴马政府不接受这个观点，但是仍然警告中国按照国际体系的规则出牌。在2009年的讲话中，他发明了一个短语“战略再保证”，当时的代理国务卿詹姆斯·斯坦伯格指出中国“增强功能”及在中国南海“其权利过于宽泛的主张”已引起华盛顿及其盟友“质疑中国的意图。
”There's little debate over those capabilities, which are clearly superior to what they were only a few years ago, and improving fast. But China's intentions are harder to read. David Finkelstein, director of China Studies at the Center for Naval Analyses in Alexandria, Va., says that he shares the "great uneasiness about how China will use its incipient but growing maritime power" throughout the region, but also notes that in recent years China has concluded that "time is on their side on Taiwan" and thus have been "relatively more relaxed" than in the past.
以上这些争论要比几年前的明显有发展，并发展的很迅速。然而中国的意图很难读懂。弗吉尼亚州亚历山德里亚海军分析中心中国研究部主任大卫·芬克尔斯坦说，他“很担心中国将在整个地区如何运用其刚刚萌芽的但不断增长的海上力量”，但也注意到，近年来中国已经得出结论：“在台湾时机对他们很有利”，因此“比过去相对较为轻松”。
The obvious Cold War analogy is to the policy of containment: George Kennan believed that the Soviet Union hoped to dance on America's grave but he was prepared to wait for history to inevitably unspool itself; the Soviets could thus be deterred by a patient and persistent policy of containment. Finkelstein argues that a combination of forceful American diplomacy, which he credits the Obama administration with undertaking, and the current level of American military presence -- the Pacific fleet and 60,000 active-duty troops in the region -- has already contained China's ambitions, and will probably continue to do so. Kaplan, too, for all his projections of growing Chinese naval and air power, argues for maintaining the current state of military deployment. In short, it's the intentions that matter.
很明显冷战如同是遏制政策：乔治·凯南认为苏联希望在美国的坟墓上跳舞，但他是准备等着历史不可避免地自己上演，苏联可能被长期持久的遏制政策制止。芬克斯坦认为，是奥巴马政府把一个强有力的美国外交政策与承诺，美国的军事目前的水平相结合起来的，这就是在该地区的太平洋舰队和有着60000名士兵的现役部队，这已经抑制了中国的野心，并在将来继续遏制。其项目中日益壮大的中国海军和空军的力量，卡普兰保持目前的军事部署状态。总之，是意图最关键。
The authors of "Asian Alliances," by contrast, tend to infer China's intentions from its capacities. In an ominous scenario that carries a strong whiff of Herman Kahn, or perhaps Dr. Strangelove, they describe China using missiles and bombers to launch a devastating attack on Taiwan and the United States responding with a missile strike against the mainland, which in turn leads to … Armageddon. The only way to preclude such a cataclysm, the authors argue, is to adopt much tougher counter-measures: rollback, in Cold War terms.
《亚洲联盟》的作者通过对比往往从自身的能力推断出中国的意图。他们形容中国使用导弹和轰炸机来对台湾发动毁灭性的攻击，而美国用导弹袭击进行回击大陆，从而导致大决战。作者认为，阻止这种大灾难唯一的做法是采取更严厉的反措施：在冷战中称为回卷。
The "Asian Alliances" report warns that "Asia's future demands nothing less" than a new "shared strategic concept." The web of Cold War alliances should give way to a military partnership among the United States, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, and others that would require a major increase in military spending and in military and intelligence cooperation. "[A]ny would-be aggressor" would be made to understand "that targeting one ally means invoking the ire of the rest." It's hard to believe that these states would agree to join such an explicitly anti-Chinese coalition. There's also the danger that China would react by concluding that time was no longer on its side, thus turning the coalition into a devastatingly self-fulfilling prophecy.
《亚洲联盟》的报告警告说，“亚洲的未来需求仅仅是”一个新的“共同的战略构想”。冷战联盟的网站应该在美国、日本，韩国，菲律宾，印尼之间让位给一个军事伙伴，其他会要求在军费开支和军事和情报合作上大幅增加。“任何可能的侵略者”会理解“针对一个盟国意味着会引起其他盟友的愤怒”。很难相信，这些国家会同意参加这样一个明确的反中国联盟。还有的威胁就是中国将作出反应，并得出结论认为时机不在自身这边，从而变成一个毁灭性的自我实现的预言联盟。
The costs for the United States would be greater still. The "Asian Alliances" report accuses the United States of courting "strategic insolvency" and proposes investments in vast amounts of new weaponry. In a congressional briefing, Blumenthal specified the hardware: "a next-generation bomber; large numbers of attack submarines (SSNs); a sizeable fifth-generation tactical aircraft fleet" and on and on and on.
美国的成本将更大。《亚洲联盟》报告指责美国拉拢“战略破产”，并提出大规模新装备的大量投资。在国会简报中，布卢门撒尔详细说明硬件：“下一代轰炸机，大量的攻击潜艇（核潜艇）;一个相当大的第五代战术飞机舰队”等等。
That sounds costly, no? Mitt Romney, who never loses an opportunity to talk up the threat from China, not to mention Russia, would peg defense spending at 4 percent of GDP -- $600 billion, or $70 billion more than the current total, which of course would necessitate equivalent cuts elsewhere to make up the difference. Or perhaps voters should accept that national insolvency is a price worth paying in order to address strategic insolvency. Or of course we could Lose China again. Or risk the Big One.
这听起来代价很大，不是吗？米特·罗姆尼一有机会就会谈论来自中国的威胁，更别提俄罗斯了，GDP的4％是国防开支为6000亿美元，或比目前总量700亿美元更多，这当然会有必要相当于多在别的地方削减补足差额。也许选民应该接受国家破产，这是值得付出的，这也是处理战略破产的代价。当然我们可能会再次失去中国，或者冒一次大风险。
Americans are, understandably, much too obsessed with the economy right now to spare a thought for national security. But the debate is waiting in the wings. The threat of terrorist attack is very real, but diminishing. Al Qaeda is not the national nightmare it once was. Are Americans going to replace it with a new nightmare -- or rather, a recycled one from the depths of the Cold War? I certainly hope not. China's regional ambitions do need to be checked. But if America bankrupts itself in the process, we'll win the battle and lose the war.
可以理解的是美国目前很痴迷于经济，并关心国家安全。但辩论时刻准备着。恐怖袭击的威胁是非常真实的，但也是逐渐衰退的。“基地”组织不再像过去一样是国家的噩梦。而美国人却用一个新的噩梦来代替它 - 或更确切地说，是从冷战深处出现的新的。我当然希望不会这样。中国的地区野心确实需要进行检查。但是，如果美国破产在进行中，我们将赢得这场战役，但输掉战争。
/@王小东：最后一句明显译错了，正确的翻译应该是“我们将赢得战役，但输掉战争” 谢谢王老师！
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狗仔卡
发表于 2011-9-5 17:27
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发表于 2011-9-5 19:10
