【卫报111106】戛纳见证实力移向北京

weater76

【中文标题】戛纳见证实力移向北京

【原文标题】Cannes showed how power has shifted to Beijing

【登载媒体】英国卫报

【来源地址】http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/economics-blog/2011/nov/06/economics-us-europe-china-crisis?newsfeed=true/

【翻译方式】   人工

【声    明】 欢迎转载，请务必注明译者和出处 bbs.m4.cn。

【译    文】

China's economic boom could be more fragile than it looks, with problems looming such as a property bubble, too much industrial capacity and corruption.
中国的经济繁荣可能比它看上去的更加脆弱，伴随着类似房地产泡沫、工业产能冗余和腐败的问题。

The global economy has three main pillars: the United States, the European Union and China. America was where the crisis began, with a housing market bubble that corrupted the financial sector. Europe is where the crisis now has its locus, amid fears that the single currency could break apart. China, despite steaming ahead since the slump of late 2008, may be next.
The fact that China is now pivotal says much about developments in the decade since it emerged as a fully fledged market economy as symbolised by membership of the World Trade Organisation. Financial meltdown in the west and east Asia's rapid growth have altered globalisation's terms of trade, leading to a shift in the balance of power as fundamental as that of a century ago.
Back in 2001, the running of global affairs was still firmly in the hands of the United States, Europe and Japan, but even then there were signs of change. China had already enjoyed two decades of spectacular expansion by the end of the 20th century and that has continued in the first 11 years of the 21st. Economic power translates into political clout and China now has a seat at the top table when the great powers meet in conclave, as they did at the G20 in Cannes last week.
　　全球经济拥有三个支柱：美国，欧盟和中国。美国是经济危机起源地，房产市场泡沫导致了金融危机。欧洲是目前危机的中心，人们担心单一货币可能分裂。中国，尽管自2008年暴跌后发展得如火如荼，也可能是下一个危机爆发地。
　　自中国作为成熟的市场经济国家进入世界贸易组织后，十年间的发展已让其成为至关重要的角色。西方的金融问题与东亚的迅速发展改变了世界贸易格局，改变了一百年前确立的实力平衡。
　　回望2001年，世界事务依然坚实地掌握在美国、欧洲与日本的手里，不过那时已经有改变的迹象了。中国已在二十世纪末经历了二十年的伟大扩张，并在二十一世纪的前十一年里保持这个趋势。经济实力转化为政治影响力，中国已在类似G20上周在戛纳召开的峰会中成为上宾。

Unsurprisingly, the focus of events was the unfolding crisis in the eurozone but it was hard to escape the sense that power had shifted from west to east over the past 10 years. It was not just that Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel were holding out the begging bowl, pleading with China to dip into its foreign currency reserves to provide capital for Europe's bailout fund. Nor was it that China's leaders felt entirely comfortable lecturing Europe on the need to get its act together when it was not so long ago that it was the other way around.
Rather, it was the mixture of bemusement and derision with which China viewed last week's events: the referendum in Greece that never was, the ratcheting up of market pressure on Italy, the looming recession, the inability to follow through on the rescue plan announced in Brussels 10 days ago. Comparisons were being made with the way in which Asia coped with its financial crisis in 1997-98 – and they were not flattering to Europe.
One small vignette perfectly summed up how small-minded and weak Europe has become as a result of its relative economic decline. Officials working on the summit communique were discussing Sarkozy's plan for a financial transaction tax (FTT), the proceeds of which the French president believes should be used to boost aid budgets and to help poor countries adapt to climate change.
　　毫不意外。尽管事件的焦点是欧元区正在发生的危机，但是很难否认实力已在过去十年从西方转向了东方。这不仅仅体现在萨科齐与默克尔端着乞讨的碗，乞求中国施舍它的外汇储备作为拯救资金。也不仅仅体现在中国的领导人在欧洲的讲台上舒舒服服地发言，而不久以前则是另外一番景象。
　　中国观察上周的事件充满了困惑与嘲笑：希腊公投没能发生；意大利市场压力逐渐激化；经济衰退若隐若现；十天以前在布鲁塞尔达成的拯救方案无法兑现。亚洲在处理1997年到1998年间金融危机的做法被拿来比较，他们那时并没有奉承欧洲来求得帮助。
　　一个小插曲完美地阐释了欧洲经济衰退的结果，并显示其如何狭隘与虚弱。在峰会公报上工作的官员们在讨论萨科齐金融交易税的计划，法国总统认为这有助于增加援助预算，帮助贫困国家适应财政气候变化。

Germany, despite an unimpressive recent record on development assistance, likes the idea of an FTT but only because it wants to use any money raised to reduce its budget deficit. So Merkel's sherpa argued that any mention of linking the so-called Robin Hood tax to aid should be removed from the text. In the end a compromise of sorts was agreed so that the communique finally read: "We acknowledge the initiatives in some of our countries to tax the financial sector for various purposes, including a financial transaction tax, inter alia to support development."
The words "inter alia" were included at the insistence of the French but mean that even if Sarkozy manages to put together his coalition of the willing for an FTT it will be up to individual countries what they do with the additional dosh. It is a fair bet that very little of it will show up in higher aid budgets, making it easier for China to portray itself as the friend of developing countries by bankrolling their infrastructure projects. Yet Europe's weakness represents a problem for China as well as an opportunity. Beijing's export-led model of economic growth depends on having a ready market for the goods being churned out by Chinese factories, so the impending recession in the eurozone will have an impact.
To an extent, the backwash from Europe – and from the still-tepid recovery in the US – will be beneficial, since it will encourage China to rely more heavily on domestic demand as a source of growth. That will mean allowing its currency, the yuan, to float higher on the foreign exchanges, encouraging consumers to buy cheaper imports while making exports dearer. In the short run, such a move will help defuse protectionist sentiments in the US. In the longer run, it will lead to a rebalancing of the global economy.
　　德国，尽管在发展援助方面并无令人印象深刻的记录，只是因为希望使用增加的收入减少预算赤字，它才同意金融交易税方案。因此，默克尔的夏尔巴人认为任何与罗宾逊式劫富济贫的税都应该从文本中剔除。最终峰会公报以妥协的形式呈现：“我们了解到在一些国家里因不同目的设置金融税的倡议，包括金融交易税在内，以此来支持发展。”
　　由于法国的坚持，“以此”被放在里面，不过这意味着即使萨科齐成功地说服他的执政盟友同意金融交易税政策，是否增收税费的决定权仍然在每个国家自己手里。很可能这项政策并不会为更高的援助预算发挥作用，使得中国作为发展中国家的朋友，更容易地提供他们基础设置建设项目的资金。然而欧洲的虚弱给中国同时带去了问题与机遇。北京的出口指向型经济依赖于一个良好的市场，欧元区到来的经济衰退会带来一些麻烦。
　　在某种程度上看，欧洲的恶果——与美国不温不火的复苏——将带来好处。这会鼓励中国在发展资源上更依赖国内需求。这将推动中国的人民币在汇率交换中升值，鼓励消费者购买更便宜的进口商品，并让出口商品变得更贵。从短期看，这样的行动可能帮助化解美国贸易保护主义者的情绪。放眼长期，这能够推动全球经济的再平衡。

But it won't happen overnight, not least because China's economy is more fragile than its near double-digit growth rate would suggest. Back in 2008, when the crisis broke, industrial production collapsed around the world.
Chinese factories were mothballed and the workers laid off. China's communist leaders well understood the potential for serious social unrest so they ordered Chinese banks to keep the economy moving by expanding credit. At one stage, the annualised increase in credit growth in China hit 170%, almost certainly the biggest such surge there has ever been.
The result was over-investment on a colossal scale: not just in industrial capacity but in property. China is now awash with factories that will struggle to make a profit and with a glut of overpriced housing. Historically, an uncontrollable rise in credit has been the single best indicator of a financial crisis, as the west knows from its own recent experience.
　　不过这不可能在一夜之间发生，中国两位数的发展速率让经济更脆弱。回想危机发生的2008年工业生产在世界各地崩溃的景象吧。
　　那时中国的工厂停产工人失业。中共的领导人们意识到严重社会动荡的可能，于是命令中国的银行通过扩大信贷保持经济增长。中国的年度信贷增长率曾达到了170%，几乎可以肯定是史上最大的放大了。
　　结果就是巨大规模的过度投资：不仅仅在工业能力上，也在财产投资上。中国一方面承受着过高的房价，另一方面到处都是拼命获取利润的工厂。从历史上看，正如西方从最近的经验收获到的，无法控制的信贷规模增长是金融危机的最好指标。

Can China buck this trend? Well, it is interesting that many of the arguments along the "this time it's different" line propounded in the US in the mid-2000s are now being trotted out again. The fundamentals justify elevated property prices, just as they did in the US. There is exaggerated confidence in the ability of the People's Bank of China to finesse a soft landing for the economy, just as there was in the ability of the "maestro" Alan Greenspan to prevent the American bubble popping a decade ago. There are booming echoes of the sub-prime crisis: too much leverage, property being sold at distressed prices, and evidence of wrongdoing.
The authorities in Beijing are now responding to signs of weakness in the property market in classic Greenspan fashion: they are relaxing the constraints on credit that were imposed both to mop up excess liquidity in the banking system and to bring down inflation. This, sadly, no more guarantees a soft landing than did Greenspan's decision to solve the problem caused by the collapse of the dotcom boom by creating an even bigger bubble in the US housing market. As an analyst noted last week, China is like a plane with engine trouble circling round an airfield until the fuel runs out.
A crash landing is likely but not necessarily imminent, because loose monetary policy may disguise the underlying problem for a while, as it did in the US. Nor will it permanently impair China's economic development; America had plenty of spectacular boom-busts when it was emerging as a superpower in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
It does mean that Europe's problems come at an unfortunate time for China, which is facing the twin problems of over-investment and overheating, and is vulnerable to even a relatively mild double-dip recession in the west.
　　中国能够逆转这一趋势吗？嗯，有趣的是“这次不一样”的许多观点再被抛出。房价升高的基本面像美国一样。对中国人民银行让经济软着陆能力的信心被夸大，正如信奉“大师”格林斯潘在十年前阻止美国泡沫破碎一样。目前已有次贷危机的回响：太高的财政杠杆率；令人心疼的房价和经济犯罪的迹象。
　　北京当局正在对房地产市场的虚弱迹象进行科林斯潘式的调控：他们放宽对信贷约束的规定，冒着流动性过剩与通货膨胀的危险。如此并不能保证软着陆，正如格林斯潘在美国房地产市场创造了一个比互联网泡沫更大的泡沫来解决问题的方法。上周一位分析家认为，中国像是一架发动机故障的飞机，只能在空中盘旋直到燃料耗尽。
　　硬着陆可能发生，不过未必迫在眉睫，因为宽松的货币政策可能在短时间内掩盖潜藏的问题，正如美国曾发生的一样。这也不会永久性地削弱中国经济的发展：美国在19世纪晚期与20世纪早期作为超级力量崛起时也经历了一轮又一轮的繁荣与萧条。
　　这也意味着欧洲问题爆发在对中国来说并不幸运的时候——面临着过度投资与发展过热的双重问题时，即便对西方相对温和的双底衰退也可能无力抵抗。

mygek

路过顶一下.........

lyycc

继续唱衰吧，一直唱到中国经济崩溃的那一天，最有吧全部的责任都归结到中国汇率政策上~

他们的目的也就达到了~{:soso__4868127410769589268_4:}

妇科主任

无视飘过~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~