【外交政策111123】中俄形成“否决联盟”

weater76

【中文标题】中俄形成“否决联盟”

【原文标题】The Axis of No

【登载媒体】外交政策

【来源地址】http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/11/23/the_axis_of_no?page=0,1

【译    者】WilliamRUC

【翻译方式】人工

【声    明】欢迎转载，请务必注明译者和出处 bbs.m4.cn。

【译    文】

Remember the Soviet-Sino split? Moscow and Beijing don't appear to. On the current developments in the Middle East and North Africa, at least, China and Russia have been increasingly coming together. At the U.N. Security Council, they either oppose Western initiatives or voice their reservations. To some, this looks like solidarity between two authoritarian governments; to others, a coordinated effort to dilute, and eventually dismantle, U.S. and Western domination of global politics. Although both these elements are involved, the reality is broader, and it needs to be better understood by Western publics and policymakers.
To begin with, there is no ideology involved. Although China still calls itself communist, it has long rejected the Maoist dogma, including in its foreign relations. Russia ditched communism exactly two decades ago. It is true that both countries are authoritarian, even if one is of a milder, and the other of a harsher variety. However, there is no such thing as an "authoritarian internationale" to inspire solidarity between the ruling autocracies. (Nor is there such a thing in the Middle East, if one looks at how Qatar has dealt with Muammar al-Qaddafi, or how Saudi Arabia is dealing with Bashar al-Assad). Both Russia and China are, above all, pragmatic.
There is also precious little regional geopolitical competition between them. China's global interests are essentially economic. It depends on Iran, for example, for a quarter of the oil it imports from the Middle East. Chinese companies are engaged in a number of projects throughout the region. The war in Libya left some 20,000 Chinese workers stranded. A similar number of Russian tourists were marooned in Egypt as Mubarak's regime fell. Moscow of course has vested interests beyond caring for its vacationers, as a supplier of arms or nuclear energy technology to several countries, but it is definitely not in a race with Washington for regional pre-eminence.
Nor does Beijing or Moscow feel any special affinity toward Middle Eastern rulers. Hosni Mubarak, after all, was a long-time U.S. ally, Tunisia's Zine el-Abidine Ben-Ali was close to Paris, and Qaddafi made peace with the West in 2003. Syria's Assad is different, of course: Damascus used to be Moscow's ally in the Cold War days, and it has kept friendly ties to Russia to this day. Syria's military has been equipped with Russian-made arms since the 1960s, and the Mediterranean port of Tartus is home to a facility used by the Russian Navy.
Certainly Russia does not wish to lose Syria. With Assad's fate hanging in the balance since March, the Moscow has opened lines to Syria's opposition. While hosting Assad's enemies in Moscow and deploring violence, the Russians have been urging Damascus to start political reforms, even as they have blocked formal condemnation by the Security Council of the Syrian government's crackdown. Beijing's approach has been essentially the same: demanding reform from Damascus, while talking to both the Syrian government and the opposition and refusing to support sanctions against Syria in Turtle Bay.
China's official stance proclaims Beijing's "support for the Syrian people." There is a huge difference, however, between this position and the attitudes taken by Western governments. For many in the West, such "support" means active involvement, not ruling out, in principle, the use of force. For the Chinese, it means allowing the Syrians to sort things out among themselves without outside interference and eventually recognizing the people's choice -- as Beijing has done, eventually, in Libya.
Like China, Russia rejects Western military interference in other countries' domestic affairs, whether in the name of humanity or democracy. But this is about much more than Beijing's or Moscow's concern for their own security. Libya has demonstrated to both powers that the West, acting essentially under pressure from domestic human rights constituencies (absent of course in Russia and China), can stumble into foreign civil wars even when its leaders should know better.
Libya, however, has always been a peripheral country strategically speaking. Not Syria. The Chinese and even the Russians -- who have better intelligence -- have no clue what will happen when the Assad regime falls. A full-scale civil war in Syria would make Libya pale in comparison. Such a conflict would be far more propitious for sectarian strife and religious radicalism, the Russians and the Chinese argue, than for democracy and the rule of law.
Syria's position in the heart of the region also means that a full-blown domestic conflict there can affect its neighbors --  above all, Lebanon and Israel -- and bring into play such regional actors as Hezbollah and Hamas. The Russians, concerned about Islamist extremism in the North Caucasus and Central Asia, and the Chinese, who import most of their oil from the Middle East, can hardly welcome Syria's meltdown.
In principle, applying pressure on Damascus while simultaneously facilitating an intra-Syrian dialogue should help prevent this worst-case scenario. In reality, however, Moscow and Beijing must have concluded that the West has written Assad off, and is in fact preparing for regime change. Seen from this perspective, sanctions are a step in the escalation game that would have to be followed up by more forceful measures -- as Libya has just demonstrated.
China and Russia's policies on Syria differ from the United States' and Europe's for two basic reasons. One, Moscow and Beijing do not believe that becoming actively involved in other people's civil conflicts is wise or useful. Two, they have no pressing interest in the elimination of the Assad regime as part of an anti-Iranian strategy. In any case, the Chinese and the Russians don't see much of a strategy at all; they think that, surprised early this year by the Arab revolt, the Americans and their allies are now being guided more by short-term politics than by long-term strategic calculus.
All or part of these concerns may be valid. Yet Moscow and Beijing have to admit that critique is not the same as leadership, which Russia covets,  and which China cannot forever escape from. Modern international leadership calls for coming up with realistic alternatives, reaching out to others, and building consensus. Saying no is not enough.

　　阿拉伯之春让整个大中东地区陷入了长久的混乱与动荡之中。美国以及整个西方世界直接或间接地介入和干涉是这场“地区革命”主要的推动力量之一。虽然阿拉伯世界的新格局还远未形成，但这场革命运动却意外促成了一个“联盟”的出现中国和俄罗斯的“否决联盟”。
　　观察世界各国对中东问题的态度不难发现，中国和俄罗斯越走越近了。中俄虽然有各自的利益考量，但在对美国和西方外交政策上的反对态度却“出奇的一致”。在联合国安理会上，中俄要么反对西方的议案，要么表达自己的保留意见。在某种程度上，中俄看起来表现地相当“团结一致”。而对其它国家来说，中俄的协调合作稀释了，甚至是消除了以美国和西方为主导的全球政治。尽管这些因素是复杂的，但现实却明显很多，西方的政治家和决定者需要好好了解一下中国和俄罗斯了。
　　首先要摒弃的观念就是，这完全与意识形态无关。虽然中国仍然是社会主义国家，但现在的中国与“毛时代”的中国已经很大的变化，包括它的外交政策。而俄罗斯早在20年前就已经不再是社会主义国家了。现在主导中国和俄罗斯的都是实用主义。
　　当然，中俄之间也会出现一些区域性的地缘政治摩擦和竞争。中国的全球利益基本上是经济利益。例如，中国在中东地区进口的石油，有四分之一都来自伊朗。中国的企业也参与了该地区的多项工程建设。而俄罗斯作为北非几个国家主要的武器或核能技术供应商，在该地区也有相当可观的利益。
　　不论北京还是莫斯科对中东统治者都没有什么特别的亲切感。毕竟，穆巴拉克可是美国长期的盟友，突尼斯的本.阿里也和巴黎走得很近，卡扎菲早在2003年就同西方和好了。
　　当然，叙利亚的阿萨德有所不同。叙利亚在冷战期间曾是苏联的盟友，现在也同俄罗斯保持着友好的关系。自从20世纪60年代开始，叙利亚就开始用俄制的武器装备军队了，而地中海的塔尔图斯港也是一个俄罗斯海军的机构的老家。
　　俄罗斯当然不想失去叙利亚。所以，自从三月份阿萨德开始显得前途未卜时，俄罗斯就开始同叙利亚反对派展开了接触。接着，俄方在莫斯科接待了叙利亚反对派，并谴责暴力行动。俄方也不断地催促叙利亚当局进行政治改革，尽管俄罗斯不久前才否决了联合国安理会谴责叙利亚武力镇压民众抗议活动的决议。
　　中方对叙利亚问题的立场是，中国将“支持叙利亚人民”。然后，中国与西方政府对待叙利亚人民的“支持”却有很大的区别。对西方国家来说，这样的“支持”就意味着主动介入，原则上并不排除使用武力。而对中国来说，“支持”的意思是，中方将允许叙利亚人民在没有外界干预的情况下进行自己的选择，并尊重叙利亚人民最后选择。事实上，北京确实是这么做的，利比亚就是一个很好的例子。
　　同中国一样，俄罗斯也拒绝西方军事力量介入他国的内政中，不论是以人权还是以民主的名义。但是，这并不意味着中俄只关心自己的安全问题。
　　叙利亚在中东国家的核心位置意味着，如果叙利亚爆发了全面的国内冲突，将会影响它的邻国尤其是黎巴嫩和以色列，并将给真主党和哈马斯发挥作用的机会。俄罗斯比较担心的是北高加索和中亚地区的伊斯兰极端主义，而中国由于在中东进口大量石油，也不希望看到叙利亚垮台。
　　原则上，一方面向叙利亚当局施压，一方面促进叙利亚内部的对话将会预防出面最糟糕的局面。但是事实上，中国和俄罗斯必做认识到西方已经决定将阿萨德赶下台，并已经开始准备推翻现有政权。从这个角度看，对叙利亚的制裁只是其中一步，军事措施将会紧接而至。
　　中俄同美欧对待叙利亚问题上的不同态度基于两个原因。一是，中俄相信主动去干涉他国内政是不明智和没用的。二是，中俄对于阿萨道政权倒台作为反伊朗战略　的一部份并没有迫切的利益需要。中俄认为，美国以及其盟友现在已经被短期的政策所主导，而不顾长远的战略考量。
　　所有或是部份的这些顾虑可能是合理的。但是，北京和莫斯科也必须承认“批评”不能等同于“领导”。现代国际领导力需要通过现实的手段来实现，通过帮助别人来建立共识。单单“说不”是远远不够的。

GAOGAO460

这种分析还是很中肯的

红鞋子

{:soso_e163:}

李小龙的双截棍

GAOGAO460 发表于 2011-11-28 20:20
这种分析还是很中肯的

外交政策的文章还不错

隐匿01

你们以为中国保叙利亚是为了石油吗,:D

天马行空0

中国保叙利亚，是为了中国的投资。

隐匿01

.......不是投资,是要表明态度

老美拿下叙利亚后就是伊朗,然后巴铁,到时我们只有蹲墙角划圈圈了...:L:L

滔滔1949

“现代国际领导力需要通过现实的手段来实现，通过帮助别人来建立共识。”

问题在于，谁的领导？？？？

美国的？？？

coldwarj

The Axis of No,否决轴心？这让我想到了法西斯轴心国！