PARIS--The only viable policy option for the United States to peacefully coexist with an ascending China is to share power.
来自巴黎—唯一能够使美国与崛起中国和平相处的政策是选择分享权力。
So says Hugh White, a professor of strategic studies at Australian National University.
White, who formerly served as an adviser to Australia's prime minister, shared his thoughts with The Asahi Shimbun in a recent interview.
澳大利亚国立大学战略研究所教授休.怀特在最近朝日新闻的采访中这样说道，他之前担任过澳大利亚总理的顾问。
"If the United States stays to compete with China for primacy, then rivalry between the United States and China escalates. And we end up with increased risk of conflict," he said.
“如果美国继续跟中国竞争头号地位，那么这样的竞争将会持续升级，有可能最终以战争结束。”他说道。
He also pointed out that in the event of military conflict, the United States would not prevail in spite of a new air-sea battle concept created to deal with China's growing military capabilities.
他也指出如果发生军事冲突，尽管美国有专门研发出来对付中国新生军事力量的空对海战役方式，但是不能取胜。
Excerpts of the interview follow:
以下是采访节选：
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Question: In your recent book, "The China Choice," you wrote: "War between the United States and China is already a clear and significant danger." What makes you say that?
问：在你最近的书中，《中国抉择》，你写道，“美国与中国之间的战争已经是显而易见的了。”你是怎样得出这样的结论的？
Answer: Well, when we look at the U.S.-China relationship today, we see a kind of a paradox. On the one hand, they have a relationship of intense economic interdependence. And we also see many aspects of the relationship in its day-to-day interactions, being quite well managed.
答：当我们审视如今中美关系时，我们可以看出一种矛盾。一方面，他们之间的经济紧密相互依赖，并且我们也可以看到他们之间方方面面的日常交流进行得很好。
On the other hand, there seems to be a very deep fracture in the underlying relationship. And I think the source of that fracture is very different and incompatible views between Washington and Beijing of the essential nature of their relationship, their status in that relationship and what that means for their respective roles in Asia. What we have seen over the last few years is an increasingly stark demonstration of that difference.
在另一方面，似乎这些关系下有潜在的致命分歧。我认为分歧的来源在于华盛顿与北京之间对于他们关系以及地位的看法差异，还有就是他们对于各自在亚洲扮演角色的目的差异，并且这些差异都是不可调和的。在过去的几年里，我们可以完全发现这种日益渐增的差异。
And if we look at, for example, the situation in the East China Sea today, where a territorial dispute between Japan and China exists, there are clear risks of a U.S.-China conflict flowing from it. The further that strategic competition escalates, the higher the risk of war becomes. We're in a very serious, downward trajectory.
例如，如果我们考虑目前东海的形势---现在那里是日本和中国领土纠纷的地方，就会发现中美之间完全有可能因此而发生冲突。战略上的竞争越升级，发生战争上的可能性就越大。我们如今处在非常严峻和不利的情况下。
Q: You name three options for the United States to deal with China's challenge.
问：你提出了美国解决中国威胁的三项选择。
A: The United States can withdraw from Asia, which I believe is unlikely. But I don't think any of us in the Western Pacific should rule out the possibility that in 10 years or 15 or 20 years from now that the United States could find that it has made a series of choices which, taken together, mean that the United States no longer asserts the kind of role in Asia that it has played in the past.
答：我不认为美国会退出亚洲。但是我不认为西太平洋地区会在将来的十年、十五年或者二十年排除这种可能性，美国完全可以选择做出一系列的抉择取代他在亚洲的作用。
If China and Japan, for example, came to blows over the Senkakus, and if the United States were to choose not to support Japan, I think that would do massive damage to the U.S.-Japan relationship, and could fundamentally change its nature. If Japan is no longer a strategic client of the United States, it's not quite clear what America's role in the Western Pacific is.
例如如果中国和日本争议的钓鱼岛，如果美国选择不支持日本，我想这会对美日关系造成大规模损害，并且根本的改变现有状况。如果日本不再是美国的战略支持对象，那么美国在西太平洋的地位就会大打折扣。
The second possibility is that it competes with China and that, as China challenges American primacy, America pushes back. That's what's happening.
And the third possibility is to share power with China.
第二种可能性是日本同中国竞争，由于中国对美国的霸主地位构成威胁，美国将以牙还牙。现在就是这样。第三种可能性是美国与中国分享权力。
Q: Why is "power share" the best option?
问：为什么“分享权力”是最好的选择？
A: It seemed to me that China was very unlikely to accept American primacy. If America responded by withdrawing, that would be a disaster for Asia, because China is much more likely to try to establish hegemony over the region.
答：似乎在我看来，中国不大可能接受美国的霸主地位。如果美国的反应是抽手亚洲事务，那么对于该地区来说是灾难性的。因为中国很大可能会在亚洲地区建立霸权。
I think, in the end, it's unlikely to succeed in doing that, because other countries, Japan obviously, perhaps also India and Southeast Asian countries, would resist. And if Japan chooses to resist a Chinese bid for primacy, even without American support, we'd end up with an escalating strategic rivalry between China and Japan, which I don't think China can win. I don't think Japan can win it, either. I think it ends up being very destructive for the whole region, disastrous for the region.
我想，最后似乎也不大可能成功，因为明显日本也许和别的国家一起，比如说印度和东南亚各国，将会集体抵抗。如果日本选择与中国竞争第一，即使是没有美国的帮助，最后是中日间的战略敌对关系持续上升，双方都不能取得胜利。我想这样的结果对于整个地区来说都是毁灭性的和灾难性的。
On the other hand, if the United States stays to compete with China, then rivalry between the U.S. and China escalates. And even if the United States has the support of Japan and the rest of us, America's chances of prevailing in that competition are very low. But I think what happens is that we end up with increased risk of conflict. And, of course, that rivalry also damages economic interdependence and interaction, impoverishes the region, slows economic growth and reverses all of the trends that we've seen in the last 40 years, which have been so positive for all of us.
另一方面来说，如果美国继续与中国竞争，那么中美间的敌对状态要升级。并且即使是美国继续支持日本和亚太地区其他国家，美国的胜算也是非常低的。但是这样的话战争有可能一触即发。当然这样的敌对状态也将会对相互依赖的经济和其他社会关系造成损害，加重这个地区的贫穷化，导致经济增长放慢以及颠覆整个过去四十年对于我们的有利状况。
So, if withdrawal and competition are bad outcomes for the region, sharing power is the only option that's left. There's the middle option in which the United States accepts that it needs to share power with China. I then started asking, "What might that kind of power sharing look like? How might it work?" And that is how I came to build the model of the "concert of Asia."
所以，如果放手和继续竞争都是对于这个区域最坏的结果的话，那么共同分享权力就是最佳选择。美国与中国共享权力是一种折中的方式。我继续问下去，“如果真的分享权力了，那又应该是怎么的呢？”这就是我构建“亚洲一致”模式的过程。
Q: But if you talk to U.S. military people, they are confident that they can defeat China militarily.
问：但是如果你去问美国军队的话，他们会非常确定的告诉你他们可以打败中国军队。
A: I think they're wrong. I think one of the reasons is that they are focusing on the operational rather than on the strategic level, and that's a mistake military people often make. And it's always disastrous to do so.
答：我觉得他们不可能。其中一个缘由是他们比起战略上来更注重操作性事务，这也是军事上常犯的错误。并且这种错误的结果通常是毁灭性的。
I mean, let's go back a couple of steps. The military foundation of America's strategic position in the Western Pacific is its capacity to project power by sea. It's the aircraft carriers and the Marines. And what's happened since 1996 is that China has progressively expanded its capacity to sink American ships.
我的意思是，让我们假设退几步说。美国在西太平洋的军事战略基础是海上导弹投射能力，就是航母和海军。然后自从1996年开始中国的能力越来越往击溃海上舰队发展。
Q: That is what the United States calls the "anti-access, area denial (A2/AD) capabilities."
问：这就是美国所谓的“反介入、区域封锁（A2/AD）能力”？
A: And, of course, that means that the costs and the risks to the United States of projecting power by sea have gone up. And the U.S. response to China's A2/AD strategy has been the air-sea battle concept. It is about degrading China's sea denial capabilities to restore American sea control.
答：是的。这意味着美国海上导弹投射开销和风险的升级。美国对于中国的反介入、区域封锁战略还是空对海的概念。这无疑是美国人自己为了假想自己仍拥有海域控制力而对中国海上能力的毁谤。
And I think there are three problems with that. The first is it's unlikely to work. The Americans are wrong to be confident that they can sufficiently erode China's sea denial capabilities to the point where it becomes safe for the United States to operate their aircraft carriers.
我认为主要包括三点。第一点是美国人不可能实现的。那就是美国人太过于自信能够有效地破坏中国的海上区域封锁能力，这种区域封锁主要针对的是破坏美国航母运作。
I think Americans underestimate China's capacity to find American carriers, and there's a real standoff in space. Chinese capacity to use space-based systems to find U.S. carrier groups has gone up a lot. The Americans, I think, believe that they can deprive China of that capability. But the Chinese can deprive the United States of a lot of space-based capability as well.
我认为美国低估了中国找到美国航母的能力，美国航母需要在空间定点。中国运用空间定点系统找到美国的航母队的能力已经大大提升不少。我认为美国人他们自负于自己能够破坏中国人的计划。但是中国人也同样能够破坏美国人的空间定点系统。
A second point is it's mistaken to believe that, even if it does win the air-sea battle, that it's achieved very much.
Now, China is a very, very big country. So, if the United States achieved the capacity either to sail the carriers or sail the Marines up to the China coast, I don't see what decisive strategic difference that's going to make. It's not going to make China stop.
第二点是美国太过于自负，即使是美国赢得了空对海战役又能怎么样呢。如今的中国是一个非常大的国家。所以如果美国确实有能力把航母或者海军开进中国海岸线，我也不知道美国还能做出什么决定性的战略，这些都不能阻止中国强大。
The third reason I don't like the air-sea battle concept is that it's massively capable to escalate. Among other things, there is a risk of nuclear escalation. Chinese might make the mistake of thinking that the United States would not retaliate against mainland China if the Chinese staged a nuclear strike on Guam.
第三点我不太赞成海对陆战役的形式是这将会导致大规模冲突升级。最有可能的是核战争。中国也许会错误的认为如果中国向关岛投放原子弹后美国不会在中国大陆报复。
Q: Now, how does "power share" work?
问：那么分享权力到底是怎么一回事？
A: The essence of it is, first of all, that both the United States and China have to accept that the other will continue to play a very significant strategic role in Asia and that the other will be there to constrain and limit each others' power. They both have to treat one another as equals.
答：首先实质上，中美双方都必须去接受对方继续在亚洲发挥的重要战略性作用，对方将会限制自身的力量。他们之间必须各自平等对待。
Now, we don't have very many examples in history of this kind of thing. But the best model we have is the concert of Europe that was established during the 19th century. It was a very unusual international system, because you had a series of great powers, six really, all of whom agreed with one another that none would seek to dominate the system, and that if any one of the group tried to dominate the system, the others would all federate together against them. In order to make it work, all of the countries have to accept the legitimacy of the political systems of the others, even though they might be very different. They have to accept that the interests of the other are going to be different from theirs and that they are legitimate.
我们很难在历史中找到类似的权力分享例子。但是如今最好的模式是19世纪初就开始的欧盟。这是一种特殊的国际间组织，因为有一系列的强国，六个的样子，它们都必须相互接受对方，没有谁能够主导这个组织。如果有任何一方想要主导，另外的其他成员都会联合起来阻止那一方。为了能顺利运行，所有的国家都必须接受其他国家政权的行使，尽管它们都不相同。就算对方的利益迥异它们也必须尊重对方的利益，因为它们都具有权力。
And if we think about that in relation to the United States, for example, that means the United States would absolutely have to accept the legitimacy of the Chinese system of government, which I don't believe it does today.
比如，如果我们把这个跟美国联系起来，这就意味着美国必须绝对接受中国政权的权力，但是现在美国并没有这样做。
Q: But doesn't it require Americans to give up their core values, like democracy and human rights?
问：但是这样做的话，美国是不是必须放弃它们的核心价值观念，比如民主和人权？
A: They don't have to give them up, but they have to recognize that the costs of allowing those values to dictate the way they relate to China is going to be very high, and they've got to set against the values of human rights and freedom of religion and so on, the value on the other side of maintaining peaceful relations.
Now in the end, strong states like the United States can afford to go to war with countries like Iraq and Afghanistan. But going to war with China would be completely different. This could quite easily be the worst war in history. And after that war was over, people would go back and say, "Were those values really worth that much?" "Is the government of China so bad?"
The second thing the United States has to do is to accept the legitimacy of China's interests on international issues, even where they differ from America's.
答：他们并不一定需要放弃，但是他们必须要意识到对中国主张这些价值观将付出非常大的成本代价，他们可以为了人权、宗教自由等观念而斗争，但是不斗争的话会得到和平相处。
最后像美国这样的强国能够花成本与伊拉克、阿富汗作战。但是与中国开战是另外一回事。这无疑将是历史上最糟糕的战争。在战争结束后，人们会反思，“这些价值观真的值得这样做吗？”“中国政府真的非常糟糕吗？”
第二点是美国必须接受中国在国际事务上与美国迥异的利益合理性。
Q: So, for example, accept China's claim over the entire South China Sea?
问：例如接受中国声称对南海所拥有的完整主权？
A: The United States might say, "OK, we'll accept your claim to the South China Sea, as long as you accept our right to undertake military operations through those waters." So, you do a deal. Or, "As long as you absolutely guarantee freedom of commercial navigation through those waters."
答：美国也许会说，“好吧，我们接受，只要你允许我们美国在南海进行军事行动。”这样协议就打成了。或者是“我们接受，只要你绝对保证海上商业自由。”
Q: That would invite criticism of appeasement, surely?
问：你确定这样可以满足中国吗？
A: Appeasement is exactly, in a sense, what it is. And, of course, what people do, then, is to say, "Well, that's what we did in the 1930s."
答：在一定意义上的满足是肯定的，这也是美国的目的。当然人们也可能会说，“这种事情我们在1930年代就已经做过了。”
And they say, "Look at what happened in Munich, where we appeased Hitler, we gave him stuff, and all he did was take more." I think that's a legitimate concern. But I also think there are two really critical points to be made.
之后他们还会说，“想想我们在慕尼黑都做过什么，我们满足了希特勒，我们给了他一些东西，但是他还想要更多。”我想这是合法性的问题。但是我认为应该还有两点是重要的。
The first is we've got to be very careful about exactly what the lesson of Munich in 1938 was, because what some people think the lesson of Munich was is that we were wrong to allow Hitler to take over the Sudetenland and that we should have gone to war with Hitler in 1938.
首先是我们必须要仔细考虑1938年的慕尼黑教训。因为一些人认为慕尼黑教训是我们不应该让希特勒接管苏台德区以及我们应该在1938年与希特勒开战。
But what was wrong in 1938 was that Chamberlain didn't make it absolutely clear that he'd go to war over Poland. And when Hitler took over the rest of Czechoslovakia in early 1939, Chamberlain extended a guarantee to Poland, and Hitler didn't believe him.
但是真正的错误是1938年张伯伦并不知道希特勒将与波兰开战。当希特勒在1939年接管捷克斯洛伐克时，张伯伦向波兰保证不会对他们开战，但是希特勒不这样认为。
Now, that was a fundamental mistake. So, to me, the lesson of 1938-1939 is not that you never compromise with ambitious powers; it's that, when you stop compromising, you have to make that absolutely unambiguous. You have to define the boundaries of your compromise absolutely unambiguously. And I think that's relevant to our situation with China.
现在就有一个基本的错误。所以在我看来，1938年到1939年教训并不是说永远不要和强权妥协。而是当停止妥协时，必须要明确，必须界定妥协的底线。我认为这就类似现在同中国的情况。
The second point about appeasement is that China is a very difficult, complex, country, but it's not Nazi Germany. I think it's a country we can do business with. It's certainly worth testing whether we can or not, before assuming the worst.
第二点是中国问题很困难，很复杂，很特殊。但是它不是纳粹德国。我觉得跟中国可以坐下来谈谈。在假设问题会变糟之前，弄清楚我们能做什么和不能做什么很有价值。
Q: When you say "concert of Asia," the membership is not limited to China and the United States, is it?
问：当你提到“亚洲组织”的时候，成员应该不只限于中国和美国吧？
A: No. A very key thing about a concert is that it has to include all of the great powers in the system, countries which are strong enough that they can disrupt the whole thing. I think, in Asia at the moment, they are the United States, China, Japan and, eventually, India.
答：是的。非常关键的一点是这样的组织应该包括所有大国。这些大国能够起主导作用。我认为目前的亚洲称得上大国的有美国、中国、日本和印度。
Q: What kind of reactions did you get to your idea of "power share" from the United States?
问：当你提出“权力分享”策略时，美国人是如何反应的？
A: A lot of Americans argue that I'm too pessimistic about the trajectory of U.S.-China relations, because they don't believe that China is really that strong. They say the economy's bung, the political system doesn't work, the environment's "shot to ribbons," and the population is aging.
答：许多美国人任何我对于中美关系的对峙太为悲观了。因为他们不认为中国已经这么强了。他们会提到经济危机，会提到中国政府的无能，会提到环境的污染，还有老龄化问题。
The second part of the argument is that, OK, maybe China will keep growing economically, but it's not that strong strategically and politically, and so, even though our economy is relatively lower, our military and diplomatic strength will sustain us. And I think that's wrong.
第二种反应是，好吧，也许中国经济会继续增长，但是在外交上与政治上并没有多强大，即使我们美国的经济相对低迷，但是我们的军事和外交力量会保持我们的强势地位。我认为这是错误的。
If you look at all the countries in Asia other than Japan, which I think is in a very special position, all of us want the same thing. None of us wants to live under Chinese primacy. All of us recognize that having the United States stay engaged in Asia is the best way to avoid that. On the other hand, all of us want to get on well with China. All of us see it as economically essential to our futures. All of us really fear being drawn into a U.S.-China strategic conflict on America's side against China.
如果你仔细观察除了日本的其他亚洲国家，我发现一个很特别的现象，其他亚洲国家想法都一致，那就是都不想附庸中国，认为让美国继续染指亚洲地区能够避免中国称王。另一方面，他们又都想与中国保持好关系因为这对于未来经济发展很关键，他们都害怕在中美冲突中跟美国一道与中国敌对。
All of us want the U.S. to stay engaged in a way that doesn't lead to escalating strategic rivalry with China. We want America to stay to balance China, but not to try to dominate it.
他们都想要美国不引发冲突升级继续与中国保持好关系，希望美中力量的平衡，同时也反对美国占主导。
Q: The reactions from China?
问：那么中国的反应是？
A: The China reaction is more complex. They like the argument about America treating China as an equal. But, on the other hand, there are some aspects of the argument that the Chinese find hard to accept. It is the idea that the concert involves Japan as well as America.
答：中国反应更为复杂。他们喜欢美中关系平等的观点。但是另一方面，有些观点认为中国不能接受中美关系平等。因为这样的权力分割不仅包括日本还包括美国。
I think the Chinese are ambivalent about America's future role in Asia, because some aspects of Chinese policy and rhetoric emphasize that they expect and accept that the United States will remain a significant strategic player in Asia.
我认为中国人对于未来美国在亚洲的作用是矛盾的，因为一些中国政策和外交辞令注重的是他们期待和认同美国继续在亚洲发挥的重要作用。
On the other hand, when they're talking about the South China Sea, for example, they say the United States has no role there. And so I think there's a tension in the Chinese position, and I don't think that’s resolved.
另一方面，例如当他们谈到南海时，他们说美国在这个问题上没有权利。所以我认为在中国方面这是个很难解决的紧张问题。
Q: What do you think of the decision by Australia and the United States to have a new rotational deployment of the U.S. Marine Corps in Northern Australia?
问：请问你对于澳大利亚和美国在北澳大利亚地区部署美国海军部队的问题？
A: I think it is a very unwise decision, not because China might punish us directly but because it encourages the United States to pursue an approach to China which is not in our interests and not in America's interests.
答：我认为这是非常不明智的决定，并不是因为中国也许会直接处罚我们，还因为这是变相怂恿美国对华威胁，这不符合我们的利益也同样不符合美国的利益。
Q: So, you think the pivoting, or rebalancing of the United States to the Asia-Pacific region is not a good idea?
问：所以你认为平衡美国在亚太地区的力量是不正确的吗？
A: It's always important to separate the operational from the strategic. There's nothing wrong with the United States maintaining a strong military presence in the Western Pacific. In fact, it is essential to my concept of how the U.S. role should play out. But, if the intention of that presence is to support a posture of containment against China, of resisting any accommodation with China, then it's wrong, because it won't work.
答：把想和做区分开来是很重要的。美国想要在西太平洋保持加强军事部署是正确的。事实上，我也在考虑美国该起到什么样的作用。但是，如果这样的方式是为了摆出对抗中国的姿态，或者说是表示不配合中国，那就是错误的，因为这没有用。
Q: How should Japan and China solve the Senkaku Islands issue?
问：日本应该怎样和中国解决钓鱼岛的问题？
A: If the U.S. found itself drawn into a Japan-China war over the Senkakus, America would expect Australia to support it. And Australia would find that an extremely difficult choice. If I was the prime minister of Japan, I would say, "Let's put that to one side. We need to have a conversation, we three, Japan, China and the United States, about our basic relationships." That would be the really statesmanlike thing to do.
答：如果美国发现它在中日钓鱼岛争端上插不上嘴，那么美国将会期待澳大利亚支持它。澳大利亚会发现这是一个相当棘手的问题。如果我是日本的首相，我会说，“先不管这个，我们需要谈谈我们还有美国之间的关系。”这才是像首相该做的事。
* * *
Hugh White, 58, is a professor of Strategic Studies at Australian National University. His book, "The China Choice," was published in August. He was deputy secretary for strategy and intelligence in the department of defense of Australia.
现年58岁的休.怀特是澳大利亚国立大学战略研究所的教授。他最近的新书《中国抉择》八月上市。他是澳大利亚国防部战略和情报科的秘书代表。
By YOICHI KATO/ National Security Correspondent
来自加藤阳一/国家安全局通讯员
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发表于 2012-11-19 19:39
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发表于 2012-11-20 16:10
