【赫芬顿邮报 20121231】中国与2013年行将就木的独裁者们

满仓

【中文标题】中国与2013年行将就木的独裁者们
【原文标题】Dictator's Dead Pool for 2013
【登载媒体】赫芬顿邮报
【原文作者】Philip N. Howard
【原文链接】http://www.huffingtonpost.com/philip-n-howard/the-dictators-dead-pool-for-2013-will-chinas-investments-pay-off-in-political-clout_b_2374668.html?utm_hp_ref=china




中国的投资在多变的政治风云中能有所收益吗？

世界很少会向独裁者的死亡致哀。一个独裁者的死亡通常会带来混乱，并给他统治下的人民带来更大的痛苦。一年前，我列出了一个时日有限的独裁者名单。他们的政敌都在想方设法尽早结束独裁者的生命。一个死掉的独裁者似乎依然有能力施加影响力，尽管他们显然都是凡人。

这样的一个名单是有用的，它能帮助我们看到那些难以预料的政治命令。经过仔细分析我们可以发现一些“可预料的意外情况”。

下面这些国家的独裁统治者到明年至少都有70岁了，名单按实力排序，其中还包括具体年龄和掌权日期。

沙特阿拉伯：阿卜杜拉•本•阿卜杜勒•阿齐兹•阿勒沙特，88岁，2005年掌权
阿曼：卡布斯•本•赛义德•阿勒赛义德，73岁，1970年掌权
古巴：劳尔•卡斯特罗，81岁，2006年掌权
伊朗：阿里•侯赛因•哈梅内伊，73岁，1989年掌权
科威特：谢赫萨巴赫•艾哈迈德•贾比尔•萨巴赫，83岁，2006年掌权
老挝：朱马利•赛雅贡，76岁
哈萨克斯坦：努尔苏丹•纳扎尔巴耶夫，72岁，1990年掌权
赤道几内亚：奥多罗•奥比昂•恩圭马•姆巴索戈，70岁，1979年掌权
喀麦隆：保罗•比亚，79岁，1982年掌权
刚果布拉柴维尔：德尼•萨苏-恩格索，69岁，1979年到1992年掌权，1997年再次掌权
斐济：拉图•埃佩利•奈拉蒂考，71岁
安哥拉：若泽•爱德华多•多斯桑托斯，70岁，1979年掌权
新加坡：陈庆炎，72岁，2011年掌权
乌干达：约韦里•卡古塔•穆塞韦尼，68岁，1986年掌权
象牙海岸：阿拉萨纳•瓦塔拉，70岁，2011年掌权
津巴布韦：罗伯特•加布里埃尔•穆加贝，88岁，1987年掌权

这个名单与去年的名单有些相似。当然世界上还有其它一些国家需要我们关注：委内瑞拉的查韦斯坚称他在2012年战胜了癌症和政敌，但都值得怀疑。阿尔及利亚的布特弗利卡已经采取了一些温和的改革措施，他的统治方式也并不像名单中的强人那样独裁，但他被指控利用选举舞弊来孤立伊斯兰教众。他已经76岁，所掌控的政治制度摇摇欲坠。上述很多国家中，人民的平均年龄都低于独裁者掌权的时间。这说明，大部分年轻人都从未染指过国家的政治事务，还说明他们的领导人与大部分民众不是一个时代的人。通过数字化媒介，大批年轻人了解到非独裁国家人民的生活状态。

这个名单与去年稍有不同，不仅仅是因为这些独裁者们都老了一岁。朝鲜的金正日在名单刚刚发布之后就去世了；阿拉伯春天让利比亚的卡扎菲丧命，让也门的撒勒赫下台。去年的名单让我想起要写一写，在一张相当有限的“肮脏网络”中，这些人是如何成为网络上的结点的？在这个网络之外，擅于洗钱、造势、运毒和贩奴的本领并不吃香。去年的名单引发了一个问题，如果脏网中少数几个结点突然死掉，整个独裁精英网络会遭受怎样的影响？

今年的名单又出现了新的问题，如果发生权力继承的混乱局面，哪个国家或许可以对新政权施加一些影响力呢？西方政府，比如美国，或许在新皇登基后施加一些非官方的影响力。但是，西方外交界在这种情况下往往会忙于报道国内继承权的争夺实况，而不敢公开宣布支持哪一方。如果美国在古巴和伊朗有它所中意的继承人，公开这个态度无异于把这些人推入火坑。

很多国家都有一个邻国，扮演老大哥、友好的对手或者政治支持主顾的角色，他们有能力施加国内的影响力。对于那些缺少成熟的选举制度、没有明确的继承规则，或者国内政治精英都在忙于营造国际支持网络的国家来说，这些邻国和主顾的影响力就更大了。

令人震惊的是，西方在今年对这些国家的继承形势几乎没有任何施加影响力的机会。这其实也并不出人意料，因为大部分西方政府的时间都用来培植建立在贸易和政治归顺前提下的国际关系。而这些独裁者和上榜的大部分国家，与西方国家和他们的爪牙之间没有任何贸易依赖关系。如果说有的话，中国才是他们对外贸易的主要增长点。美国传统基金会向我们展示出中国为了营造这样的关系，曾经付出了哪些努力。

任何独裁者的死亡都会留下权力真空期，国内的精英分子或许会支持能够维持经济和政治稳定的领导人。对很多国家来说，这种稳定来源于外国直接投资，而这正是中国长期以来毫无芥蒂所从事的工作。

在那些振臂一呼应者云集的政治势力中，哪个国家有能力影响独裁者死后所留下的乌合之众呢？外人或许对伊朗、阿曼、科威特和沙特阿拉伯内部的继承权斗争只能袖手旁观。乌干达、象牙海岸和津巴布韦的国内势力有可能会兵戎相见，与军阀和将军们的理解不同，那里的上层社会与民众意见没有多大关系。那么究竟哪个大国的意见会左右哪些国家的形势呢？古巴、老挝、赤道几内亚、喀麦隆、斐济和安哥拉或许对中国的态度比较感兴趣。哈萨克斯坦会看俄罗斯的眼色。对了，或许只有新加坡才会留意美国鼓励民主选举的意见。

中国对独裁政权的投资背后有很多原因。如果任何一个强权独裁者在2013年去世，我们就可以看到中国的现金换回了多大的政治影响力。



原文：

The world rarely mourns dead dictators. The death of an authoritarian ruler usually means chaos and more suffering for the people they ruled. A year ago I drafted a list of the aging and sickly dictators of this world whose days were numbered for natural reasons. Political enemies often work to end a dictator's tenure early. And a dead dictator can still seem to exert influence from beyond the grave; even they are mortal.

A list like this is useful because it helps set into sharp relief the parts of the world where political order might quickly become precarious. Analyzing such a list can help identify the "predictable surprises" I've written about elsewhere.

Here is a list of countries with authoritarian rulers who will be at least 70 years old next year. The list is ordered by who is toughest (with toughest at the top), and includes information about each ruler's age and the year they took over:

•Saudi Arabia: Abdullah Bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud, age 88, in power since 2005
•Oman: Qaboos Bin Said Al Said, age 73, in power since 1970
•Cuba: Raúl Castro, age 81, in power since 2006
•Iran: Ali Hoseini-Khamenei, age 73, in power since 1989
•Kuwait: Jaber Al Hamad Al Sabah, age 83, in power since 2006
•Laos: Choummaly Sayasone, age 76
•Kazakhstan: Nursultan A. Nazarbayev, age 72, in power since 1990
•Equatorial Guinea: Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, age 70, in power since 1979
•Cameroon: Paul Biya, age 79, in power since 1982
•Congo-Brazzaville: Denis Sassou Nguesso, age 69, in power 1979 to 1992 and since 1997
•Fiji: Ratu Epeli Nailatikau, age 71
•Angola: José Eduardo dos Santos, age 70, in power since 1979
•Singapore: Tony Tan Keng Yam, age 72, in power since 2011
•Uganda: Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, age 68, in power since 1986
•Ivory Coast: Alassane Ouattara, age 70, in power since 2011
•Zimbabwe: Robert Mugabe, age 88, in power since 1987

In some ways, this list is like last year's. And there are still other countries to worry about. Venezuela's Chavez insists he beat his cancer and a major political opponent in 2012, but there are questions about both claims. Algeria's Bouteflika has enacted modest reforms, and his rule may not be as authoritarian as some of the other strongmen on this list, but he has been accused of using electoral fraud to keep the Islamists at bay; he is 76 and managing a precarious political system. In many of these countries, the average age of the population is lower than the number of years the dictator has been in power. This means that large cohorts of youth have little personal experience with competitive politics, but it also means that their leaders are generations out of touch. Through digital media, those large cohorts of youth are learning about what their peers experience in less authoritarian countries.

This list has changed a bit, and not just in the sense that these dictators are a year older. North Korea's Kim Jong Il died shortly after the last version of the dead pool. The Arab Spring took life from Libya's Gaddafi and employment from Yemen's Saleh. Last year's list inspired me to write about how these guys are all nodes in a "dirty network" that is inherently limited because a few losses in membership can have a big impact on the strength of the network. And being good at money laundering, propaganda, drug smuggling or trading slaves is not valued outside the dirty network. Last year's list provoked the question of what might happen to the overall network of authoritarian elites if only a few nodes in the dirty network died off.

Looking at this year's list, a new question comes to mind. If there is a succession crisis, which countries might have some influence in the evolving regime? Western governments, like the United States, might be able to exert some informal influence during a period of interregnum. But in succession crises, Western diplomats often go into high gear reporting on the succession battles for their home governments, and cannot openly pick favorites. If the U.S. had any favored candidates for succession in Cuba or Iran, making those favorites known would probably hurt the candidates.

Many countries have a big brother, friendly rival, geopolitical patron or culturally similar neighbor that exercises some domestic influence. For countries without practiced election systems or clear succession processes, or where local elites are tied up in international patronage networks, these neighbors and patrons can have more influence.

What is striking about this year's list is that the West would have little or no influence on the succession process in these countries. This isn't surprising, because most Western governments spend more time cultivating relationships on the basis of trade and political affinities. Given that they are dictatorships, many of the countries on this list do not have exclusive trade dependencies with the West or strong camaraderie with Western politicians. If anything, the growing trade relationships are with China, and the Heritage Foundation's great interactive map reveals just how much China has invested in those relationships.

The death of any of these rulers would leave a power vacuum. Local elites would probably back the political leader most likely to provide both economic and political stability. For many of these countries, such stability comes through foreign direct investment, something that Chinese investors have been providing without ethical qualms.

Of the countries with political clout, which might be able to influence domestic elites when a dictator dies? Outsiders will probably have little or no influence over succession battles in countries like Iran, Oman, Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. Succession battles in Uganda, the Ivory Coast and Zimbabwe might well involve physical battles where elite alliances and public opinion are less relevant than what warlords and generals think. But which powerful countries' opinions might carry some weight in which countries? Political elites in Cuba, Laos, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Fiji and Angola might be interested in China's opinions. Elites in Kazakhstan might be sensitive to Russian influence. Alas, only Singapore might be a country where countries like the United States might encourage a democratic transition through competitive elections.

There are lots of reasons why China invests in authoritarian regimes. And if any of the world's toughest dictators passes away in 2013, we may be able to see how much China's financial investments pay off in political influence.

Jigong

不扯上中国，好像是不过瘾！;P

paoding

第一，这种人忘了，美国给中国投资设立了据说无数美国人民都支持的这样那样的限制，除了据说美国能决定是否成为废纸的美债之类，，，
第二，这是媒体在告诉美国人民，中国就是现在和将来的那些独裁者们的资金源，所以。。。

所以，其实这就是个三流的剧本，即便扔到好莱坞也只能骗到些三流以下的制片四流以下导演以及末流的盒饭演员，当然最终买单的是无脑的粉丝。。。

无可就要

美国并不是容不下不同的意识形态，像沙特，巴林，卡塔尔这样君主世袭皇权，只要愿意屁颠屁颠跟在美国屁股后面，从属于西方利益，美国还是很乐意接受的。
     对于美国人来说，民主的意义就在于：听美国人的话，照美国人说的去做。否则，就是独裁，就是专制，美国就要不择手段地进行换人。当今世界，舆论的话语权几乎完全掌握在霸权主义美国和西方列强手里，为了自己的利益，他们常常撒下弥天大谎，已以达到他们的丑恶目的。他们哪里有什么真实，公正可言。伊拉克战争之前，美国的主流媒体CNN、 ABC、FOX一天24小时不停地轰炸洗脑，丑化萨达姆政权，编造大规模杀伤性武器谎言，而正是这种新闻媒体的舆论一致，维护了美国资产阶级政府对外战争的合法性。他们不断地给不听话的国家造谣，罗列各种罪名，这个独裁，那个专制，不是大屠杀，就是有大杀伤性武器，...........最近又出现了一个乌干达军阀《Kony》，总之，都是欲加之罪何患无辞的强盗逻辑！美国人从骨子里就认为这世界就是他们主宰的。

     西方国家根本就没打算让中国的人民来掌握自己国家命运，就像西方不能接受俄罗斯人民选择了普京一样。西方政客对于他们的一切都是为了“国家利益”从来都是毫不掩饰的，只有傻瓜才会真相信“普世价值”的谎言，只有西方利益集团在中国的代言人才会起劲地推销西方的所谓“普世价值”。