【洛杉矶时报20130127】重新思考我国对华战略

阿妮阿妮你在哪

【中文标题】重新思考我国对华战略
【原文标题】Rethinking our China strategy
【登载媒体】Los Angeles Times 洛杉矶时报
【来源地址】
【译者】阿妮阿妮你在哪
【翻译方式】人工
【声明】欢迎转载，请务必注明译者和出处 bbs.m4.cn。
【原文库链接】
【译文】Senate committees will soon be asked to vote on President Obama's nominees to head the departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency . Many, if not most, of the senators' questions will be focused on the nominees' views on the pressing security problems the United States faces in the greater Middle East and Afghanistan. But it would be a mistake for the committees to let the hearings pass without also examining the administration's own stated policy priority — the "pivot" or "rebalance" to the Asia-Pacific region.

参议院很快将就奥巴马总统提名的国务卿、国防部部长及中情局局长人选进行投票。议员们的很多问题，将围绕候选人对目前美国在大中东和阿富汗地区面临的日益紧张的安全问题提出。但是听证会还应该仔细检查其首要政策——重返亚太地区，或称亚太再平衡。

A productive discussion of the pivot, however, will require a frank acknowledgment that the primary factor driving the change is increased nervousness in Washington and Asian capitals about China's rise and, in turn, recognition that the U.S. policy of engagement with China has not been as effective in shaping that rise as successive administrations, Republican and Democratic, had hoped.

若想关于重返亚洲的讨论有成效，则要求他们坦率得承认，引发此变动的首要原因，正是华盛顿和亚洲其他国家日益增加的对中国崛起的焦虑。并且，美国干预中国崛起的战略，并不如历届政府——民主党和共和党——所期望的那样有效。

On this point, it is particularly useful to reread then-Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick's  2005 speech in which he famously invited Beijing to become a "responsible stakeholder" in the international system. Since the late 1970s, the U.S. had been, as Zoellick put it, "opening doors to China's membership into the international system" with the expectation that doing so would lead to change in Chinese behavior as it saw the security and economic benefits of that system. By no means a China "hawk," Zoellick provided a reasonable set of benchmarks for judging just how successful engagement would be in moving China along the path of a benign rise to great-power status.

关于这一点，重读2005年，时任美国副国务卿罗伯特佐利克的演讲会很有启发。在那篇著名的演讲中，罗伯特佐利克邀请中国成为国际体系中“负责任的利害关系人”。佐利克说：“从上个世纪七十年代后期，美国就一直对中国加入这个国际体系持肯定态度，期望中国看到这个体系带来的经济和安全利益之后，可以改变自己的做法。”作为一个对华鹰派，佐利克不可能就为了评判让中国和平崛起的战略有多成功而提供一套合理标尺。

                                                                                                                                                                So, what does the score card look like?
To start, Zoellick noted that, although China had "gained much from its membership in an open, rules-based international economic system," its mercantilist economic policies put in doubt its commitment to that system's underlying principles. And little has changed on that front. China keeps its currency undervalued to promote its exports, limits foreign access to its markets and treats natural resources as exclusive national assets. The government has done little to rein in intellectual property piracy or commercial cyber-espionage. State-owned banks still dominate China's financial sector, and Beijing-driven industrial policies have increased, not decreased, in recent years.

那么，结果是怎么回事呢？佐利克指出：“虽然中国从这段开放的，有规章可循的国际体系中收获颇多”，但是它的重商主义经济政策让人对它是否忠于该体系的根本原则产生了怀疑。这一点到现在仍未改变。中国持续低估本国货币币值来增加出口，限制外国资本进入本国市场并且把天然能源作为国家专有财产。未加强保护知识产权和打击商业网络间谍活动的力度，国有银行在金融界依然占有统治地位，近年来政府干预的产业政策有增无减。

Another point of contention Zoellick hoped the Chinese would address was the lack of transparency when it came to China's military buildup. But despite repeated U.S. initiatives, military-to-military exchanges have produced little of substance, and American intelligence continues to be surprised as some new Chinese weapons system is rolled out of its hangar or deployed at sea. Even during some of the roughest patches of the Cold War, the White House had a direct hot line to the Kremlin, and we knew, by mutual agreement, how many strategic warheads and missiles the Soviets had. With China, we haven't a clue.

佐利克希望中国重点处理的另一个问题，就是加强军事透明化。只有美国不停的在主动公开军事，两国的军事交流却收效甚微，并且中国总是让美国情报部门措手不及，经常从飞机库拉出些武器系统，或者在海洋布置新武器。即使在冷战最严重的时期，白宫和克里姆林宫也有一条直通专线，根据双方共识，我们可以知道（前）苏联有多少战略核弹头和导弹。但是对于中国，我们一无所知。

As a responsible stakeholder, Zoellick said, China could and should do more to address the problem of North Korea  and weapons proliferation more generally.

On North Korea, only Beijing has the ability to pressure or persuade Pyongyang to change behavior. Yet North Korea continues to stockpile nuclear weapons and is bent on perfecting missiles that threaten our allies and, soon enough, the United States.

佐利克说，作为一个负责任的利害关系人，中国可以，并且应该加大力度处理朝鲜问题和武器扩散问题。在朝鲜问题上，只有中国有能力施压于朝鲜或劝说朝鲜改变。然而，平壤却继续储备核武器并完善其导弹以威胁我们的盟国，不久以后就会威胁到美国。


If there is any good news, China's direct role in proliferating has lessened. And while the recent vote by Beijing in support of the U.N. Security Council resolution condemning North Korea's last missile test is a small but positive step, Beijing has not used its considerable leverage with Pyongyang to stop North Korea's proliferation, and has dragged its feet on helping the rest of the world deal with the destabilizing impact of Iran's nuclear program. As Zoellick noted, "China's actions on Iran's nuclear program will reveal the seriousness of China's commitment to nonproliferation" and, so far, its record falls short of that mark.

中国在武器扩散中的直接角色削弱算是一个好消息吧。最近联合国安理会投票制裁朝鲜进行导弹试验，中国投了赞成票，步子虽小，却是积极的一步。北京还未使用它手中的重要砝码去制约朝鲜武器扩散，而是转身帮世界其他国家应对由伊朗核试验引起的震动。就像佐利克所说，中国对伊朗核问题的处理将揭示其对核不扩散条约的认真程度，到目前为止，中国所做努力并不够。

And, finally, Zoellick said that "China's choices about Twaiwan will send an important message too.... It is important for China to resolve its differences with Taiwan peacefully." However, despite the most conciliatory government in Taiwan since the establishment of the People's Republic of China, Beijing's military buildup across from the island democracy has not diminished. Since Zoellick's speech, China has taken an even more aggressive posture toward its neighbors, with confrontations with Japan in the East China Sea and Vietnam and the Philippines in the South China Sea.

最后，佐利克说：“中国对台湾的选择也会传递出重要的信。……中国跟台湾和平解决争端很重要。”但是，与自中华人民共和国成立以来，历届台湾最温和的政府相反，北京布置在岛上的民主政权对岸的军事力量却没减弱过。自佐利克的演讲以来，中国甚至对它的邻居采取了更挑衅的姿态，在东海对日本发难，在南海为难越南和菲律宾。

So what does this assessment of Chinese behavior mean for U.S. policy in an Obama second term? First, it reinforces the administration's rationale for upping America's strategic game in the Asia-Pacific region. What the Senate should be looking to hear, however, is exactly how the new national security team will go about making that a reality, especially in an era of major cuts in defense spending.

那么，这份对中国动作的评估对第二任期内，美国的政策有什么意义呢？首先，为美国升级亚太地区战略提供了更有力的理由，议员们要听的正是新的国家安全队伍如何使这一设想变为现实，尤其是在国防费用大幅削减的时期。


Second, it means that, to the extent engagement is pursued, it should be with an eye to what is mutually and concretely beneficial, not with the expectation that the process itself will lead to China's transformation.

第二，这意味着，这项战略应该着眼于相互并正确的利益，不要寄希望于中国在这一进程中会自己转变。

Finding the right balance in U.S.-China policy is a complex task. But the first step for the new secretaries of State and Defense in getting it right must be to understand what engagement can and can't do, and to realize it is unlikely that China will become a member in good standing of the liberal international order until its leaders have made the decision to become liberal at home.

在中美之间寻找平衡点是一项复杂的任务，为此，新的国务卿和国防部长第一步要做的就是要明白什么能做，什么不能做，还要理解，中国不可能成为遵守自由国际秩序的国家，除非他们的领导层决定让国内先自由了。

仙外飞天

美国应卖掉台湾

万里鹰扬

又给中国下心里套索了。