美国国家档案关于如何分裂西藏

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http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xxx/337_343.html

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XXX ChinaDEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

Questions Pertaining to Tibet

337. Memorandum for the Special Group/1/
Washington, January 9, 1964.
/1/Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Special Group Files, S.G. 112, February 20, 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. The source text bears no drafting information. Memoranda for the record by Peter Jessup of February 14 and 24 state that the paper was considered at a Special Group meeting on February 13 and approved by the Special Group on February 20. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80-B01285A, Box 1, 303 Committee Meetings (1964))
SUBJECT
Review of Tibetan Operations
1. Summary--The CIA Tibetan Activity consists of political action, propaganda, and paramilitary activity. The purpose of the program at this stage is to keep the political concept of an autonomous Tibet alive within Tibet and among foreign nations, principally India, and to build a capability for resistance against possible political developments inside Communist China.
2. Problem--To explain Agency expenditures in support of the Tibetan program.
3. Background and Objectives--At a 13 December 1963 meeting "The Special Group approved the continuation of CIA controlled Tibetan Operations [1 line of source text not declassified]." Previous operations had gone to support isolated Tibetan resistance groups within Tibet and to the creation of a paramilitary force on the Nepal/Tibet border of approximately 2,000 men, 800 of whom were armed by [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] airdrop in January 1961. In 1963, as a result of the [2 lines of source text not declassified] and as a result of the cited Special Group meeting, the Agency began a more broadly based political program with the exiled Tibetans. This included bringing 133 Tibetans to the United States for training in political, propaganda and paramilitary techniques; continuing the support subsidy to the Dalai Lama's entourage at Dharmsala, India; continuing support to the Nepal based Tibetan guerrillas; the reassignment of a part of the unarmed guerrillas to India for further training; and the [6 lines of source text not declassified]. Operational plans call for the establishment of approximately 20 singleton resident agents in Tibet [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] two road watch teams in Tibet to report possible Chinese Communist build-ups, and six border watch communications teams [1 line of source text not declassified]. The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] will stay in direct touch with Dharmsala and will conduct political correspondence with Tibetan refugee groups [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to create an increased Tibetan national political consciousness among these refugees. The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] was established in October 1963, and the communications center serving it, [1 line of source text not declassified] is presently being built with a completion date scheduled in February 1964.
One of the most serious problems facing the Tibetans is a lack of trained officials equipped with linguistic and administrative abilities. The Agency is undertaking the education of some 20 selected Tibetan junior officers to meet this need. A United States advisory committee composed of prominent United States citizens has been established to sponsor the education of these Tibetans. Cornell University has tentatively agreed to provide facilities for their education.
The Agency is supporting the establishment of Tibet Houses in [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Geneva, and New York City. The Tibet Houses are intended to serve as unofficial representation for the Dalai Lama to maintain the concept of a separate Tibetan political identity. The Tibet House in New York City will work closely with Tibetan supporters in the United Nations, particularly the Malayan, Irish, and Thai delegations.
The cost of the Tibetan Program for FY 1964 can be summarized in approximate figures as follows:
a. Support of 2100 Tibetan guerrillas based in Nepal--$ 500,000
b. Subsidy to the Dalai Lama--$ 180,000
c. [1 line of source text not declassified] (equipment, transportation, installation, and operator training costs)--$ 225,000
d. Expenses of covert training site in Colorado--$ 400,000
e. Tibet Houses in New York, Geneva, and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] ( 1/2 year )--$ 75,000
f. Black air transportation of Tibetan trainees from Colorado to India--$ 185,000
g. Miscellaneous (operating expenses of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] equipment and supplies to reconnaissance teams, caching program, air resupply--not overflights, preparation stages for agent network in Tibet, agent salaries, etc.)--$ 125,000
h. Educational program for 20 selected junior Tibetan officers-- $ 45,000
Total--$ 1,735,000
4. Coordination--This Tibetan operational program has been coordinated with the Department of State for a number of years. Specific operational activity has been coordinated with the Department of Defense and the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] as necessary.
5. Recommendations--Barring sudden developments inside Communist China and Tibet, expenses for this long-range, politically-oriented Tibet program are not expected to exceed this amount in the foreseeable future. In fact, there are a number of probable economics, [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] for example. Nonetheless, this program will continue to require fairly large expenditures over a long period of time to keep the possibility of a non-Communist government alive to the Tibetan people. We recommend continuance of this program.

338. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/
Washington, December 29, 1964, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 TIBET/US. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by John W. Kimball of IO/UNP; cleared by Sisco, Officer in Charge of Indian Affairs David T. Schneider, Louise McNutt of FE/RA, Henry W. Allen of SCA/ORM, Bundy, Komer, and the President; and approved by Marshall Green. Repeated to USUN.
1292. Please convey following message from President Johnson to Dalai Lama in reply to Dalai Lama's letter of November 18./2/
/2/Not printed. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Tibet--Dalai Lama)
Begin text
Your Holiness:
I thank you for your gracious letter of November 18, 1964.
As you point out, the United States Government is deeply concerned with the abrogation of the basic human rights of the Tibetan people and the progressive elimination of their distinctive cultural and religious heritage by the Communist Chinese.
The United States welcomed the opportunities in previous years to assist in bringing the plight of the Tibetan people to the attention of world opinion through the United Nations. As Your Holiness is aware, the United States has also assisted directly in programs to alleviate the material hardships of the Tibetans who have been forced to leave their homeland.
Your Holiness may be assured that the deep and abiding interest of the United States in the welfare of the Tibetan people will continue. My Government welcomes the initiative of the Governments of El Salvador, Nicaragua, and the Philippines to place the Tibetan question on the agenda of the Nineteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly. We wish, of course, to see the Tibetan item succeed in the United Nations, and we will do everything appropriate to support it.
With assurances of my highest esteem.
Sincerely yours,
Lyndon B. Johnson. End text.
Embassy should indicate to Tibetans that Dept expects no publicity on exchange of correspondence. Embassy may at its discretion inform appropriate GOI officials of substance President's letter.
Rusk

339. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State/1/
New York, November 30, 1965, 0229Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 TIBET/UN. Confidential. Repeated to New Delhi, Manila, Managua, and San Salvador.
2354. Tibet. Gyalo Thondup called on Goldberg and Congressman O'Hara Nov. 29. Thondup said Dalai Lama is anxious keep Tibetan issue alive and to forefront of world opinion; sees no better way accomplish this than through GA debate, though he recognizes GA debates and reses unlikely produce concrete results. Thondup said Tibetans are, however, in somewhat of quandary as to how they best proceed this year. On one hand, Tibetans own convictions re status of Tibet, plus desire give hope and encouragement to people within Tibet, lead them to prefer GA debate which would end with res recognizing political aspects of Tibetan problem through references to self-determination and independence.
On other hand, Tibetans well aware of attitude of GOI which, for two years, has assured Tibetans it willing give full and active support to res emphasizing human rights aspects of Tibetan problem. However, GOI has been very hesitant, and is more so than ever at present moment, to support res touching on political side of Tibetan problem. Would, therefore, appreciate US advice.
Goldberg assured Thondup (and asked that this be conveyed to Dalai Lama) that US Govt and people deeply concerned re plight of Tibetan people, recognize Tibetan problem has both human rights and political aspects, and prepared support appropriate res touching on both. Nevertheless, must recognize that Afro-Asian attitude has been disappointing this year in many respects (e.g. ChiRep vote and inscription of Tibetan item); Africans are unusually preoccupied with problems of own continent; and many AAs seem anxious avoid taking stand on issues which entail degree of confrontation with Communist China.
In planning strategy, therefore, Goldberg said care must be exercised not to seek res which would fail to carry or carry with only weak vote. Attitude of Asian states with sizeable Buddhist populations of central importance. This particularly true of India, partly because of its positions in AA world, partly because it is closest to and has most intimate knowledge of Tibetan problem. It is unlikely that at present time many AAs willing go much further on Tibetan res than Indians prepared to lead.
Thondup said US support and help with other delegations will be essential for any res. Goldberg said US, of course, would render appropriate help but reiterated view that essential thing for Tibetans is to get active support of Indians and other Asians. MisOff added that US help, if too obvious, would tend damage rather than improve prospects for good vote because it would lend credence to those who contend Tibetan item is essentially US-inspired "cold-war" item./2/
/2/Telegram 1412 to USUN, December 6, stated that while the Department had been concerned that "too active" lobbying on the Tibet item might be disadvantageous, additional effort might be desirable to overcome "apparent apathy enveloping item in GA." It instructed USUN to broaden its approaches to Western European and African delegations and to include such delegations as Jordan and Iran. (Ibid.)
Thondup then presented us with text of draft res which, he said, was drafted by Tibetans in New Delhi and approved by GOI (text which Thondup has not yet discussed with Phils and other co-sponsors, sent septel). Thondup expressed concern that res might be interpreted as retreat from 1961 res. Goldberg said it did not appear to be retreat since it reaffirmed both previous reses in preamble, and spoke of "denial of the fundamental freedom" which Tibetans have always enjoyed in operative section.
After leaving Goldberg, Thondup told MisOff he was assured in New Delhi that GOI would instruct its UN del to give "full and active support" to this res, including speech in debate and promoting support among other dels. Thondup said Indian Mission confirmed receipt of such instructions earlier in day.
Goldberg
340. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, December 17, 1965.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 19 TIBET. Confidential. Drafted by Koren.
SUBJECT
Tibet
PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Gyalo Thondup
Dep. Under Secretary U Alexis Johnson
Amb. H. L. T. Koren, INR
Mr. Thondup said that the Indian attitude regarding the Tibetan question had changed, and, largely because of India's new situation vis-a-vis Communist China, India was now being more forthcoming and helpful. However, the difficulty was that India was weak militarily and hard-pressed, and therefore, reluctant to be truly forthcoming. They were supporting, although not sponsoring, the human rights resolution on Tibet now before the General Assembly. What the Tibetans wanted was support in a political sense and to have a case made for their political freedom. For instance, when approached for support, the Afro-Asians asked what the Tibetans really gained from a resolution on human rights. The Afro-Asians felt that a political resolution looking to independence was what was needed, a resolution dealing with fundamental freedom for Tibet. However, the Indians were unwilling to take this step and the current resolution, which was first aimed at fundamental freedom, was watered down at their insistence to fundamental freedoms. Prime Minister Shastri and the majority of his ministers as well as the Indian people were for the Tibetan cause. But in their present situation, they were not ready to take a position of leadership. They needed to be urged by the U.S.
Therefore, Mr. Thondup wished to pass on to Mr. Johnson the Dalai Lama's request that the U.S. re-examine its position and encourage India to take a political, rather than a purely humanitarian position regarding Tibet. Mr. Thondup went on to say that for Communist China Tibet was a weak spot militarily, spiritually, and morally. He felt that the U.S. had a right to ask for a stronger Indian position and hoped that Ambassador Bowles might take this up with Prime Minister Shastri. The near-term objective was to establish a government-in-exile under the Dalai Lama in India.
Mr. Johnson said that Taiwan posed something of a problem for us. It was not a question that Taiwan's influence with us was strong, but it was a factor that we must consider. Mr. Thondup felt that the Nationalist Chinese should take a more progressive attitude, but in talking to them he found them difficult and hampered by a hundred years of tradition and the present dominance of the conservative group. The younger officials were not so hidebound, but the present Chi-Nat stance was that once they were back on the Mainland, they would support self-determination for Tibet. There followed a brief discussion of the status of Tibet in recent history, whether it had been, in fact really independent.
Mr.Thondup said, in summary, that in future efforts it was best to avoid the question of past independence and to rally support for the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan people in their independence struggle. He made a strong plea for U.S. help as well as advice on how to pursue their goals. Mr. Johnson noted that the question of government-in-exile was somewhat difficult for us at the present time, because we had resisted all pressure for a Cuban Government-in-exile in this country. He promised to discuss Mr.Thondup's plea with his colleagues who had been following Tibetan matters much more closely recently than he and we would pass our considered view to him, most likely through Ambassador Bowles.

不必人懂我

英语早忘光了...............

zhichiqoyunzg

希望你能给翻译一下  看不懂啊

zhichiqoyunzg

以下是我用一个翻译工具翻译的，还是看不懂


外交关系，美国1964年至1968年卷三十chinadepartment的国家，华盛顿特区有关的问题，西藏337 。备忘录特别小组/ 1 /华盛顿， 1964年1月9日。 / 1/source ：国务部，卢比的历史档案，特别小组的文件，法律政策专员112名， 1964年2月20日。秘密;眼睛只。源文本的起草承担任何信息。谅解备忘录，以便记录在案彼得杰瑟普的2月14日和24个州，该文件被认为是在一个特别小组会议，就2月13日和批准的特别工作组2月20日。 （中央情报部， DCI标准（ mccone ）档案，工作80 - b01285a ，框1 ， 303委员会会议（ 1964年） ）除检讨西藏行动1 。概述-美国中央情报局西藏的活动构成的政治行动，宣传，和准军事活动。的目的，该计划在此阶段，是保持政治的概念，一个独立的西藏活着与西藏之间的和外国的国家，主要是印度，并建立一种能力抵抗可能的政治事态发展内的共产主义中国。 2 。问题-解释机构支出在支持西藏的计划。 3 。背景和目标-在1 963年1 2月1 3日会议的“特别小组批准继续中央情报局控制西藏的行动[ 1线的源文本没有解密] ” 。以前的行动去支持西藏分离抵抗组织内部的西藏，并建立一个准军事部队对尼泊尔/西藏边境的大约2000名官兵， 800名武装[少于1线的源文本没有解密]空投在1961年1月。 1963年，由于[ 2线的源文本没有解密]作为一个结果，引用特别小组会议，该机构开始一个更广泛基础的政治纲领与流亡海外的西藏人。这包括使133西藏人到美国训练，在政治，宣传和准军事技术;继续支持资助dl喇嘛的陪同人员在dharmsala ，印度;继续支持尼泊尔的西藏游击队的基础;调动的一部分，手无寸铁游击队对印度进行了进一步的培训;和[ 6线源文本没有解密] 。行动计划，呼吁建立大约20个单身居民代理商在西藏[少于1线的源文本没有解密]二道纠察队在西藏的报告可能中国共产党建立UPS ，以及6边境观赏通信队[ 1路线源文本没有解密] 。 [少于1线的源文本没有解密]将留在直接接触dharmsala ，并会进行政治函授与西藏难民组[少于1线的源文本没有解密]创造一个增加西藏民族的政治意识，这些难民。 [少于1线的源文本没有解密]是成立于1963年10月，和通讯中心服务， [ 1线的源文本没有解密]目前正在兴建一个完成日期定在1964年2月。之一，面临的最严重问题，藏族是一个缺乏受过训练的官员配备了语言和行政能力。该机构是教育事业的大约20选定西藏初级人员，以应付这方面的需求。美国的一个咨询委员会的组成，突出的美国公民已经成立了以赞助教育的这些西藏人。康乃尔大学已初步同意提供设施，让他们的教育。该机构是支持建立西藏之家在[少于1线的源文本没有解密] ，日内瓦和纽约市。西藏的房子打算作为非官方的代表dl喇嘛保持的概念，一个独立的西藏政治身份。西藏之家在纽约市将密切与西藏的支持者在联合国，特别是马来亚，爱尔兰，泰国代表团。成本西藏的计划， 1964财政年度，可以归纳为近似的数字如下： a.支持2100年西藏游击队总部设在尼泊尔-五十〇点零零零万美元乙资助dl喇嘛-十八万元长[ 1线的源文本没有解密] （设备，运输，安装和操作人员培训费用） -二二五〇 〇 〇美元四开支的秘密训练场在科罗拉多州-四十○点零万美元e .西藏之家设在纽约，日内瓦，和[少于1线的源文本没有解密] （ 1 /二年） -七万五美元楼黑色航空运输的藏族学员，从科罗拉多州到印度-一十八点五万美元g .杂项（营运开支[少于1线的源文本没有解密]设备和用品，以侦察队，缓存程序，空中补给-不飞越，准备阶段，代理网络，在西藏，代理人的薪酬等） -元125000每小时教育计划为20选定初级藏族人员-四五○○○美元共计-一七三五○○○四美元。协调-这藏族业务方案已协调部国家数年。具体的业务活动已协调与防御部门和[少于1线的源文本没有解密]作为必要的。 5 。建议-除非有突发的事态发展内的共产主义中国和西藏，费用为这个存在已久的范围内，在政治上面向西藏的计划是预计不超过这个数额在可预见的将来。事实上，有一些可能的经济学， [ 1-1/2线的源文本没有解密]例如。然而，这一计划将继续需要相当大的支出超过一段很长的时间保持的可能性，一个非共产党政府的活着，向西藏人民。我们建议继续这一计划。 338 。电报由国务部向大使馆在印度/ 1 /华盛顿， 1964年12月29日，下午1时/ 1/source ：国务部，中央文件，波兰19日，西藏/我们。保密; limdis 。草拟的约翰瓦特金博尔的团/统一国民党;清拆sisco ，主任，负责印度事务的大卫汤匙，施耐德，路易丝mcnutt铁/放射摄影术，亨利瓦特李鹏飞政制事务局局长/ ORM的ORM ，邦迪，科默尔，和总统;并批准了马歇尔的绿色。重复usun 。 1292 。请转达以下信息由约翰逊总统向dl喇嘛在答复dl喇嘛的信11月18日。 / 2 / / 2/not印刷。 （约翰逊图书馆，国家安全档案，特别国家元首的信件档案，西藏-dl喇嘛）开始的文字您的成圣：我感谢您殷勤的信1 964年1 1月1 8日。正如你指出，美国政府对此深表关注与废除的基本人权，西藏人民的和逐步消除他们的独特文化和宗教遗产，由共产主义中国。美国欢迎的机会，在过去数年，以协助实现的困境了西藏人民的关注世界舆论的通过联合国。作为您的是成圣知道，美国还协助直接在程序，以减轻材料的困难，藏族人已被迫离开自己的家园。您的成圣可以放心，深和守法的利益，美国在社会福利的西藏人民将继续下去。我国政府欢迎的倡议，政府萨尔瓦多，尼加拉瓜，菲律宾把西藏问题议程上的第十九届会议的联合国大会。我们希望，当然，看到藏族项目成功，在联合国，我们将尽一切适当的支持。与我最崇高的敬意自尊。您诚挚的，林登约翰逊。年底的案文。大使馆应表明，以西藏人认为，部预计，没有宣传，书信往来。大使馆可能在其斟酌告知适当的戈伊官员物质主席的信。腊斯克339 。电报从驻联合国代表团向国务部/ 1 /纽约， 1965年11月30日， 0229z 。 / 1/source ：国务部，中央文件，波兰19日，西藏/联合国。保密。多次到新德里，马尼拉，马那瓜，和圣萨尔瓦多。 2354 。西藏。 gyalo顿杜普所谓对戈德堡和国会议员奥哈拉11月29日。顿杜普说，dl喇嘛是急欲保持西藏问题活着，并前列，世界舆论认为没有更好的办法做到这一点，比通过遗传算法的辩论，他虽然认识到遗传算法的辩论和reses不可能产生具体结果。顿杜普说，藏族人，但是，在有点无所适从至于如何，他们最好的进行，今年。一方面，西藏人自己的信念转口地位的西藏，再加上给予的愿望，希望和鼓励人民在西藏，带领他们宁愿大会辩论这将结束与第认识到政治方面的西藏问题通过提述的自决权和独立。在另一方面，西藏人清楚知道的态度，戈伊，为两年，保证西藏人，它愿意给予充分和积极的支持，第强调人权方面的西藏问题。不过，戈伊一直很犹豫，更使比以往任何时候都在目前为止，支持号决议在谈到政治方面的西藏问题。会，因此，欣赏美国的意见。戈德堡保证顿杜普（并询问这转达给dl喇嘛）说，美国政府和人民的深切关注转口的困境，西藏人民，承认西藏问题是双方的人权和政治问题，并准备支持适当的事在谈到双方。然而，必须承认，亚非的态度一直令人失望，今年在许多方面（如chirep表决，并题词藏族项目） ;非洲人异常专注的问题，自己的大陆和许多原子吸收光谱法，似乎急欲避免采取立场的问题上，需要程度的对抗与共产主义中国。在规划策略，因此， Goldberg表示，必须小心行使不寻求号决议，其中将无法进行或进行与只有疲软的表决。的态度，亚洲国家与庞大的佛教人口中环的重要性。这尤其如此，印度，部分原因是它的立场，在机管局的世界，这部分是因为它是最接近和最熟悉西藏的问题。这是不大可能的时间，目前许多原子吸收光谱法愿意能更进一步，对藏事比印度人准备带头作用。顿杜普说，美国的支持和帮助，与其他代表团将是至关重要的任何事。戈德堡说，美国，当然会提供适当的帮助，但重申认为，至关重要的事，西藏人是要积极支持，印度人和其他亚洲人。 misoff补充说，美国的帮助，如果太明显，往往会损害而非改善的前景良好的表决，因为这将给予轻信那些争鸣藏族项目，基本上是我们创作灵感的“冷战”项目。 / 2 / / 2/telegram usun到1412年， 12月6日指出，虽然该署已关注到“太积极”游说对西藏的项目可能会处于不利的，额外的努力可能是可取的，以克服“明显的冷漠包络项目，在遗传算法” 。它指示usun扩大其办法，西欧和非洲国家代表团和包括诸如代表团约旦和伊朗。 （同上）顿杜普，然后向我们提出的案文决议草案，他说，这是草拟的西藏人在新德里和批准的戈伊（文本顿杜普尚未讨论与phils和其他共同提案国，发送septel ） 。顿杜普表示关注事可能被解释为退出1961号决议。戈德堡说，它似乎并没有被撤退，因为它重申了双方以往的reses在序言中，并以“剥夺的基本自由” ，西藏人一直享有的执行部分。戈德堡在卸任后，顿杜普告诉misoff向他保证在新德说，戈伊将指示其联合国DEL ，以给予“充分和积极的支持”这个事，包括讲话，在辩论中，支持和促进其他住客。顿杜普说，印度团证实收到这样的指示较早时在天。戈德堡340 。谅解备忘录的谈话/ 1 /华盛顿， 1965年12月17日。 / 1/source ：国务部，中央文件，波兰19日，西藏。保密。起草koren 。受西藏与会者先生gyalo顿杜普的DEP 。根据司u亚历克西斯约翰逊的AMB 。高级别小组koren ，卢比先生顿杜普说，印度的态度，关于西藏问题发生了变化，和，主要是因为印度的新形势下，相对于共产主义中国，印度目前正在更多即将举行的和有益的。然而，困难在于印度是薄弱的军事和硬压，因此，不愿意真正即将举行的。他们的支持，虽然不是办学，人权决议对西藏的现在摆在大会面前。什么西藏人希望有人支持，在政治意识和有一个案件作出他们的政治自由。举例来说，当接触的支持，非裔，亚裔问什么西藏人真正获得了从一项决议，关于人权。非裔，亚裔认为，政治解决展望独立所需要的一项决议，处理与基本自由西藏。不过，印度人都不愿意采取这个步骤和目前的决议，这是第一次，目的是在基本自由，被淡化，在他们的坚持基本自由。总理夏斯特里和大多数他的部长们，以及为印度人民，为西藏的事业。但在其目前的情况来看，他们不准备采取的领导地位。他们必须敦促美国因此，先生顿杜普希望传授给Johnson先生dl喇嘛的要求，即美国重新审视其立场，并鼓励印度采取政治，而不是一个纯粹的人道主义立场，关于西藏。先生顿杜普接着说，为共产主义中国西藏是一个薄弱点在军事上，精神上和道义上。他认为，美国有权利要求一个强大的印度的立场，并希望驻华大使查尔斯可能采取的，这与总理夏斯特里。短期目标是建立一个政府在流亡政府下，dl喇嘛在印度。 Johnson先生说，台湾所带来的一些问题我们。这不是一个问题，台湾的影响力，我们是强大的，但这是一个因素，我们必须考虑的问题。先生顿杜普认为，民族主义的中国应采取更进取的态度，但在谈他们，他发现这些困难和阻碍了由一个百年的传统和目前的主导权，保守组。年轻的官员们并非如此墨守成规，但目前的智NAT的立场是，一旦他们回到在大陆，他们会支持自决权为西藏。随后简要讨论了地位，西藏在近代历史上，是否已，其实是真正独立的。 mr.thondup说，概括而言，在未来的努力，这是最好避免的问题，过去的独立和团结支持dl喇嘛和西藏人民在他们的独立斗争。他提出了强烈呼吁美国帮助，以及就如何实现其目标。 Johnson先生指出的问题，政府在流亡政府是有点困难，我们目前的时间，因为我们抗拒所有的压力，古巴政府在流亡政府在这个国家。他誓言将讨论mr.thondup奇摩恳求与他的同事曾经下列事项西藏更紧密合作，最近的比他和我们将通过我们的考虑后认为，他说，最可能是透过驻华大使查尔斯。