Tibet, the great game and the CIA

炮郎

Tibet, the 'great game' and the CIA

By Richard M Bennett

Giventhe historical context of the unrest in Tibet, there is reason tobelieve Beijing was caught on the hop with the recent demonstrationsfor the simple reason that their planning took place outside of Tibetand that the direction of the protesters is similarly in the hands ofanti-Chinese organizers safely out of reach in Nepal and northernIndia.

Similarly, the funding and overall control of the unresthas also been linked to Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama, and byinference to the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) because of hisclose cooperation with US intelligence for over 50 years.

Indeed,with the CIA's deep involvement with the Free Tibet Movement and itsfunding of the suspiciously well-in????ed Radio Free Asia, it wouldseem somewhat unlikely that any revolt could have been planned oroccurred without the prior knowledge, and even perhaps the agreement,of the National Clandestine Service (????erly known as the Directorateof Operations) at CIA headquarters in Langley.

Respectedcolumnist and ????er senior Indian Intelligence officer, B Raman,commented on March 21 that "on the basis of available evidence, it waspossible to assess with a reasonable measure of conviction" that theinitial uprising in Lhasa on March 14 "had been pre-planned and wellorchestrated".
Could there be a factual basis to the suggestionthat the main beneficiaries to the death and destruction sweeping Tibetare in Washington? History would suggest that this is a distinctpossibility.

The CIA conducted a large scale covert actioncampaign against the communist Chinese in Tibet starting in 1956. Thisled to a disastrous bloody uprising in 1959, leaving tens of thousandsof Tibetans dead, while the Dalai Lama and about 100,000 followers wereforced to flee across the treacherous Himalayan passes to India andNepal.

The CIA established a secret military training camp forthe Dalai Lama's resistance fighters at Camp Hale near Leadville,Colorado, in the US. The Tibetan guerrillas were trained and equippedby the CIA for guerrilla warfare and sabotage operations against thecommunist Chinese.

The US-trained guerrillas regularly carriedout raids into Tibet, on occasions led by CIA-contract mercenaries andsupported by CIA planes. The initial training program ended in December1961, though the camp in Colorado appears to have remained open untilat least 1966.

The CIA Tibetan Task Force created by Roger EMcCarthy, alongside the Tibetan guerrilla army, continued the operationcodenamed ST CIRCUS to harass the Chinese occupation forces for another15 years until 1974, when officially sanctioned involvement ceased.

McCarthy,who also served as head of the Tibet Task Force at the height of itsactivities from 1959 until 1961, later went on to run similaroperations in Vietnam and Laos.

By the mid-1960s, the CIA hadswitched its strategy from parachuting guerrilla fighters andintelligence agents into Tibet to establishing the Chusi Gangdruk, aguerrilla army of some 2,000 ethnic Khamba fighters at bases such asMustang in Nepal.

This base was only closed down in 1974 by the Nepalese government after being put under tremendous pressure by Beijing.
Afterthe Indo-China War of 1962, the CIA developed a close relationship withthe Indian intelligence services in both training and supplying agentsin Tibet.
Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison in their book TheCIA's Secret War in Tibet disclose that the CIA and the Indianintelligence services cooperated in the training and equipping ofTibetan agents and special forces troops and in ????ing joint aerialand intelligence units such as the Aviation Research Center and SpecialCenter.

This collaboration continued well into the 1970s andsome of the programs that it sponsored, especially the special forcesunit of Tibetan refugees which would become an important part of theIndian Special Frontier Force, continue into the present.

Onlythe deterioration in relations with India which coincided withimprovements in those with Beijing brought most of the joint CIA-Indianoperations to an end.
Though Washington had been scaling backsupport for the Tibetan guerrillas since 1968, it is thought that theend of official US backing for the resistance only came during meetingsbetween president Richard Nixon and the Chinese communist leadership inBeijing in February 1972.

Victor Marchetti, a ????er CIAofficer has described the outrage many field agents felt whenWashington finally pulled the plug, adding that a number even "[turned]for solace to the Tibetan prayers which they had learned during theiryears with the Dalai Lama".

The ????er CIA Tibetan Task Forcechief from 1958 to 1965, John Kenneth Knaus, has been quoted as saying,"This was not some CIA black-bag operation." He added, "The initiativewas coming from ... the entire US government."

In his bookOrphans of the Cold War, Knaus writes of the obligation Americans feeltoward the cause of Tibetan independence from China. Significantly, headds that its realization "would validate the more worthy motives of wewho tried to help them achieve this goal over 40 years ago. It wouldalso alleviate the guilt some of us feel over our participation inthese efforts, which cost others their lives, but which were the primeadventure of our own."
Despite the lack of official support itis still widely rumored that the CIA were involved, if only by proxy,in another failed revolt in October 1987, the unrest that followed andthe consequent Chinese repression continuing till May 1993.

Thetiming for another serious attempt to destabilize Chinese rule in Tibetwould appear to be right for the CIA and Langley will undoubtedly keepall its options open.

China is faced with significant problems,with the Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang province; the activities of theFalun Gong among many other dissident groups and of course growingconcern over the security of the Summer Olympic Games in August.

Chinais viewed by Washington as a major threat, both economic and military,not just in Asia, but in Africa and Latin America as well.

TheCIA also views China as being "unhelpful" in the "war on terror", withlittle or no cooperation being offered and nothing positive being doneto stop the flow of arms and men from Muslim areas of western China tosupport Islamic extremist movements in Afghanistan and Central Asianstates.

To many in Washington, this may seem the idealopportunity to knock the Beijing government off balance as Tibet isstill seen as China's potential weak spot.
The CIA willundoubtedly ensure that its fingerprints are not discovered all overthis growing revolt. Cut-outs and proxies will be used among theTibetan exiles in Nepal and India's northern border areas.

Indeed,the CIA can expect a significant level of support from a number ofsecurity organizations in both India and Nepal and will have no troublein providing the resistance movement with advice, money and above all,publicity.

However, not until the unrest shows any genuinesigns of becoming an open revolt by the great mass of ethnic Tibetansagainst the Han Chinese and Hui Muslims will any weapons be allowed toappear.

Large quantities of ????er Eastern bloc small arms andexplosives have been reportedly smuggled into Tibet over the past 30years, but these are likely to remain safely hidden until the rightopportunity presents itself.

The weapons have been acquired onthe world markets or from stocks captured by US or Israeli forces. Theyhave been sanitized and are deniable, untraceable back to the CIA.

Weaponsof this nature also have the advantage of being interchangeable withthose used by the Chinese armed forces and of course use the sameammunition, easing the problem of resupply during any future conflict.

Thoughofficial support for the Tibetan resistance ended 30 years ago, the CIAhas kept open its lines of communications and still funds much of theTibetan Freedom movement.

So is the CIA once again playing the "great game" in Tibet?

Itcertainly has the capability, with a significant intelligence andparamilitary presence in the region. Major bases exist in Afghanistan,Iraq, Pakistan and several Central Asian states.

It cannot be doubted that it has an interest in undermining China, as well as the more obvious target of Iran.

Sothe probable answer is yes, and indeed it would be rather surprising ifthe CIA was not taking more than just a passing interest in Tibet. Thatis after all what it is paid to do.

Since September 11, 2001,there has been a sea-change in US Intelligence attitudes, requirementsand capabilities. Old operational plans have been dusted off andupdated. Previous assets re-activated. Tibet and the perceived weaknessof China's position there will probably have been fully reassessed.
ForWashington and the CIA, this may seem a heaven-sent opportunity tocreate a significant lever against Beijing, with little risk toAmerican interests; simply a win-win situation.

The Chinesegovernment would be on the receiving end of worldwide condemnation forits continuing repression and violation of human rights and it will beyoung Tibetans dying on the streets of Lhasa rather than yet moreuni????ed American kids.

The consequences of any open revoltagainst Beijing, however, are that once again the fear of arrest,torture and even ????ution will pervade every corner of both Tibet andthose neighboring provinces where large Tibetan populations exist, suchas Gansu, Qinghai and Sichuan.

And the Tibetan Freedom movementstill has little likelihood of achieving any significant improvement incentral Chinese policy in the long run and no chance whatever ofremoving its control of Lhasa and their homeland.

Once again itwould appear that the Tibetan people will find themselves trappedbetween an oppressive Beijing and a manipulative Washington.