[08.07.24经济学人] 卖空——裸露的恐惧

erihao

【媒体出处】http://www.economist.com/opinion ... m?story_id=11791505
【中文翻译】erihao
【声明】本文翻译仅供Anti-CNN内部使用，谢绝转载！


【原文】

Short-selling
Naked fear

Jul 24th 2008
From The Economist print edition
Regulators have yet to justify their restrictions on short sales


IF BANK bosses have slept at all in recent months, their dreams haveprobably been unhappy ones. Quite a few of them will have featurednightmarish beings known as short-sellers. These ghouls sell sharesthey do not own—usually borrowed stock, which they sell in the hope ofbuying it back at a lower price. Many of them have been bettingvocally, and successfully, that bank shares will fall. Now financialregulators in both America and Britain are doing their best to makebankers’ waking and sleeping hours a little less troubled, by imposingrestrictions on short-selling. They should have left bankers to tossand turn a little longer.

This month America’s Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) banned“naked” shorting—the sale of stock that investors do not yet have intheir possession—of the American-listed shares of 17 investment banksas well as of the country’s mortgage giants, Fannie Mae and FreddieMac. Last month Britain’s Financial Services Authority (FSA) introduceda new disclosure regime for short positions in companies that areselling new shares. Both announcements bore a whiff of panic: they weremade during steep falls in bank shares and the fine print was tidied upafterwards. Both were accompanied by the rattling of regulatory sabres.The FSA growled that “market abuse” could explain the “severevolatility” of shares. The SEC thundered that “false rumours can leadto a loss of confidence”. It has reportedly fired off more than 50subpoenas, largely to hedge funds.   
Spreading false rumours with the intention of manipulating shareprices is to be deplored. Indeed, it is usually illegal. If eitherregulator has evidence that this explains the fall in banks’ shareprices, they should bring the culprits to book. It may be that theSEC’s flurry of subpoenas turns up something substantial. But neitherof the watchdogs has produced such evidence so far.

Naked shorting too can be a cause for concern. It can result infailed trades if investors sell shares without properly checking thatthey will be able to obtain them before their trade settles. This cansometimes lead to disorderly markets. But the SEC already has rulesagainst this as well—although some argue they could be enforced better.It also has tests for levels of botched trades in any individual stock,which trigger its intervention. However, these tests were met for onlyone of the 19 institutions the SEC has leapt to protect. Indeed, thecommission’s chairman has said that “unbridled” naked short-selling offinancial stocks has “not occurred”. The SEC has also shown lessenthusiasm for policing trading in other distressed industries, such ascarmaking, where short-sellers have been much more active than theyhave in banking.

The Selective Enforcement Commission

The sense of selective enforcement, combined with regulators’ darkmutterings about short-sellers of financial stocks, explains thewidespread suspicion in the markets that both regulators acted in orderto prop up bank shares. After all, as well as policing stockmarkets,the SEC and the FSA are responsible for supervising the capitalpositions of these institutions (although the SEC does not oversee thesolvency of Fannie and Freddie). More failures on their watch would beembarrassing.

If this suspicion is accurate, it is unfair that regulators shouldtake aim at short-sellers. Although overall short positions in bankshave risen, they have not overwhelmed other trading. After thecollapses of Bear Stearns and Northern Rock it is entirely legitimatefor investors to debate other banks’ vulnerabilities—and to back theiropinions with money. Indeed, prominent short-sellers have played animportant role in exposing the poor condition of some companies, oftenin the face of intense hostility from management. There is no guaranteethat the regulators’ actions will even work beyond the very short term.On July 21st, a month after the FSA intervened, the shares in HBOS,Britain’s biggest mortgage lender, languished below the price at whichthe bank was trying to sell new equity, forcing it to rely on itsunderwriters.

Some may say that the rules should still be bent to prop up bankshares, because banks rely on confidence and their failure causessystemic damage. But lenders now have generous privileges to borrowfrom central banks; these should prevent runs on solvent banks. Fannieand Freddie now have near-explicit state guarantees. Shareholdersneither need nor deserve any more privileges. Attempting to distortshare prices away from their market level is not a legitimate activityfor traders. It is no business of regulators either.

erihao

卖空

裸露的恐惧

监管方还没有证明他们对卖空的限制是正当的

近几个月，若银行老板们沉睡不醒，他们的梦境大概不那么愉快，被称作卖空者的家伙将成为其中相当多人的梦魇。这些盗尸者们卖出他们并不拥有的股票——通常是借来的，寄希望于其下跌时再赎回。 他们中的许多人放言打赌银行股将跌，并且成功了。现在美国和英国的金融监管部门正用对卖空强加限制的手段竭力使银行家们安心。他们本应让银行家们辗转反侧的更久一点。

这个月美国证券交易委员会(SEC) '颁布对17家美国上市投资银行和两大国家住房抵押巨头房利美和房地美的裸露卖空禁令，裸露卖空指投资者还未持有股票时就将其卖出。上个月英国金融服务局 (FSA)提出一项新的针对要发售新股的公司存在的空头头寸（即空头减去多头后的净额，译者注）的披露制度。这两项新令带来一阵恐慌：他们是在银行股急剧下跌期间制定的，并且附属的例外条件被一并购销。FSA咆哮道 “市场操纵”能够解释股价的“剧烈波动”。SEC怒吼道“谣言能够导致信心丧失”。据说SEC已开出50多张传票，主要发给对冲基金。

散步谣言以操控股价是要被谴责的。当然，它通常是违法的。如果任一监管方有证据表明是它解释了银行股票的下跌，监管者应当将罪魁登记在册。或许SEC纷踏发出的传票呈现某些实质的东西，但是任一监管方迄今还未提供这样的证据。

裸露卖空也是引起关注的一个缘由。它能导致交易违约，倘若投资者在卖出股票时却没有审慎的核算他们将在合约交割前有能力赎回这些股票。这有时能导致市场混乱。但是SEC也已经有了应对的法令——尽管有些争论它们能被实施的更好。SEC 也测试任何一只股票中存在的误交易的水平，并设置了入场干预的触发点。然而，SEC急于保护的19家机构中只有一家满足测试标准（入场干预标准的，译者注）。的确，SEC的主席说“肆无忌惮”的裸露卖空金融股票还“未发生”。SEC对其他低迷行业的交易监管可没这么热情，比如汽车制造业，那里卖空比银行业更为活跃。

选择性执行委员会

有选择的政策执行与监管当局难以理解的嘀咕结合在一起，解释了市场上广泛流传的怀疑：两个监管当局的行为目的是支撑银行股价。毕竟，在管理股票市场的同时，SEC和FSA也要对监管这些机构（尽管SEC没有监督房利美和房地美的偿付能力）的资本情况负责。如果有更多监管上的失职将令他们难堪。

如果这个怀疑是正确的，那么监管者拿卖空者作靶子就不公平。尽管银行股的空头头寸总额已然上升，但它们还没有压过其他交易。贝尔斯登和北岩覆灭后，投资者对其他银行的脆弱程度产生疑虑是完全合理的。并且用资金来支持他们的观点也是完全合法的。的确，卓越的卖空者对曝光一些公司的不良状况起到了重要的作用，他们经常面对来自管理方的强烈敌意。没有什么能保证监管者的行动在很短时期之后还会起作用。7月21日， FSA干预实施一个月后，英国最大的抵押贷款银行HBOS的股票跌至该行试图发售新股的价格以下，迫使它不得不依赖它的证券包销商。

一些人或许会说，规则依然应该倾向于支撑银行股票。因为银行依靠信心，并且它们的破产引发系统性破坏。但是银行现在有从央行大量借款的特权；这些应当能够防止有偿付能力的银行出现挤兑。而房利美和房地美现在则有近乎明确的政府担保。股东既不需要也不值得享有更多特权。对交易者来说，试图歪曲股票价格以使它偏离市场水平是不合法的。这也不是监管当局的职责所在。

erihao

【一些解释和题外话】

首先向寻找花边新闻的朋友道歉，“裸露卖空”是根据英文直译过来的，本人虽然学经济出身，但对这个词还真没有文雅点的中文翻译（百度谷歌也都未找到更好的术语）。

文章名字如果想和内容更贴切应该翻译成对裸露卖空的担忧，但是为了更吸引眼球，换成了现在的名字。

NakedShorting是华尔街近几年找到的最新的敛钱工具。卖空在西方市场本来是个很正常的概念，先卖后买，无可厚非。可华尔街强盗们的卖空可不是一般的卖。他们钻法律的漏洞，是彻头彻尾地卖，根本就没打算平仓（cover）地卖，直要卖到对你公司的股票信心崩溃，变成几分钱的股票（pennystock），或者干脆因资金问题破产。这样回购股票的成本几乎为零了。最初卖空时收了钱，在卖空的合约期限内放在其他金融机构还收了利息，最后连根毫毛都不用还。就这样，几乎每个对冲基金公司经理每年都能从中小投资者手里抢劫上亿美元的“奖金”。 　

华尔街流氓们在矿业资源股搞这一行已经好多年了，而搞得炉火纯青的应属加拿大的一些投资公司，明目张胆地抢，谁都拿他们没办法，行业内号称是碰不得（un-touchable）

华尔街流氓们大概这次发国难财有些被利润冲昏了头脑，忘乎所以了，竟然瞄准了同类，先是贝尔斯登，后是利门兄弟，最后竟然想分食“房地美““房利美”两大以政府作靠山的公司。　一时间，狗咬狗，嚎叫声此起彼伏。　

SEC（美国的证监会）向来对这种行为睁一只眼闭一只眼，但这次却再也坐不住了，毕竟无法向主子交待，无奈中，抛出一个紧急措施。措施保护的还只是他们被围困的同类，但Naked Shorting 这一问题的严重性却一下子暴露在光天化日之下。　

公众们要问：为什么唯独金融股裸空不得， 其他行业却不受保护？华尔街的流氓们，你们有胆量面对真相么？

[ 本帖最后由 erihao 于 2008-7-26 04:13 编辑 ]

看吧

裸露卖空好像是没有协议的卖空，相对于套利和套保吧，不知道这么理解对不对。

[ 本帖最后由 看吧 于 2008-7-30 15:44 编辑 ]

erihao

原帖由 看吧 于 2008-7-30 15:41 发表
裸露卖空好像是没有协议的卖空，相对于套利和套保吧，不知道这么理解对不对。

在交易所开立空头，肯定是要有协议的，这个所谓的协议，就是在做市商的账簿上登记（book），在我国如果有卖空则是在清算中心的账簿上登记。

你将裸露卖空看做是与套期保值不同的交易策略是有一定合理性的。

与套利相比较，则不好说。因为套利（arbitrage）这个词有多重意思，要看语境。

oracle0380

原来有解释啊，实在太好了，我对金融问题不是十分了解，这下起码知道个梗概了，谢谢！

不过华尔街这帮畜生可真厉害啊，杀人于无形，刀刀见血，现在更是发展到空手套白狼了，高！