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【20110303经济学人】地产特别报告(他山之石可以攻玉)

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 楼主| 发表于 2011-3-9 09:53 | 显示全部楼层 |阅读模式
本帖最后由 下个月 于 2011-3-9 13:41 编辑

【中文标题】地产特别报告

【原文标题】A special report on property

【登载媒体】经济学人
        【来源地址】http://www.economist.com/node/18250431

【译者】陈晨

【翻译方式】人工
        【声明】本翻译供Anti-CNN使用,未经AC或译者许可,不得转载。


Between a rock and a living space

介于一块石头和一个生活空间之间

The lessons from the property boom

从房产泡沫中学到的一课

Mar 3rd 2011

2011-03-03


IF THERE is one chart that captures the madness of the housing bubble in the first half of the 2000s, it is Robert Shiller’s index of real (ie, inflation-adjusted) house prices in America. The index goes back to 1890, and for the first 100 years or so prices go up and down but gain very little overall. Then, starting in the late 1990s, house prices pretty much double in real terms within a decade (see chart 8). The run-up in values was not just unprecedented, it was obviously lunatic. That begs an equally obvious question: if no one intervened to pop that bubble, is anyone likely to do so next time round?



假如要找出一张能够描绘二十一世纪初前一半时间内房产泡沫的疯狂的图表,那就是Robert Shiller的美国房价指数表(经通胀调正)。这个指数可以追溯到1890年,从那时起大约100年左右的时间内,房价有涨有跌,但是总体来看增长不快。接着,从90年代早期开始的十年时间,房价几乎突然增长至两倍。房价发生突然性的猛增不仅仅是前所未有的,而且这显然很疯狂。这也回避了一个同样明显的问题:如果现在没有人来干涉并破灭这个泡沫,在下一轮增长到来时会有人来这么做么?



Some argue that the market has learned its lesson, although even the bankers do not sound all that convinced. The crisis has clearly prompted changes to risk management and underwriting practices: more emphasis on affordability, more rigorous stress-testing, better pricing for borrowers with more equity to put in. The data from this debacle will inform the models of the future. Mr Jennings of FICO, for instance, says he is working on ways to relate customers’ credit scores to the macroeconomic environment so that lenders can judge how the odds of default change when, say, unemployment goes up or down.



有人说这个市场会从中学到些什么,尽管从那些银行家们那里听到的也不是那么确信。很明显,这场危机触动了风险管理和保险业务方面的改变:更加以支付能力为重点,更严格的压力测试,更好的更公平的为借款人的定价。这场灾难中所得到的数据将会用于将来的模型之中。例如,美国个人消费信用评估公司的Jennings先生说他正在致力于将消费者信用分数与微观经济环境相联系起来的方法,以至于借款者可以评判在失业率上下浮动的情况下,违约情况会如何变动。





But for the reasons explained earlier in this report, property exerts a siren-like attraction for banks. Property loans are relatively light on capital and backed by real assets. In retail banking mortgages are thought to anchor long-term relationships with customers. Lending on commercial property is lumpy enough for a single big deal to get sales teams to their targets. To keep it under control, HSBC imposes a global 12.5% cap on commercial-property assets as a proportion of its overall book.



但是由于本报道之前解释的原因,对于银行,房产有着海妖一般的诱惑力。房屋产权贷款在基于不动产的基础上相对较容易得到资金。在零售银行,按揭贷款被看作是用来和客户保持长期合作关系的好工具。借款给商业产权对于一笔大交易是一种很粗放的方式,能够使得销售团队完成他们的目标。为了保持控制,汇丰银行对他全球的商业性地产资产施以限制,要求这笔资产低于总量的12.5%




Prophets scorned

被藐视的预言者




The crisis has made it obvious that when things get frothy, banks find it difficult to hold back. Property valuers in Dubai who advised banks that the market was overheating were ignored. Regulators in Britain and America who issued similar warnings were disregarded. Whistleblowers inside banks fared little better. An ex-employee of Countrywide, a particularly gung-ho American lender, recalls presenting a forecast of a flat housing market to a meeting at the bank in 2006 and being shouted down by salespeople, who argued that if they priced for credit risk on that basis they would be out of business.



当泡沫出现时,银行会发现要想控制局面会变的很难。这场灾难已经让这点变得很明显了。迪拜的产权估值专家曾经向银行提出了市场过热的建议,但是却被无视。英美两国的官方监管机构也曾发表过类似的警告,当最终还是被无视了。来自银行内部的揭秘者不会生活得更好。一位来自美国一家特别活跃的贷款公司的雇员回忆起曾在2006年向一场会议提交了公寓房屋市场的预测,但是他的报告被销售人员的声音说淹没,这些销售人员认为如果他们在那个基础上为信用风险定价,他们将会被踢出这个商业圈。








Taking a break

突破




If the market cannot be trusted to ease up on property when it overheats, that leaves policymakers. Very broadly, there are three levers that officials can pull to make property safer. All three of them need to be used.



如果市场发展过热时,我们不信任他会使得产权冷却并适度发展,那就只有通过决策者了。概括的说,官方有三种手段可以使得地产更安全,而且这三种方式都必须用到。





The first is the institutional framework that is controlled by governments—things like tax breaks, housing subsidies, land supply and the laws on recourse in the event of default. Some of these are more tractable than others; for example, the case for a property tax is theoretically powerful, but no one wants to do anything that might subdue housing markets while they remain weak. Nonetheless, fiscal pressures may require governments to introduce big changes. Under draft proposals for pruning America’s budget deficit, mortgage interest will enjoy fewer tax advantages.



第一就是通过政府所控制的组织机构实行:减税优惠、房屋补贴、土地供给和在违约情况下的追索法律。这些措施中的一些比其他要更易于掌控;例如,地产税从理论上说会更有效一些,但是没有人会在房产市场仍然虚弱的时候来干那些雪上加霜的事情。尽管如此,财政压力可能需要政府引入更大的改变。在美国预算赤字修剪草案提议中,房屋按揭利率将会享受更少的税收优惠。






The second lever is the system of mortgage financing. Disentangling the various causes of the property bubble is extremely difficult, but few would dispute that easy credit played a part in driving up prices and making the bust worse. According to a recent OECD report on housing and the economic recovery, financial deregulation may have boosted real house prices across industrial countries between 1980 and 2005 by as much as 30%. More liberal financing regimes are often a good thing (ask any young Italian who wants to buy a home), but only as long as basic underwriting standards continue to be met.



第二种方法就是抵押贷款系统。摆脱房产泡沫的各种原因是极其困难的,简单的信用管理对价格猛涨和失败的恶化起到了促进的作用,对这点几乎没有人还有争议。根据最近一份来自经合组织的关于房屋和经济复苏的报告,在1980至2005期间,金融性质的限制法令的撤销至少使得工业国家中的房屋价格上涨了30%。狂荣的金融体制通常是一件好事(问下任何一个想要买房的意大利青年),只要保险标准保持满足要求。





The crisis has set off a search for the best possible mortgage-financing system. Many observers warmly commend the Danish model, which features specialised mortgage lenders that observe strict loan-to-value limits, along with a system of matched funding in which each mortgage is financed by a specific bond with the same maturity and cash-flow characteristics. Losses at Danish mortgage banks remained low and there was plenty of liquidity throughout the crisis.



这场危机引发了对于可能是最好的抵押贷款系统的研究。很多观察者温和的评论丹麦人的模型,这个模型以监测着严厉的质押率限制的专业贷方为特征,他们还有一个匹配资金体系,在这个体系中,每个贷款都有一个专门的债券来提供资金,这个债券拥有相同的成熟期和现金流等特征。丹麦按揭银行的损失一直保持在很低的水平,而且在这场金融危机自始至终,表现了充足的流动性。





The Danish system, like the American one, also protects borrowers from interest-rate risk by offering long-term fixed-rate mortgages (although adjustable-rate mortgages were spreading fast before the crisis). That has undoubted appeal for policymakers in countries where floating-rate mortgages expose borrowers to the risk of payment shocks as rates rise.



这个丹麦的体系,正如美国的那个一样,还通过提高长期固定利率按揭(尽管在此之前,可调正利率按揭范围更广)来保护借方不受利率风险的影响。这样做无疑吸引了那些流动比率国家的决策者,避免了将借方直接暴露在由利率升高而引起的支付危机面前。




Inimitable Copenhagen

不可效仿的哥本哈根




In truth, however, there is no magic system. The Danish mortgage banks are clearly too big to fail, so the problem of an implicit government guarantee for banks remains. The same is true for Canada, where those who want to borrow more than 80% of the value of a property have to pay an insurance premium to a government agency. And even if the perfect model existed, it might not be transferable. The specialised infrastructure of the Danish mortgage-bond market, for instance, could not be easily replicated elsewhere.



事实上,无论如何,魔法系统是不存在的。丹麦抵押银行很明显就是大而不倒,所以由政府对银行做出的完全担保而产生的问题仍然存在。这同样适用于加拿大,在这里那些想要贷款房产价值80%以上的人需要事先向政府机构支付一份保险费。即使这个完美模型存在,他也是不可转让的。这个丹麦按揭债券市场的专业结构,例如,在别的地方不会容易复制成功。





And as so often in finance, constraining liquidity in one part of the system risks shifting trouble somewhere else. Danish banks had problems with commercial property. Spain’s residential-mortgage standards were fine, but the same could not be said of banks’ lending to developers. German banks that were not able to go mad on mortgages at home bought up American subprime loans instead.



由于在金融中经常发生,对系统风险中的一部分,流动性进行强制性的要求将麻烦转移到了另一处。丹麦银行在商业地产方面已经产生了砝码,西班牙的住宅按揭标准很好,但是银行对投资者的政策同样很好,德国银行不会在家为了按揭贷款而疯狂,因为他们买下了美国的次级贷款。= =!





Imposing rigid limits on how much people can borrow either disenfranchises some—first-time buyers and the self-employed tend to suffer most—or risks encouraging them to find a way around the rules by topping up their borrowing with more expensive, unsecured financing. Some lenders also fret that if underwriting becomes too prescriptive, borrowers are relieved of taking responsibility for their own actions. These are legitimate worries, but they carry alarming echoes of arguments put forward by bankers at the height of the housing boom just gone.



对人们能借多少进行生硬的限制不仅剥夺了那些首次购买者的公民权利,也使得那些只因者趋向于忍受更多,因为这些风险鼓励他们寻找规则之外,通过更高成本和不安全的融资方法来提高他们借款额度的方法。某些贷方也非常着急,担心一旦保险业的规范化,借方则可以放心不用为他们自己的行为而负责了。还有合理的担忧,在刚过去的这场房产泡沫的高峰时期,他们传播着对银行家提出的言论的警鸣。





The third lever that policymakers can pull is the now-popular idea of leaning against the wind when systemic risks are rising. Such “macroprudential” regulation is already common in some parts of the world. Governments and regulators in China, Hong Kong, Singapore and elsewhere always seem to be adjusting loan-to-value ratios, restricting the availability of credit for speculative homebuying, imposing taxes on homes that are flipped within a certain period and so on.



决策者可以推出的第三个办法就是现在正流行的当系统性风险升高时候“凭借风势”。审慎的宏观规定在这个世界上已经非常普通了,中国、香港、新加坡和其他一些地方的政府和决策者看起来一直在调正质押率比率,限制投机性买房的可能性,对一定时间内转卖房产的行为征税。





Macroprudential regulation is a good idea in theory, but extremely hard to do well. First, there is the difficulty of spotting bubbles, which often look unsustainable only when they have already burst. Despite the evidence of Mr Shiller’s chart, lots of clever people in finance and in the corridors of power persuaded themselves that things were different this time. And once property booms have got going, they can be hard to calm down, as China’s authorities have found. Still, the politics of dampening booms is easier in emerging markets, where there are usually more people to help into homes than there are existing homeowners. “Macroprudential regulation is not seen as an intervention,” says one Asian central banker. “It is seen as part of a healthy credit relationship.”



审慎的规章制度从理论上说是一个好主意,但是很难做好。首先,观测泡沫的难度很大,看起来是不可持续的,只有当泡沫破灭时才能更好点。尽管有着希尔先生的图表作为证据,很多金融界和权利走廊的聪明人说服他们自己:这次的事情不一样。而且一旦地产开始激增,他们很难以冷却下来,如中国官方机构说发现的那样。政治回潮很容易在新兴市场被发现,因为在这些地方通常想要买房的人比已经有房的人要多。“审慎的规章制度不能被看作是干预”,一位亚洲央行的银行家说到:“而是要把他当作健康的信用关系中的一部分。”





Regulators and central banks in developed economies are feeling much more nervous about the prospect of cooling property markets. “We know that punchbowl-removal operations are very unpopular among the slightly sloshed,” is how one Western regulator puts it. The sloshed can include governments themselves. Thanks to transaction taxes, property bubbles are helpful to exchequers and the jobs market when they first get going. Regulators will therefore need to have a very clear mandate, or use automatic measures such as a countercyclical loan-to-value rule, to resist the pressures they will face when the next boom is under way.



发达经济体中的监管者和央行对与冷却房产市场的前景感到更紧张。“我们知道把盛满酒的酒杯从微醉的人们面前挪开是很不受欢迎的”。这就是一位西方监管者如何来描述他的。当然微醉的人还包括政府本身。由于交易税的功劳,地产泡沫在产生初期对国库和求职市场非常有利。因此监管者必须有非常清晰的指令,或者使用例如“反周期质押率”规则的自行办法来抵抗当下一轮膨胀发生时,他们将要面对的压力





This mortar coil
        That problem is years away; but in America the worst effects of the property crisis are probably over. The banks with the biggest exposures to dud commercial assets are smaller lenders, and the government is willing to provide support to residential markets. But prices are likely to keep falling this year, so economic recovery will lack one of its usual booster rockets.


问题已经过去几年了,但是在美国地产危机的最坏的效应很有可能已经蔓延到各地了。暴露出没有价值的商业资产最多的银行是那些小型的贷方,政府现在很愿意为住宅市场提供帮助。但是今年的价格很有可能继续下跌,所以经济恢复还是缺少了他原有的推动力之一。





Parts of Europe are much more fragile. Prices still have further to fall to reach fair value, the capacity of certain banks and governments to cope with losses is more doubtful, and the risk of interest-rate rises looms. Even if the sense of crisis fades, the chronic effects will linger for years as property weighs down banks’ balance-sheets, first-time buyers struggle to get on the housing ladder and buildings in second-rate locations slowly decay.



欧洲很多地方都是非常脆弱的。现在的价格离他真正价值还很远,某些银行和政府解决损失的能力相当值得怀疑,利率上升的风险也逐渐出现了。尽管危机感觉已经慢慢消褪了,但是由此形成的长期影响还将会持续数年,因为地产让银行的资产负债表负担更多,首次买房者努力爬上通向住宅的体制,二线城市的建筑却开始缓慢的衰退。





Property may be prone to excess everywhere but the policy response to the events of the past decade will—and should—vary from country to country. Culture, taxes, politics, demography, laws and physical geography all have an influence on property markets. Americans like to own their homes. The Hong Kong government has a limited supply of land. The Danes understand, as few others do, that the market value of their debt can shift.



虽然地产一不小心就会容易过剩,但是在不同国家,应对例如过去十年这样的时间的政策将也-也应该不同。文化,税收,政治,人口,法律和自然地理对地产市场都有影响。美国人喜欢拥有自己的家。香港政府限制土地供应量。丹麦人明白,但是很少有人做到的,他们负债的市场价值可以被转移。





But if there is one universal lesson from the recent past, it is that leverage is lethal. Upping the amount of equity that banks have to hold is one way of keeping down the amount of debt that finds its way into property, but this is still an asset class that is privileged, not imprisoned, by the capital regime. As one Asian regulator points out, even highly capitalised banks like lending against homes. The best way to limit the damage from a property bust is to exercise more direct control over the amount of debt available to property owners and developers, whether through discretionary interventions or standing rules.



但是如果有一条是大家都可以从最近的事件中的学到的,那就是杠杆作用是有效的。提高银行必须保持的资产数量,是降低投入地产的负债量的一种方法,但是还是通过资本体制还有一种资产分类是特殊的,非禁锢的,正如一位亚洲监管者提出的,即使是高度资本化的银行也偏好向家庭贷款。限制地产破产带来的危机的最好办法就是运用更多的对地产所有者和投资者可运营的负债的直接控制,不管是通过自主干涉还是通过立法。





The past decade has proved again that the phrase “safe as houses” is a nonsense. Property will always be volatile—and financial crises will always be destructive. The main aim for policymakers must be to sever the connection between the two.



过去的十年证明了“十分可靠”这个短语是荒唐的。地产一直就是不稳定的,金融危机从来就是具有破坏性的。决策者最大的目标就是必须切断两者之间的联系。

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发表于 2011-3-9 13:05 | 显示全部楼层
楼主辛苦了。
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发表于 2011-3-11 22:13 | 显示全部楼层
一篇好文章
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