【中文标题】不可避免的超级大国——为何中国的统治是理所当然的
【原文标题】The Inevitable Superpower
Why China’s Dominance Is a Sure Thing
【登载媒体】外交事务
【来源地址】http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68205/arvind-subramanian/the-inevitable-superpower
【译 者】杨靖旼
【翻译方式】人工
【声 明】本翻译供Anti-CNN使用，未经AC或译者许可，不得转载。
【译 文】
对债务人而言，债权人会如同独裁者。陷入金融危机的政府会转向国际货币基金组织求助，并且按他们自己主要的债权人意志行动。国际货币基金组织总是会对这些政府开出苛刻的条件。从90年代后期的亚洲金融危机之后，为克林顿政府下得美国贸易代表坎特，将国际货币基金组织称为“攻城锤”，因为IMF为美国商品打开了亚洲市场。在1956年的苏伊士运河危机中，美国威胁英国要拒绝给予英国急需的金融支持，除非英国从苏伊士运河中退出势力。当是的财政大臣负责这场危机中羞辱的阶段的麦克米伦，后来回忆起那段记忆时，称之为“衰落大国的苟延残喘”。他还说，“200年之后，可能美国也会了解到我们是怎么衰落的。”但是，这个时间已经早早的随着中国优雅的取代美国而到来了吗？这个是个至关重要的问题，但到现在，美国也没有认真对待过。美国的妄自尊大仍然存在：美国经济上的优越地位不可能再受到什么威胁了，因为这正是美国迟早要失去的，美国会进行高挑战来避免失去它。中国可能以自己的方式去成为超级经济大国，将来美国可能要与中国一起分享这个全球舞台，又或者中国会从多方面的将美国挤出领导者的地位。
因此，经济学家艾肯格林在不同货币储备的历史《过分特权》中总结道：“好消息是美元的命运是掌握在我们美国人手里，而不是中国手中。”2010年12月，萨默作为奥巴马的国家经济顾问离开白宫时说：“美国衰落的预言，像合众国的年纪一样，已是老生常谈。但是这些预言行使了一个关键功能来鞭策每一代美国人都应需要的那种重建。我可以这样说，只要我们担心未来，未来就会更好。我们是面临挑战， 但我们同样还有这世界上从未出现过的，灵活、活力四射且具有开创精神的社会。”换句话说，如果美国处理好国内经济，就可以控制住中国的威胁。
但是这种观点低估了中国可能在20年之内在经济上统治世界的可能。而且这种观点只揭示了一方面，美国中心说的感知：世界的统治大部分是由美国的行为决定，而非中国。事实上，这场竞赛的结果更像是由中国决定的。
2030年的世界
广泛意义上说，经济的统治权是一个国家利用经济的能力，它意味着有能力让其他国家去按该国意愿做得事，或是有能力避免被其他所强迫做并非自愿的行为。这个能力意义包括了该国的经济总量、贸易、国内外财政的合理程度、该国的军事力量、科技活力，以及该国货币在国际上享有的地位。我即将出版的书中开发了一种经济支配能力指数，包含三个关键变量：国家GDP，贸易（按进出口贸易总量计算），该国作为世界其他地方的净债权国的范围。GDP之所以重要是因为它决定了一个国家能否用自己的方式集中力量和所有资源来与潜在对手竞争。贸易，尤其是进口，决定了国家从允许和绝对他国进入本国市场中获得多少杠杆。作为一位其他国家的融资人，该国被赋予了对这些需要资金的国家极大的影响力，尤其是在危机发生时。没有比这三种更具启发性的优势：其他国家是被衍生出的优势（例如，军事力量取决于一国经济在长时间内的整体规模与健康程度）；边际优势（货币控制权），或是很难在国家间固定衡量的优势（财政实力）
我从1870年开始计算指数（集中关注那时英国与美国的经济地位）。这个设计是基于对中国未来经济非常保守的估计，考虑了中国将要面临的几个主要挑战。首先，中国的人口将在下一个十年里开始另个时代。中国的经济将受到一下几种问题严重歪曲：过分廉价的资本导致过度投资；汇率被低估导致了出口的过分发展；能源补贴导致了能源利用的无效率和污染。想纠正这些不当，需要付出巨大代价。考虑到这些成本，我预测中国的经济将严重放缓：在将来的20年，相对前十年每年平均11%的增长速度，中国会以每年平均7%的速度增长。历史建议很多经济体，如德国、日本、新加坡、韩国和台湾的发展步伐就是在中国现在的发展水平放缓的。同时，我假设美国的经济将在以后的30年以每年2.5%的速度增长。与美国国会预算办公室2.2%的预期相比，这是个比较乐观的假设，国会预算办公室偶尔会降低预期是由于国家公、私债务的积增与高失业率带来的负面影响所致。
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我的分析结果是在2030年，美国相关的衰落会导致以中国控制的单极化，而非一个多极化的世界。中国会占全球GDP的20%（一半按美元计算，一半按实际购买力计算），而美国将只是占15%。从这方面说，中国人均GDP差不多是3.3万美元，是美国的一半。换句话说，中国不会像大众所认为的那么贫困。更有甚者，中国将占掉世界贸易总量的15%，这是美国所占比重的两倍。到2030年，中国会取得优势地位，无论GDP是否被认为比贸易或其他方面更加重要，中国在贸易和GDP上都将领先。
根据这个指数和这些预测，中国的崛起已经近在眼前。尽管美国的GDP比今天得中国要大得多，而且两国各自的贸易水平相近，但是美国是个大且脆弱的负债者——它包揽了世界50%的净资本流入——而中国则是个庞大的净债权国。2010年，美国对中国的领先优势是边际的：美国与中国在各自的优势领域只相差不到一个百分点。事实上，如果其中一项变量稍稍有所不同，稍微降低经济对贸易关系的权重，那中国就已经在2010年超过了美国。
中国在未来的崛起同样适用于其他因素，比今天认识到的因素还多。中国的经济会比美国的经济实力大得多，会比其他经济体的经济实力都强，中国的贸易和供应资本也会是一样情况。人民币作为世界主要的储备货币将会是美元的一个可信对手。
更有甚者，中美之间的差距会远比预想的更大。2010年，美国国家情报委员会估计2025年“美国会保持现有的卓越权力，但美国的优势会很大程度下降。”这个估计是过分乐观的。我的预测建议中美之间的差距在2030年会与美国在上世纪70年代中期与对手的差距相似，那个时期是美国霸权的全盛时期，这个差距要比英国在大英帝国在1870年这个稳定时期与对手的差距还要大。简单来说，中国未来经济的优势是更为迫切，并且将比目前的预想要更大、更多样化。
壮如牛
《金融时报》的专栏作家马丁•沃尔夫曾用“为时过早的超级大国”还形容中国这种绝无仅有的能力来实行权力，尽管还微弱。然而根据我的预测，到2030年，中国不会那么糟糕，它的人均GDP（按购买力平价计算）将超过美国的一半，并且大大超过世界的人均GDP。还有，中国经济的优势将会很奇特：以以往不同，当主要强国——英国和美国——相对其他对手还非常富裕时，中国将只是个中等或中上等收入国家。试问一个并非最富裕的国家能成为主导国吗？
有三种可能的理由认为中国不可能在非最富国家情况下成为主导国。首先，一个相对贫穷的国家应该会将它对国际权力的期望放到次于国内需求的位置，来着力解决更有压力国内挑战，比如努力达到更好的生活水平和维持更加稳定的社会。其次，中国可能没有能力得到更多可靠的资源用以发展境外权力。军事资产就是其中一项，它需要财政，比较贫穷的国家要想从公民那收税的难度远大于富裕的国家。第三，穷国只可能靠软权力影响世界，如外交、开放型的社会和多元的价值观。伴生于优势的领导地位只能依靠激励他者维持：只有那些领导者所主张的事物是符合普遍或接近普遍的诉求时，那他们的主张才会具有激励性。
就是说，即使主导地位一般是与贫穷不相符的，但是还是有国家可以不加入最富国家的行列而依然成为主导。甚至是一个中等发达国家，就是中国很有可能在2030年所能达到的程度，也能达到内部的凝聚力，集中资源来实现对外目标（如军事开支），并且具备一些令人鼓舞的国家理念。事实上，尽管中国现在的人均GDP还相对较低，但它已经在好几个方面取得了优势。中国确信他们在非洲国家的巨额投资使得这些国家关闭了台湾在这些国家的使馆。中国用3万亿美元外汇储备许诺购买希腊、爱尔兰、葡萄牙和西班牙债务，来防止或减轻欧洲金融的混乱。（“中国西班牙两国是最好的朋友，”西班牙总理萨帕特罗在胡锦涛四月访问西班牙的场合时说道。）中国同样利用它的经济实力加强了它与亚洲和拉丁美洲其他国家的贸易和金融关系：例如，现在贸易交易在这两地区的几个国家中，都能使用人民币结算。
最重要的是，中国的汇率政策影响了全世界的经济体，对发展中国家的伤害和美国一样多：通过保持货币低价，中国管制保持了对于孟加拉、印度、莫斯科和越南的出口竞争力。这些国家站到了一旁，留下美国单独为自己国家工作的工资向中国讨伐——在这方面，美国没有成功。与此同时，中国却又能力收买反对派来支持。尽管很多国家害怕看到他们的竞争力被低估的人民币所征服，他们还是保持了沉默，即使恐惧中国的政治实力，也是因为中国对他们许诺了金融援助和贸易机会。即使是在美国内部，也有些集团是反对美国讨伐中国的政策。中国对美国公司而言，是个巨大的市场，并且因为左翼自由派，不是美国资本的所有者的那些人则谴责中国的汇率政策对美国工人所造成的伤害。
即使中国不像是要随时很快要召集调动起这种优势，这种优势自然会激励或是有可能会对建立那些就像美国在二战后建立的那些国际体系和制度来说很必要，北京已经实践了其他形式的优势。比如，中国要求美国和欧洲公司在取得市场准入前，与中国公司分享他们的技术。而且即使会受到来自世界的很多反对，中国还会追求出台具有系统效应的政策。这种低估汇率的政策就是经典的“与邻为壑”战略来破坏世界贸易与金融的开放性，同时也创造了放宽流动性的条件，而正是这些流动性造成了全球经济危机。中国的优势，没有若隐若现。从某些方面来说，它已经到来。
被数字淹没
美国能逆转这一趋势吗？美国的经济未来让人焦虑：这个国家现在有财政问题，增长问题，还有可能使最顽固的问题，中产阶级问题。反复的削减税赋和两场战役，2008年到2010年的金融与经济危机，政府可能永久的对不良资产担保的行为造成了对美国公共部门资产负债表的严重质疑。高额的公、私债和长期的失业状况会打压长期的增长。加上中产阶层长期停滞的收入，日益加剧了不平等，降低了流动性，最近更是连受到过高等教育的人也产生了严重的分配问题而前景暗淡。中产阶级感觉到了困境：这个阶层的人既不想屈尊降贵与技术劳动阶层，但他们上升的前景却受制于中国与印度的竞争。
美国持续的力量来自于它“肯做能行” ， 去解决经济问题的态度，还有它的自信，就是所说的经济基础能够保证它持续的经济优势。最显著的是，美国给得起绝无仅有的创业机会，按照“全球创业观察”，一个研究世界范围内国家创业活力的学术财团的研究认为“因为美国有重商的文化，有发展最成熟的投行和开放的移民政策。”在2009年的调查中，创业板块排名世界第一的是美国，因为美国提供了上述的机会。几乎所有在过去30年中，在商业上成功取得突破的主要科技公司——苹果，微软，谷歌和脸谱——都是在美国建立且以美国为大本营。事实上，美国在90年代就是靠寻找新的、又具活力的增长来源来获得抗击日本崛起所产生的挑战所需的能力。今天，乐观者认为美国可以对中国复制与对付日本一样的经历。如果美国的经济增长在以后的20年中能像90年代时那样保持在3.5%，投资者对美元作为储备货币的信心重新被振奋，那这样的估计是可成真的。
但今天一些关键的相异性会挫伤这些乐观的期望。美国主导了90年代所举的国债远比将来可能会消耗的国债要少得多。在90年代，公债只占GDP的42%，然而美国国会预算办公室对2020年最新的预期数据是占GDP的100%。美国的外部地位比起20年前要脆弱很多。比如，在90年代，国外持有美国国债占19%，但今天，这个数字已经达到50%，而且绝大部分是由中国持有的。在90年代，美国同样离要考虑特权代价的时间还在相当遥远。
然后就是陷入困境的中产阶级。在过去的20年，有几项相关的病症已经积压了美国中产阶级，例如停滞的平均收入已经变得根深蒂固且更为棘手。即使是3.5%的增长率，也是超出当前的预期，可能不足以保持对美国模式的信心，这个信心是基于未来对大多数人来说更好的愿望。
换句话说，美国不能逃脱人口结构这个无情的逻辑，并且事实上那些穷国，尤其是中国，就快赶上它了。中国有着比美国多4倍的人口，当它的平均生活水平（以人均GDP计算）超过美国的四分之一时，将要成为一个更大的经济体。有一些评估，包括我自己的，中国已经成为更大的经济体，而且介于中国还要继续增长，这个差距只会更大。美国的复活可能会减缓这个进程，但是美国还是无法阻挡差距加大这个趋势。最好是接下来二十年的增长率是3.5%而不是2.5%的增长也许才能繁荣美国的经济，促进社会稳定和平复国民情绪。但这依然不会在美国面临中国7%增长的相对情况上，给美国带来显著不同。
这些预测破坏了美国占主导地位的信念，这个信念就是美国经济的卓越地位是他们自己丧失的。中国的行为将会破坏中国与美国在增长上的差异，这些行为是柔和的或是巨大的。中国也可能会彻底一团糟，比如如果它允许房地产泡沫再高增或是没能避免政治动乱。或者，中国也可能靠纠正存在的经济扭曲现象而从继续前行，尤其是纠正以出口密集型的增长战略转变为扩大自身内需的经济增长战略。美国的行动范围就更加狭窄了。如果美国的增长过分慢于2.0-2.5%，那么它就更不可能快过3.5%了。这是经济发展处于前沿的诅咒：上升或是下降的潜力都很有限。
即使美国的增张按照所说的3.5%加快，其他国家，比如中国同样会更加迅速的增加，同样留下没有受增长影响的最基本的经济实力对比状况。事实上，当像美国这样主导国科技创新的步伐加快时，新的技术会快速的适用于穷国，同样刺激了这些国家的增加。甚至比生产这些新技术更加重要的是可以使用这些科技的人力资本和技术。按照国家科学基金会的说法，2006年中国学习科技与工程的本科生是美国的两倍。这个差距机会加大。尽管中国教育制度比美国差得多，但中国看起来还是对吸收新技术很在行。2002，美国有中国近6倍的科学同行评议的出版物，但在2008年美国仅领先2.5倍。固有的问题限制了富裕国家保持增长优势，因为，中国更善于吸收和利用新科技。中国的尖端科技在发展：美国，欧洲，日本几乎没有出口什么中国不出口的产品了。泛泛来说，如果美国的经济放缓，那中国的经济也会受影响，但如果美国的经济加速了，那中国的经济同样会加速。无论是哪种情况，美国都不可能推开中国自行发展。
回到苏伊士
一个复活的美国也不能对崛起的中国行使权力的权力和霸主地位。中国已经有了做世界其他国家不想它做的能力。也许很快中国就有能力让美国做美国不愿做得事吧？
1956年，英镑承受了压力，因为埃及封锁了苏伊士运河，英国给予与美国的“特殊关系”转向美国求取财政支持。但是美国总统艾森豪威尔拒绝了英国。他对英国在纳赛尔将苏伊士运河国有化后袭击了埃及非常恼怒，就是因为艾森豪威尔正作为一个结束朝鲜战争的和平人士在竞选连任。他要去英国配合美国支持的联合国决议，迅速无条件的撤出英国部队。如果英国拒绝，华盛顿将阻断英国从国际货币基金组织获得资源的途径，并且美国会提供大规模的财政方案，包括史无前例的价值13亿美元国际货币基金组织的贷款，以及从美国进出口银行贷出的5亿美元贷款。
现在，可以想象一个不远的将来，美国可以从2008-2010年的危机中恢复过来，但却仍然背负着结构性的问题：扩大的收入差距，受挤压的中产阶级，以及被削弱的经济社会动力。金融体系还是和危机前一样脆弱，政府已经开始控制增加的享受权利的成本和堆积金融体系的不良资产，这些事政府必须接手做完的。新兴市场的发展造成了物价的飞涨，使得通胀成为全球最主要的问题。中国的经济和贸易的流动是美国的两倍。美元已经失去了她得光芒；人民币作为储备货币的需求正在增加。
与1956年非常相似，当华盛顿被怀疑精心策划了在纽约抛售大宗英镑以迫使英国政府从苏伊士运河撤军，关于中国计划显示它的金融权力的谣言也在纷飞；美国海军在太平洋的出现得已经够多了。北京开始卖出了一部分货币储备（大概是4万亿美元）。投资者因为惧怕美元崩溃和债券市场成为美国政府的纸，开始另谋出路。美国很快的失去了它原本A++的信用评级。审计发现美国财政债券没有购买者。为了维持信心，美联储突然的增加了利率。此前没多久，利率大大超过了经济增长率，美国急需要廉价融资。美国转向了石油出口者，但是昔日友好的独裁者被不同伊斯兰教派信仰的狭隘民主者所取代，从温和到极端，他们所有人都对美国干涉中东有着长期的记忆。更多的像目前的希腊，爱尔兰和葡萄牙，向世界货币基金组织求帮助在所难免：拖欠美国债务会成为美国在全球角色中的致命伤。
但这时，中国已经从2000年开始，成为了世界最大的银行家，控制着货币的活栓。尽管如此，国际货币基金组织的融资还是很必要，它有个前提条件：美国要退出其西太平洋的海军存在。这个要求还是很够力，因为中国作为国际货币基金组织的最大出资人，并且对其中的很多会员都施过惠，所以中国可以很轻易的阻挡美国的融资要求。到那时，中国可能还会获得否决权，这还得多亏对2018年的治理改革日程。
有人会觉得这个场景实在很搞笑。毕竟美国在1956年可以轻易的暂停对英国的融资，因为这样做不会对美元或是美国经济带来严重后果。但如果以后中国要卖掉美元，或是停止购买美国债券，那么美元就会下跌而人民币就会升值——这就是中国坚定不移想要避免的结果。中国不会突然破坏它商业发展战略并且让外汇储备承受巨大损失的风险。即使中国想冒这个风险抛售美元，如果美国经济衰落了，美联储只会高兴的收购被中国抛弃的美国国库券。
但是这些所有的可能性都会随着中国未来的激励机制不同而消失。10年，中国可能不再拘泥于将人民币保持在一个低水平上。如果中国继续放缓人民币的国家化，那么它保持弱人民币的能力还有获得的利润都会消失。但如果人民币国际化，中国的权力将远超美国。1956年，英国的金融家分散于公共和私人的部门。但中国政府是美国最大的资本净供应商：中国持有了美国众多国库券并支持美国的赤字。撬动美国的杠杆都集中在中国的手中。
当然，美国假设未来美元贬值的前景并没有1956年英镑的衰弱对英国所造成的伤害那样痛苦。追忆到那时，英镑贬值会带来英国前殖民地用英镑计价的财产的巨大损失。这些殖民地会变卖英镑资产，减轻英国与他们国家的联系。避免这些殖民地变卖英镑资产就是英国政府为了保留其在大英帝国剩下的能力。美元贬值的问题要相对打击少些，部分原因是美国的负债都是以美元计价的。
重蹈英国当年在苏伊士运河危机的覆辙现在是不可能了。但美国现在的经济状况会从根本上是美国面对中国不可避免的优势时，变得脆弱不堪。英国当时在苏伊士运河危机期间，表现得软弱无力，是因为有另外一个强大的经济大国出现了。今天，美国的经济存在结构性的弱点，它不断增加的债务也会使美国更加依赖于外国，美国经济增长的前景很渺茫，还有出现了一个强劲的对手。中国也许不是一个对抗者，但也同样不是美国的盟友。麦克米伦在1971年预言美国会在200年之后衰落，违反了对历史的机械解释：这种解释预测了美国作为主导国家的时限与英国所享有霸主地位的时限很相似。但是中国可能会加速这一历史规律——并使美国要面对比麦克米伦或是更多其他人所预期美国衰落的时间要更快的挑战。
To debtors, creditors can belike dictators. Governments in financial trouble often turn to theInternational Monetary Fund as supplicants, and acting at the behest of its ownmajor creditors, the imf often imposes tough conditions on them. After theAsian financial crisis of the late 1990s, Mickey Kantor, U.S. trade representative under President BillClinton, called the organization “a battering ram,” because it had served toopen up Asian markets to U.S.products. During the 1956 Suez crisis, the United States threatened to withhold financingthat the United Kingdomdesperately needed unless British forces withdrew from the Suez Canal. Harold Macmillan, who, as the British chancellor of theexchequer, presided over the last, humiliating stages of the crisis, wouldlater recall that it was “the last gasp of a declining power.” He added,“perhaps in 200 years the United States would know how we felt.” Is that timealready fast approaching, with Chinapoised to take over from the United States? This is an essential question, andyet it has not yet been taken seriously enough in the United States.There, this central conceit still reigns: the United States’ economic preeminence cannot be seriouslythreatened because it is the United States’to lose, and sooner or later, the United States will rise to thechallenge of not losingit. China may be on its wayto becoming an economic superpower, andthe United Statesmay have to share the global stagewith it in the future. But, the argument goes,the threat from China is not so imminent, so great, or so multifacetedthat it can push the United Statesout of the driver’s seat. Thus,the economist Barry Eichengreen concludes inhis recent history of different reserve currencies, Exorbitant Privilege,“The good news, such as it is, is that the fateof the dollar is in our hands, notthose of the Chinese.” And in December 2010, as he was leaving the White House as President Barack Obama’snational economic adviser,Larry Summers said, “Predictions of America’s decline are as old as the republic. But they perform a crucialfunction in driving the kindof renewal that is required of each generationof Americans. Isubmit to you that as long as we’re worried about the future, the future will be better. We have our challenges. But we also havethe most flexible, dynamic,entrepreneurial society the world has ever seen.” In other words, if the United Statescan get its economic house in order, itcan head of the Chinese threat. Butsuch views underestimate the probability that China will be economically dominant in 20 years. And theyreveal a one-sided, U.S.-centricperspective: that world dominance will be determined mostly by the actions of the United States, not those of China. In fact, the outcome of this race is far more likelyto be shaped by China. the world in 2030 Broadly speaking, economic dominance is the ability of astate to use economic means to get othercountries to do what it wants orto prevent them from forcing it to do what it does not want. Such means include the size of a country’s economy,its trade, the health of itsexternal and internal finances, its military prowess, its technological dynamism, and the international status thatits currency enjoys. My forthcoming book develops an index ofdominance combining just threekey factors: a country’s gdp, its trade (measured asthe sum of its exports and imports ofgoods), and the extent to which it is a net creditor to the rest of the world. Gdp matters because it determines the overall resources that a country canmuster to project power againstpotential rivals or otherwise have its way. Trade, and especially imports, determines how much leverage acountry can get from offeringor denying other countries access to its markets. And being a leading financier confers extraordinaryinfluence over other countries thatneed funds, especially in times of crisis. No other gauge of dominance is as instructive as these three: theothers are largely derivative (militarystrength, for example, depends on the overall health and size of an economy in the long run), marginal(currency dominance), or difficult to measureconsistently across countries (fiscal strength). Icomputed this index going back to 1870 (focusing on the United Kingdom’sand the United States’economic positions then) and projectedit to 2030 (focusing on the United States’and China’spositions then). The projections arebased on fairly conservative assumptions about China’sfuture growth, acknowledging that China faces several major challenges going forward. Forstarters, its population will begin toage over the coming decade. And its economy is severely distorted in several respects: overly cheap capitalhas led to excessive investment; theexchange rate has been undervalued, which has led to the overdevelopment of exports; and energy is subsidized, leading to its inefficient use and pollution. Correcting thesedistortions will impose costly dislocations.To take account of these costs, I project that China’s growth will slow down considerably: it willaverage seven percent a yearover the next 20 years, compared with the approximately 11 percent it has registered over the last decade.History suggests that plenty of economies—Germany, Japan,Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan— grew at the pace I project for China after they reached China’s current level of development. Meanwhile, I assumethat the U.S.economy will grow at about 2.5percent per year, as it has over the last 30 years. This is slightly optimistic compared withthe Congressional Budget Office’s latest long-termgrowth forecast of 2.2 percent, a forecast that the CBO lowersoccasionally because of the negative impact of the country’s accumulating public and privatedebt and sustained high unemploymenton the U.S. economy. Theupshot of my analysis is that by 2030, relative U.S.decline will haveyielded not a multi-polarworld but a near-unipolar one dominated by China. China will account for closeto 20 percent of global gdp (measured half in dollarsand half in terms of real purchasing power), compared with just under 15 percent for theUnited States. At that point,China’s per capita gdp will be about $33,000, or about half of U.S. gdp. In other words, China will not be dirt poor, as iscommonly believed. Moreover, itwill generate 15 percent of world trade—twice as much as will the United States.By 2030, Chinawill be dominant whetherone thinks gdp is more important than trade or the other way around; it will be ahead on bothcounts. Accordingto this index and these projections,China’sascendancy is imminent. Although theUnited States’ gdp is greater than China’s today and the two countries’respective trade levels are close,the United States isa very large and vulnerable debtor—it hogsabout 50 percent of the world’s net capitalflows—whereas China is a substantial netcreditor to the world. In 2010, the United States’ lead over China was marginal: there was less than one percentage point differencebetween their respective indices ofdominance. In fact, if one weighed these factors slightly differently, giving slightly less weight to the size of the economyrelative to trade, China was already ahead of the United Statesin 2010. China’sascendancy in the future will also apply to many more issues than is recognized today. TheChinese economy will be larger thanthe economy of the United States and larger than that of any other country, and so will its trade andsupplies of capital. Theyuan will be a credible rival to thedollar as the world’s premier reserve currency. Whatis more, the gap between Chinaand the United Stateswill be far greater than expected. In 2010, theU.S. National Intelligence Councilassessed that in 2025, “the U.S.will remain the preeminent power,but that American dominance will be much diminished.”This is unduly optimistic. My projectionssuggest that the gap between Chinaand the United States in2030 will be similar to that between theUnited States and its rivalsin the mid-1970s, the heyday of U.S. hegemony, and greater than that between theUnited Kingdom and its rivals during the halcyon days of the British Empire, in 1870. In short, China’s future economic dominance ismore imminent and will beboth greater and more variedthan is currently supposed. strong like a bull Martin Wolf, the Financial Times columnist,has used the term “prematuresuperpower” to describe China’sunique ability to wield powerdespite being poor. According to my projections, however, by 2030, China will not be so badly off. Rather, its gdp percapita (in terms of purchasing powerparity) will be more than half that of the United States and greater than theaverage per capita gdp around the world. Still, China’s economic dominancewill be singular: unlike inthe past, when the dominant powers—the United Kingdom and the United States—were very rich relativeto their competitors, Chinawill be just a middle- or upper-middle-income country. And can a country be dominant even when it isnot among the richest? Thereare three plausible reasons for thinking that it cannot. First, a relatively poor country might have tosubordinate its hopes of projectingpower internationally to its need to address more pressing domestic challenges, such as achievinghigher standards of living and greatersocial stability. Second, it might not be able to reliably raise the resources it needs to project powerabroad. Military assets, for one thing,have to be financed, and poorer countries have more difficulty taxing their citizens than do richcountries. Third, a poor country can haveonly so much influence abroad if it does not have soft power, such as democracy, an open society, orpluralistic values. The leadership thatcomes with dominance lasts only if it inspires followers: only those who stand for something that commandsuniversal or near universal appeal are inspiring. Likewise, only a richcountry—one on the economic andtechnological edge—can be a fount of ideas, technology, institutions, and practices forothers. That said, even if dominance is generallyinconsistent with poverty, onecan be dominant without being among the richest countries. Even a middle-income power, which China is likelyto be by 2030, canbe internally cohesive, raise resources forexternal purposes (such asmilitary expenditures), and possess some inspiring national ideals. In fact, despite China’s relatively low per capita gdp today, it is already dominant in several ways. China convincedthe African countries in which it invests heavily to close down the Taiwaneseembassies they were hosting. With $3 trillion in foreign reserves, it has offeredto buy Greek, Irish, Portuguese, and Spanish debt to forestall or mitigate financialchaos in Europe. (“Chinais Spain’sbest friend,” said Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero in Aprilon the occasion of the Chinese president’s visit.) Chinahas also used its size to strengthen its trade and financial relationships inAsia and Latin America: for example, tradetransactions among several countries in both regions can now be settled inyuan. Aboveall, China’s exchange-rate policy has affected economies throughout the world,hurting developing countries as much as the United States: by keeping its currencycheap, China has managed to keep its exports more competitive than those fromcountries such as Bangladesh, India, Mexico, and Vietnam. Yet these countrieshave stood on the sidelines, leaving Washingtonto wage a crusade against Beijingon its own—and for that reason, it has not done so very successfully. China,meanwhile, has been able to buy off the opposition. Although many countrieschafe at seeing their competitiveness undermined by an undervalued yuan, theyremain silent, either for fear of China’spolitical muscle or because Chinaoaers them financial assistance or trading opportunities. Even within the United States, fewgroups have really been critical. Chinais a large market for U.S.companies, and so it is the liberal left, not the holders of U.S. capital, that has condemned China’s exchange-rate policy, on behalf of U.S. workers. Evenif China is unlikely tomuster anytime soon the kind of dominance that naturally inspires or might benecessary to build international systems and institutions like those the United States created after World War II, Beijing is alreadyexercising other forms of dominance. For example, it can require that U.S. andEuropean firms share their technology with Chinese firms before granting them accessto its market. And it can pursue policies that have systemic effects, despiteopposition from much of the world. Its policy of undervaluing its exchange rateis a classic beggar-thy-neighbor strategy that undermines the openness of theworld’s trading and financial systems while also creating the conditions foreasy liquidity, which contributed to the recent global economiccrisis. Chinese dominance isnot looming. In some ways, it is already here. Drowning by numbers Can the United States reverse this trend? Itseconomic future inspires angst: the country has a fiscalproblem, a growth problem, and, perhaps most intractable of all, amiddle-class problem. Repeated tax cuts and two wars, the financial andeconomic crisis of 2008–10, the inexorable growth of long-termentitlements (especially related to health), and the possible buildup of badassets for which the government might eventually be responsible havecreated serious doubts about the U.S. public sector’s balancesheet. High public and private debt and long-term unemployment will depress long-term growth. And a combination of stagnating middle-class incomes,growing inequality, declining mobility, and, morerecently, falling prospects for even the college educated has createdbig distributional problems. The middle class is feeling beleaguered: itdoes not want to have to move down the skill ladder, but its upwardprospects are increasingly limited by competition from China and India. TheUnited States’continued strength comes from its can-do attitudeabout fixing its economic problems and its confidence that sound economic fundamentals can ensure its enduringeconomic dominance. Most notably, the United Statesaffords unique opportunities for entrepreneurship “because it has a favorable business culture, the mostmature venture capital industry, close relations betweenuniversities and industry, and an open immigration policy,” according to the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, anacademic consortium that studies entrepreneurialactivity worldwide. In a 2009 survey, gem rankedthe United Statesfirst in the world in providing such opportunities. Nearly all the majorcommercially successful companies that have made technologicalbreakthroughs in the last three decades—Apple and Microsoft, Google andFacebook—were founded and are based in the United States.In fact, it was by finding new and dynamic sources of growth in the1990s that the United States was able to head oa the economicchallenge posed by that era’s rising power, Japan. Today, optimists argue that the United States can replicate that experience with China. It istrue that if the U.S.economy were to grow consistentlyat a rate of 3.5 percent over the next 20years, as it did in the 1990s, investor sentiment and confidence in the dollar as a reserve currency could bebuoyed. Butsome key differencestoday should dampen any such hope. TheUnited Statesheaded into the 1990s with far less government debt than it will have in the future. In1990, the ratio of public debt toGDP was about 42 percent, whereas the COB’s latest projected figure for 2020 is close to 100 percent. Theexternal position of the United Stateswas also less vulnerable two decades ago. For example, in 1990, foreign holdings of U.S. government debt amounted to 19 percent; today, they are close to 50 percent, and amajority are in China’shands. In the 1990s, the countrywas also considerably further away from the date at which it would have to reckon withthe cost of entitlements. Andthen there is the United States’beleaguered middle class. Overthe last 20 years, several related pathologies that have squeezed the American middle class, such as astagnating median income, have becomemore entrenched and more intractable. Even a 3.5 percent growth rate, whichwould be well above current expectations, may not be adequate to maintain confidence in the U.S. model,which is based onthe hope of a better future for many. Inother words, the United Statescannot escape the inexorable logicof demography and the fact that poor countries, especially China, are catching up with it. China, which is four times as populous as the United States, will be a bigger economy as soon as itsaverage standard ofliving (measure in per capita gdp) exceeds one-quarter ofthe United States’. By some measures,including my own, this has already occurred,and as Chinacontinues to grow, the gap will only widen. A resurgentUnited Statesmight be able to slow down that process, but it will not be able to prevent it. Growingby 3.5 percent, rather than 2.5percent, over the next 20 years might boost the United States’ economic performance, social stability, and nationalmood. But it would notmake a significant differencein its position relative to Chinain the face of, say, a seven percent growthrate there. Theseprojections undermine the dominant belief that the United States’economic preeminence is its own to lose. It is China’sactions that will largelydetermine whether the differentialin growth between Chinaand the United Statesis modest or great. Chinacan radically messup, for example, if it allows asset bubbles to build or if it fails to stave off political upheaval. Or it can surge aheadby correcting existing economicdistortions, especially by moving away from an export intensive growth strategy toward one that developsdemand at home. TheUnited States’range of action is much narrower. If the United Statesis unlikely to grow significantly slower than by 2.0–2.5 percent, it is even more unlikely to grow fasterthan by 3.5 percent. This is thecurse of being at the frontier of economic development: both the potential downsides and the potentialupsides are limited. Evenif the United States growsfast—say, by 3.5 percent—other countries,such as China,may grow faster, too, leaving the basic picture of their relative economic powerunaffected. In fact, when the pace of technological innovation inleading countries, such as the United States,quickens, the new technologies become quickly available to poorer countries, providing astimulus to their growth, too. Even more important than producing new technologies ishaving the human capital and the skills to usethem. According to the National Science Foundation, in 2006 there were nearly twice as many undergraduates in science and engineering in Chinaas in the United States. This differential islikely only to grow. Despite having a considerably worse educational system than the United States, Chinaseems well positioned to absorb new technologies. There were sixtimes as many peer-reviewed scientific publications inthe United States as in China in 2002—and just 2.5 times as manyin 2008.The ability of rich countries tostay ahead in terms of growth is inherently limited because China is better able to absorb and use new technologies. China’s technologicalsophistication is growing: the United States, Europe, and Japanexport very few products that Chinadoes not also export. Moregenerally, if growth in the United Statesslows, China’s growth might be unaffected, but if it accelerates, China’s growth might, too. Either way, the United States cannot pull away. Back to Suez Even a resurgent United States could not exercise power and dominance over a rising China. China is already able to do whatthe rest of the world does not wantit to do. Might it soon be able toget the United States to do what the United States does not want to do? Isanother Suezcrisis possible? In1956, with sterling under pressure because of Egypt’sblockade of the Suez Canal, the United Kingdom turned to the United States for financial assistance, invoking their“special relationship.” But U.S. PresidentDwight Eisenhower refused. He was furious that the British (and the French) had attacked Egyptafter President Gamal Abdel Nassernationalized the canal, just as he was campaigning forreelection as the man of peace who had ended thefighting on the Korean Peninsula. He demanded that the United Kingdom comply with a U.S.- sponsored UN resolution requiring the prompt and unconditional withdrawal of British troops. If it did not, Washington would block the United Kingdom’s access to resources from the imf. But if it did, it would get substantial financial assistance. The United Kingdom agreed, and the United States supported a massive financialpackage, including an unprecedented imf loan worth $1.3billion and a $500 million loan from the U.S.Export-Import Bank. Now,imagine a not-so-distant future in which the United States has recovered from the crisis of 2008–10but remains saddled with structuralproblems: widening income gaps, a squeezed middle class, and reduced economic and social mobility.Its financial system is still asfragile as before the crisis, and the government has yet to come to grips with the rising costs of entitlementsand the buildup of bad assetsin the financial system, which the government might have to take over. Inflation is a major globalproblem because commodity pricesare skyrocketing as a result of rapid growth in emerging markets. Chinahas an economy and a trade flow twice as large as the United States’. The dollar has lost itssheen; demand for the yuan as areserve currency is growing. Muchas in 1956, when Washington was suspected oforchestrating massivesales of sterling in New York to force theBritish government towithdraw its troops from the Suez Canal, rumors are swirling that Chinais planning to wield its financial power; it has had enough of the United States’ naval presence in the Pacific Ocean. Beijingstarts selling some of itscurrency reserves (by then likely to amount to $4 trillion). Investors grow skittish,fearing that the dollar might collapse, and bond markets turn on U.S. governmentpaper. The United Statessoon loses its aaa credit rating. Auctions for U.S. Treasury bonds find no buyers. To maintain confidence, the U.S. Federal Reserve sharply raises interest rates.Before long, interest rates substantiallyexceed growth rates, and the United States urgently needs cheap financing. It turns to oilexporters, but the friendly autocratsof yore have been replaced by illiberal democrats of various Islamic persuasions, ranging from moderateto extreme, and all with longmemories of U.S.intervention in the Middle East. Much as for Greece, Ireland, and Portugalrecently, seeking help from the imf seems unavoidable: defaulting on U.S. debt obligations would be fatal to the effort to preserve what is left of the United States’global role. Butby this time, China,already the world’s largest banker since 2000, controls the spigot. Although it,too, deems that an imf bailout is necessary, it has a precondition: thewithdrawal of the United States’naval presence in the western Pacific. The request has bite because China,as the imf’s largest contributor and a benefactor to many of its members, can easily block the United States’request for financing. By then, China may evenhave acquired veto power thanks tothe governance reforms scheduled for 2018. Somewill say this scenario is pure fantasy. After all, the United Statescould easily withhold financing from the United Kingdom in 1956because doing so had no serious consequences for the dollar or the U.S. economy. But if tomorrow, China sold, or just stopped buying, U.S. Treasury bonds, the dollar woulddecline and the yuan would appreciate—thevery outcome that Chinahas steadfastly been trying toprevent. Chinais unlikely to suddenly undermine its mercantilist growth strategy and risk large capitallosses on its stock of foreign exchangereserves. Others might say that even if Chinawere willing todo so, if the U.S. economywere depressed, the Federal Reserve might be only too happy to buy up any U.S. Treasuries dumped by China. Butall this leaves out that China’s incentives might be very different in the future. Ten years on, China might beless wedded to keeping theyuan weak. If it continues to slowly internationalize its currency, both its ability to maintain a weak yuanand its interest in doing so maysoon disappear. And when they do, China’spower over the United Stateswill become considerable. In 1956, the United Kingdom’s financiers were dispersed across the publicand private sectors. But theChinese government is the largestnet supplier of capital to the United States: it holds many U.S. Treasury bonds andfinances the U.S. deficit.Leverage over the United Statesis concentrated in Beijing’shands. Ofcourse, the prospects of a dollar devaluation would probably be less painful for the United States in this hypothetical future thanthe prospects of a weakening sterling was forthe United Kingdomin 1956. Back then, a devaluation of sterlingwould have inflicted heavy losseson the currencies of the United Kingdom’s former colonies that held large sterling-denominated assets.These colonies would have soldtheir sterling assets, weakening their economic links with the United Kingdom. Preventing this wasimportant to the government inLondon in order to preserve what was left of theBritish Empire. A devaluation of the dollar would be less ofa problem partly because theUnited States’foreign liabilities are denominated in dollars. Arepeat of the Suezcrisis may seem improbable today. But the United States’current economic situation does leave the country fundamentally vulnerable in the face of China’sinescapable dominance. TheUnited Kingdom was playingwith a weak hand during the Suez crisis not just because it was in debt andits economy was weakening butalso because another great economic power had emerged. Today, even as the United States’ economy isstructurally weak, its addiction todebt has made the country dependent on foreigners, and its prospects for growth are minimal, a strong rival hasemerged. Chinamay not quite be an adversary, butit is not an ally, either. Macmillan’s 1971 prophecy that the United States might decline “in 200 years”betrayed a mechanical interpretationof history: it projected enduring dominance for the United States, much like his owncountry had enjoyed. But Chinacould accelerate the patterns of history—and make the United Statesconfront its decline much sooner than Macmillan anticipated or even than most people expect today.
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狗仔卡
楼主
提升卡
变色卡
抢沙发
千斤顶
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发表于 2011-9-1 14:36
