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【中文标题】全球化的失败
【登载媒体】金融时报
【来源地址】
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2b9dab2e-c817-11e0-9501-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1VN8Dnkg0
【译 者】yangfuguang
【声 明】本翻译供Anti-CNN使用，未经AC或译者许可，不得转载。
【译 文】
A failure of economic strategy and leadership lies behind the near simultaneous collapse of market confidence in the eurozone and US economies. No need to blame the rating agencies: governments in Europe and America have been unable to cope with the realities of global capital markets and competition from Asia – and deserve the lion’s share of the blame.
经济战略的失败，领导能力的削弱，这几乎同时在欧元区和美国发生的事实根源在于经济自信心的崩溃。没必要去指责评级机构，因为欧洲和美国政府已经没有办法处理全球资本市场和来自亚洲的竞争，理应得到亚洲的责备。
I’ve watched dozens of financial crises up close, and know that success means showing the public a way out that is bold, technically sound and built on social values. Transatlantic leadership is falling short on all counts. Neither the US nor Europe has even properly diagnosed the core problem, namely that both regions are beinwhipsawed by globalisation.
我曾近距离观察很多的金融危机，明白成功就是意味着向世界展示一种前进方向，它是勇敢，合情合理的。美国的领导力在诸多方面是不合格的。不管是美国还是欧洲到目前还没有发现真正的问题所在：就是它们都深受全球化之害。Jobs for low-skilled workers in manufacturing, and new investments in large swaths of industry, have been lost to international competition. Employment in the US and Europe during the 2000s was held up only by housing construction stoked by low interest rates and reckless deregulation – until the construction bubble collapsed. The path to recovery now lies not in a new housing bubble, but in upgraded skills, increased exports and public investments in infrastructure and low-carbon energy. Instead, the US and Europe have veered between dead-end, consumption-oriented stimulus packages and austerity without a vision for investment.
在制造业给低技能工人提供就业和在新兴领域的投资，这些我们已经落后于同行们。在二十一世纪头十年，欧美的就业率只能靠着低利率和不按常理出牌刺激下的房产建设来维持颜面，直到泡沫崩溃。复习之路现在不仅是依靠新的房产泡沫，而是在提升技能，增加出口和在基础设施的公共投资，以及低碳能源上。实际上，欧美已经从这种无出路的消费导向的刺激计划和紧缩计划中转型，因为这没有投资的观念。
Macroeconomic policy has not only failed to create jobs, but also to respond to basic social values too. Let me be clear: good social policy does not mean running big deficits. Public debts are already too large in both Europe and the US. But it does mean a completely different balance between cuts to social services and tax increases on the rich.
宏观政策不仅没有制造就业机会，而且也对基本的社会价值产生了毒害。说得明白点，良好的社会政策绝不意味着产生大笔赤字。在美国和欧洲，公共债务都显得超出了限度了。但是这并不意味着通过增加富人的税收和减少全社会的福利这种非常手段来加以平衡（债务）。
The simple fact is that globalisation has not only hit the unskilled hard but has also proved a bonanza for the global super-rich. They have been able to invest in new and highly profitable projects in emerging economies. Meanwhile, as Warren Buffett argued this week, they have been able to convince their home governments to cut tax rates on profits and high incomes in the name of global tax competition. Tax havens have proliferated even as the politicians have occasionally railed against them. In the end the poor are doubly hit, first by global market forces, then by the ability of the rich to park money at low taxes in hideaways around the world.
一个简单的事实是，全球化不仅仅是打击了劳动密集型行业，也为全球的有钱人提供了绝佳机会。他们可以在新兴经济体内投资新兴、利润更高的行业。同时，就像巴菲特本周说的那样，他们借着全球税率竞争的现实，还可以说服当地政府减少针对利润和收入的税负。即便有政治家偶尔提出反对案，税收天堂依旧使得他们获得巨额利润。最后，穷人无疑受到伤害，首先是被全球市场的劳动力，第二，被富人在世界范围内更加低赋税的地方投资的行为伤害。
An improved fiscal policy in the transatlantic economies would therefore be based on three realities. First, it would expand investments in human and infrastructure capital. Second, it would cut wasteful spending, for instance in misguided military engagements in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen. Third, it would balance budgets in the medium term, in no small part through tax increases on high personal incomes and international corporate profits that are shielded by loopholes and overseas tax havens.
那么在欧美地区，一项改进的财政政策就要基于三种事实。第一，它会扩大在基础设施和社会福利方面的投资。第二，它可以减少浪费性支出，比如在一些地区，如伊拉克、阿富汗、也门，这种被误导的军事行动应该消除。第三，它可以平衡中期预算，更多的是提高富人税负，增加跨国公司的利润税，这些被海外税收天堂屏蔽了的行为。
Infrastructure investment also need not increase deficits if any new projects pay their own way. Even if they require upfront borrowing, projects will not add to net financial liabilities if they are repaid through future revenues. Currently, budget accounting in the US and Europe generally fails to distinguish between these self-financing capital projects – such as bridges, which earn revenue through future tolls – and those financed by general revenues.
即使他们自己掏钱，基础设施投资也要在不增加赤字的前体下进行。即使他们需要借款，如果它们未来的收入来垫付，工程也不会成为净金融负债。当下，欧美的审计工作中往往没能分辨这种自我筹资和依靠公共财政的项目，比如桥梁，它可以通过以后的通行费实现自足，以及那些依靠一般财政的工程。
Export-led growth is the other under-explored channel of recovery. Part of this must be earned through better skills and technologies – another reason not to cut education. But another part can be earned through better financial policies. China, realising this, has sold Africa many billions of dollars per year of infrastructure export projects, financed by long-term Chinese loans. Yet the US and Europe have virtually ceded that market to China by the lack of financing to African and other fast-growing economies.
出口导向的增长也是一个有待开发的复兴途径。这些部分依靠的是更好的技术，这也是另一个不能减少教育投入的原因。但也可以通过金融政策加以扶持。中国就是这样做的，通过贷款给非洲，让他们购买中国的基建工程，这些工程量可以达到每年数十亿美元。而欧洲和美国却通过减少援助非洲和其它快速增长的经济体，退出了这一领域。
The last missing piece for any recovery, however, is clarity of purpose from the political class. In Europe, a coherent response led by the European Union has been sidelined to policymaking by national governments – the pact between France and Germany being only the latest example. For months, Europe’s fate has been decided by German state elections and small Finnish parties. The European Central Bank has been so divided that it too has neglected core functions of stabilising panicked markets. There is no way the euro can survive if European-wide institutions continue to be so weak, slow and divided.
最后一个对任何恢复都有用的方法是，政治阶层要有明确的政策。在欧洲，由欧洲联盟提出的连续的对策，被各国政府的小算盘打得逐渐边缘化——法国和德国的条约是最新的证据。几个月来，欧洲的命运被德国大选和小的芬兰政党决定。欧洲央行四分五裂，以至于它忘记了自己的核心工作是稳定住恐慌的市场。如果欧洲范围的国家持续脆弱、低速发展以及分裂，欧元就很难独善其身。
The US has similarly devolved into a mélange of sector, class, and regional interests. President Barack Obama is the incredibly shrinking leader, waiting to see whether Congressional power barons will call. More generally, the US cannot prosper while its politicians go hat in hand to the vested interests that finance their nonstop campaigning.
美国类似，它被移交给各种部门、阶层、地区利益结合的杂合体。总统奥巴马无疑是畏缩的，它还在等待国会实权人物的命令。更普遍的是，如果政治家只对给予他们支持的财团唯唯诺诺，那么美国难以持续繁荣。
The recent swoon in financial markets and the stalled recovery in the US and Europe reflect these fundamental shortcomings. There is no growth strategy, only the hope that scared and debt-burdened consumers will return to buying houses they don’t need and can’t afford. Sadly, these global economic currents will continue to claim jobs and drain capital until there is a revival of bold, concerted leadership. In the meantime, the markets will gyrate in pangs of uncertainty.
最近欧美金融领域和增长的低迷反应了这种根本的弊病。没有实际的振兴计划，只有一种希望，希望惶恐而又负债累累的消费者继续购买房子，这些他们不需要或者负担不起的东西。悲催的是，这种全球化的经济流向会继续带走劳动力和资本，只到有个勇敢、协调的领导层出现。在此期间，市场会在不确定的漩涡中挣扎。 |
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狗仔卡
楼主
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发表于 2011-9-2 21:20
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