本帖最后由 小明啊 于 2011-9-22 15:03 编辑
【中文标题】中国是个金融侏儒？
【原文标题】Why China Is a Financial Midget
【登载媒体】华尔街日报
【来源地址】http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904106704576582760749856144.html?mod=googlenews_wsj
【原文作者】JONATHAN ANDERSON
【译 者】 小伟小明
【翻译方式】人工
【声 明】本翻译供Anti-CNN使用，未经AC或译者许可，不得转载。
【译 文】
Beijing's economic model will prevent the yuan from replacing the dollar as the world's reserve currency.
中国的经济模式将阻止人民币代替美元作为世界储备货币。
The title says it all: "Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China's Economic Dominance." Arvind Subramanian's new book is a good example of a more aggressive line of argument regarding China—that it's a matter of whether, not when, China will take over economic leadership of the world. But China's road to real financial influence promises to be far longer and rockier than the GDP numbers would suggest.
萨勃拉曼尼亚（Arvind Subramanian）的新书标题就说明了一切“日蚀：生活在中国经济优势的阴影下”。这是本关于中国更强势的论点的例子。重要的是中国是否会将在世界经济领域中起领导者作用，而不是什么时候会成为更重要。而中国在通往经济大国的路远比GDP数字所反映的更加漫长与艰辛。
The argument for dominance has two prongs. The first is that China's economy will very soon be larger than either the U.S. or the EU. And second, as this happens the yuan will also naturally replace the dollar as the global reserve currency, with profound consequences for international markets.
关于这个问题有两个论点，首先,中国的经济将很快超过美国或欧盟。其次,当中国经济可与美欧一较高下后，人民币也将自然取代美元成为全球储备货币,并将深刻影响国际市场。
On the first issue, there is little debate. China already has a $7 trillion economy, roughly half the size of the U.S. or the EU. If it can continue to grow even at 6% to 7% a year, not even at 10% or 11% as it did through much of the 2000s, then in five years the Chinese economy could easily pass the $15 trillion mark, where the U.S. is today. By the end of this decade, China should already be larger than the U.S. and equal to Europe.
在第一个问题上,很少存在争议。中国已经拥有7万亿美元的经济规模,大概相当于美国或欧盟的一半。如果它能持续增长,即使一年增长6%到7%，虽然达不到之前2000年的10%或11%,，在五年内中国经济仍能够轻易地突破15万亿美元大关，犹如今日的美国。到2020年前，中国的经济水平应能大于美国并比肩欧洲。
The future of China's financial role is murkier. Within 10 years the yuan will probably play only a marginally more important global role than it does today. It won't replace the U.S. dollar as the world's reserve currency, and it may not even challenge the Japanese yen or the pound sterling.
未来中国金融经济的作用将会更加隐蔽，十年内，人民币可能只是扮演一个比今天重要一点的全球角色。它不会取代美元的世界储备货币地位，甚至也不会去挑战日元和英镑。
Why? It's one thing to hold the yuan for trade invoicing, but if you're going to hold it as a liquid "safe haven" portfolio investment choice, you need free and unfettered access to deep domestic fixed-income markets. This is what the dollar and euro offer, and essentially so do the yen and other G-10 major currencies.
为什么呢？持有人民币的一部分原因是将其作为交易货币。如果把它保持看做是避风港，需要放宽和解放国内固定收入市场，这就是美元和欧元所带来的影响，并且本质上也是日元和其他G10主要货币带来的影响。
But not China, which maintains one of the most closed capital account regimes in the world. That is true in comparison to developed markets and to lower-income neighbors in Asia and other emerging regions.
事实上，相对于发达国家市场和在亚洲低收入国家以及其他一些新兴地区来说，
一直保持着世界上最封闭的资本帐户制度的不是中国。
AFP/Getty Images
Chinese President Hu Jintao (left) wonders if his country can dominate the U.S.
胡锦涛主席考虑中国是否可以控制美国
The bigger problem is that China can't open its capital regime, at least not fast enough to matter. For more than two decades, China's philosophy of monetary management and financial development has been based on a closed-economy system: maintaining low and stable interest rates without having to worry about external arbitrage, breezily adopting economic stimulus when needed without concern about the banking system's asset quality, propping up banks with historically high nonperforming loan ratios and fixed-cost pricing, and keeping iron-clad control over the exchange rate. All of these only work when foreign portfolio funds cannot influence asset prices, and when locals have nowhere else to go.
更大的问题是,中国不会开放资本体制,至少不会很快开放。二十多年以来，中国货币管理和金融发展的理念是建立在封闭经济的体系上：保持低而稳定的利率,而不必担心外部套利。在需要时轻松采取经济刺激手段，而并不关心银行系统资产的质量。银行不良贷款比例创历史新高，修订费用定价，严格控制汇率。所有这些工作并不能奏效，除非外国有价证券基金不能影响资产价格或者当地人无处可去。
While China's GDP may be 10 times larger than it was in 1995, its external capital controls are still similar to what they were back then. China has opened a few windows at the margin, but it has never seriously opened the doors. If anything, the financial crises of 1997-98 and 2008-09 have taught the authorities to be as slow as possible in making adjustments.
虽然中国的GDP是1995年的10倍，但是其外部资本管制率仍然还停留在过去，它只是开了边缘几个不甚重要的小窗口，并没有真正的敞开大门。如果非要区别于过去的话，那只是官方在1997-98和2008-09的金融危机中学会了如何缓慢的采取调整。
Even if China were to remove external controls, this still leaves the lack of deep domestic markets. Put simply, there's nothing to invest in. You need a local bond market, and China doesn't have one. Relative to its size, China has a much less mature fixed-income market than most of its major emerging-market peers.
即使中国想要移除外部控制，这仍留下了深入国内市场的空白。简单地说,没有什么值得投资。你需要一个本地债券市场,而中国没有。相对于它的地位,中国的固定收益市场的成熟度比其主要新兴市场的同行要小得多。
As with capital controls, this is part of the financial model. China's unique prevalence of undisciplined state-owned borrowers and reliance on quantitative macro-credit measures makes it imperative to keep financial flows concentrated in the banking system.
由于资本管制是财务模型的一部分，针对于现状中散漫的借款人和依赖于定量的宏观信贷的现象，集中在银行体系中促使资金流动的措施势在必行。
This explains why the bond market failed to outgrow GDP for much of the 2000s. And it explains why, after the unbridled explosion of corporate paper in the past two years, the authorities are now back-pedaling to bring down exposures, precisely to preserve bank asset quality and leverage ratios.
这就解释了为什么债券市场未能摆脱GDP在 2000年代的速增。并解释为什么，在过去两年肆无忌惮的企业爆炸后，当局急刹车以降低风险，正是为了维护银行资产质量和杠杆比率。
One common rejoinder is that China has no option but to open up its capital markets and make reforms to pave the way for yuan convertibility, since the alternative is to continue to accumulate hundreds of billions of dollars per year in questionable foreign assets—a trend that is increasingly unpalatable to China's leadership.
一个共同的回答是，中国除了为人民币兑换铺平道路而开放资本市场并且采取改革外，别无选择，因为问题是在令人质疑的外国资本情况下继续每年继续积累美元政策的实行，从而形成一个对中国领导地位反感的趋势。
This argument makes no economic sense. As long as China's domestic saving rate is above its domestic investment rate—as long as it is running external current account surpluses—it will continue to accumulate foreign assets.
这个争论没有任何经济意义，只要中国国内储蓄率是高于国内投资率—只要外部运营的账户经常盈余—它就将继续积累国外资产。
If the yuan were the world's reserve currency, China might be able to stop accumulating claims denominated in dollars and euros and generate claims in its own currency instead (as the U.S. is able to borrow in dollars abroad today). But we're still talking about an ever-increasing pile of claims on questionable sovereign borrowers in the West, regardless of the currency those debts are kept in.
如果人民币成为世界储备货币,中国可能会停止积累美元和欧元,用它自己的货币代替(就像今天美国在其他国家也能借到美元)。无论这些债务货币保持。但我们现在所要解决的是一个西方借款国不断增长的债务，而不是那些债务中的货币。
In short, making the yuan into a true global reserve currency doesn't solve any of China's current problems and could create very painful new ones along the way. Which is why it's not going to happen any time soon. China may be an economic giant on the world stage, but in this sense it will remain a financial midget.
简而言之，真正的使人民币成为国际储备货币，不能够解决任何中国现在的问题，并且会在以后产生新的令人头疼的问题。这就是为什么不会立刻实现的原因。中国在世界的舞台上可能会成为一个经济巨人,但在某个意义上,仍然是一个金融侏儒罢了。
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发表于 2011-9-22 14:51
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