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【中文标题】穆斯林、自由主义者、卡扎菲追随者坐下来聊聊利比亚 【原文标题】An Islamist, a Liberal, and a Former Regime Loyalist Walk into a Cafe 【登载媒体】Foreign Policy 外交政策OCTOBER 23, 2011 【来源地址】http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/21/an_islamist_a_liberal_and_a_former_regime_loyalist_walk_into_a_cafe 【原文作者】RYAN CALDER 【译者】hadrienyoung 【翻译方式】人工 【声明】欢迎转载，请务必注明译者和出处 bbs.m4.cn Hours after Muammar al-Qaddafi met a bloody end 350 miles to the west in Sirte, three Libyans walk into a Benghazi café: an Islamist, a liberal, and a former Qaddafi loyalist. They had agreed to meet me there virtually, via Skype, to discuss Qaddafi's death and the future of Libya, where I had gone in March and April to report on the war and investigate the roots of the uprising. One of the three men -- the liberal -- is the friend of a friend I met in Benghazi. The other two are his co-workers at a survey-research firm; they've known one another for a few weeks. 卡扎菲死后几个小时，在苏尔特以西350英里的地方，三个利比亚人走进了班加西咖啡馆，他们分别是穆斯林、自由主义者和卡扎菲的追随者。他们同意与我通过Skype聊聊卡扎菲的死亡和利比亚的未来。自由主义者是我在班加西朋友的朋友。其他两人是他在调查研究公司的同事，他们互相认识只有几个星期。 Convening this get-together from my home in Oakland, California is less than ideal; Internet failures interrupt our conversation every ten minutes or so over the course of a couple hours, and the loud crack of rasaas al-farah -- celebratory gunfire, literally "bullets of joy" -- periodically barges into our conversation. Benghazi, Libya's second city and the birthplace of the uprising against Qaddafi, is no longer a city at war, but it is not yet a city at peace: Civilians still wield automatic weapons, a legacy of the war's chaotic early days, and the city's new government seems to be struggling in its efforts to claim a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force (to use the German sociologist Max Weber's famous definition of a state). 我是在加利福尼亚奥克兰的家里召集这次聚会，但效果并不理想，因为几个小时的网聊常常断线，咖啡馆外庆祝的枪声也干扰我们。班加西是利比亚的第二大城市，是反抗卡扎菲起义的发源地。这里的战斗已经结束，但并没有恢复平静。这里的老百姓拥有武器，新政府则竭力想掌控政权。 The Islamist, Abdul Salaam, is 30 years old. He is very tall with a big ready smile, and likes to dress simply, in loose collared shirts and capris with sandals. Abdul Salaam，穆斯林，30岁。他个子很高，面带笑容，衣着简单，穿宽松衬衣和凉鞋。 And a long beard. He began growing his beard for the first time in February, days after the Qaddafi regime was thrown out of Benghazi. For years, he had wanted to grow one, but he had waited. "I saw what happened to people who had long beards under Qaddafi," he explains. "Someone would write a secret report about you, and you'd go to jail." Some of Abdul Salaam's cousins and neighbors, he reports, went to jail for growing beards, or for other signs of "excessive" piety. "Their ideas weren't what Qaddafi wanted," Abdul Salaam explains matter-of-factly. Even frequent mosque attendance could bring a knock on the door in the middle of the night from members of Qaddafi's security apparatus, the feared Internal Security forces and the Revolutionary Committees. The price of being religious? "Some went to jail for 15 years," Abdul Salaam says. "Others died there." 关于蓄长胡须 在二月，卡扎菲政权被赶出班加西之后的几天，Salaam开始第一次蓄胡须。几年以来，他一直想蓄胡须，但没有这么做。“我知道在卡扎菲政权下蓄胡须意味着什么。”他解释说，“你会被列入秘密报告，被投入监狱。”他的一些亲戚和邻居因为蓄胡须或是有其他对宗教过度虔诚的表现而被投入监狱。Abdul Salaam说：“这些不是卡扎菲想看到的。”甚至频繁到清真寺礼拜也会招来半夜来敲门，敲门的人来自卡扎菲安全部门，包括令人生畏的国内安全部队和革命委员会。信奉宗教的代价是什么？Abdul Salaam说：“有的在监狱待了15年，有的则丢了性命。” A few of Abdul Salaam's acquaintances went beyond growing beards and took up arms against the regime in the 1990s. They were members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), which formed in eastern Libya in the early 1990s and included Libyans recently returned from fighting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The LIFG tried to assassinate Qaddafi three times in the 1990s. The colonel's revenge was vicious and indiscriminate: Many people merely suspected of association with the LIFG landed in Tripoli's notorious Abu Salim prison, site of a 1996 massacre that may have killed as many as 1,200 inmates. (Two months ago, Abu Salim fell to opposition forces.) By 1998, Qaddafi had quashed the LIFG as a domestic force. Some of the group's members joined al Qaeda from exile, and after 9/11, the LIFG's links to al Qaeda landed the organization on terrorist lists in the West. But between 2007 and 2009, LIFG leaders publicly renounced al Qaeda and its violent methods, apparently splitting with Osama bin Laden's group; when revolution broke out this year in Libya, they endorsed the rebels' National Transitional Council (NTC). Abdul Salaam认识的一些人在1990年代拿起武器反抗卡扎菲政权。他们是利比亚伊斯兰战斗团（LIFG）的成员。在1990年代早期，利比亚伊斯兰战斗团成立于利比亚东部，成员包括曾经在阿富汗反抗苏联占领的利比亚人。利比亚伊斯兰战斗团在1990年代三次暗杀卡扎菲。卡扎菲上校的报复是残忍的和无限制的：许多人仅仅被怀疑与利比亚伊斯兰战斗团有关系就被送到的黎波里臭名昭著的阿布·萨利姆监狱，在这里1996年的大屠杀就杀害了1200人（两个月前，阿布·萨利姆监狱落入反对派武装手里）。卡扎菲在1998年镇压了利比亚伊斯兰战斗团。战斗团的一些成员流亡后加入了基地组织。在911之后，由于利比亚伊斯兰战斗团与基地组织有联系，被西方列入了恐怖组织名单。但在2007年至2009年间，利比亚伊斯兰战斗团的头头公开宣布放弃暴力手段、断绝与基地的关系。当革命在利比亚爆发，他们站在“全国过渡委员会”一边。 With relatives and friends who endured so much under Qaddafi, you might expect Abdul Salaam to be jubilant today. But he speaks with a circumspect air. "When I first heard the news, I didn't believe it," he says. "And even after I'd seen the photos and knew he was really dead, I wasn't as happy as I'd expected to be." For many Libyans, the reality of life without the only leader they have ever known is still sinking in. Even after loyalist troops had lost control of Tripoli and most of the rest of Libya, Qaddafi himself retained an air of slippery invincibility. "I figured he'd either be outside Libya by now, or somewhere he could escape from easily," Abdul Salaam muses. It's hard for him to believe that the man who ruled Libya for almost 42 years couldn't find a way to cheat death. Abdul Salaam的一些亲戚和朋友受到卡扎菲政权的迫害，你可能认为他会为今天而欢呼，但他的态度很谨慎。“当我第一次知道这个消息，我并不相信。”他说，“即使是看到了照片，知道卡扎菲真的死了，我也不如想象中的那么高兴。”对很多利比亚人而言，没有了这个唯一的领导人，现实生活依然每况愈下。尽管忠于卡扎菲的部队节节败退，卡扎菲仍然被认为不可战胜。Abdul Salaam谨慎地说：“我认为他已经离开了利比亚，或者能够从容地逃到某个地方。”很难让Abdul Salaam相信这个统治利比亚42年的人已经难逃一死。 It may also be hard to savor the dictator's demise because of the challenges that lie ahead. Abdul Salaam says he's "optimistic" about Libya's future, "but not 100 percent." He thinks conflict could arise among cities and among tribes. Moreover, he feels his own political goals may be out of reach. As an Islamist, he supports making sharia Libya's primary legal framework -- but he doubts this will come to pass, at least not anytime soon. "It's not impossible," he says, but he expects resistance -- not least from the Western powers that supported the National Transitional Council. "The developed countries won't like it," he quips. Like many Libyans, he is aware of many Westerners' dim view of the idea of an Islamic state. "I support sharia -- but not bin Laden's kind of sharia," he is quick to point out. 独裁者的死亡并没有带来欢乐，因为还有挑战在前面。Abdul Salaam说他对利比亚的未来是乐观的，但不是100%乐观。他认为在城市之间、部族之间会爆发冲突。他感到自己的政治目标可能不会实现。作为穆斯林，他支持将伊斯兰教教法作为利比亚主要的法律体制，但他怀疑是否能实现，至少不会很快实现。虽然他认为这不是不可能的，但是他预计支持全国过渡委员会的西方列强会反对。他嘲弄地说：“发达国家是不会喜欢的。”像许多利比亚人，他知道西方对穆斯林国家持怀疑态度。但他很快表示：“我支持伊斯兰教教法，但不是本拉登的伊斯兰教教法。” Abdul Salaam also senses occasional discrimination from other Libyans. Now that his beard identifies him as a man of faith, people look at him differently, even with Qaddafi gone. "Some people absorbed Qaddafi's view [of pious Muslims]," he sighs. Abdul Salaam能偶尔感觉到来自其他利比亚人的歧视。由于他蓄着胡须，表明他是虔诚于宗教的人，即使在卡扎菲离开后，人们仍以异样眼光看他。他叹息道：“在对待穆斯林问题上，一些人持有与卡扎菲一样的态度。” *** The rat-tat-tat of machine-gun fire outside the café interrupts our conversation. It's those bullets of joy again -- young men have been firing Kalashnikovs into the air all day, celebrating Qaddafi's death. 咖啡馆外的枪声打断了我们的交谈。年轻人用卡拉斯尼科夫冲锋枪整天向天开枪，庆祝卡扎菲之死。 Libya today is awash in weapons. As the eastern part of the country fell to the rebels in February, defeated loyalist militias fled, leaving behind machine guns, grenade launchers, and anti-aircraft guns that the everyman rebels picked up and took home. In the absence of a clear military command structure for the first two months of the revolution, ordinary people -- many of whom had never held a gun before -- grabbed these weapons and drove westward to fight, teaching themselves in their backyards how to shoot Kalashnikovs and mounting anti-aircraft guns on their pickup trucks. 当前的利比亚武器泛滥。在二月，东部的城市落入反对派手中，忠于卡扎菲的部队逃走后，留下了大量武器，人人都能将武器扛回家。在革命的最初两个月，由于缺乏军事指挥系统，很多从来没有拿过枪的老百姓拿起武器，在后院自学如何使用卡拉斯尼科夫冲锋枪，在皮卡车上装上高射炮，一路向西参加战斗。 Throughout the summer and fall, the NTC established a command structure and announced programs to bring Libya's scattered weaponry under its control. But opposition fighters around the country continued to gather up what small arms they could, stripping them from dead loyalist soldiers, picking them up as enemy militias fled, and buying them on the black market. Weapons found their way back to cities like Benghazi that were no longer on the front lines. Today, it is often unclear who exactly is carrying weapons and what form of state imprimatur, if any, they have. 从夏天到秋天，全国过渡委员会（NTC）建立起指挥系统，将如乌合之众的武装控制起来。但是，全国各地的反对派武装不断收集任何能得到的轻型武器，有的来自战死的政府军士兵，有的来自敌人逃跑后扔下的武器，有的从黑市买。武器流向了城市，包括不再是前线的班加西。现在，你不清楚谁带有武器，如果可能的话，是否有国家的许可。 In the major cities, a dizzying array of groups assert responsibility for keeping the peace and resolving disputes: neighborhood militias, police, local councils, tribal forces, and special units that report directly to the National Transitional Council. The neighborhood militias defend their home turf and sometimes also take on the task of hunting out suspected criminals or Qaddafi loyalists who might be causing trouble. But there are other layers of "security" too. "If a fight breaks out, the first people to arrive are the neighborhood militias, and then it's the police officers," says Alixe Turner, a Benghazi-based analyst with the Shabakat Corporation, an international research firm. "But the NTC sometimes doesn't even know who the police officers are, and whether they're legitimate police officers. And if someone dies, tribal figures will get involved as well." Tribal leaders regularly adjudicate disputes and negotiate settlements between victims and accused perpetrators. 在主要城市，让人眼花缭乱的各种组织宣称由他们负责维持社会秩序、解决争端，这些组织包括地方民兵、警察、地方委员会、部族武装、全国过渡委员会的特派机构。地方民兵负责保护地方安全，有时也参与搜捕嫌疑犯以及制造混乱的亲卡扎菲分子。Alixe Turner是从事国际研究的Shabakat公司驻班加西的分析员，他说：“如果爆发战斗，最先到达的是地方民兵，然后是警察。但全国过渡委员会有时并不清楚这些警察是谁，他们是否合法。如果有人战死，部族重要成员就会卷入其中。”部族领导人定期裁决纠纷，帮助受害者与犯罪者之间达成协议。 The lack of clear state authority worries Osama Mustafa Drese, the liberal who has gathered his two co-workers for the Skype call. Osama is also 30, a lean, energetic man with high cheekbones and long eyelashes that accentuate his big eyes. "The NTC isn't a real government yet," he says. "When Libya has a constitution, recognized ministries, a prime minister, clear laws, and a proper system of government -- whether a monarchy, a federal republic, whatever -- then I'll say we have a government. But what we have now isn't a government." 是Osama Mustafa Drese将他的两个同事召集来进行这次网聊，他是个自由主义者，为当前的无政府状态忧虑不已。Osama也是30岁，身体偏瘦，但精力充沛，高颧骨，长睫毛让他的眼睛显得更大。他说：“全国过渡委员会还不是真正的政府。当利比亚有了宪法，任命了各部部长、总理，健全了法律，构建了合适的政府机构——无论是君主制还是联邦共和制——才称得上有了政府。我们现在还没用政府。” Osama is frustrated, and with reason. Yesterday, masked gunmen entered his cousin's home in the middle of the night. "They took him away in front of his children," he explains. For 24 hours, Osama's family tried to figure out what had happened, suspecting that the cousin had been kidnapped by the February 17 Martyrs' Brigade, a citizens' militia turned opposition paramilitary already accused of having killed a senior military leader in July to settle an old score. Osama这么说是有理由的。昨天，蒙面枪手半夜闯入他堂兄家。他解释说：“他们当着他孩子的面把他带走了。” 在24小时中，Osama的家人想尽办法想弄清楚到底是怎么回事，怀疑是被2月17日烈士旅绑架了。这个民兵组织是反对派的准军事部队，已经被指控在七月为了平反一个旧冤情而杀害了一个高级军事领导。 But after his family spent the night worrying, Osama's cousin was released -- by the police, who turned out to have been the ones who "kidnapped" him. According to Osama, the police apprehended his cousin based on an informant's report that he was a secretly active member of the pro-Qaddafi Revolutionary Committees. But quickly, Osama says, the police realized that the informant was lying. "So today, the police let my cousin go, and arrested the informant instead." This Keystone Kops moment might be funny if it hadn't been so terrifying -- and if it didn't reflect the chaotic state of Libya's security apparatus, which seems to have the structural consistency of hummus. 在一夜担心后，Osama的堂兄被警察释放了，是这些警察逮捕了他。据Osama说，警察逮捕他堂兄，是有人告密说他堂兄是卡扎菲革命委员会的秘密成员，但很快，警察发现告密者说了谎，就释放了他堂兄，逮捕了告密者。这场有惊无险的经历反映了利比亚安全机构还处于混乱状态。 Despite the chaos, Osama manages a sense of humor. He was a master's student in economics and finance until the revolution broke out, and he still thinks like a businessman. When asked what he would have said to Qaddafi if he had encountered the colonel before his death, he laughs. "I would have offered to cut him a deal," he says: "'You pay me lots of money, and I'll get you out of Libya.'" Joking aside, Osama has little sympathy for Qaddafi. Like many Libyans, he remembers the ruler for running a regime that seemed to reward only loyalty. "You could have nothing but an elementary education, and yet be appointed mayor of a city -- as long as you were loyal to Qaddafi," he recalls. Those who pledged themselves to the regime earned material rewards. "By selling yourself, you could buy the things you wanted: houses, cars, and jobs." 尽管局势混乱，Osama还保持着幽默感。在革命爆发前，他是金融专业的硕士研究生，一直想做商人。当他被问到，如果遇到卡扎菲，他会对他说些什么，他笑了，说：“我将和他达成一个协议，他付给我大笔钱，我把他赶出利比亚。”调侃之余，Osama也流露出对卡扎菲的少许同情。像许多利比亚人，Osama记忆中的卡扎菲治理国家的手段就是奖赏忠诚。他回忆道：“即使你只有小学生水平，只要忠于卡扎菲，你也会被任命为市长。”宣誓效忠的人获得了物质奖励。Osama说：“出卖自己，就能买到自己想要的东西，包括房子、车子、工作。” There was also Qaddafi's capriciousness. "The regime was like a storm," Osama continues, "and Qaddafi was its eye. The man in the middle always stayed the same, but he constantly changed everything around him: commercial regulations, political relations, everything." Osama recalls applying to become a teacher's assistant before he reached the maximum age for applicants, which was 28 -- only to have someone change it to 26 just after he applied, rendering him ineligible. Such quotidian whims of state, often issued by unqualified functionaries who had secured their government jobs by informing on their neighbors and otherwise "paying their dues" to the regime, infuriated Osama. 卡扎菲表现得反复无常。Osama说：“卡扎菲政权像是个风暴，卡扎菲本人就是风暴的风眼。身处其中的人们没有什么变化，但卡扎菲不停地变动周围的一切：商业法规、政治关系，所以的一切。” Osama回忆说，他申请成为教师助理时，年龄刚好没有超过要求的上限28岁，但在他申请之后没多久，年龄上限改成了26岁，如果按新的标准，他就没有申请资格。国家经常这样无厘头，是因为有不称职的官员。这些官员能保住职位，是因为他们告密邻居，取悦卡扎菲政权。谈到这些，Osama愤怒不已。 *** "I'm relieved that Qaddafi is dead," says Khalid (not his real name), "but I wouldn't say I'm happy." The round-faced, kind-looking 27-year-old's ambivalence is understandable: He used to work for Saif al-Islam al-Qaddafi, the erstwhile ruler's most prominent son and onetime heir apparent, who as of this writing may be dead, hiding in the desert, or lying wounded in a Tripoli hospital, depending on which report you believe. “卡扎菲的死让我好受了些。” Khalid（这不是他的真名）说，“但我不会说我很高兴。” Khalid圆脸，面相和善，27岁。他这种矛盾心理是可以理解的，过去，他为卡扎菲的儿子赛义夫工作。赛义夫是卡扎菲最出色的儿子，也是卡扎菲的继承人。对赛义夫的去向，报道众说纷纭，有的说他已经死了，有的说他躲在沙漠里，也有说他受伤在的黎波里医院治疗。 In 2007, while he was a university student majoring in management, Khalid applied to join a volunteer militia that reported to Saif al-Islam, one of his personal "guard" units. The application process was competitive: Khalid reports that out of 1,000 applicants, only 300 were chosen. "Of those 300, I was one of only seven from Benghazi," he notes. "The rest were from the west [of Libya]." The bias against Benghazi reflected the Qaddafi regime's longstanding policy of preferring the west, and especially Tripoli, to Benghazi and the east, where development was slower and state investment in infrastructure only trickled in. 在2007年，Khalid还是学管理的大学生，申请加入了自愿民兵组织，这个组织是赛义夫的私人卫队。加入这个组织竞争激烈，Khalid说1000人申请只录取300人。“在这300人里，只有7个人来自班加西，我是其中的一个。” Khalid接着说，“其他人全来自利比亚西部。”对班加西的不待见反映了卡扎菲政权长期偏爱西部，特别是的黎波里，而班加西和东部其他地区发展缓慢，获得的国家基础建设投资也很少。 Khalid was proud to be chosen. "We had two months of weapons training before starting work," he recalls. Why did he volunteer to join? Khalid lowers his voice a bit. "I wanted to protect Qaddafi, his sons, the al-Fateh Revolution" -- Qaddafi's 1969 overthrow of King Idris -- "and the country of Libya," he says. His tone is measured, but not without pride. 能被选中加入赛义夫的私人卫队，Khalid感到很自豪。他回忆道：“我们在工作之前经历了两个月的武器使用训练。”为什么自愿加入？对于这个问题，Khalid的声音略微降低了些说：“我想保卫卡扎菲、他的儿子、阿尔法塔赫革命（1969年卡扎菲推翻了伊德里斯国王）以及利比亚。”他的语气很有分寸，但带着自豪。 Since the uprising began, the world has come to know Saif al-Islam as his father's vigorous defender. He earned international notoriety for the finger-wagging speech he delivered on Feb. 20, promising to unleash "rivers of blood" if the uprising in Benghazi continued and blaming it on groups trying to set up Islamic emirates in Libya's east. But when Khalid was applying to join Saif al-Islam's volunteer guard, the ruler's son was viewed both at home and abroad as Libya's great hope for reform. Domestically, Libyans viewed him as the antidote to vested interests and corruption, and as the hope for change after three decades of his father's rule had sunk the country into decrepitude and international isolation. 自从起义爆发后，世界开始认识到赛义夫是他父亲坚强的保卫者。2月20日，在赛义夫发表的警告性演说中，他说，如果班加西的起义持续，那将血流成河，并指责起义者试图在利比亚东部建立穆斯林酋长国。赛义夫强硬的态度让他在国际社会声名狼藉。但在Khalid加入卫队时，赛义夫在国内和国外都被看作是推动利比亚改革的最大希望。在国内，利比亚人把他看作是对抗特权阶层和腐败象征，是在日益老朽、与世隔绝的利比亚推动变革的希望。 "Saif al-Islam was loved in Libya," Khalid says simply. "I protected him for free because I loved him. He was a moderate and a reformer. He was a defender of Libya. And he tried to fix a lot of the country's problems." Khalid was not part of Saif's inner circle; "I talked with him, but not much," he admits. The trouble, he believes, was that others were always getting in the way of the heir apparent's common touch. "The officials who were around Saif always insulated him and didn't want ordinary people to speak with him," Khalid says. Khalid说：“赛义夫在利比亚深受爱戴。我自愿保护他是因为我爱戴他。他是温和的人，也是改革者，是利比亚的守护者。他尽力解决利比亚面临的问题。” Khalid不是赛义夫圈子的核心成员。他承认：“我和赛义夫说过话，但不多。”他认为一个很大的问题是，虽然赛义夫平易近人，但有的人妨碍他与其他人的接触。Khalid说：“赛义夫身边的官员一直将他与普通人隔绝，不想他与普通人交谈。” Khalid is not the only Libyan I have heard speak of Saif al-Islam with a mixture of fondness and sympathy, even among those who support the overthrow of the Qaddafi regime. "He's not a bad kid, really," said one Libyan I spoke with in Tubruq in April. "But he got everything he ever wanted growing up. Anyone who grows up like that will have problems. And you know, in the end, he just wanted too much to be like his dad." Even to some Libyans who supported the revolution against him, Saif al-Islam was just a spoiled kid who needed some therapy. To others, of course, he was a monster -- and the International Criminal Court, which indicted him in June for crimes against humanity, agreed. 据我所知， Khalid不是唯一一个喜欢并同情赛义夫的利比亚人，甚至一些支持推翻卡扎菲政权的人也是如此。四月，我在托布鲁克遇到一个利比亚人，他对我说：“他真的不是坏孩子，但他成长的环境让他想要什么都能得到满足。任何在这种环境中成长起来的人都有不足。你知道，最后他想要的太多，就像他父亲那样。”甚至一些对他不满的利比亚人也认为赛义夫是被宠坏的孩子，他需要的是治疗。当然，对其他人而言，赛义夫是魔王，国际刑事法院也是这么认为。七月，国际刑事法庭指控赛义夫犯了反人类罪。 When the uprising broke out in Benghazi in February, Khalid says he and his volunteer guard unit refused to obey government orders to clear protesters out of government-owned apartments they were occupying. "As Saif al-Islam's guard unit, it wasn't our duty to do that kind of thing anyway," he says. "It was the police's job." The regime was swept out of Benghazi days later. Still, Khalid has a few good things to say about Qaddafi père, though he concedes that "under the present circumstances, it's hard to talk about the positive things that al-Qaddafi did. But after all, he built the country up. And he built the military." But Khalid also points to the corruption that infested the Qaddafi regime -- and he wonders if perhaps he was wrong about Saif al-Islam, after all. "On the outside, he was cultured and a moderate," he says. "But on the inside... I don't know." Khalid说，当班加西在二月爆发了起义时，抗议者占据了政府办公楼，政府命令他所在的卫队去清除抗议者，但他们拒绝执行这个命令。他说：“做这种事情不是赛义夫私人卫队的职责，而是警察的工作。”几天之后，卡扎菲政权被赶出了班加西。Khalid也谈到了一些卡扎菲做的好的事，但他承认：“在目前情况下，谈论卡扎菲做过的好事是很难的。但不管怎么说，他建立了一个国家，组建了军队。” Khalid也指出卡扎菲政权腐败滋生。他也怀疑他对赛义夫的看法可能是错的。他说：“在人前他是有教养、性情温和的人，但在人后，他是什么样，我就不知道了。” Turning his attention to Libya's post-Qaddafi situation, Khalid is rueful. "There is chaos. There is no government, no security, no police. Everybody has guns and weapons." As if to make his point, more celebratory gunfire erupts outside the cafe. When I ask about Libya's future, Khalid immediately identifies three challenges to political stability. "First of all," he says, "there could be civil war in the west, especially around Misrata. Second, you have the ongoing presence of many Qaddafi supporters. And third, there is the desire for revenge." 谈到利比亚后卡扎菲时代，Khalid是悲哀的。他说：“利比亚陷入了混乱。没有政府，没有安全、没有警察，人人都有武器。”似乎是为了证明他的看法，此时咖啡馆外庆祝的枪声更加密集。对于利比亚的未来，Khalid认为利比亚的政治稳定面临三个挑战。他说：“首先，在西部特别是在米苏拉塔周围很可能爆发内战；第二，利比亚还有许多卡扎菲的支持者；第三，可能出现的报复。” *** Later, as our discussion comes to a close, I ask how these three men -- an Islamist, a liberal economist, and a recent volunteer for the regime -- manage to get along. Do they just avoid talking politics? Osama smiles at the question. "No way," he says. "We talk politics all the time." But they have a system: "When we get together, each of us gives his opinion. We talk it over. Sometimes the conversation ends with a laugh, and sometimes it just ends with us saying, 'Well, let's quit talking about it and all go out together.'" Perhaps Libya could use such a system, too. 网聊即将结束，我问他们三个——穆斯林、自由主义者、卡扎菲政权的自愿兵——如何融洽相处，是避免谈论政治吗？Osama笑谈这个问题，他说：“不，我们总在谈论政治。当我们聚在一起，我们每个人都说出自己的观点，进行讨论。我们的交谈有时在笑声中结束，有时用这样的话结束，‘好吧，谈话到此结束，我们一起走吧。’”这就是他们面对分歧的方法，也许利比亚可以用这个方法。 | 
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