【福布斯111108】中国房地产及其未来泡沫

kamina_shin

【中文标题】中国房地产及其未来泡沫

【原文标题】China's Housing Bubble Past, And Its Future

【登载媒体】《福布斯》

【来源地址】http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2011/11/08/chinas-housing-bubble-past-and-its-future/

【译    者】 kamina_shin

【翻译方式】人工

【声    明】欢迎转载，请务必注明译者和出处 bbs.m4.cn。

【译    文】

       China’s housingmarket: when will it pop, and how loud of an explosion will it make when itgoes boom?  That seems to be the questionon many investors’ minds. Chinais the No. 2 economy after the U.S.,so avoiding a crisis in Chinais nearly as important as avoiding one in Europe.
       中国的房地产市场：它将何时破裂，并且会有多大的爆炸规模，当它急剧变大的时候？这似乎是许多投资者心中的疑惑。中国是美国之后的第二大经济体，所以避免一场中国的危机几乎与同样一场欧洲的危机一样重要。

There is no question that China’s highproperty prices are a serious concern for policymakers and investors, says Barclays Capital analysts in a 29 page report published onTuesday.  The housing price index hasrisen by at least 70% since 2000. Year over year, housing prices are up by asmuch as 10% in some cities, and by at least 3% in the major tier one cities,according to the National Bureau of Statistics.

       毫无疑问中国高位的房价是决策者和投资人心中的一块大石，巴克莱资本分析家在一份周二出版的29页的报告中提到，房价指数从2000年起至少上升了70%。由国家统计局的数据，在某些城市每年房价都会上升10%，在主要的一线城市也至少3%。

Taken over the longhaul, China housing price increases is similar to the propertybubbles which developed in Japanin 1982-1991 and in the U.S.in 1996-2006, according to Barclays.  In both the U.S.and Japan, however, thoseperiods of bubble building were immediately followed by painful adjustments,the subprime crisis in the U.S.and the “lost decade” in Japan.  These raise importantquestions about the next step for China’s property prices, leading some China bears tocall for imminent collapse of the Chinese housing market.

       经过长期的人为追捧，中国房价增长相似于1982-1991日本和1996-2006美国的房地产泡沫，巴克莱分析道。而在日本和美国，那期间的泡沫建筑都迅速接受痛苦的调整，美国的次级债和日本的“消失的十年”。这些都是下一步中国房地产价格重要的问题，这将导致部分人承担即将崩塌的中国房地产市场。

However, Barclays says that China policymakers have taken action sooner rather than later. The property bubbles areindeed different. And while the U.S.lowered interest rates at a time while housing was skyrocketing, pretending thebubble didn’t exist, Chinaraised rates and made borrowing for housing and building housing, a more costlyendeavor.  That, of course, has its ownconsequences, albeit different than the popping of the U.S. housing bubble and the subsequent crash of the mortgage backed derivatives  market that led to the credit crisis of2008.

       然而，巴克莱说中国的决策者早已采取行动。房地产泡沫实际上与之前不同。美国假装泡沫不存在，在房市大涨的时候逐次降低利率，而中国提升利率，使买房与造房更加昂贵。当然事必有果，尽管与美国房地产泡沫破裂和随后抵押贷款衍生品市场的破产所引起的2008信用危机所不同。

China’s first encounter with a property bubbleoccurred between 1988-1992 in Hainan Island, an upscale resort island in southChina, the kind of place that houses foreign financeminster conferences a few times a year. In 1988, real estate developers quickly emerged. Housing prices wentfrom just 300 Chinese yuan per square meter in 1989 to 7,500 in 1992.  One square meter is equal to 10 square feet,so a 1,000 square foot apartment went from being priced at just 30,000 yuan to750,000 yuan. All things being equal, if one yuan equaled one dollar, that would be like a one bedroom trailer home parked in Conch Key, Florida nowbeing worth a 1,500 square foot piece of property in South Beach.

    中国首次遭遇房地产泡沫发生在1988-1992的海南，华南的高档度假胜地，也是每年多次提供国外金融首脑峰会的地方。在1988年，房地产开发商大量涌现。房价从1989年每坪300元到1992年7500元。一平米等于10平方英尺，所以1000平方英尺的房间从30000元变为750000元。在相同的条件下，如果一元等于一美元，那将会像佛罗里达州海螺礁岛上的一间房车，现在变成迈阿密海滩1500平方英尺的房产。

Wheninterest rates began rising in 1993, home prices dropped six-fold to1,000 yuan per square meter and  stayedthat way until the early 2000s.

Then, as recent as 2002, the Hainangovernment was still cleaning up the messes created with the bursting of thatbubble. Development of China’scommodity and private housing market started in 1998.  While the sector has a short history of alittle over 10 years, it has been growing very rapidly, contributing to  expansion of real economic activities.Currently, real estate investment and construction is about a quarter of totalfixed investment, at 12% of GDP, Barclays says. Its overall impact on GDPgrowth is significantly greater given the upstream links withsteel, and construction material and downstream links withfurniture, electronics and the service industries. Exposure of economic agents,including the banks, households, corporate and local governments, to realestate markets has also increased significantly.

    当利率在1993年开始上升，房价降到了六分之一,1000元每坪并且持续到了2000年初。

    之后，最近的2002年，海南政府还在扫除泡沫破裂的后患。中国商品化和私有化的房产市场发展始于1998年。虽然这个领域只有十年出头的历史，但它发展迅猛，这归功于实体经济活动的膨胀。眼下，房产投资与建设大约占所有固定投资的四分之一，国民生产总值的百分之十二，巴克莱分析道。它在国民生产总值增长的总体影响上显而易见，上端链接了钢铁业，建材业，下端链接了家具业，电器和服务产业。经济角色包括银行，住户，公司和当地政府，在房地产市场也显著增多。

Butnone of that means China isbound to repeat the credit crisis in the U.S. While there are similarities,there are plenty of stark differences.

Likein the U.S. and Japan, there was an extraordinary credit boom inChinain recent years, as a policy response to the global financial crisis led toover $700 billion in stimulus spending. Much of it went to infrastructure,including building out housing in anticipation of further urbanization.

Easy money boosted investment demand for housing mainlybecause China’s middle class and wealthy have few otherplaces in the country to put their money. Bank rates are barely aboveinflation. The stock market is a casino. Property prices rose rapidly fromearly 2009 because of real estate investing and speculation on the same theme:that if you build it, eventually, people will come.

   但没有任何一项表明中国一定会重复美国的信用危机。虽然两者有相似之处，但更多的是截然不同的地方。

    作为一项回应全球金融危机7000亿刺激计划的政策，中国近年来像美国和日本一样，有不正常的借贷激增。其中许多投入了基础设施包括建设住房为了长远城市化进程的预期。低息贷款促进投资需求住房，主要因为中国的中产阶级和富人在国内没地方放钱。存款利率几乎不高于通胀率。股票市场就是一个赌场。房产价格从2009年初快速上升，因为房地产投资和投机都基于一个想法：那就是只要你造了房子，最后，总会有人来住的。

Until recently, the general belief remainsthat house prices will continue to increase, despite the significant policytightening in both the property sector and the macro-economythat began from the second half of 2010, Barclays analysts wrote. Moreover, theChinese economy has constantly experienced over-heating, with propertyinvestment being a main driver in the past decade. The total investment/GDPratio reached an alarming 48.5% last year. If China’sproperty bubbles are already quite serious by international standards, at leastin some large metropolitan cities, why were they able to continue to grow? Had no policy restrictions on house purchases been introducedfrom early 2011 in a large number of cities, Chinese property prices wouldprobably have been rising even today. Barclays sees four key factorssupporting sustained growth of property prices in China:

Strong income growth

Urbanization, home upgrading and favorable demographic change

Limitedinvestment alternatives

Households’strong balance sheets

From Barclays:

“But it isalso important to remember that the government’s purpose is not to crash thehousing market, since that would cause devastating consequences for the economyat large. After all, the property sector has already become a key driver ofeconomic growth in China.Therefore, we do not expect the government to sit idle and watch the free fallof property prices.” — Barclays Capital.

    直到最近，公众依然相信房价会继续涨，尽管政策从2010年下半显著收紧房地产领域和宏观经济，巴克莱分析师写道。此外，中国经济持续的经历过热，房地产投资在过去的十年作为主要的马车。总计投资比国内生产总值率去年达到了危险的48.5%。如果中国房地产泡沫由国际标准已经非常严重，那至少在一些特大城市，为什么它们能够继续增长？如果没有2011年初房屋购置的规章政策引入大部分城市，中国的房产价格可能今天还在涨。巴克莱找到了四个关键因素支撑中国房价的持续增长：

    强劲的收入增长；

    城市化，住房升级和有利的人口变化；

    受限的投资选择；

    房产拥有者强劲的资产表；

来自巴克莱：
    “但记住政府的目的不是搞垮房地产市场也同样的重要，因为那会导致整体经济的毁灭性结局。毕竟，房地产领域已经成为中国经济增长的首辆马车。因此，我们不希望政府坐视不理房产价格的自由落体运动。”——巴克莱银行。