【时代周刊 11/12/20】稳定的朝鲜对于中国的利害关系

满仓

【中文标题】稳定的朝鲜对于中国的利害关系
【原文标题】China’s Stake in a Stable North Korea
【登载媒体】时代周刊
【原文作者】Austin Ramzy
【原文链接】http://globalspin.blogs.time.com/2011/12/20/chinas-stake-in-a-stable-north-korea/


北京与这个无赖国家保持友谊关系的历史和战略原因。



2009年10月4日，朝鲜最高领导人金正日与中国总理温家宝在平壤。

朝鲜最高领导人金正日在12月17日的去世必将引发中国——它的巨大邻邦和唯一盟友——的焦虑情绪。尽管金的身体状况人所共知，在2008年中风后更是每况愈下，但后来健康状况似乎趋于稳定。国际危机组织东北亚项目负责人Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt说，中国领导人以为他的情况“比看起来好得多。他的去世非常出人意料，各方加强戒备是完全可以理解的。”

中国首要关注的问题是，金的死是否会让长期以来蕴含各类不稳定因素的朝鲜发展方向更难预料？北京大学国际关系学者朱峰说：“或许没有人敢说朝鲜有很大可能性在内部崩溃，但也没有人能否认其内部的紧张和不安定因素。”权力在死去的独裁者和他第三个儿子之间的转交，就发生在中国早已计划好的高层领导人转换即将开始的一年前，这让北京更加担心。Kleine-Ahlbrandt说：“中国人最想看到的是稳定的局面，尤其是在这个时候，他们不希望有哪怕一点点异常情况来影响领导层的转换。”

中国与朝鲜间独特的关系让这种压力不会无限升高。它是朝鲜最大的粮食援助方、重要的贸易伙伴和军事武器供应方。中国严格管理中朝边境，把叛逃者当作“经济移民”遣送回国。它还曾经推动平壤进行经济改革，中国就是凭借这样的方式成长为世界第二大经济体。（金正日一直担心市场化经济会产生一些威胁到他独裁统治的因素，所以拒绝采取任何关键性的改革措施。）

中国的帮助不仅局限在朝鲜内部，北京通过主办漫长的朝鲜去核六方会谈，让朝鲜有机会与其它国家达成一致意见。在朝鲜权力转换期，这是尤其要重点关注的。韩国延世大学国际关系研究生院的助理教授John Delury说：“北京的角色相当重要，因为他在政治和军事上与平壤的关系非同一般。它同时也肩负着重大的使命，就目前来看，它是新一代朝鲜领导人通往外部世界的大门。”

朝鲜与中国之间牢固的关系形成于1950年到1953年的朝鲜战争期间，这两个国家仰仗苏联的支持，与美国领导的联合国军队进行了一场血腥的战争。这场战争传承下来的关系依然被两国所继承。2010年10月，即将在明年政府换届时继承胡锦涛担任中国主席的习近平，说这场导致400万人死亡的战争是“保卫和平、抵抗入侵的伟大而正义的战争”。这样的结论与大部分人所秉持的观点相左，苏联的历史文件中甚至有记载，说这场战争是朝鲜军队挑起的。2010年10月，中国总理温家宝赴朝鲜参拜毛岸英纪念碑，他是毛泽东的儿子，在志愿军作战中牺牲。这场战争在中国被称为“抗美援朝”战争。

对朝鲜来说，这场战争并未正式结束，现在只不过是处于停战期，平壤一直让国家处于战备状态。它疯狂地研究核武器（在2006年和2009年分别进行过两次核试验），保持着世界上最大规模的现役部队，并且在“先军”政策指导下进行官方决策。朝鲜和韩国间的停战区是世界上最敏感的边界线，经常出现领土纠纷引发的武装冲突。2010年3月，韩国一艘巡洋舰在有争议的海域被鱼雷击沉，46名海员丧生，首尔认为朝鲜应对此负责。2010年11月，朝鲜炮击韩国一个岛屿，两名韩国士兵丧生。

这些挑衅行为让北京承受了一些需要训斥他的小兄弟的压力，但中国政府尽管努力呼吁朝鲜半岛的和平，但从未公开谴责平壤。与朝鲜的传统纽带关系，加上希望在中国和美国撑腰的韩国之间保持缓冲地带，让北京不大可能与平壤翻脸。朱说：“朝鲜问题在国内一直存在争议。我们看到这个不断给中国找麻烦的极权国家所具有的核武器野心和军事挑衅行为，但出于地理、传统和历史原因，北京不能放弃朝鲜。中国内部意见最分歧的问题就是对朝政策。”

12月19日星期一，中国最高领导团体——共产党中央政治局向朝鲜发出唁电，说金“为建立富强的朝鲜社会主义伟大国家贡献了一生的力量”。北京同时认可了平壤的继承人计划，说，希望朝鲜“在金正恩同志的领导下，化悲痛为力量，继续建设一个强大的社会主义国家。”

然而，北京群众的情绪没有太大变化。星期一朝鲜大使馆降半旗，几个人哭泣着从边门迅速走出，旁边的一个朝鲜人餐厅停业致哀。几乎没有人关注这件事，这些朝鲜人唯一的盟友似乎对旁边沃尔玛超市的减价活动更感兴趣。




原文：

The historic and strategic reasons Beijing maintains its friendship with the rogue state

North Korea's leader Kim Jong Il waves next to China's Premier Wen Jiabao in Pyongyang on Oct. 4, 2009

The death of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il on Dec. 17 is expected to cause concern within China, its massive neighbor and only major ally. While Kim was known to be frail, particularly after a 2008 stroke, his condition had appeared to stabilize, and Chinese leaders were under the impression that he “was in better health than was the case,” says Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Northeast Asia project director for the International Crisis Group. “His death is very unexpected, and they will be understandably alarmed.”

Of particular concern to China is whether Kim’s death will make North Korea, long a source of instability in the region, even more unpredictable. “No one should say the possibility will be high for North Korea to implode, but no one can neglect the potential risk of that sort of domestic tension and unrest,” says Zhu Feng, an international-relations scholar at Peking University. The transition to the deceased dictator’s appointed heir, his third son Kim Jong Un, also comes in a year when China is expected to carry out its own long-planned change of top leaders, adding to the concerns in Beijing. “The Chinese have always prioritized stability and particularly at this moment want nothing to interfere with their own preparations for leadership transition,” says Kleine-Ahlbrandt.

The pressure stems from China’s unique relationship with North Korea. It is the North’s largest provider of food aid, a key trading partner and a weapons supplier for its military. China also maintains rigorous control of its border with the North, sending back defectors, whom it considers “economic migrants”; to help stem the flow, it has tried to push Pyongyang to adopt economic reforms of the sort that helped China grow into the world’s second largest economy. (Kim Jong Il always remained wary of the threats to his authority that could arise from a market economy, however, and backed away from any significant reform.)

The help isn’t limited to the domestic sphere. By hosting the long-running six-party talks on North Korean denuclearization, Beijing facilitates North Korea’s dealings with other nations. That’s a job it will have to focus on intensely during the North Korean leadership transition. “Beijing has a key role to play because it has the best channels politically and militarily with Pyongyang,” says John Delury, an assistant professor at Yonsei University’s Graduate School of International Studies in South Korea. “There’s a lot of weight on their shoulders because, for the time being, they are the new North Korean leadership’s door to the outside world.”

The relationship between North Korea and China was forged in the 1950–53 Korean War, when the two nations, backed by Soviet aid, battled U.S.-led U.N. forces to a bloody stalemate. The legacy of that conflict remains an important part of their ties. In October 2010 Xi Jinping, the leading candidate to succeed Chinese President Hu Jintao in the leadership transition that begins next year, called the war, which killed an estimated 4 million people, “a great and just war for safeguarding peace and resisting aggression.” That contravened the widely held understanding, backed up by documents in Soviet archives, that the war was started by North Korean forces. Also in October 2010, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited a memorial in North Korea for Mao Anying, a son of Mao Zedong who died while fighting as a volunteer in the conflict, which is officially known in China as the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea.

In North Korea itself, the war has never officially ended but is merely considered to be at a cease-fire. That keeps Pyongyang in a perpetual state of military readiness. It has relentlessly pursued nuclear capability (testing devices in 2006 and ’09), maintains one of the world’s largest standing armies and makes official decisions under a policy of songun (military first). The demilitarized zone between North and South Korea is, despite its name, the most fortified border in the world, with territorial conflict an ever present danger. In March 2010, a South Korean navy corvette was sunk by a torpedo in disputed waters, killing 46 sailors in an attack that Seoul blamed on the North. In November 2010, North Korea shelled a South Korean island, killing two South Korean soldiers.

The provocations put pressure on Beijing to reprimand its ally, but while Chinese officials made calls for peace on the Korean Peninsula in both cases, they stopped short of publicly condemning Pyongyang. The traditional bonds with the North and the desire to maintain a buffer state between China and U.S.-fortified South Korea mean that Beijing is unlikely to break with Pyongyang. “The North Korea issue has always been controversial for China,” says Zhu. “We see a totalitarian regime that causes trouble for China with its nuclear ambitions and its provocative behavior, but based on proximity and traditional and historical links, Beijing can’t abandon the North. There’s no single policy divide in China greater than North Korea.”

On Monday, Dec. 19, the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, the country’s top ruling body, sent condolences to its North Korean counterpart, saying Kim “gave his life’s energy to the great cause of establishing a rich and powerful, Korean-style socialist nation.” Beijing also endorsed Pyongyang’s succession plans, saying it hoped that North Korea, “under the leadership of Comrade Kim Jong Un, will turn grief into strength and build a powerful socialist country.”

Public sentiment in Beijing has been less effusive, however. On Monday at the North Korean embassy, where the flag flies at half-mast, a handful of people could be seen weeping and walking briskly out a side entrance, and a nearby North Korean–run restaurant was closed in mourning. Few people noticed or cared. Instead, the citizens of North Korea’s only real ally seemed far more interested in the deals at the Walmart next door.

paoding

混乱甚至战乱的半岛或东亚将合乎谁的利益？

可能华尔街吸血鬼们饥渴的眼神能说明。。。