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【中文标题】中国,将要崩溃:2012版(2011版打脸了,对不起大家)
【原文标题】The Coming Collapse of China: 2012 Edition
【登载媒体】Foreign Policy
【来源地址】
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/29/the_coming_collapse_of_china_2012_edition?page=0,0
【译 者】东风笑
【翻译方式】人工+百度
【声 明】欢迎转载,请务必注明译者和出处 bbs.m4.cn
(注意了,图片老百姓家里挂着太祖)
I admit it: My prediction that the Communist Party would fall by 2011 was wrong. Still, I'm only off by a year.
BY GORDON G. CHANG | DECEMBER 29, 2011
我承认,我之前预测TG在2011年崩溃打脸了,但是还不够疼,我将之推迟一年。
——戈登.张
In the middle of 2001, I predicted in my book, The Coming Collapse of China, that the Communist Party would fall from power in a decade, in large measure because of the changes that accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) would cause. A decade has passed; the Communist Party is still in power. But don't think I'm taking my prediction back.
在2001年中期,我在我的书里预测,“中国即将崩溃”,共产党将在十年内丢掉政权,在很大程度上是因为加入世界贸易组织(WTO)产生的变化。十年过去了,土八路还不崩溃,真是气死我了,但是我还是不收回我的预测。
Why has China as we know it survived? First and foremost, the Chinese central government has managed to avoid adhering to many of its obligations made when it joined the WTO in 2001 to open its economy and play by the rules, and the international community maintained a generally tolerant attitude toward this noncompliant behavior. As a result, Beijing has been able to protect much of its home market from foreign competitors while ramping up exports.
为什么红色政权在普世强权下得以生存?首先,中国中央政府已经设法避免了自2001年加入世贸组织开放经济和玩游戏的规则时候程罗坚持的许多义务,国际社会普遍宽容的态度保持着向这一腹黑行为。结果,北京已经能保护其国内市场免受许多外国竞争者而骤然加大出口。
By any measure, China has been phenomenally successful in developing its economy after WTO accession -- returning to the almost double-digit growth it had enjoyed before the near-recession suffered at the end of the 1990s. Many analysts assume this growth streak can continue indefinitely. For instance, Justin Yifu Lin, the World Bank's chief economist, believesthe country can grow for at least two more decades at 8 percent, and the International Monetary Fund predictsChina's economy will surpass America's in size by 2016.
不论从哪个角度来衡量,中国一直在加入世贸后成功地发展了经济——恢复90年代末经济不景气之后的两位数增长。许多分析家认为这样的增长可以持续下去。例如,林毅夫,世界银行首席经济学家,相信这个国家的增长至少持续还能继续在8%上继续两个十年,国际货币基金组织预测中国的经济会在2016年超过美国。
Don't believe any of this. China outperformed other countries because it was in a three-decade upward supercycle, principally for three reasons. First, there were Deng Xiaoping's transformational "reform and opening up" policies, first implemented in the late 1970s. Second, Deng's era of change coincided with the end of the Cold War, which brought about the elimination of political barriers to international commerce. Third, all of this took place while China was benefiting from its "demographic dividend," an extraordinary bulge in the workforce.
不相信这些国际五毛的鬼话。中国比其他国家牛,因为它是处在向上的三十年轮回supercycle ? ,主要有三个原因。首先,是摄政王邓小平在70年代晚期启动的无与伦比的“改革开放”政策。第二,邓小平时代的变迁正好与冷战时代的结束,并因此导致的政治障碍消除国际贸易。第三,这一切发生,而中国是受益于其“人口红利”,一个非凡的凸出在劳动力。
Yet China's "sweet spot" is over because, in recent years, the conditions that created it either disappeared or will soon. First, the Communist Party has turned its back on Deng's progressive policies. Hu Jintao, the current leader, is presiding over an era marked by, on balance, the reversal of reform. There has been, especially since 2008, a partial renationalization of the economy and a marked narrowing of opportunities for foreign business. For example, Beijing blocked acquisitions by foreigners, erected new barriers like the "indigenous innovation" rules, and harassed market-leading companies like Google. Strengthening "national champion" state enterprises at the expense of others, Hu has abandoned the economic paradigm that made his country successful.
然而中国的“sweet spot ”结束了,因为在最近几年,创造这种繁荣的条件要么消失了,要么就要消失了。第一,中国共产党背弃了摄政王的新政。现任国家主席胡锦涛,总的来说,领导的是一个“reversal of reform”【俺们的话叫:路线修正】的时代。就我所见,特别是2008年以来,部分经济重新收回国有【国进私退】,明显缩小了境外生意的机会【外企?】。例如,北京封锁了国内企业被外国人收购、建立诸如“自主创新”的新壁垒,和骚扰领先的公司,如谷歌。【其实是google像骚扰中国政府】。加强央企,牺牲私企,胡锦涛已经抛弃了让他的国家成功的经济学范式。
Second, the global boom of the last two decades ended in 2008 when markets around the world crashed. The tumultuous events of that year brought to a close an unusually benign period during which countries attempted to integrate China into the international system and therefore tolerated its mercantilist policies. Now, however, every nation wants to export more and, in an era of protectionism or of managed trade, China will not be able to export its way to prosperity like it did during the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. China is more dependent on international commerce than almost any other nation, so trade friction -- or even declining global demand -- will hurt it more than others. The country, for instance, could be the biggest victim of the eurozone crisis.
第二,全球繁荣的最后两年结束于2008年当全球市场崩溃了。混乱的事件带给一个关闭一个难得的良好期间中国国家试图整合国际体系并因此容忍其重商主义政策。
然而现在,每个国家都想增加出口,在这样一个时代,贸易保护主义或者管理贸易的,中国将无法出口的繁荣之路一样被亚洲金融危机期间发生在1990年代晚期。中国是国际商务更加依赖于几乎比其他任何国家,所以贸易摩擦—甚至下降——会伤害它的全球需求超过别人。这个国家,例如,可能是最大的受害者,欧元区的危机。
Third, China, which during its reform era had one of the best demographic profiles of any nation, will soon have one of the worst. The Chinese workforce will level off in about 2013, perhaps 2014,according to both Chinese and foreign demographers, but the effect is already being felt as wages rise, a trend that will eventually make the country's factories uncompetitive. China, strangely enough, is running out of people to move to cities, work in factories, and power its economy. Demography may not be destiny, but it will now create high barriers for growth.
第三,中国,在改革开放时期有一个最好的人口剖面的任何国家,很快就会有一个糟糕的一天。到中国的劳动力将平整大约在2013年左右,大约2014,根据中国和外国的人口统计学家,但效果已感受到工资上涨,一种趋势,最终使国家的工厂没有竞争力的。中国,奇怪的是,正在人们迁移到城市,工厂工作,电力经济的发展。人口统计学不得的命运,但是现在它要创造高壁垒的增长前景。
At the same time that China's economy no longer benefits from these three favorable conditions, it must recover from the dislocations -- asset bubbles and inflation -- caused by Beijing's excessive pump priming in 2008 and 2009, the biggest economic stimulus program in world history (including $1 trillion-plus in 2009 alone). Since late September, economic indicators -- electricity consumption, industrial orders, export growth, car sales, property prices, you name it -- are pointing toward either a flatlining or contracting economy. Money started toleave the country in October, and Beijing's foreign reserves have been shrinkingsince September.
与此同时,中国经济不再受益于这三个条件有利的话,它必须收回——资产泡沫和通货膨胀的混乱——北京的过度造成泵启动2008年和2009年,最大的经济刺激计划在世界历史上(包括超过美元,仅在2009年)。九月下旬以来,经济指标——电力消费、工业订单,出口增长,汽车销售,房地产价格,你的名字- - - - - -要么是flatlining指向或收缩的经济。钱开始离开这个国家在10月和北京的外汇储备收缩自年9月。
As a result, we will witness either a crash or, more probably, a Japanese-style multi-decade decline. Either way, economic troubles are occurring just as Chinese society is becoming extremely restless. It is not only that protests have spiked upwards -- there were 280,000 "mass incidents" last yearaccording to one count -- but that they are also increasingly violent as the recent wave ofuprisings, insurrections, rampages and bombings suggest. The Communist Party, unable to mediate social discontent, has chosen to step-up repression to levels not seen in two decades. The authorities have, for instance, blanketed the country's cities and villages with police and armed troops and stepped up monitoring of virtually all forms of communication and the media. It's no wonder that, in online surveys, "control" and "restrict" were voted the country's most popular words for 2011.
因此,我们将见证或撞车,或者更有可能,日式会下降。不管怎样,经济危机的发生是正如中国社会正变得非常不安。它不仅是抗议尖向上,有280000“大规模事件”去年根据一项数——但他们也越来越暴力最近一波你prisings,叛乱,rampages和爆炸建议。共产党,无法调和社会不满情绪,所选择的水平未见商场镇压在两年。当局已经,比如,覆盖了中国城市与乡村的警察和武装部队与加强监测,几乎所有形式的沟通和媒体。难怪,在网上调查,“控制”和“限制”投票是这个国家最受欢迎的单词在2011 .
That tough approach has kept the regime secure up to now, but the stability it creates can only be short-term in China's increasingly modernized society, where most people appear to believe a one-party state is no longer appropriate. The regime has clearly lost the battle of ideas.
野路子,一直到现在这个政权安全,但稳定它创造只能在中国越来越多的短期现代化社会,大多数人似乎相信一党专政不再是合适的。政府已明确落败的想法。
Today, social change in China is accelerating. The problem for the country's ruling party is that, although Chinese people generally do not have revolutionary intentions, their acts of social disruption can have revolutionary implications because they are occurring at an extraordinarily sensitive time. In short, China is much too dynamic and volatile for the Communist Party's leaders to hang on. In some location next year, whether a small village or great city, an incident will get out of control and spread fast. Because people across the country share the same thoughts, we should not be surprised they will act in the same way. We have already seen the Chinese people act in unison: In June 1989, well before the advent of social media, there were protests in roughly 370 cities across China, without national ringleaders.
今天,在中国社会变革加速。这个问题对国家的执政党,虽然中国人通常不具有革命性的意图,他们的行为可以影响社会崩溃具有革命性的因为他们的发生是一个异常敏感的时间。总之,中国是非常动态多变的对中国共产党领导人坚持下去。明年在某些地点,是否一个小村庄或伟大的城市,这一事件将失控和传播得很快。因为全国人民共享相同的思想,我们不应感到惊讶他们就会采取在同样的方式。我们已经看到中国人民一致行动:1989年6月,在社会媒体的出现,有大约370个城市抗议活动在中国各地,没有国家首要。
This phenomenon, which has swept North Africa and the Middle East this year, tells us that the nature of political change around the world is itself changing, destabilizing even the most secure-looking authoritarian governments. China is by no means immune to this wave of popular uprising, as Beijing's overreaction to the so-called "Jasmine" protests this spring indicates. The Communist Party, once the beneficiary of global trends, is now the victim of them.
这一现象,这已经席卷了北非和中东今年,告诉我们,大自然的政治改变世界的本身就是改变,即使是最secure-looking不稳定的独裁政府。中国决不是免疫此波流行的起义,和北京的的过度反应而局促不安着所谓的“茉莉花”抗议这个春天指出。共产党,一旦受益人的全球趋势,现在他们的受害者。
So will China collapse? Weak governments can remain in place a long time. Political scientists, who like to bring order to the inexplicable, say that a host of factors are required for regime collapse and that China is missing the two most important of them: a divided government and a strong opposition.
所以,中国将会倒塌?软弱的政府能继续存在一段很长的时间。政治科学家,那些喜欢将命令这个令人费解的,说一个主要因素所需的政权崩溃,而中国是失踪的两个最重要的:一个分裂的政府和强烈的反对。
At a time when crucial challenges mount, the Communist Party is beginning a multi-year political transition and therefore ill-prepared for the problems it faces. There are already visible splits among Party elites, and the leadership's sluggish response in recent months -- in marked contrast to its lightning-fast reaction in 2008 to economic troubles abroad -- indicates that the decision-making process in Beijing is deteriorating. So check the box on divided government.
当时至关重要的挑战上,共产党是开始一项多年,因此没有政治转型为面临的问题。已经有可见的分裂党精英,领导的反应迟缓最近几个月——在鲜明的对比2008年其闪电般的反应国外经济危机——表明在北京决策过程中日益恶化。请注意箱子里分裂的政府。
And as for the existence of an opposition, the Soviet Union fell without much of one. In our substantially more volatile age, the Chinese government could dissolve like the autocracies in Tunisia and Egypt. As evident in this month's "open revolt" in the village of Wukan in Guangdong province, people can organize themselves quickly -- as they have so many times since the end of the 1980s. In any event, a well-oiled machine is no longer needed to bring down a regime in this age of leaderless revolution.
至于存在的一个反对,苏联没有太多了。在我们相当大的挥发性的时代,中国政府可以溶解像在突尼斯和埃及的独裁国家一样。在这个月的同时也感染了“公开反叛”Wukan的村庄在广东省,人们可以迅速地组织起来,他们有很多次自1980年代末以来。在任何情况下,一台上好的机器运转顺利不再需要将下一个政权在这个时代没有革命。
Not long ago, everything was going well for the mandarins in Beijing. Now, nothing is. So, yes, my prediction was wrong. Instead of 2011, the mighty Communist Party of China will fall in 2012. Bet on it.
不久前,一切都顺利在北京的官员们。现在,什么都没有。所以,是的,我的预测是错误的。而2011年,强大的中国共产党在2012年将会崩溃。我打赌。【不崩溃我就去死】
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