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【经济学家 20120128】党和私企

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 楼主| 发表于 2012-1-31 09:02 | 显示全部楼层 |阅读模式
本帖最后由 woikuraki 于 2012-3-31 17:10 编辑

【中文标题】党和私企
【原文标题】The long arm of the state, Where’s the party?
【登载媒体】经济学家
【原文链接】http://www.economist.com/node/21543575


共产党是如何对私有企业施加影响力的。

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尽管很多城市居民都在贪婪地阅读一些西方杂志的中文版本,比如《大都市》、《智族》、《时尚》,但是一些官员却热衷于更有分量的出版物。12月份,十几名共产党官员齐聚东部城市杭州,庆祝一份颇有诱惑力的杂志《中国非公企业党建》创刊一周年。其中一位官员说,出版一年以来,这份杂志“引领了美好的潮流”。就像它的名称一样,这份杂志揭示了一个微妙的问题——共产党如何对越来越庞大的非公有制企业施加影响力。

这个话题实际上是当今中国社会最深层级的矛盾,党怎样才能控制一个从意识形态角度上讲不再是共产主义的国家?90年代大批国有企业的倒闭撼动了党的群众基础,过去十年里,神秘的党组织部(负责处理8000万党众的人事问题)的首要工作是在私有企业中设立党的机构,用官方的说法是“新型经济模式”。到1999年,只有3%的私有企业中存在党政机构。现在,官方的数字是13%。沿海省份浙江宣称,所有雇员超过80人的私有企业都建立了党支部。

在党内官员看来,在私有企业中建立党支部不仅仅是为了证明,革命出身的党依然在与群众保持密切联系。在一个迅速发展、不安定因素层出不穷的社会里,官员们希望新型的党支部可以确保私企的稳定,同时密切关注潜在的问题。有些私企老板很欢迎至少需要三名党员组建的党支部,他们认为这个机构是与地方官僚政府打交道的途径。但是其他人有各种顾虑,他们担心“红领章”工人——对党员工人的称呼——或许会干涉公司的经营行为。

在国有企业中,党支部一度掌控着工人们的生命,从他们的思想意识到生育周期。现在,党似乎对私企中的党支部的角色有些困惑,一般情况下只是摆出一副童子军般的正义面孔。

国有新闻机构新华社在去年7月份一本正经地报道,在2008年全球金融危机之后,上海外商投资企业中的党支部起到了“红色推动力”的作用。它说,一家英国水上设备的分公司给伦敦总部写信说到,通过把更多的业务从英国转移到中国,它充分利用了本地强大的市场需求。收到这封信之后,英国总部的管理层“眼睛一亮”,于是公司服从了党的安排。

实际上,党支部基本上不会与公司管理层争执意识形态的问题。即使在党内,也不再有人相信马克思主义了。对那些20来岁、热衷于iPhone和推特的新一代党员来说,吸引人的私企职业发展与拥护共产党之间的矛盾是他们内心纠结所在。他们很多人当初之所以加入共产党,仅仅是因为他们在大学班级里表现比较好,并且认为入党能够挣大钱。

在中国有些地方,政府会征收一些费用,通常是所有员工工资的0.5%,来支持党支部的各类活动。几乎没有人抱怨,但是也有一些拒绝党的声音出现。非政府组织——党称其为“新型社会组织”——尤其难以渗透。党担心某些组织会演化成敌对势力,所以尽量控制它们的规模。但是,一家政府智囊团在12月份发布的报告中说,非政府组织需要加强“党的领导”,否则,它们或许会变成“境外敌对势力”的工具。

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原文:

How the Communist Party is trying to expand its influence in the private sector

WHEREAS many urbanites devour Chinese editions of Western magazines like Cosmopolitan, GQ, and Vogue, some officials still peruse weightier titles. In December a dozen Communist Party officials gathered in the eastern city of Hangzhou to celebrate the first anniversary of an alluring journal, Party Construction in Non-State-Owned Enterprises. In its inaugural year, said one of them, the magazine had “struck a beautiful pose”. The journal in question, as its title suggests, is engaging with the tricky issue of how the Communist Party can maintain influence within a growing private sector.

The subject exposes some of the deepest contradictions that now lie at the heart of Chinese society. How can the party maintain control over a place that, in ideological terms, is no longer communist? The closure in the 1990s of vast numbers of state-owned enterprises shattered the party’s grassroots base. Over the past decade a priority of the party’s secretive Organisation Department (it handles personnel issues for the 80m-strong party, yet has no listed telephone number) has been to form party cells in private businesses, or “new economic organisations” as the official literature calls them. In 1999 only 3% of private businesses had party cells. Now the national figure is nearly 13%. Coastal Zhejiang province claims all private firms with more than 80 employees have a branch.

As party officials see it, setting up branches in the private sector is about more than just proving that a once-revolutionary party is still in touch with the masses. At a time of rapid social change and outbreaks of unrest, officials hope the new party branches will reinforce stability and keep the party abreast of potential trouble. Some bosses of private firms encourage the formation of cells, in which at least three party members are required. They do so in order to curry favour with local officialdom. But others have misgivings. They worry that the “red-collar” workers, as party-member employees are sometimes called, might interfere in the running of the company.

In state firms, party committees once controlled workers’ lives, monitoring everything from their ideological rectitude to their reproductive cycle. Now the party appears less clear about exactly what the cells should be doing, though it often tries to present them as exemplars of do-gooding in a boy-scout vein.

Xinhua, the state news agency, reported without irony last July that Communist Party branches in foreign-invested firms in Shanghai had acted as a “red impetus” to growth in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008. It said one such branch in a British marine-equipment company wrote to the firm’s headquarters in London suggesting that the company take advantage of strong local demand by moving more of its operations from Britain to China. On receiving this suggestion, “light filled the eyes” of the top British management, and the firm carried out the party’s plan.

In practice, party cells are most unlikely to be debating ideology with company management. Even within the party, few people believe in Marxism any longer. The tension between an attractive private-sector career and allegiance to the Communist Party is always there for the new breed of party members: 20-somethings who tote iPhones and tweet furiously. Many of them joined the party in the first place only because they were top of their college class and they saw it as a way to earn a lot more money.

In some parts of the country, the government levies a tax, usually 0.5% of payroll, to pay for private firms’ party activities. Few openly complain, but some resist the party’s embrace. Non-governmental organisations—known in party-speak as “new social organisations”—have proved particularly difficult to penetrate. The party, fearful that some might evolve into opposition groups, tries to keep them small. But in December a report published by a government think-tank warned that “party leadership” over NGOs needed to be strengthened. Otherwise, the report warned, they might become tools of “hostile foreign forces”.

In a crisis, the party expects its grassroots cells to help dissuade people from staging public protests and to feed information to the authorities about possible unrest. In the far-western region of Xinjiang, where the authorities are on high alert against separatist unrest among Muslims, at least some party cells in private firms are expected to report on potential troublemakers. Last year the authorities in Jimsar county selected 39 party members from private firms to act as gatherers of public opinion and intelligence on “the enemy situation”. A local party report in August said nine pieces of “valuable information” had been collected this way. Clearly some red-collar workers are still putting the party first.

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发表于 2012-1-31 10:14 | 显示全部楼层
也顶一下
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发表于 2012-1-31 10:38 | 显示全部楼层
看一下
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发表于 2012-1-31 10:59 | 显示全部楼层
回复一下
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发表于 2012-1-31 11:04 | 显示全部楼层
私营企业的员工入党,更多的是为了仕途,还是更多的出于理想?还是企业形式主义的道具?
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发表于 2012-1-31 12:19 | 显示全部楼层
美欧的“工会”“人权组织”之类的玩意儿是董事会的领导还是玩物呢?让99%和1%同台辩论下了,俺将热情围观。。。
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头像被屏蔽
发表于 2012-1-31 12:52 | 显示全部楼层
某些组织,事实上就是颜色革命的先遣军,比如中文笔会,这样的组织党组织当然不可能进入
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发表于 2012-1-31 14:01 | 显示全部楼层
很重要的命题。谢谢翻译。
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发表于 2012-1-31 15:12 | 显示全部楼层
回复一下
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发表于 2012-1-31 19:02 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 沐霜 于 2012-1-31 19:05 编辑

有点意思

这招绝了、、、
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发表于 2012-2-1 15:37 | 显示全部楼层
yzx702 发表于 2012-1-31 09:55
顶一下。

也顶一下
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发表于 2012-2-7 10:23 | 显示全部楼层
拿我们公司(私企)的党建工作来说:三会一课这些基础的东西,每月的政治理论学习(基本上都是最新东西,老总们能及时把握一些时事动态),发展新党员等等,总体来说做的不错,并不是在敷衍了事。公司内入党考察考核的很细致,在人员竞岗等方面党员基础评价分要比非党员高,优秀的党员待遇要比同级别的非党员工好。俺们老总有一句话,现在是党执政的社会,要想企业壮大发展,必须坚持跟着党的路线走。
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发表于 2012-2-8 14:21 | 显示全部楼层
看看隐藏内容再回复
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发表于 2012-2-9 09:46 | 显示全部楼层
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发表于 2012-2-9 14:35 | 显示全部楼层
首先,有关地方发展的话题计划基本都在党委上先发布,不参加你知道吗?炒楼炒地的绝佳消息来源。
再说多多发展私企党员,党费也收的高。老板级的会员交的党费多!08年我们镇的老板级特别DF都是0.5W起。
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