|
|
本帖最后由 woikuraki 于 2012-3-31 11:00 编辑
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/46f85840-613e-11e1-8a8e-00144feabdc0.html
Beijing’s lessons for central banks
By Stephen S. Roach
Contrary to widespread concerns over an imminent hard landing, China will defy the naysayers.
Even after premier Wen Jiabao’s latest warning over a moderate slowing of growth, it is doing a far better job in managing its economy than most give it credit. It even offers some lessons in macro policy strategy that the rest of the world should heed.
Nowhere is that more evident than on the inflation front, where Chinese authorities have waged a very successful campaign against what has long been the nation’s most destabilising economic threat. After peaking at 6.5 per cent in July 2011, the headline consumer price index (CPI) has decelerated to 4.5 per cent in early 2012, with more disinflation likely in the coming months.
This reflects the impacts of three very deliberate policy actions taken by Beijing.
First, administrative measures were put in place to deal with bottlenecks in agriculture – pork, cooking oil, fresh vegetables and fertiliser. Food inflation, which accounts for about one-third of the items on the Chinese CPI, peaked at 15 per cent in mid-2011. It has slowed to about 10 per cent.
Second, bank required reserve ratios were raised 12 times in 2011 to slow credit growth. The results are encouraging. Renminbi bank loan growth decelerated from 19.9 per cent in 2010 to 15.8 per cent in 2011 and renminbi deposit growth slowed even more sharply from 20.2 per cent in 2010 to 13.5 per cent in 2011.
Third, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) raised policy interest rates five times in 2011. This was particularly important in light of the acceleration of non-food, or core inflation, to a 3 per cent high last northern summer – the sharpest such increase in more than a decade. Had the PBoC not acted, underlying inflationary pressures could have intensified further. Instead, they have now begun to moderate – with non-food CPI inflation easing off to 1.8 per cent in January 2012.
This three-pronged approach – in conjunction with a modest acceleration in renminbi currency appreciation – is an important example of China’s increased prowess in macro policy stabilisation.
Particularly significant was the central bank’s willingness to take its policy rate – the one-year benchmark lending rate – up to the peak headline inflation rate of 6.5 per cent last northern summer. By doing so, the PBoC not only ended the excessive accommodation imparted by negative real interest rates but it was then able to orchestrate a “passive” monetary tightening – allowing real short-term interest rates to climb to 2 per cent as administrative actions took food price and headline inflation lower in the second half of 2011.
This is classic central banking at its best. China now has plenty of ammunition in its monetary policy arsenal – namely, high required bank reserve ratiosand positive real short-term interest rates – to deploy as circumstances dictate. In contrast, the US Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England are out of traditional ammunition. They have followed the Bank of Japan and taken their short-term policy rates down to the zero bound.
As a result, the world’s big central banks have been forced to rely on untested and dubious liquidity injections as the primary means of monetary control. Where this ends and what it implies for the future – inflation, another outbreak of asset and credit bubbles, or some combination of all that – is anyone’s guess.
In the event of a downside shock to its economy, Chinese authorities have ample scope to ease. With economic activity slowing, they have already taken modest actions in that direction with two recent 50 basis point cuts in the required reserve ratio to a still very high 20.5 per cent. At the same time, with real policy rates at 2 per cent and likely to rise a little further as headline inflation eases, there is plenty of scope for traditional monetary easing if there is further weakening in the economy. The west – out of basis points and with massive budget deficits – has no such option.
In a crisis-prone world, there is a gathering sense of foreboding over China. First it was the US, then Europe. Now there are growing fears the Chinese economy must be next. It’s not just the hand-wringing over inflation but also worries of a huge property bubble, a banking crisis or social unrest.
Those fears are overblown. China is cut from a very different cloth than the advanced economies of the west. Long focused on stability, it is more than willing to accept the short-term costs of a growth sacrifice to keep its development strategy on track.
A successful battle against inflation is an important example of the interplay between China’s tactical imperatives and its overarching strategic objectives. That’s a lesson the rest of the world could certainly stand to learn.
Stephen S. Roach, a member of the faculty at Yale University, was formerly chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia and is the author of ‘The Next Asia’
中国抗通胀经验值得世界学习
【英国《金融时报》网站3月5日文章】题：北京给各国央行上了一课
http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2012-03/07/c_122801824.htm
人们普遍担心中国经济会出现硬着陆，但与此相反，中国会让那些唱衰中国者落空。
虽然温家宝总理刚刚警告说，经济增长会温和放缓，但在经济管理方面，中国的表现远远好于大多数人的预想。实际上，中国在宏观经济战略方面的成功为世界各国上了有价值的一课。
最明显的例子是在控制通货膨胀方面。在与长期以来对中国经济稳定构成最大威胁的通货膨胀作战时，中国政府打了一场十分成功的战役。消费价格指数曾于2011年7月达到峰值6.5%，2012年初已降至4.5%，未来几个月还可能继续下降。
为此，北京采取了三项非常深思熟虑的政策行动。
首先，对猪肉、食用油、新鲜蔬菜和化肥等农业薄弱环节采取了行政措施。在中国消费价格指数中约占三分之一权重的食品通胀率曾于2 0 1 1年中达到1 5%的峰值，现在已降至10%。
其次，为减缓信贷增长，在2011年对银行存款准备金率进行了12次上调。结果振奋人心，人民币的银行贷款增长率从2010年的19.9%下降至2011年的15.8%。
第三，中国人民银行在2011年对政策利率进行了5次上调。考虑到去年夏天非食品通胀率，即核心通胀率达到了3%，为过去十几年来的最快增速，这一措施显得尤为重要。
这三项措施，连同人民币升值温和加速，是中国日益增强的宏观政策调控能力的重要例证。
最具意义的是中国人民银行在去年夏天愿意将政策利率，即一年期基准贷款利率提高到等同于总体通胀率峰值的6.5%。通过这样做，中国人民银行不仅结束了负的实际利率所带来的过度宽松，而且还操控了“被动的”货币紧缩。
如果经济出现巨大的下行风险，中国当局将有足够的回旋余地。
在这个危机四伏的世界，人们对中国有一种越来越强烈的不祥之感。但这些担心过了头，中国的情况与西方发达经济体完全是两码事。针对通货膨胀进行的一场成功战役是中国的战术手段和战略目标相互作用的一个重要例证。这绝对是外部世界应该学习的一课。(前摩根士丹利亚洲有限公司董事长斯蒂芬·罗奇) |
评分
-
1
查看全部评分
-
|
狗仔卡
发表于 2012-3-8 08:53
提升卡
变色卡
抢沙发
千斤顶
显身卡
发表于 2012-3-8 09:36
